Trump and Tehran are betting on who breaks first, NYT columnist says

For two decades, the United States sought a durable nuclear settlement with Iran. Each failure strengthened the Islamic Republic. It deepened ties with Russia and China, expanded proxies from Iraq to the Red Sea, and built a missile and drone arsenal while burying key infrastructure underground—beyond inspection and reach.

The revelation of the Pickaxe Mountain facility in June 2025 ended ambiguity. In Washington and Jerusalem, red lines hardened into a single demand: effective surrender of Iran’s military-nuclear-industrial complex.

For all intents and purposes, the Khamenei–IRGC refusal of American–Israeli demands precipitated the February 28–April 8, 2026 conflict—the 40-day war. To outsiders, Tehran’s refusal appeared reckless. The regime, however, believed too much had been invested—in blood and treasure—to retreat without resistance.

With President Trump’s April 8 ceasefire declaration, a new round of diplomacy began in Islamabad (April 11–12, 2026). It lasted twenty-one hours and yielded nothing. Vice President Vance stated plainly that Iran had rejected American terms.

Reports indicated that senior IRGC figures, including Vahidi and Zolghadr, vetoed any concession. Authority was fractured; Ghalibaf’s delegation could not bind the state. The collapse exposed internal divisions and set the pattern ahead.

Tehran signalled its readiness to escalate—threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, recover concealed arsenals, with strikes on Gulf monarchies’ energy infrastructure.

Trump ordered a naval blockade of Iranian ports. As both sides manoeuvred behind the scenes, Tehran’s April 17 declaration that the strait remained open was swiftly overtaken, as Washington seized upon it as evidence of capitulation while maintaining the blockade. Trump nevertheless indicated that talks would continue.

Yet Vice President Vance’s planned return to Islamabad has now been placed on hold after Tehran failed to respond to American negotiating positions. The diplomatic track is no longer merely fragile—it is suspended.

Even if revived at short notice, the underlying reality remains unchanged: any Iranian delegation would face the same internal veto, and any concession would deepen recent humiliations—the decapitation of senior leadership and the degradation of strategic infrastructure.

It is at sea that the confrontation sharpens.

Washington maintains that its blockade is a lawful belligerent measure under the law of armed conflict at sea, subject to effectiveness, proportionality, and notification as reflected in customary law and articulated in the San Remo Manual (1994).

Tehran, by contrast, operates under narrower constraints. Though not party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), it remains bound by customary international law.

Transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz—Articles 37–44 of UNCLOS—cannot be suspended, even in armed conflict, as affirmed in the Corfu Channel case (1949) and reflected in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. Any attempt to mine or disrupt the strait would violate both the law of the sea and the law of armed conflict at sea and fail the tests of necessity and proportionality under Article 51.

What once served Tehran as deterrence now operates as constraint. Geography, turned against it, has become Washington’s leverage.

That leverage is already being applied through calibrated force. The recent strike on the Toska vessel, confined to the engine room, demonstrated how force may be applied with precision and restraint at once. Restraint, therefore, has been calculation, not limitation. This is not indiscriminate destruction but controlled degradation.

During the 40-day war, US–Israeli strikes targeted steel, gas, and petrochemical hubs with precision. They may resort to that practice again.

There is precedent. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, NATO struck power plants, depriving Serbia of over seventy per cent of its electricity. The logic was calibrated escalation in the service of coercion.

Should negotiations fail, the next rungs are visible: precision strikes on power grids, bridges, and transport arteries. The Kosovo template may yet be reprised in the Persian Gulf.

Over the past year—across Ukraine, Gaza, and in dealings with China—President Trump has demonstrated a consistent posture: he neither retreats nor entertains settlements that suggest humiliation.

Lest we forget the chorus that once insisted President Trump would refrain from a prolonged conflict—that oil shocks would stay his hand, that he would restrain Israel, or that he would contrive accommodation with Tehran.

Events have ruthlessly overtaken these assumptions, leaving in their place a single, unambiguous note: the President now declares that the blockade “is absolutely destroying Iran” and will not be lifted until there is a “deal”—one he insists will be “far better” than the JCPOA.

Across the divide, Ghalibaf answers in a discordant key, rejecting negotiations “under the shadow of threats” while signalling preparation for escalation.

Trump is dividing and conquering on two fronts. He drives a lethal wedge between Ghalibaf’s faction—seeking a face-saving accommodation—and hardliners such as Vahidi and Zolghadr who command the instruments of force.

If Ghalibaf prevails, Trump imposes his terms and claims victory. If the hardliners purge him, they will be branded irredeemable extremists, and what remains of the regime will be subjected to decisive force. In either outcome, the structure of pressure favours Washington.

