Iran International
US President Donald Trump was still pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran even as military plans for an attack were falling into place, according to a new book that offers a detailed account of how diplomacy gave way to strikes on the Islamic Republic.
Regime Change, published this week, portrays a president who continued to believe diplomacy remained possible almost until the operation began.
Yet as negotiations stalled, he grew increasingly convinced Iran was vulnerable, repeatedly telling advisers he had "a good feeling" about striking and, according to the authors Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman, wanted to "wipe out the regime and figure out the details later."
Drawing on interviews with senior administration officials, the book reconstructs the White House debate over diplomacy, regime change and military action, including a CIA assessment that Ali Khamenei could likely be targeted if the United States decided to strike him.
The book says Trump's Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and adviser Jared Kushner continued negotiating with Iranian officials in Oman and Switzerland almost until the attack.
Among the proposals was an offer to supply Iran with free nuclear fuel for the lifetime of its civilian program, intended to test whether Tehran’s insistence on uranium enrichment was driven by energy needs or by a desire to preserve a possible pathway to a nuclear weapon.
Witkoff and Kushner ultimately concluded Iran was "playing games" and dragging out negotiations in the hope of outlasting Trump's presidency, convincing Trump that diplomacy had reached its limits.
At the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was urging Trump to act, arguing Iran was unusually vulnerable and that the opportunity to strike might not last.
The book says Netanyahu presented Trump with a four-part plan: eliminate Iran's senior leadership, dismantle its military, topple the Islamic Republic and pave the way for a successor government.
As part of the pitch, Netanyahu showed Trump a video outlining how a post-Islamic Republic transition could unfold and identified figures he believed could help lead a new government, including Iranian exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi.
Trump was captivated by the presentation. But while he appeared persuaded that the first two objectives were achievable, he remained less convinced the latter stages would materialize.
Trump concluded that broader questions about regime change would be "their problem," though the book does not clarify whether he was referring to Israel, the Iranian people or another party. Instead, they write, Trump remained focused on what he believed were achievable military objectives: targeting Iran's leadership and dismantling its military capabilities.
Senior members of Trump’s national security team were deeply skeptical of Netanyahu’s vision for regime change. CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly called the scenario “farcical,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio dismissed it outright, cutting in: "In other words, it's bullshit."
The Final Situation Room
One of the book’s most striking scenes comes in the final Situation Room meeting before the attack, when Ratcliffe briefed Trump on intelligence suggesting Iran’s senior leadership was expected to gather at Khamenei’s compound in Tehran.
If regime change simply meant killing Khamenei, Ratcliffe reportedly told the president, “we can probably do that.”
The account also describes sharp divisions inside Trump’s national security team.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine warned that a prolonged conflict could drain US weapons stockpiles, strain missile interceptor inventories already supporting Ukraine and Israel, put American forces at risk and complicate efforts to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.
Vice President JD Vance repeated his opposition to military action, but told Trump he would support the president’s decision if he chose to proceed.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who favored continuing “maximum pressure” on Iran, argued against making regime change the objective. “If our goal is regime change or an uprising, we shouldn’t do it,” he said, adding that destroying Iran’s missile program was “a goal we can achieve.”
The authors write that Trump listened to each adviser before reaching his decision.
"I think we need to do it," he concluded.
According to the book, Trump gave the final order the following afternoon while travelling to Texas.
Seventeen days into the war, the authors describe finding Trump in the Oval Office with printouts of maple trees spread across the Resolute Desk instead of military maps.
“I’m ordering trees for the White House,” Trump told them. “I know how to buy good trees. Maples.”
For months, analysts have debated whether Trump always intended to strike Iran or whether diplomacy served primarily as a delaying tactic.
Regime Change presents a more complicated picture: a president who kept negotiations alive almost until the eve of military action, increasingly trusted his instincts over some advisers’ warnings, and ultimately chose to strike while leaving unresolved what would come next.
Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei plans to remove judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje'i at the end of his first five-year term and appoint a new figure to lead the judiciary, sources familiar with the matter told Iran International.
Sources inside Iran told Iran International that Khamenei does not intend to extend Eje'i’s term for another five years, breaking with a practice followed for nearly four decades in which judiciary chiefs have usually served two consecutive five-year terms.
The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the decision is not aimed at judicial reform but is part of a broader reshaping of power after the recent war.
They said the new supreme leader is seeking to replace key officials in major state institutions with figures more closely aligned with him.
Eje'i’s expected removal could mark one of the first major signs of Khamenei’s effort to rebuild control over the Islamic Republic’s judicial, security and political apparatus after the transfer of power.
Hardliners step up pressure on Eje'i
The decision comes amid growing criticism of Eje'i from hardline figures after the names of Supreme National Security Council members who voted in favor of a memorandum of understanding with the United States were disclosed.
Critics say Eje'i’s vote was at odds with Khamenei’s stated position, after the leader said in a letter that he had, in principle, held a different view on the memorandum of understanding.
Signs of dissatisfaction with Eje'i’s five-year record have also appeared in recent official and semi-official commentary close to the power structure.
In a message marking Judiciary Week, Khamenei did not clearly endorse Eje'i’s continuation in office. Instead, he addressed the judiciary as an institution and called for the “actualization” of demands previously made by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The message repeated calls for the implementation of the judicial transformation document, fighting corruption inside the judiciary, reviving public rights, blocking the use of recommendations and lobbying, and improving communication with the public.
Eje'i seeks to defend his record
A day later, Eje'i published a letter to Khamenei in deferential language, defending the judiciary’s performance and pledging to continue the path of “judicial transformation.”
“I and all components of the judiciary consider ourselves obliged to carry out Your Excellency’s binding commands precisely, swiftly and without any reduction,” Eje'i wrote.
Media outlets and figures close to the establishment criticized Eje'i for not publishing such a letter before Khamenei’s message. Some also described the new leader’s renewed emphasis on his father’s demands as a negative assessment of Eje'i’s record, arguing that their repetition showed the judiciary had failed to deliver practical results under him.
Rival factions inside the establishment have also stepped up attacks on Eje'i, accusing him of distancing himself from the leadership’s demands.
Media close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and President Masoud Pezeshkian have described the attacks as part of an effort by the faction aligned with Saeed Jalili, a member of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and the Paydari Front to create divisions among senior officials and weaken the postwar political path.
Media close to the judiciary and Eje'i’s supporters have sought to portray his five-year record as successful, citing reduced imprisonment, electronic court proceedings, shorter trials, anti-corruption efforts and public outreach.
Rights groups point to record of repression
Human rights groups and activists say Eje'i is not a reformist figure but a long-standing part of the Islamic Republic’s repressive judicial and security apparatus.
They point to his record in the Special Clerical Court, the Ministry of Intelligence, and later as first deputy and head of the judiciary, saying his tenure has been marked by continued heavy sentences against protesters, political activists, journalists, prisoners of conscience and minorities.
Rights advocates say the judiciary under Eje'i has continued to act as the legal and executive arm of security institutions in political and security cases.
They also argue that replacing Eje'i alone would not bring meaningful change without structural reform, an end to security interference in judicial cases, guaranteed access to lawyers, a halt to forced confessions, the annulment of political verdicts and respect for fair trial standards.