Backed by the more uncompromising faction within the senior ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), these emerging hardliners have been testing their ability to disrupt talks that already face significant obstacles.
Within the IRGC itself, commanders appear to be split into at least two camps. One faction, associated with IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi and Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is widely described by Iranian observers as favoring continuation of the conflict.
The opposing faction aligns more closely with former IRGC Air Force commander and current Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. He is believed to retain influence within the IRGC’s aerospace branch and to maintain ties to the household of Iran’s slain leader Ali Khamenei, including his son Mojtaba.
Despite their rivalry, both factions share a core objective: ensuring the survival of the Islamic Republic. Their disagreement lies in the methods and strategic direction needed to achieve that goal.
Similar infighting existed before the latest war and under Ali Khamenei, but the absence of a figure with comparable authority appears to have widened the field to rival forces.
Among civilian political actors, many have attempted to distance themselves from the ultraconservative Paydari Party, which has been the loudest anti-American voice in Tehran for some time. Yet their ideological and personal links to Paydari figures remain evident.
Even Ghalibaf, now seen by many as the de facto leader of Iran’s “pragmatic” camp, has referred to these actors as a radical militia. He has also hinted at their connections to Paydari-aligned figures such as former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and hardline lawmaker Amir Hossein Sabeti, both of whom journalists in Tehran accuse of enticing anti-talks rallies.
Over the weekend, an X account identifying itself as “Fans of Saeed Jalili” sharply criticized Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, accusing them of falsely suggesting that their more moderate positions toward Washington had been endorsed by Mojtaba Khamenei.
The account demanded that Mojtaba appear publicly—or at least release an audio or video message—to clarify his political intentions. The post was deleted within an hour, and Jalili later distanced himself from its content, though he did not deny links to the account.
Ghalibaf has also criticized calls to continue the war, referring to the large crowds of mostly young Iranians who have taken to the streets nightly to demand renewed attacks on the United States and Israel.
In an unprecedented televised address on Sunday, he told the nation that Iran “controls the battlefield,” but acknowledged that “the US and Israeli militaries are far stronger and more experienced than Iran’s.”
Meanwhile, several members of parliament—including Ali Khezrian, Hamid Rasai and Morteza Mahmoudi—have been reported to be encouraging efforts to unseat Ghalibaf as speaker and to push for the impeachment of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
Whether these pro-war factions are strong enough to derail the Islamabad talks remains uncertain. The deeper issue is that while Ali Khamenei often managed factional rivalries to maintain control, the emerging leadership—what President Trump has referred to as the “new regime in Iran”—has yet to demonstrate the same ability to balance competing forces.
Under Khamenei, domestic politics remained a relatively contained arena in which rival factions competed but ultimately operated within boundaries he enforced.
The new leadership now faces a far more volatile environment: major military powers are directly engaged in the region, and the Middle East remains perched on a geopolitical powder keg.