This is coercive diplomacy in its classical form. It draws from Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict and Arms and Influence, fused with what Jeffrey Sonnenfeld describes as Trump’s “divide and conquer” doctrine—his so-called Ten Commandments.

A public commitment device raises audience costs and forces a stark binary: agreement or refusal. The “threat that leaves something to chance”—brinkmanship—is fully engaged. Each rung narrows retreat and magnifies miscalculation.

Contrary to prevailing punditry, the 40-day war has turned Tehran and Washington into adversaries locked in a contest of endurance. Attacks on regional energy infrastructure have eroded tolerance, while American resilience has diminished Iran’s deterrent card. What once compelled caution now invites pressure.

Vice President Vance’s journey to Islamabad has now been halted. If no credible Iranian response emerges, detonation will follow—not in metaphor, but in action. The United States and Israel may then treat the remaining IRGC leadership as beyond restraint—men whose decisions invite elimination rather than negotiation.

The outcome now narrows to a single choice: acceptance—or detonation.

Roughly 21 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products normally transit the strait. That volume accounts for one fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption and one quarter of all seaborne traded oil.

Yet the destinations of those flows expose the asymmetry that ultimately doomed the strategy.

In the first half of 2025 ~89% percent of crude oil and condensate flowed eastward to Asian markets.

China absorbed 37.7 percent of the total followed by India at 14.7 percent South Korea at 12 percent Japan at 10.9 percent and other Asian buyers at 13.9 percent.

Europe received just 3.8 percent and the United States only 2.5 percent. The IRGC was never holding the West hostage. It holds the East.

By throttling traffic during the conflict the regime exercised its only economic "card". Ship transits collapsed to under ten percent of normal levels even after the ceasefire. Insurance rates soared and oil prices spiked.

The move they thought would delivered short term tactical breathing room and helped force negotiations. Yet the decision transformed a potent deterrent into a wasting asset.
The primary victims were Asian importers especially China and India. Those nations faced immediate cost spikes and supply uncertainty.

Beijing responded by drawing down its strategic petroleum reserve which covers more than four months of imports while accelerating purchases of Russian African and Latin American crude.

India pursued parallel diversification.

More critically Persian Gulf producers gained the political urgency and capital they needed to lock in permanent bypass infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia ramped its East West Petroline to near its seven million barrels per day capacity routing crude to Red Sea terminals at Yanbu.

The United Arab Emirates expanded the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Additional overland proposals and expanded export terminals emerged almost immediately.

Once those routes reach commercial scale the strait loses its status as a global chokepoint. It becomes a regional inconvenience whose disruption matters far less to the broader market.

Simultaneously United States crude exports have surged to a record 4.9 million barrels per day in April 2026 with forecasts pointing toward five million or higher in coming months. That volume covers roughly 23 percent of normal full Hormuz traffic and about one third of the crude and condensate segment.

Asian refiners have redirected demand toward US Gulf Coast barrels to fill the shortfall from Middle East shut ins estimated at 7.5 to 9.1 million barrels per day. The surge not only caps price spikes but also cements American producers as the flexible swing supplier to Asia.
This development accelerates the very diversification that erodes Iranian leverage.

The one year five year and ten year horizons reveal starkly divergent outcomes.

For IRGC the picture darkens at every stage. In the first year oil revenues collapse despite temporary price spikes because export volumes remain minimal. The economy already contracting from war damage and sanctions faces hyperinflation in food prices and widespread shortages.
Over five years bypass pipelines and alternative supply chains become permanent fixtures. Petrodollar inflows never recover and sanctions compound the isolation.

By year ten Iran confronts structural marginalization as a secondary supplier at best. Internal pressures from economic rot and factional rivalry mount inexorably.

The regime is forced to move first. It cannot sustain years of revenue denial while rivals reroute around it. Diplomatic capitulation or escalated domestic repression becomes inevitable well before the five year mark.

China absorbs the heaviest short term pain yet emerges stronger. Higher import costs slow some refinery runs in the first year but strategic reserves Russian pipelines and surging United States imports prevent outright shortages.

Over five years Beijing locks in new sourcing habits and accelerates renewables and domestic production. By year ten China enjoys markedly improved energy security with far less exposure to any single chokepoint. The crisis ultimately serves as an expensive but effective catalyst for diversification but shines a light on Chinese dependency on US rendering any multipolar aspirations null, China isn't a pole probably never was if it can't survive without IRGC cheap oil paid with the blood of Iranians.

