Military escalation overshadows US-Iran peace efforts

Soleimani Ardestani, a religious scholar, former Mofid University professor and member of a reformist association of Qom seminary teachers and researchers, is being held in Qom’s prison.

According to Mojtaba Lotfi, an official from the office of the late dissident cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, the court convicted him on all eight charges brought against him.

Lotfi said Soleimani Ardestani does not plan to appeal unless the court agrees to hold a public hearing.

In a letter from prison, Soleimani Ardestani said the charges against him included disturbing public opinion, insulting sacred values, insulting the leadership in relation to Ali Khamenei and his son Mojtaba, taking part in a gathering over the house arrest of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and assembly and collusion against domestic security.

Mousavi, a former prime minister, has been under house arrest since 2011 after rejecting the official result of Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election and becoming one of the symbols of the Green Movement protests.

Soleimani Ardestani also listed accusations such as propaganda against the system, spreading falsehoods online, insulting senior religious authorities, damaging the dignity of the clergy and “mind control and psychological suggestion” – a striking charge even by the standards of Iran’s broad political indictments.

He has called the indictment weak and baseless, criticized his arrest and solitary confinement, and said he wrote his defense not to seek acquittal but to leave a record for history.

The case began with remarks in a debate with pro-government cleric Hamed Kashani. Soleimani Ardestani questioned long-promoted Shiite accounts about the death of Fatemeh Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammed and wife of Ali, the first Shiite Imam.

In Iran, the story of Fatemeh’s martyrdom is not only a religious narrative but part of a vast state-backed culture of mourning, ritual and political identity.

Soleimani Ardestani argued that if Ali had merely watched his wife being attacked and had not intervened, then the traditional account would raise questions about his justice. He later said he had not insulted Fatemeh and was challenging what he called the “stories told by religious singers or eulogists (maddahs).”

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He also questioned mourning ceremonies for Muhammad Taqi, the ninth Shiite Imam, saying his death was linked to jealousy by his wife after he remarried and that mourning the event 1,300 years later was meaningless.

The backlash was immediate. Pro-government eulogists, who play an influential role in mobilizing religious crowds, attacked him with vulgar and sexist language. Reports also emerged of a group attack on his home.

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Hardline figures called for prosecution and defrocking, while some religious voices went further, suggesting that denial of Fatemeh’s martyrdom could amount to leaving Shiite doctrine.

The controversy also split parts of the political middle ground. Reformist figures criticized Soleimani Ardestani’s tone and timing, while others warned that violent threats, home attacks and denunciations violated freedom of belief.

The sentence is significant because it shows how quickly the Islamic Republic can convert a dispute over religious history into a security case.

Soleimani Ardestani was not an outside critic of clerical rule. He was a cleric from inside the seminary world, which makes his challenge more sensitive.

By sentencing him to prison and stripping him of clerical status, the system is not only punishing one man. It is policing the boundaries of who is allowed to interpret religion, how far internal debate can go, and what happens when religious scholarship collides with the political theology of the state.

The debate emerged after Iran launched missiles at Israel following Israeli strikes in Beirut's southern suburbs, at a time when negotiations between Tehran and Washington were widely described as nearing an agreement.

Although Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters announced on Monday that it was halting further strikes, it warned that attacks would resume if Israel targeted either Iran or Lebanon again.

US President Donald Trump called on both sides to halt retaliatory attacks, while Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Washington bore "direct responsibility" for any action taken by Israel against Iran.

Speaking to the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)-linked Tasnim News Agency, an unnamed military source dismissed Washington's lack of public endorsement for Israeli attacks as a "purely propagandistic and deceptive act."

"If the Israelis and Americans believe they can, through 'controlled escalation,' make Iran and the Resistance Front predictable or limit the nature of Iran's response, they are making a foolish mistake," he said.

A new strategic doctrine?

Among the most notable reactions came from Sadegh Larijani, chairman of Iran's Expediency Council.

In a post on X, Larijani described the strike carried out in defense of Lebanon as "the official declaration of a strategic doctrine" and the opening of "a new chapter in defense policy," in which Iran would pursue its regional power through initiative and offensive capability.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who also heads Iran's negotiating team in talks with Washington, argued that Iran had "overturned the equation of a ceasefire on paper and its repeated violation on the battlefield."

"As long as there is no genuine will for confidence-building, Iran's response will remain the same," he wrote on X.

President Masoud Pezeshkian struck a more measured tone, arguing that diplomacy and deterrence remained complementary rather than contradictory.

"We will firmly defend the rights of the nation and retreat before no threat," he wrote. "Diplomacy and defense are the two wings of national power; we have abandoned neither the battlefield nor the negotiating table."

