Senator Warner links rising US housing costs to Iran war

Tehran media coverage of the impasse with Washington following President Donald Trump’s visit to China points to growing frustration, with many insiders voicing concern that diplomacy has stalled and more confrontation may lie ahead.

Trump’s visit had fueled speculation in parts of the Iranian press that China might play a more active mediating role or pressure the United States toward concessions over the Strait of Hormuz and the broader conflict.

Instead, Chinese statements after the summit largely emphasized stability in global trade and uninterrupted shipping flows, reinforcing perceptions in Tehran that Beijing would ultimately prioritize its own economic interests.

Part of the disappointment stems from signs that Trump saw little value in seeking China’s help on Iran, while Beijing itself appears unwilling to meaningfully intervene unless its own strategic and economic interests are directly threatened.

US officials suspect Iranian hackers were behind a series of breaches targeting systems used to monitor fuel levels in storage tanks at gas stations across several states, CNN reported on Friday.

According to the report, the breaches involved automatic tank gauge systems, which help track fuel levels and detect leaks or other issues.

Officials told CNN there is no indication of physical damage so far, but warned that compromising such systems could create broader safety risks if problems go unnoticed.

US investigators reportedly suspect Iranian involvement partly because Iranian-linked cyber actors have previously targeted vulnerable infrastructure systems tied to energy and utilities.

The United Arab Emirates said on Saturday that all its actions were part of defensive measures aimed at protecting its sovereignty, civilians and vital infrastructure.

The statement by the UAE foreign ministry came days after the Wall Street Journal reported that Abu Dhabi carried out military operations against Iran in early April.

The UAE statement did not explicitly refer to the reported strikes on Iran.

“All actions taken by the UAE came within its framework of defensive measures aimed at protecting its sovereignty, civilians, and vital infrastructure,” the foreign ministry said.

Trump’s visit had fueled speculation in parts of the Iranian press that China might play a more active mediating role or pressure the United States toward concessions over the Strait of Hormuz and the broader conflict.

Instead, Chinese statements after the summit largely emphasized stability in global trade and uninterrupted shipping flows, reinforcing perceptions in Tehran that Beijing would ultimately prioritize its own economic interests.

Part of the disappointment stems from signs that Trump saw little value in seeking China’s help on Iran, while Beijing itself appears unwilling to meaningfully intervene unless its own strategic and economic interests are directly threatened.

Hamid Reza Taraghi, a senior figure in the traditional conservative Islamic Coalition Party, said no real negotiations are currently taking place between Tehran and Washington.

While the two sides continue exchanging written messages through Pakistan, he said Trump has offered no positive response to Iran’s proposals.

“The prolonged limbo,” he told moderate outlet Khabar Online, "is worsening economic pressures inside Iran," complicating efforts to stabilize markets and deepening public uncertainty about the future.

Taraghi also acknowledged internal divisions within Iran, saying domestic opposition to negotiations continues to disrupt the process and is amplified by prime-time coverage on state television.

Like many Iranian commentators in recent days, Taraghi described the greatest danger facing the country as the risk of another round of conflict.

That sense of strategic deadlock was echoed Friday in a lengthy analysis published by the reform-leaning Fararu website, which argued that Washington now finds itself trapped in a “no victory, no exit” situation.

The report said the United States appears torn between several risky paths: reviving indirect diplomacy through regional intermediaries, escalating military pressure through a heavier regional presence, or tightening maritime restrictions to further squeeze Iran’s trade and access to sea routes.

None, Fararu argued, offers a clear path to success.

The analysis also pointed to divisions inside Washington, with Republican hawks pressing for stronger military action while Democrats continue advocating diplomacy and warning against deeper entanglement in the Middle East.

According to analysts cited by the outlet, the current US approach has failed to achieve its central objectives, while Iran has largely preserved both its deterrence posture in the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear leverage.

Some of the unnamed experts warned that Washington risks repeating long-standing miscalculations about Iran’s vulnerabilities, potentially deepening rather than resolving the crisis.

