The report alleged that during the opening days of Israeli and US attacks on Iran, discussions took place in Washington about whether Ahmadinejad could help manage a political transition after the collapse of the Islamic Republic’s leadership and the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
But many Iranian commentators quickly questioned both the credibility of the report and the assumptions behind it.
Conservative journalist Parisa Nasr described the story as “weak and flimsy” in a post on X, arguing that circulating such narratives under current conditions risked contributing to “wartime psychological operations.”
Security analyst Majid Rajabi also challenged the report’s premise, noting that Ahmadinejad had spent recent years openly criticizing official policies and meeting supporters publicly, making claims that he had effectively been under tight restrictions difficult to reconcile.
The reaction soon expanded beyond skepticism over the report itself.
Online users across Iran’s political spectrum revived longstanding accusations that Ahmadinejad’s presidency and rhetoric had ultimately served Israeli interests. Some mockingly referred to him as “Iran’s Eli Cohen”while others demanded investigations into his past conduct and political ties.
One widely circulated post argued that if the report were true, Ahmadinejad would represent “a super-spy unlike anything in human history,” noting that he had served eight years as president while later remaining a member of the Expediency Discernment Council.
Online speculation also revived scrutiny of Ahmadinejad’s unusual foreign trips in recent years, particularly visits to Guatemala and Hungary that some commentators retrospectively framed as politically suspicious after the New York Times report.
An editorial in Asr-e Iran argued that Ahmadinejad’s insistence on traveling to countries viewed as close to Israel had “raised many questions among the Iranian public,” especially given his former image as one of Iran’s most hardline anti-Israel presidents.
Former Ahmadinejad adviser Abdolreza Davari—now a vocal critic—argued that many of Ahmadinejad’s statements during his presidency benefited Israel’s far right by portraying Iran as radical and extreme.
“Ahmadinejad said things that the Israeli far right needed,” Davari said. “Things that could present Iran as radical and extreme and strengthen the project of Iranophobia.”
But Davari also cautioned against drawing definitive conclusions about covert ties. “Whether there was truly an organic convergence or not, I honestly do not know,” he said.
According to the New York Times report, some US officials believed Ahmadinejad—despite years of anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric—still retained influence within parts of Iran’s security and military establishment and could play what they viewed as a stabilizing role during a period of turmoil.
At the time, US President Donald Trump had publicly suggested that perhaps “someone from inside Iran” should govern the country after the conflict. Speculation had largely centered on figures such as former president Hassan Rouhani, former security chief Ali Larijani or parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
The report further alleged that Ahmadinejad was aware of the proposal but changed his position after being injured in an attack during the first day of the war.
Neither Ahmadinejad nor his close associates have commented publicly.
Reinvention and political survival
Ahmadinejad’s relationship with Khamenei deteriorated sharply during his second presidential term, most notably during a 2011 dispute over intelligence minister Heydar Moslehi, whom Khamenei publicly reinstated after Ahmadinejad attempted to remove him.
The episode exposed the limits of Ahmadinejad’s authority and marked the beginning of his gradual marginalization within the establishment.
State media reportedly restricted coverage related to him, and despite explicit opposition from Khamenei, Ahmadinejad repeatedly attempted to return to the presidency only to be disqualified each time.
Yet unlike former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, he was never fully pushed out of the system and remained a member of the Expediency Discernment Council.
In recent years, Ahmadinejad and his allies have sought to recast him as an independent nationalist politician and critic of the establishment rather than the confrontational populist associated with his presidency.
He has largely abandoned the anti-Western rhetoric that defined his years in office, focusing instead on economic grievances, governance failures and criticism of mandatory hijab policies.
Reformist commentator Ahmad Zeidabadi wrote that Ahmadinejad had changed his positions on “almost every important issue” over the past two decades and was “no longer the same person” he had once been.
“He has long remained silent—or been forced into silence,” Zeidabadi wrote, “but even the occasional hints and meanings between the lines of his statements clearly show his growing distance from the Ahmadinejad of the past.”
Some Iranian outlets argued that despite lingering anger over the economic legacy of his presidency, Ahmadinejad still appears to retain support in parts of the lower-income electorate and in smaller cities.
Ahmadinejad has not appeared publicly since the war began. His office near his residence was reportedly targeted during the conflict, killing three IRGC protection officers.
Apart from several brief written statements, including condolences following Khamenei’s death and congratulations to Mojtaba Khamenei after his selection as supreme leader, he has remained largely absent from public view.
The reaction to the New York Times report nevertheless highlighted a broader reality inside Iran: more than a decade after leaving office, Ahmadinejad remains one of the few former insiders capable of provoking suspicion, fascination and hostility across nearly every political faction.