Media echo the new strategy

Iranian media quickly expanded on that interpretation, arguing that the strike reflected a broader shift in Tehran's deterrence strategy.

Farda News, a website close to Ghalibaf, argued that attacks on Lebanon would no longer be cost-free and that Israeli actions on one front could trigger responses on another. The outlet also interpreted the reported targeting of the Haifa refinery—described by the IRGC as retaliation for attacks on Iran's petrochemical industry—as an example of "strategic symmetry."

"The era of cost-free attacks on the Resistance Front has ended," it wrote.

Other conservative outlets advanced similar arguments. Tabnak, which is considered close to Mohsen Rezaei, an adviser to Iran's supreme leader, argued that Tehran had for the first time retaliated militarily for an Israeli attack on a country other than Iran itself.

Khabar Online described the strike as a redefinition of deterrence equations in the Middle East, while Rouydad24 argued that Tehran was signalling a willingness to expand both the geography and scope of future confrontations.

Several commentators framed the issue not simply as support for Hezbollah but as a test of Iran's credibility with its regional allies. Allowing Hezbollah to be weakened or destroyed without a response, they argued, would undermine decades of Iranian regional strategy and raise questions about the reliability of Tehran's support for its partners.

Mixed reactions online

Public reactions on social media were more divided.

Some users criticized Iran's involvement on behalf of Hezbollah. One commenter wrote that Iran had effectively become "the proxy force of a foreign group called Hezbollah," arguing that resources intended to strengthen Iran's own security were instead being spent defending an ally.

Others focused on the domestic costs of escalation.

"If they hit our water, electricity, refineries and power plants tomorrow, remember that your Revolutionary Guard brothers dragged Iran into war because of Lebanon," one user wrote.

Several users expressed concern that prolonged conflict could make Iran resemble Lebanon, a country long marked by instability and recurring wars.

"I fear the Beirutization of Tehran," one commenter wrote. "I am terrified of the Beirutization of Iran."

Together, the reactions highlighted a widening debate over the costs and benefits of Tehran's regional strategy. While officials and conservative media presented the strike as the emergence of a new deterrence doctrine, many ordinary Iranians appeared more concerned about the risks that such a doctrine could bring at home.

The performance took place on Thursday during Eid al-Ghadir celebrations at Imam Hossein Square in central Tehran. The event, which received extensive coverage from official and semi-official media outlets, featured Binesh Bolour, known professionally as Gheysar, who has lived outside Iran for nearly four decades.

In recent years, the Islamic Republic has sought to transform Eid al-Ghadir into a broader national celebration through large-scale public events held in city streets and squares.

The festival included speeches by clerics, performances by government-approved pop singers and religious vocalists closely associated with hardline political groups. Gheysar took the stage as some members of the crowd chanted “Long Live Iran” and “Death to America.”

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Official and semi-official media outlets, including state broadcaster IRIB, widely circulated videos of his appearance. In a caption accompanying one of the videos, IRIB wrote that Gheysar had “shouted out his patriotism and returned to Iran” after the outbreak of the recent war involving Iran, the United States, and Israel.

The newspaper Haft-e Sobh described Gheysar’s participation in an official event as both “surprising” and “taboo-breaking,” noting that it was unprecedented since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

The newspaper wrote: “Gheysar’s presence in Tehran and his performance should be regarded as an important development with dimensions beyond an artistic event. This form of participation in an official ceremony could symbolize the breaking of one of the cultural boundaries of the past four decades.”

Anti-western statements during the war

During the recent conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel, Gheysar repeatedly criticized US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on social media. He also strongly attacked Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and opposition groups that advocated foreign support for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.

In one video, he said the Iranian nation had broken the “hegemony of the West” and that he was proud of being Iranian. Following the military confrontation, he published additional videos praising Iran’s military capabilities and said: “We shattered the West’s grandeur, and I am proud of that.”

Mixed reactions online

The singer’s appearance has generated sharply divided reactions on social media. Some users described the government’s decision to allow him to perform as hypocrisy, arguing that the authorities embrace nationalism only when they need public support.

One user, Mehrdad Raha, wrote: “Whenever you see a veteran Iranian singer abroad becoming softer in tone toward the Islamic Republic, know that the government has probably been in contact with them for some time, using intermediaries, with promises of money, sponsorship, travel opportunities to Iran, or other incentives to win them over.”

Gheysar rejected such accusations in a video circulated online. He said this was not his first visit to Iran and insisted that he had not returned for money or to obtain a permanent license to work in the country.

He said he had participated in the ceremony because, like many Shiites, he holds a deep respect for Imam Ali, whom Shiites believe was designated by the Prophet Muhammad as his successor at Ghadir.

The legacy of the “Los Angeles singer”

The controversy also revived discussion about the long-standing phenomenon of the so-called “Los Angeles singer.”