The United States stands as the unambiguous winner across all horizons. Export revenues boom in the first year as shale producers respond to sustained high prices.

Over five and ten years America solidifies its role as the reliable Atlantic basin supplier to Asian demand. Strategic leverage deepens without proportional domestic pain.

Arab states astride the Persian Gulf also gain by converting crisis into durable infrastructure and expanded market access.

In strategic terms the IRGC executed a classic use it or lose it blunder. By weaponizing the eastern hostage it compelled the very adaptations that render the hostage irrelevant. Global energy flows have begun a permanent eastward rerouting that favors flexible producers over vulnerable chokepoint holders.

The 2026 crisis therefore accelerates the long term isolation of Iran. It diminishes the regime's economic shield permanently and hastens the internal collapse dynamics already evident before the conflict.

What began as a tactical gambit to survive immediate pressure has instead locked in decades of strategic decline. The geography of oil trade the scale of United States export capacity and the self interest of Asian importers have combined to ensure that the IRGC traded its last "card" for time it didn't get and burned what it could not afford to waste relevance and economic potential to climb out of the grave it dug itself.

The Hormuz closure wasn't a surprise to any serious person, one might argue Trump turned what the enemy believed to be a leverage to a ticking time bomb trap the IRGC just walked into.

IRGC was never the end goal, China is.

In recent weeks, as US and Israeli strikes have targeted the Islamic regime’s military infrastructure, public attention has also turned to vast underground tunnel networks used to house missile systems, some carved deep into mountains over decades.

As Iran’s environmental crisis deepens, these networks reveal the scale at which the regime has mobilized land, resources, and engineering capacity for its military agenda rather than for environmental protection or public infrastructure.

This points to a broader reality: Iran’s environmental strain is not only the result of neglect or mismanagement, but also of deliberate policies that have redirected natural and economic resources toward militarization at the expense of long-term sustainability.

These policies have pushed the country’s water resources, ecosystems, and air quality to the edge of collapse. In recent years, millions of Iranians have lived without reliable access to clean water or breathable air. Aquifers have been depleted, rivers have dried, and major cities face hazardous levels of air pollution.

The recent military action by the United States and Israel comes against a regime that has systematically exploited Iran’s resources in pursuit of military and ideological goals, with lasting consequences both inside and beyond its borders. These developments have already weakened a regime that has long been a major source of global instability, but what comes next will shape not only Iran’s political trajectory but also the future of its landscape, and with it, regional stability.

If the Islamic Republic remains in place, regardless of how it is presented, the outcome is not difficult to predict; the current trajectory points toward environmental collapse.

Over more than four decades, the regime has demonstrated neither the capacity nor the willingness to preserve the country’s resources or to ground its governance in science. Under political and economic pressure, such systems tend to reinforce existing patterns rather than pursue meaningful reform.

The result is an environmentally exhausted state facing water scarcity, uninhabitable regions, toxic air, and accelerating ecological decline.

Environmental crises do not respect borders. Dust storms originating in Iran already affect neighboring countries. Water mismanagement in shared basins contributes to regional tensions. As ecosystems fail, livelihoods disappear, driving migration and placing additional strain on neighboring countries.

A collapsing environment in Iran is not only a national tragedy; it is a driver of economic, environmental, and social instability at both the regional and global levels.

The regime, or any remnants of it, is unlikely to attempt meaningful reforms. Even if it did, it would face a fundamental constraint: the absence of public trust.

Environmental recovery is not only a technical challenge; it depends on public confidence, without which meaningful change is nearly impossible.

Water conservation, resource management, and ecological restoration all depend on societal cooperation. This requires legitimacy, credibility, and a shared national vision.

The current regime does not have this trust and cannot rebuild it. Decades of unfulfilled promises and disregard for public demands, reflected in nationwide protests that were repeatedly suppressed, have made meaningful confidence unattainable. Recent public reactions to reports of underground missile tunnel construction and its environmental impact offer a clear example of this continuing breakdown.

If the current regime remains, Iran will continue on a path toward environmental collapse, driving mass migration, destabilizing neighboring countries, and undermining regional investment in sustainability and cooperation.

The path forward

Any viable path forward must be grounded in public trust. In today’s Iran, that trust is not broadly distributed but is increasingly concentrated around Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as a unifying national figure. Across different regions and segments of society, his name has been repeatedly voiced in protests, often at significant personal risk.

In response to his calls, millions of Iranians have taken to the streets, both inside Iran and abroad, expressing support for him as a leader of a transition toward a democratic and secular Iran. This reflects a level of recognition and legitimacy that distinguishes him from any other figure in the current landscape.