Fararu suggested the Trump administration may ultimately seek a symbolic off-ramp—potentially even through rebranding or redefining its military campaign to justify limited renewed strikes while claiming a form of victory.

But the analysts cited by the publication argued that Iran is unlikely to yield under pressure, leaving Washington facing an increasingly unappealing choice between renewed escalation and acceptance of a costly stalemate.

The panel, moderated by Iran International’s Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, brought together Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute and Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies to discuss what comes after a ceasefire that has not ended the wider confrontation.

The debate, held on May 14, came a month after the US naval blockade of Iranian ports began on April 13, intensifying pressure on Tehran’s economy and maritime trade. But the blockade has also pushed shipping, insurance risk and control of Hormuz to the center of the conflict.

A regime under pressure, but not necessarily near collapse

Alterman said the Iranian regime has changed since the war began, but “not in a positive way.” He warned that the war may not have pushed the Islamic Republic toward compromise, but further into the hands of its security establishment.

With Mojtaba Khamenei less visible and Revolutionary Guard hardliners appearing more influential, he said Tehran’s instinct seems to be to “hunker down and wait out” President Donald Trump.

“It feels like the default is toward confrontation rather than compromise,” Alterman said.

For Alterman, that does not necessarily mean the regime is closer to falling. It may instead mean Tehran is more likely to absorb pressure and wait for Trump’s political calendar to become more difficult.

Pletka also warned against assuming that a weakened regime automatically produces a better outcome. She said Washington often frames Iran’s power struggle as one between hardliners and moderates, but the reality is more complicated.

“These are all people who support the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” she said. “Some of them want to kill fewer people. Some of them want to kill more people.”

The danger, she suggested, is that US and Israeli strikes weaken Iran militarily while empowering the most repressive factions at home. Alterman put the question more starkly: does the pressure lead to regime collapse, or “just lead to more Iranians suffering for a longer period of time”?

Hormuz changes the balance

The clearest divide between the two experts came over the Strait of Hormuz.

Alterman argued that the war has revealed an uncomfortable truth for Washington: even a damaged Iran can still disrupt one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.

“Even a weak Iran, a battered Iran, can control the strait,” he said.

It only needs to create enough fear to alter the behavior of shipping companies, insurers, and neighbouring Arab states and energy markets. In that sense, the threshold for disruption is lower than many had assumed.

Pletka sharply disagreed with the idea that Iran truly controls the strait.

“The reason the Iranians control the Strait of Hormuz right now is because we’re letting them,” she said. “We can take control of it. We can do what we want. We can move traffic through.”

She said the issue is no longer only military. It is also about risk, insurance and the willingness of shipowners to send vessels into waters where even a single strike, mine or ambiguous threat can have major consequences.

The result is a paradox: Iran may be weaker than before the war, but it may have discovered a tool it can use more confidently than before.

No clear road to victory or a deal

Both experts were skeptical that the current diplomatic track can quickly produce a comprehensive settlement.

Alterman said the two sides have persuaded themselves that they are excellent negotiators, which makes compromise harder. The best Washington may get, he argued, is not a grand bargain but a framework for drawn-out talks.

“The best-case scenario from a US perspective is locking yourself into negotiations with the Iranians through the end of the Trump administration,” he said.

Such a process could include talks over the nuclear file, missiles and freedom of navigation, but it would likely remain incremental and fragile, with both sides preserving the option to resume escalation.

Pletka said Trump appears most focused on removing Iran’s fissile material and its ability to produce more. But she warned that narrowing the issue to the nuclear file would repeat a familiar mistake.

“Everybody focuses on the nuclear when they need to focus on all of it at once,” she said, pointing to missiles, proxies and Iran’s regional conduct as inseparable parts of the challenge.

That leaves the conflict suspended between competing assumptions. Trump appears to believe economic pressure will force Iran to blink. Alterman suggested Tehran may believe it can outlast him by enduring pain, repressing dissent and waiting for US domestic politics to intervene.