Following the 1979 revolution, many Iranian pop stars and actors left the country, particularly female performers whose singing careers were effectively prohibited under the new political order. Many settled in the United States, especially in Southern California.

For years, recordings by exiled singers circulated inside Iran through cassette tapes and videotapes that were copied and distributed despite official restrictions. Possession or distribution of such material could expose people to legal penalties.

The style of dance-oriented Persian pop music associated with Los Angeles was often portrayed in official discourse as morally corrupt, and the term “Los Angeles singer” frequently carried a derogatory connotation in state media.

Several Iranian outlets referred to Gheysar, who has also performed in Israel, a destination Iranian citizens are generally prohibited from visiting, in exactly those terms while reporting on his recent appearance.

Yet the two songs he performed in Tehran differed markedly from the repertoire that made him famous.

One song was dedicated to his hometown, Tehran. The second, titled “The Children of Minab,” was inspired by damage to a school in the southern city of Minab during the first day of the recent conflict. Iranian media reported that 120 schoolchildren and nearly 40 teachers, staff members and parents were killed in the attack.

Could other exile artists return?

Gheysar’s official appearance has renewed speculation about whether other prominent exile artists might be allowed to return.

Haft-e Sobh asked: “Now we must wait and see whether Gheysar’s return is an exception or whether this path will be opened for other artists as well. Will this remain limited to one person, or could it become a model for the future?”

In recent months, several well-known Los Angeles-based Iranian singers have publicly expressed a desire to spend their final years in Iran.

Among those expressing a desire to return is veteran singer Shahram Shabpareh, who has said he would like to spend the final years of his life and career in Iran.

The possibility of a return by singer Moein has also been the subject of recurring speculation, although reports about potential concerts in Iran have repeatedly been denied by him or those close to him.

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For supporters, Gheysar’s appearance may signal a gradual easing of long-standing cultural restrictions surrounding exiled performers.

Skeptics, however, point to the experience of singer Habib, who returned to Iran in 2009 but was repeatedly denied permits to perform, arguing that official approval can be fleeting and does not necessarily translate into lasting artistic freedom.

Recent reports by state-linked, reformist and business-affiliated institutions suggest growing concern not only about economic hardship but also about its long-term social consequences.

One of the most striking indicators comes from Eghtesad News, which reported in May that Iran's middle class, estimated at 65% to 70% of the population at the beginning of the 2010s, now accounts for only around half of the country's population.

While the recent conflict involving Israel and the United States has intensified economic pressures, many analysts argue that the underlying deterioration long predates the war.

A separate study highlighted by the state-owned Mehr News Agency points to mounting pressure on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which remain among the largest employers of working- and lower-middle-class Iranians.

According to the Iran Chamber of Commerce Research Center, macroeconomic pressures are "systematically destroying" SMEs while leaving large state-backed entities comparatively insulated.

Unable to access affordable financing and struggling with rising costs, many businesses have resorted to what the report describes as "hidden layoffs"—reducing working hours, delaying wage payments and replacing long-term contracts with temporary arrangements.

The result, according to the report, is a gradual shift of workers out of the formal economy and into more precarious forms of employment.

That trend is explored in a separate analysis published by the reformist website Rouydad24, which traces the growth of informal labor to the sanctions shock that followed intensified international pressure in 2012.

Industries dependent on foreign trade and international supply chains increasingly turned to informal employment arrangements, hiring workers without insurance coverage or social-security protections.

According to the report, the probability of workers entering the informal economy rose by roughly 9% following the sanctions shock, with the effects becoming more pronounced over time.

While the informal sector helped absorb displaced workers and prevented a sharper rise in unemployment, the long-term costs have been significant. Analysts cited by Rouydad24 point to lower productivity, weaker tax collection and growing strain on pension funds as insurance contributions decline.

Low-skilled and less-educated workers have experienced the highest rates of displacement into insecure employment, while rural communities have seen some of the sharpest reductions in working hours and income stability.

What began as a deterioration in working-class security has increasingly spread into the middle class, leading to housing insecurity, declining consumption, shrinking access to cultural activities and growing economic pessimism.

Property prices and rents have risen far faster than incomes, forcing many households into smaller homes, peripheral neighborhoods or satellite towns on the outskirts of major cities.

Economists warn that such displacement carries broader social consequences, weakening community ties, increasing commuting times and reducing overall quality of life.

Inflation has also altered household consumption patterns. Reports increasingly describe families reducing spending on meat, dairy products and other staples, while expenditures on books, cinema, travel, restaurants and other cultural activities have become harder to sustain.

The cumulative effect is a gradual narrowing of the economic and social space traditionally associated with middle-class life.