Environmental recovery requires exactly this kind of trust. Without it, even the most well-designed plans cannot be implemented.

This credibility has not emerged suddenly; it has been built over the years through the Crown Prince’s continued engagement. His sustained focus on environmental concerns, which have remained part of his public positions over time, has also resonated with many Iranians. He is widely seen as a national figure capable of bringing people together around a shared goal of rebuilding and preserving the country.

This alignment between leadership and public confidence allows policies to move beyond rhetoric and into execution, something that has been absent in Iran for over four decades.

Restoration efforts could attract international investment, enable regional cooperation, and position Iran as a contributor to environmental stability rather than a source of disruption. In this context, initiatives such as the Cyrus Accords, proposed by Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, point to new opportunities for environmental collaboration between Iran, Israel, and neighboring countries.

A recovering Iran could participate in regional water initiatives, climate adaptation efforts, and sustainability-driven economic development. It could evolve into a hub for environmental innovation and sustainable tourism, leveraging its geography, history, and human capital.

To be born a scientist in the Middle East, and particularly in Iran, is to inherit constraints that shape your education, your mobility and often your sense of belonging long before you publish your first paper.

For many students, the obstacles begin early. Access to higher education can depend on geography, religion, ethnicity or family background. Certain research topics are restricted. Background checks are routine. Resources are uneven.

These constraints do not extinguish ambition. Many of the most driven students I have met from the region have worked relentlessly to overcome barriers that would discourage others. A significant number succeed in gaining admission to leading universities abroad, often ranking among the strongest in their cohorts.

But leaving does not mean leaving politics behind.

Students from Iran and other parts of the Middle East frequently undergo additional security screening when applying for visas or research permits in Western countries. Even when governments recognise the vulnerability of marginalised groups, the bureaucratic process can be prolonged and uncertain. Delays disrupt research timelines, funding and family life.

For a graduate student on a fixed stipend, uncertainty is not an abstraction. It is rent, tuition and the ticking clock of a degree.

Once abroad, the challenges evolve rather than disappear entirely. Family, friends and history bind students to their countries of origin. Political upheaval, internet shutdowns, military escalation or widespread protests reverberate across continents.

During periods of unrest, many students feel a moral obligation to support loved ones financially and emotionally. They spend hours each day checking the news, supporting movements on social media, translating information, sending money and making calls at odd hours.

Research suffers. Sleep suffers. Concentration suffers. The entire laboratory feels the impact when one member is under acute stress.

Political manipulation and disinformation can deepen divisions within diaspora communities, leading to heated disputes that further isolate students already under strain.

I have lived through several such cycles as a graduate student and now as a professor. Today I receive daily messages from students—via email, on social media or during meetings—asking for advice. My guidance is simple, though not easy to follow: help where you can, avoid corrosive debates and focus on your research and your long-term goals.

This tension between civic conscience and scientific focus is what I think of as a form of geographic discrimination. Events far beyond one’s control can disrupt internet access, travel, funding and collaboration, affecting thousands of scientists across the globe simply because of where they were born.

The current conflict involving Iran, Israel and the United States illustrates this clearly. Universities and schools have closed. Conferences and workshops have been postponed or cancelled. Laboratories face interruptions, whether from direct damage, security restrictions or the displacement of staff and students.

Even when military actions are described as targeted, research institutes and surrounding civilian infrastructure are not immune to the shock.

Recent strike damage near civilian educational facilities in Iran, which cost the lives of 160 students, and the previous attack on the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel are reminders that scientific ecosystems are fragile. Rebuilding infrastructure takes years. Rebuilding trust and a sense of safety can take longer.

The long-term cost is not measured only in damaged buildings or delayed experiments. It is measured in lost collaborations, abandoned projects and the quiet departure of talented young people who decide that stability matters more than prestige.

Science thrives on openness, mobility and sustained concentration. War undermines all three.

When we speak about geopolitical conflict, we often focus on borders, strategy and power. We speak less about research teams fractured by forces entirely outside their control.

If we value scientific progress, we must recognise how deeply it depends on the human beings who carry it forward. For many scientists from the Middle East, war is not a distant headline. It is an interruption that follows them into the laboratory and into the quiet hours when research demands clarity of mind.

Protecting science, in times of conflict, means protecting them as well.

This is not wishful thinking; it's a conservative estimate grounded in Iran's untapped potential, benchmarked against its neighbors like Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

A free Iran represents the single largest untapped pro-American economic opportunity of the 21st century. Conservative modeling shows over $1 trillion in US export revenues, millions of American jobs, decisive energy-price stabilization, and the permanent collapse of the world’s most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism, without US occupation or nation-building.

