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ANALYSIS

Canada’s Middle East role: From Pearson’s legacy to passive diplomacy

Mahsa Mortazavi
Mahsa Mortazavi

Iran International

May 8, 2026, 22:43 GMT+1
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney stands alongside the Chief of the Defence Staff Jennie Carignan and Minister of National Defence David McGuinty as he makes a speech about defense and security at Fort York Armoury, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada June 9, 2025.
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney stands alongside the Chief of the Defence Staff Jennie Carignan and Minister of National Defence David McGuinty as he makes a speech about defense and security at Fort York Armoury, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada June 9, 2025.

As tensions escalate in the Middle East, critics say Canada’s “values-based realism” has left Ottawa a passive observer rather than an influential middle power confronting Iran’s threats and regional crises.

Prime Minister Mark Carney has emphasized diplomacy, multilateral cooperation and commitment to a rules-based international order. But critics, including parts of Canada’s Iranian diaspora and opposition politicians, describe Ottawa’s current approach as “beautiful words without operational backing."

Just one month before the start of Operation Epic Fury, Carney told the World Economic Forum in Davos that Canada would pursue a “values-based realism” approach, which he presented as a return to the country’s historical diplomatic role on the world stage.

Seventy years ago, during the Suez Crisis, Canada helped chart a path between war and paralysis through the initiative of Lester B. Pearson in establishing the first United Nations Emergency Force.

That episode became central to Canada’s diplomatic self-image as a middle power able to defuse conflicts through coalition-building and multilateral institutions.

It is this legacy that has raised expectations for Ottawa to play a meaningful role in today’s Middle East crises, from Iran’s nuclear program to security in the Strait of Hormuz.

Critics say the reality on the ground tells a different story.

Carney’s initial response to the latest tensions combined support, concern and caution. He stressed the need to prevent the Islamic Republic from obtaining nuclear weapons, while also insisting that all parties, including the United States and Israel, must adhere to international law.

On the Strait of Hormuz, Ottawa has emphasized international cooperation, legal frameworks for maritime security and efforts to restore safe shipping lanes. Critics argue the approach amounts to crisis management without addressing the root causes.

Leo Housakos, leader of Canada’s Conservatives in the Senate, delivered a sharper critique in an exclusive interview with Iran International. He said Canada had shown leniency toward the Islamic Republic and argued that the government’s moral statements, without concrete action, had weakened Ottawa’s international credibility.

Housakos said Canadian foreign policy had become overly reactive to the actions of others and that the country no longer creates diplomatic opportunities as it once did. According to him, Ottawa often arrives late to negotiations and settles for participating in decisions already shaped by larger powers.

These criticisms also resonate among many Iranian Canadians. For them, diplomacy only has meaning if the available tools are properly used — from stricter enforcement of sanctions and immigration laws to confronting the Islamic Republic’s financial and influence networks inside Canada.

The case of Mehdi Taj, head of Iran’s football federation and a former commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, became a prominent example of that debate.

Iran International reported that Taj had been granted a Temporary Resident Permit, a document that can allow entry for someone otherwise deemed inadmissible under normal circumstances.

After the report was published and political pressure mounted in Ottawa, Taj and his companions left Canada shortly after arriving. The incident renewed questions about how seriously Canada enforces its designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization.

Housakos said Canada cannot simultaneously claim to stand with the Iranian people while showing leniency toward the Islamic Republic in practice. He argued that phrases such as human rights, women’s rights and freedom of expression should not remain rhetorical flourishes in speeches but should be reflected in government policy decisions.

According to critics, the current crisis is a test of Canada’s diplomatic capital. They say Ottawa still has the capacity, as a middle power, to help build new coalitions, defend freedom of navigation, contain nuclear threats and support Iranian civil society.

But they argue that role can only be revived if Canada moves beyond the broad language of diplomacy and demonstrates political will in practice — the very gap critics say now defines the distance between Canada’s diplomatic rhetoric and the realities of its foreign policy.

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Spotlight

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    ANALYSIS

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Iran runs dry as Islamic Republic funds ideology and foreign proxies

May 8, 2026, 19:26 GMT+1
•
Mohammad Nayeb Yazdi, Mehdi Ketabchy, Saeed Ghasseminejad

Iran’s water crisis is not only about scarcity or drought. It is also about where the Islamic Republic chooses to spend the country’s money, and what it leaves unfunded at home.

In a system where political and ideological objectives consistently outweigh environmental sustainability and public welfare, even severe and widely recognized crises fail to trigger meaningful correction.

