Most outlets framed negotiations as deadlocked. Reform-leaning Fararu warned of “the increasing possibility of yet another escalation.”
In an article titled “Negotiating About Negotiating” published by Sharq, former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi examined the growing impasse after Trump reportedly rejected Iran’s latest 14-point proposal as “completely unacceptable.”
According to Tasnim and IRIB, Tehran’s proposal included demands for the withdrawal of US forces from Iran’s periphery, war reparations, full sanctions relief and a new legal framework for the Strait of Hormuz.
Ahmadi argued that the recent exchange of written messages marked a regression from even the already limited framework of indirect negotiations.
“This is no longer substantive diplomacy,” he wrote, describing the process instead as “negotiating about the method of negotiation.”
He argued that Trump remains focused on Iran’s 60 percent uranium enrichment while Tehran continues prioritizing sovereignty and economic compensation, leaving little common ground.
Rather than full-scale war, Ahmadi predicted prolonged “low-intensity military encounters,” tighter naval blockades and sustained economic pressure aimed at keeping Iran unstable.
In Etemad, foreign policy analyst Morteza Makki argued that after 40 days of military confrontation both Tehran and Washington are now effectively “forced” to seek some form of agreement.
Makki said the conflict had reshaped regional dynamics, arguing that despite heavy costs Iran had preserved key strategic objectives and demonstrated deterrence in the Persian Gulf, while Washington had failed to secure broader goals despite military escalation and operations such as Operation Freedom.
“The White House is now managing the costs of war rather than leading an offensive,” he said.
Makki pointed to domestic pressures in the United States, fears of rising energy prices and reluctance among Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia to enter a broader conflict.
He concluded that both the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz remain negotiable if political will exists, but argued that China is now the only power capable of offering guarantees Tehran would trust.
“It seems China is the only country that can play an effective role in creating space for dialogue and guaranteeing a stable agreement between Iran and the U.S.,” he said.
Expanding on China’s role, Iran’s former ambassador to Beijing Hamid Aboutalebi argued in a Fararu commentary that the confrontation has evolved beyond a regional crisis into a test of China’s willingness to defend partners against US pressure.
He wrote that the conflict was no longer simply about sanctions or Iran’s nuclear program, but about whether Beijing is prepared to challenge a US-centered global order.
According to Aboutalebi, if China succeeds in building alternative financial and energy networks while defending partners such as Iran, Tehran could evolve from an isolated sanctioned state into a key player in an emerging multipolar order.
But if Beijing retreats under pressure, he warned, it would expose the limits of Chinese power despite its global ambitions.
He argued that tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have elevated the conflict into a broader geopolitical contest, increasingly forcing China to balance its ambitions as a global power against its dependence on stability and open trade routes.