Iran is the last large greenfield market opportunity in the world. It combines industrial sophistication, underinvestment, labor arbitrage, and a large population base. We can turn the North Korea of the Middle East into the South Korea of the region.

What makes Iran different is the rare convergence of scale, capability, and readiness. Iran is not a fragile post-conflict state; it is a compressed modern economy held back by ideology, not capacity.

It graduates roughly 250,000 engineers annually, with STEM penetration rivaling that of advanced industrial nations, and has a global diaspora poised for immediate reverse brain drain. Its 90-million-plus, urbanized population sits in a demographic sweet spot, young, educated, and consumer-ready, creating instant market scale.

Geographically, Iran is a natural Eurasian bridge, linking the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf and serving as a credible alternative logistics corridor between East and West.

Unlike hydrocarbon-only economies, Iran combines energy abundance with deep industrial and manufacturing capability, enabling it to build, not merely extract.

Finally, Iran’s vast diaspora is highly productive and skilled economically and professionally. In America alone, Iranian Americans have helped create trillions of dollars in value and millions of jobs via such companies. We estimate that millions in the diaspora will return at least part-time and invest in the vast potential to rebuild Iran into an economic powerhouse.

For 47 years, the Islamic Republic has squandered Iran's vast resources on terrorism, proxy wars, and nuclear ambitions, leaving its economy in ruins and its infrastructure crumbling. But imagine a free Iran—a secular, democratic nation restored to its pre-1979 glory as a US ally, recognizing Israel, and joining an expanded Abraham Accords, perhaps rebranded as the Cyrus Accords in honor of ancient Persian tolerance.

Under a committed, democratic Iranian government, anchored by investment protections and US-approved financing, the country would embark on a "catch-up" phase of massive modernization. Half of that $1 trillion in US sales could materialize in the first five alone, concentrated in high-value sectors that create millions of American jobs.

Take aviation, where Iran's fleet is a relic of sanctions and neglect. Replacing at least 250 wide-body jets, narrow-body aircraft, infrastructure upgrades, and maintenance services, could generate $150 billion over a decade. This isn't charity; it's smart business, revitalizing an industry starved of growth.

The transportation and automotive sectors offer another $150 billion. With demand for a million electric vehicles, think Tesla, plus passenger cars, trucks, agricultural machinery, and EV charging networks, American innovators stand to dominate. Iran's roads and farms have been starved of investment; a free market would unleash pent-up demand for quality US products.

Even in military and security, opportunities abound for $250 billion modernization: command systems, ISR technology, training, and sustainment. A post-regime Iran would pivot from sponsoring Hezbollah and Hamas to partnering against terrorism, creating long-term contracts for US defense firms while bolstering regional stability.

The energy sector alone could deliver $300 billion in non-ownership revenues through services, reconstruction, equipment, and technology licensing. Upstream drilling tech, midstream pipelines, downstream refining upgrades, and risk-management services would flow to companies like ExxonMobil and Halliburton. Iran's reserves are among the world's largest; a reliable, transparent supplier could help stabilize global prices and reduce dependence on adversaries such as Russia.

Beyond these, additional sectors from water infrastructure and AI networks to biotechnology, healthcare, finance, and entertainment could add $350 billion. U.S. firms in IT, pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods would tap into an educated, 90+ million-strong market eager for American products. Tourism could boom with resorts and hotels, while mining critical minerals would secure supply chains for American tech. Wall Street could be the main driver of many of the deals, which will generate significant fees and other services revenue.

Iran's prolonged underinvestment means explosive growth post-opening, outpacing even the post-Soviet Eastern Europe boom. Unlike risky ventures elsewhere, this would be backed by vast natural resources and a government that prioritizes U.S. ties and includes safeguards against corruption.

Critics will cry "interventionism," but the Iranian people are already fighting—with bare hands against foreign mercenaries like Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shabi, and Fatemiyoun. They need the regime’s killing capacity neutralized—its surveillance, command nodes, and imported mercenaries degraded—so civil resistance can succeed.

A free Iran isn't just good for Iranians; it's the biggest strategic global win for America since winning WWII and defeating the Soviet Union. It offers the largest economic and peace dividend since the fall of the Soviet Union. It would dismantle the axis of evil, secure the Middle East, and deliver prosperity that echoes and expands the pre-Khomeini era when Iran was a pillar of peace. Iran can catch up on what it lost in 47 years in just 10 years.

The regime is a rotting corpse; let's bury it and build a future where Iran and America thrive together. The opportunity is here; let’s seize it.