In this sense, Iran’s water crisis is not a failure of resources, it is a consequence of deliberate choices. The impact of decades of misguided water engineering and policy decisions is already visible across Iran’s water systems.

Major lakes and wetlands such as Urmia Lake have shrunk. Groundwater has been depleted across more than half of the country’s plains, land subsidence is accelerating, and per capita water availability has fallen to near or below 1,000 cubic meters.

At the same time, access to reliable drinking water has become increasingly uncertain. Water quality is declining because of inadequate wastewater treatment and aging infrastructure, while policy still emphasizes large-scale agricultural self-sufficiency despite mounting environmental constraints.

It would be easy to assume that these failures could stem partially from financial limitations. But this is not a story of absolute constraint. Even under sanctions, Iran has continued to generate substantial revenues, particularly from oil exports, over the past decade.

The water crisis is not necessarily due to a lack of resources, but how those resources are allocated. Based on Iran’s FY1404 (2025-2026) public budget, significant funding is still directed toward religious and ideological institutions, amounting to roughly $750 to $860 million annually, depending on exchange rates.

At the same time, Iran’s regional activities, including support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, and allied militias, are widely estimated, based on publicly reported figures, to cost an additional $1.1 to $1.5 billion each year.

These estimates reflect direct financial transfers and likely understate total support, which also includes substantial non-cash assistance such as weapons, equipment, and logistical backing.

In total, nearly $1.8 to $2.4 billion per year is allocated to priorities that do little to address Iran’s most urgent domestic challenges. Even redirecting a portion of these resources toward water management and infrastructure could support large-scale, practical solutions. Over a five-year period, such a shift would mobilize roughly $10 billion, enough to move beyond short-term fixes and begin addressing some of the structural drivers of Iran’s water crisis.

Based on order-of-magnitude cost benchmarks for standard water infrastructure projects, a reallocation of roughly $10 billion over five years could finance a coherent national water program. This would include a full-scale effort to reduce water losses in Tehran’s aging distribution network, where non-revenue water (NRW), water lost before it reaches consumers due to leaks, aging infrastructure, and inefficiencies is estimated at roughly 25 to 30 percent.

It could also support the deployment of potable reuse facilities across major urban centers such as Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and Ahvaz, helping relieve pressure on overstretched freshwater supplies.

In parallel, a targeted desalination and conveyance package could be implemented for Sistan and Baluchestan province, designed specifically to secure drinking water in a region facing chronic shortages, rather than to support inland agriculture.

Such an investment could also enable the construction of dozens of wastewater treatment plants nationwide, depending on facility size and treatment level, addressing both water quality degradation and reuse potential in regions struggling with untreated discharge.

Beyond urban infrastructure, even limited investments in agriculture could deliver measurable benefits. For example, modernizing irrigation in a single province such as Isfahan, where more efficient systems can reduce water use by roughly 30 to 60 percent, could significantly lower demand in one of Iran’s most water-stressed regions.

Even at the current economic development and growth, over a five-year period, roughly $10 billion directed toward ideological priorities could instead finance a nationwide water recovery program: upgrading Tehran’s water distribution system to reduce losses, building 10 potable reuse facilities for major cities, developing seven coastal desalination plants for southern Iran, and constructing a strategic water transfer system to Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan.

It could also fund eight large wastewater treatment plants, dozens of mid-size facilities across the country, and modernize irrigation in Isfahan. Instead, those resources are being directed elsewhere. Now imagine how the country’s water infrastructure can be overhauled if the regime is gone and Iran is back on the path to growth and prosperity, with access to the latest technologies the world has to offer, to tackle this issue.

These figures are illustrative, not precise. They highlight both Iran’s potential capacity to invest in water infrastructure and the scale of resources currently misallocated, without even accounting for additional spending on missile programs, and nuclear development, which further underscores the magnitude of available resources.

Ultimately, the constraint is neither technical nor financial: it is political. As long as the current regime remains in power, resources that could stabilize and modernize Iran’s water systems will continue to be diverted toward non-productive ideological ends.

Tehran hails China’s support, but Beijing’s limits are showing

May 8, 2026, 02:42 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani

Iranian media have welcomed Beijing’s unusually sharp rhetoric in support of Tehran, portraying recent Chinese diplomacy as evidence of a deepening strategic partnership.

Much of the coverage has focused on Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Beijing and his meetings with senior Chinese officials.

