The controversy began following a Monday broadcast on the state television, where hardline commentator Mostafa Khoshcheshm asserted that the Iranian people overwhelmingly favor military confrontation over diplomatic efforts to end the war.
“According to polls conducted by academic centers regarding the war, 87% of the people said that once and for all, this decayed tooth should be pulled out,” he said, arguing that reopening the Strait of Hormuz could leave Iran unable to close it again if needed.
No details about such a survey—its methodology, sample size or sponsoring institution—have been published, making the claim impossible to independently verify.
Yet the figure is notable less for its credibility than for what it reveals about a shifting narrative inside Iran.
Early in the conflict, some hardline factions and state-aligned voices attacked members of the Iranian diaspora and others who openly welcomed military pressure on the Islamic Republic or argued that war might weaken the system.
At some rallies and in media commentary, those seen as supporting foreign intervention were portrayed as traitors or collaborators.
Now, some of those same domestic factions are the ones most vehemently opposing negotiations with the United States and calling for the continuation of the war.
The contradiction reflects a more complicated reality.
Many Iranians may initially have supported military escalation—not out of loyalty to the Islamic Republic, but in the belief that war could weaken or even topple the regime.
That is not the kind of support state television appears to be claiming.
Instead, hardliners and state media have pointed to crowds at nightly rallies as evidence of a “majority” favoring war, though critics argue these gatherings represent a narrow and possibly organized segment of society.
At some of these rallies, participants have described the conflict with the United States as “existential” and argued it must continue until the “victory of good over evil.”
Online, many reacted with ridicule.
“When was the last time the opinion of the people of Iran—not the presenters of IRIB—was important and influential in the country’s major decisions?” one reader wrote on the Khabar Online website.
Another user sarcastically noted: “I don't know, maybe your ‘people’ are different from our ‘people.’ Who are these 87%? 87% of government supporters? … Do you even count us as part of the statistics?”
Public skepticism has been further fueled by allegations of digital manipulation by organized “commenting forces,” often referred to as the “Cyber Army.”
Readers have pointed out that while pro-negotiation comments often initially receive the vast majority of “likes,” those numbers are sometimes reversed within hours.
One user wrote: “Unfortunately, within a few hours, the ‘Zombies’ of the cyber army change the scores.”
Whether or not 87% of Iranians support continuing the war, the backlash to the claim suggests the battle over public opinion—and over who gets to define patriotism—may be intensifying alongside the conflict itself.