These assessments stand in sharp contrast to recent remarks by Vice President Jafar Ghaempanah, who said that 82% of Iranians were satisfied with market management and the availability of essential goods during the war.

His comments came as government officials simultaneously acknowledged that authorities were unable to increase the purchasing power of subsidized coupons used to buy basic necessities.

For many economists, the central concern extends beyond living standards. Historically, Iran's middle class has played an important role in education, entrepreneurship, professional development and civic participation.

As economic pressures push more households downward, analysts increasingly warn of declining social mobility, weaker social trust and a growing risk of future instability.

The warnings emerging from Iranian experts converge on a similar point: the country's economic difficulties are no longer confined to the poorest segments of society and are reshaping the social foundations on which long-term stability depends.

According to recent media reports, negotiators are discussing a package worth roughly $12 billion that could become available if a preliminary agreement with the United States is reached.

The issue matters because even partial access to blocked funds could affect Iran's currency market, imports, government finances and broader economy.

Iranian officials estimate that more than $100 billion in assets remain inaccessible because of sanctions, banking restrictions and legal disputes that have accumulated over decades. Not all of that money would necessarily become available even in the event of an agreement, as some assets remain tied up in court cases and other restrictions unrelated to sanctions.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf recently traveled to Qatar, where discussions reportedly touched on the release of frozen Iranian funds.

Saeed Ajorlou, a member of the media team accompanying Iran's negotiating delegation, said in a televised interview on June 2 that the talks had been successful. He stated that once a framework agreement receives final approval, a portion of Iran's blocked assets should become available to the Central Bank of Iran in a manner that could not easily be reversed.

He also indicated that Tehran is seeking guarantees that access to the funds will continue and has linked the release of assets to the implementation of any future agreement.

Why the funds matter

A large share of Iran's blocked assets consists of oil revenues accumulated in foreign banks after the United States withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement in 2018 and reimposed sweeping sanctions.

Secondary sanctions made it difficult for countries purchasing Iranian oil to transfer payments directly to Tehran, causing substantial sums to accumulate in overseas accounts.

Economists say that even partial access to these resources could provide a significant boost to Iran's economy.

One immediate effect would be an increase in the Central Bank's foreign currency reserves, strengthening its ability to manage exchange-rate volatility. Additional funds could also be used to finance infrastructure projects, pay government obligations and support imports of essential goods, industrial equipment, raw materials and technology needed by domestic industries.

South Korea

South Korea once held one of the largest pools of frozen Iranian funds.

Roughly $6 billion in oil revenues accumulated in two South Korean banks before being transferred to accounts in Qatar in 2023 as part of a prisoner-exchange agreement between Tehran and Washington.

Although Iranian officials initially described the funds as released, access has remained subject to significant restrictions and the money has largely remained beyond Tehran's direct control.

Iraq

Iraq represents another major source of Iranian claims.

Much of the money stems from Iraqi purchases of Iranian natural gas and electricity. While neither side has publicly confirmed an exact figure, Iranian officials have repeatedly said that outstanding payments amount to several billion dollars.

Some of these funds have already been used for humanitarian purchases under arrangements approved by the United States. Estimates suggest that Iran could eventually gain access to between $10 billion and $12 billion held in Iraq if restrictions are eased.

China, India and Japan

China and India present a more complicated picture.

Iranian officials often avoid describing funds held in those countries as formally frozen, arguing that mechanisms exist to use at least part of the money for trade and imports.

Nevertheless, transactions remain difficult because banks and intermediaries facilitating such transfers risk exposure to US sanctions.

Iranian estimates place holdings in China in the tens of billions of dollars, while funds in India are believed to total roughly $7 billion.

Japan also holds Iranian funds linked to oil sales. Estimates generally range from $1.5 billion to $3 billion, although the exact amount remains unclear. Japanese authorities have occasionally allowed limited payments for humanitarian imports and Iran's obligations to international organizations, but most of the money remains inaccessible.

Europe

In Europe, Iranian assets are spread across multiple countries and financial institutions. Their status is shaped not only by sanctions but also by legal disputes, court rulings and anti-money-laundering regulations.

Total Iranian assets affected by these issues are estimated at anywhere from several billion dollars to as much as $20 billion.

One of the most prominent disputes involves approximately $1.6 billion to $2 billion connected to accounts belonging to Iran's central bank in Luxembourg. These assets have been tied up in litigation involving efforts by holders of US court judgments to obtain compensation related to terrorism cases.

While the exact amount of Iranian assets that could ultimately be released remains uncertain, access even to a fraction of these funds could strengthen Iran's foreign-exchange reserves, ease pressure on imports and provide the government with a significant financial cushion.

For that reason, frozen assets have become one of the most important economic components of the ongoing negotiations between Tehran and Washington.