During the trip, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered some of Beijing’s strongest language to date on the conflict, condemning what he called “warmongering by the US and Israel” and warning that the region had reached a “decisive turning point.”

Iranian outlets quickly cast the remarks as evidence that China was moving closer to Tehran.

Economic daily Donya-ye-Eqtesad linked Beijing’s rhetoric to Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to China, arguing that the Chinese were trying to secure a de-escalation framework before the summit while resisting US pressure over the Strait of Hormuz.

Other Iranian analyses cited Chinese Communist Party journals describing the conflict as a costly strategic failure for Washington.

The Iranian economic site Tahlil Bazaar highlighted articles in Qiushi arguing that the war had damaged US credibility and increased economic pressure on Western countries through rising energy prices.

These narratives, amplified by Iranian media, emphasized Iran’s asymmetric tactics and their impact on global markets. But beneath the celebratory tone lies a more complicated reality: China sees Iran as a useful junior partner, not an ally worth sacrificing its broader economic interests for.

China’s messaging has not been uniformly supportive. Chinese officials have repeatedly stressed opposition to any action threatening shipping lanes or escalating regional instability.

Iranian media also quoted Beijing calling for a “complete and immediate ceasefire” after Iranian strikes on oil facilities in neighboring states.

That dual messaging—rhetorical support for Tehran combined with warnings against escalation—reflects China’s real priorities.

Beijing’s first concern is the Strait of Hormuz. Although China buys discounted Iranian oil, it depends far more heavily on energy imports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

When Iran effectively closed the strait earlier this year, Chinese officials were reportedly alarmed by the resulting spike in energy prices and its potential impact on economic growth. For Beijing, disruptions in Hormuz are not ideological matters but direct threats to economic stability.

China’s second expectation is restraint. Despite the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” signed in 2021, Beijing has no interest in being dragged into a direct confrontation between Iran and the United States.

Since April, China has worked with Pakistan to facilitate temporary pauses in fighting, but Chinese officials have also made clear that Beijing will not fight on Iran’s behalf. Mediation, not military alignment, remains the limit of China’s commitment.

The third expectation is stability. China wants Iran strong enough to challenge US influence and remain a reliable sanctioned oil supplier, but not unstable enough to damage Beijing’s broader regional interests or require large-scale economic rescue.

Chinese analysts have increasingly warned that prolonged economic deterioration in Iran could complicate Beijing’s ties with Arab states across the Persian Gulf and undermine its long-term regional strategy.

This balancing act explains why China’s rhetoric has sharpened even as its limits have become clearer.

Beijing is willing to criticize the United States and Israel, support ceasefire diplomacy and pressure Washington politically. But it does not seem prepared to jeopardize its relationships in the region or Western markets to shield Iran from the consequences of a wider war.

Iran's war hawks dominate state TV as diplomacy inches forward

May 7, 2026, 03:37 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani

A former senior Iranian security official has criticized state television for amplifying hardline rhetoric that he warned could deepen social divisions at a sensitive moment for the country.

Mahmoud Mirlohi, a former deputy interior minister, said Iran’s state broadcaster has failed to reflect the diversity of Iranian society, instead operating as though the entire country shares the views of radical ultraconservative factions.

His remarks come as speculation intensifies over possible leadership changes at the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), whose chief, Payman Jebelli, is nearing the end of his five-year term.

Iranian media in recent weeks have floated several possible successors, including former IRIB deputy Ali Darabi and former state TV chief Ezatollah Zarghami—figures who, despite their roots in the system, are now often seen as more pragmatic and more responsive to public opinion.

The debate comes as signs of diplomatic progress between Tehran and Washington have fueled cautious optimism about a possible de-escalation after weeks of conflict. But mistrust between the two sides remains deep, and hardliners in both countries continue pushing rhetoric that risks undermining negotiations.

IRIB, which holds a monopoly over terrestrial radio and television and still exerts broad influence across Iran’s media landscape, has long faced accusations of functioning as a platform for the ultraconservative Paydari Party.

Under Jebelli, much of the broadcaster’s programming has been shaped by his deputy Vahid Jalili, brother of hardline politician Saeed Jalili. Both are associated with Paydari’s ideological camp.

Over the past week, IRIB has prominently featured commentators advocating confrontation both at home and abroad.

Some warned Iranians against protesting rising prices, while one guest called for the execution of former president Hassan Rouhani and former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Others attacked Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, exposing widening fractures even within conservative circles.

Several hardline figures also escalated rhetoric against the United Arab Emirates.

Paydari-aligned lawmakers Ali Khezrian and Alaeddin Boroujerdi called for the UAE’s destruction, with Khezrian threatening to “force the Emirates back to the age of camel riding.”

Mirlohi warned that such rhetoric undermines national cohesion at a time when authorities are attempting to project wartime unity.

Even Iranians attending nightly pro-government gatherings, he argued, do not necessarily share the ideological views promoted by state television.

He warned that treating those gatherings as proof of broad support for hardline ideology risked further alienating the public.

The criticism has not been limited to establishment insiders.

Reformist commentator Abbas Abdi wrote in Etemad Online that constant propaganda about Iran’s “victory” in the war rang hollow amid worsening economic conditions, arguing that genuine success would require stabilizing the country’s economy rather than relying on slogans.

Commentator Nasrin Zamiri wrote on the Asr Iran website that state television has failed to properly inform the public about the country’s real conditions and challenges.

She noted that no traditional or social media platform in Iran rivals IRIB’s reach, particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, making its editorial choices especially consequential.

The criticism reflects growing concern among even some establishment figures that IRIB’s increasingly ideological tone may alienate parts of the public at a moment when the state is trying to project national unity.

Hope and hostility collide in Tehran over possible deal with US

May 6, 2026, 22:29 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee

Signs of a possible breakthrough between Tehran and Washington have triggered sharply divergent reactions across Iran’s political and media landscape.

US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that a deal with Tehran “will happen” but insisted there was “never a deadline” for negotiations.

When asked whether a deal could come before his planned trip to China next week, he said “it’s possible,” while stressing that renewed strikes also remained on the table.

His comments came as Axios reported that the White House believes a one-page memorandum to end the war may be within reach, potentially laying the groundwork for broader nuclear talks and a possible agreement within 30 days.

Reacting cautiously, Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the US proposal remains under review and that Tehran’s response would be conveyed to Pakistani mediators once finalized.

According to Axios, Washington expects a reply within 48 hours.

The combination of Trump’s remarks and reports of a possible agreement had immediate economic effects inside Iran, with the value of foreign currencies and the cryptocurrency Tether falling sharply in Tehran markets.

Hardline rejection

Media outlets affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), however, pushed back strongly against suggestions that an agreement was imminent.

“Today’s propaganda by American media is about justifying Trump’s retreat from his recent hostile action,” Tasnim News wrote, citing an unnamed informed source. “Trump’s move was wrong from the beginning and should not have been taken.”

The source added that after Trump’s “retreat,” Iran had resumed reviewing the proposal and would announce its conclusion to mediators “whenever it reaches one.”

Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson for parliament’s national security committee, also dismissed the reports.

“What the Americans did not achieve in face-to-face negotiations, they will not obtain through a failed war,” he said. “Iran is ready, finger on the trigger… if they do not surrender and grant the necessary concessions… we will deliver a harsh and regret-inducing response.”

Diplomatic opening?

Despite the rhetoric, other voices portrayed the developments as a possible diplomatic opening.

The website Nour News, close to security institutions, described the suspension of the “Freedom Project” as evidence of a US “miscalculation” but added that it had “once again given value to the diplomacy card and strengthened the negotiation option to resolve the crisis.”

It also pointed to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s recent trip to Beijing as evidence that Iran had entered a new phase of diplomatic activity, with China emerging as a potential facilitator in the Hormuz crisis.

The outlet warned, however, that “given Trump’s impulsive decisions, the situation remains fragile.”

Even as negotiations continue, Tehran appears intent on reinforcing its leverage in the Strait of Hormuz.

Reports indicate Iranian authorities have issued new instructions to shipping companies through a body referred to as the “Persian Gulf Strait Authority.”

The reported rules state that ships from countries that sanctioned Iran or froze Iranian assets could be denied passage. Violations may result in seizure and fines amounting to up to 20 percent of cargo value.

Journalist Mohammadreza Manafi wrote on X that Araghchi’s meeting with China’s foreign minister may have helped break the deadlock.

“It seems Araghchi will return to Tehran from the land of the dragon with ‘full hands’,” he wrote.

Analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi offered a more cautious analogy, comparing the negotiations to “the heart of a heart-attack patient being resuscitated in an operating room.”

“Fortunately, today this heart shows better vital signs than in previous days,” he wrote, “but there is no certainty about its condition tomorrow.”

‘Permit for a terrorist’: Canada opposition asks who cleared ex-IRGC official’s entry

May 2, 2026, 09:28 GMT+1
•
Negar Mojtahedi

The Canadian opposition has accused the government of bypassing its own rules after Iran International reported that an IRGC-linked Iranian football official was granted special permission to enter the country despite being inadmissible.

Iran International’s reporting was followed by political backlash in Ottawa, international coverage and Mehdi Taj being turned back within hours of landing in Canada.

Speaking to Iran International’s Eye for Iran, Melissa Lantsman, deputy leader of Canada’s Conservative Party, said the case raised serious questions about who approved Mehdi Taj’s entry and why.

“We need to know who did it, when it happened, how it happened, why it happened, and why it’s never going to happen again,” Lantsman said.

Taj, president of Iran’s football federation, had been expected to travel to Vancouver for the FIFA Congress on April 30 at the Vancouver Convention Center.

Iran International previously reported that Taj was issued a Temporary Resident Permit, or TRP, a tool that allows Canadian authorities to admit a person who would otherwise be barred under immigration law.

Canada listed the IRGC as a terrorist entity in 2024, making people linked to the force inadmissible. Taj has longstanding ties to the Islamic Republic’s security establishment and previously served as an intelligence commander in the IRGC in Isfahan.

Lantsman said the permit showed that the issue was not simply a screening failure.

“Somebody actively made this decision to circumvent our own rules,” she said.

“I can’t believe that I work in a place with a minister who would issue a terrorist a permit.”

Taj was able to board a flight to Canada and land in Vancouver. He was sent back within hours, after Iran International’s reporting on the case had already become public.

That sequence has become central to the political fallout in Ottawa. Critics say the government acted only after the case drew public attention, while ministers have declined to discuss details, citing privacy rules.

Lantsman rejected that explanation in the podcast interview.

“We don’t give privacy to terrorists,” she said. “There is no privacy to people who are inadmissible to our country.”

  • Iran football chief with IRGC ties sent back by Canada after arrival

    Iran football chief with IRGC ties sent back by Canada after arrival

  • Ottawa on defensive after Iran football chief linked to IRGC entered Canada

    Ottawa on defensive after Iran football chief linked to IRGC entered Canada

The issue quickly reached Parliament.

Opposition MPs pressed ministers to explain how a person barred under Canada’s own rules received permission to enter the country.

At Thursday’s meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security in Ottawa, Conservative MP Frank Caputo asked Immigration Minister Lena Diab how a person deemed inadmissible had been granted entry.

Caputo said “the rule of law demands transparency” and asked “who gave him a visa,” saying Iran International’s reporting had brought the case to public attention.

Prime Minister Mark Carney declined to comment on Taj’s case, citing privacy laws, but defended the government’s position on the IRGC.

“Members of the [Iranian] Revolutionary Guard rightly have been prohibited from entering this country and they will not enter this country,” he said.

Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand suggested the permit may have been granted and later revoked, saying her understanding was that “there is a revocation of the permission” and that “it was unintentional.”

Lantsman said that response only deepened the need for answers.

“If they unintentionally gave him a permit, then we need to know how that happened and why it happened,” she said. “And if the unintentionality of it was about the revocation, that’s even worse.”

The controversy has turned a single immigration decision into a broader political test of Canada’s handling of officials tied to the Islamic Republic.

Although Canada has formally banned the IRGC, Temporary Resident Permits allow authorities to override inadmissibility in certain cases. Taj’s case has raised questions about how such exceptions are approved and what safeguards exist when national security concerns are involved.

The controversy also comes as anger continues over the Islamic Republic’s crackdown on protests in January, with the IRGC at the center of the state response. Rights groups and Iranian activists have described the violence as among the deadliest episodes in modern Iranian history.

At least three Iranian footballers have been killed during the unrest. Ali Karimi, Iran’s former national team captain, has criticized FIFA’s silence and called on the organization to condemn the killing of athletes and speak out against the crackdown.

Lantsman said the opposition has submitted formal questions in Parliament and would continue pressing the government for details.

“This cannot happen,” she said. “We’re going to continue to keep the pressure on.”

The case has also drawn wider attention beyond Canada. The New York Times, USA Today, Agence France-Presse and The Canadian Press have covered the incident, citing Iran International’s reporting.

For Lantsman, the central issue remains who approved the permit and why.

“Somebody in Canada, somebody very high up in the ministry, decides that it’s in public interest of Canada to have this person here,” she said.

The government has yet to publicly identify who authorized the permit, why it was issued, or what measures are being taken to prevent a similar case.