Iranian citizen extradited to US over alleged sanctions-evasion scheme

US Senator Tammy Baldwin said she will force a vote in the Senate aimed at ending the war with Iran.

“Tomorrow, I am forcing a vote to end the war in Iran,” Baldwin wrote on X.

This will be the Democrats fifth attempt at a War Powers vote. The previous four failed to pass.

In Section 20 of Bagh Rezvan cemetery in Rasht, thick layers of cement had been poured over part of the graves of slain protestors, creating a uniform surface higher than the surrounding gravestones.

In some areas of the cemetery, the cemented section was so large that it was unclear how many graves lay side by side, the sources added.

Some graves showed no names or dates of birth or death, only a grey surface that appeared intended to erase all trace of them. Several others had small headstones roughly the size of an A4 sheet of paper, with only the deceased’s first and last names engraved in small script.

Witnesses said the graves were defaced and damaged in the presence of government agents and plainclothed security forces.

Graves levelled in Tehran

At Tehran’s main cemetery, Behesht Zahra, some graves of those killed were levelled with the ground and covered with cement after third-day mourning ceremonies, a memorial traditionally held three days after burial.

Sources said the graves were covered in a way that made it impossible to determine from a distance how many had been newly dug.

In Section 329 of the cemetery, families also said some gravestones were destroyed or broken in the days following Feb. 11, the anniversary of Iran's 1979 revolution.

Only a small number of families of slain protestors have so far managed to install gravestones, sources told Iran International.

Families said they were pressured to alter inscriptions on the stones.

In some cases, the use of the Persian term Javidnam—meaning eternally remembered and widely used for slain protestors—or the phrase Farzand-e Iran (“Child of Iran”) drew objections from state bodies and threats that the stones would be destroyed.

‘Too costly’

Families also reported threats to destroy the gravestones of Mojtaba Karabi and Azra Bahaderi-Nejad in the northeastern city of Sabzevar. They said paint had been sprayed on the gravestone of Arman Gorjian and a metal plaque at the grave of Maryam Ebrahimzadeh had been defaced.

Some families temporarily removed gravestones to prevent further damage and said they would not reinstall them until restrictions were lifted.

Gravestone sellers advised families to install stones only for the 40th-day memorial ceremony and remove them afterwards to avoid destruction, sources said, adding that many could not afford the cost of reinstalling headstones and its psychological impact.

Iran International previously received an image showing the broken gravestone of slain protestor Behnam Darvishi.

Darvishi was killed on Jan. 8 after being struck by live ammunition on Persian Gulf Boulevard in Tehran and was buried in Nahavand in western Iran.

Precedents

Damage to graves of people killed in the 2022 protests has also been reported in previous years, including those of Majidreza Rahnavard, Siavash Mahmoudi, Kian Pirfalak, Zakaria Khial and Aylar Haghi.

The broader protest movement followed the September 2022 death in custody of Mahsa Jina Amini, which triggered nationwide anti-government demonstrations.

In earlier cases, gravestones were broken while inscriptions were altered or removed.

In August 2023, Amnesty International said it had documented the destruction of graves belonging to more than 20 victims across 17 cities.

The group said graves had been damaged with tar, paint and arson, headstones had been broken, and phrases describing victims as martyrs or stating they died for freedom had been forcibly erased.

Apparent divisions over negotiations with the United States may have strengthened the most confrontational elements within Iran’s political landscape and facilitated the rise of new hardline actors.

Backed by the more uncompromising faction within the senior ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), these emerging hardliners have been testing their ability to disrupt talks that already face significant obstacles.

Within the IRGC itself, commanders appear to be split into at least two camps, which despite their rivalry, share a core objective: ensuring the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Their disagreement lies in the methods and strategic direction needed to achieve that goal.

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Former US ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said a ship seized by the United States in the Strait of Hormuz was traveling from China to Iran and was linked to chemical shipments used for missiles.

“The ship the U.S. seized in the Strait of Hormuz this weekend was headed from China to Iran and is linked to chemical shipments for missiles,” Haley wrote on X with no further explanation.

Haley argued the incident was another sign of China’s support for Iran that “can’t be ignored.”

Backed by the more uncompromising faction within the senior ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), these emerging hardliners have been testing their ability to disrupt talks that already face significant obstacles.

Within the IRGC itself, commanders appear to be split into at least two camps. One faction, associated with IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi and Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is widely described by Iranian observers as favoring continuation of the conflict.

The opposing faction aligns more closely with former IRGC Air Force commander and current Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. He is believed to retain influence within the IRGC’s aerospace branch and to maintain ties to the household of Iran’s slain leader Ali Khamenei, including his son Mojtaba.

Despite their rivalry, both factions share a core objective: ensuring the survival of the Islamic Republic. Their disagreement lies in the methods and strategic direction needed to achieve that goal.

Similar infighting existed before the latest war and under Ali Khamenei, but the absence of a figure with comparable authority appears to have widened the field to rival forces.

Among civilian political actors, many have attempted to distance themselves from the ultraconservative Paydari Party, which has been the loudest anti-American voice in Tehran for some time. Yet their ideological and personal links to Paydari figures remain evident.

Even Ghalibaf, now seen by many as the de facto leader of Iran’s “pragmatic” camp, has referred to these actors as a radical militia. He has also hinted at their connections to Paydari-aligned figures such as former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and hardline lawmaker Amir Hossein Sabeti, both of whom journalists in Tehran accuse of enticing anti-talks rallies.

Over the weekend, an X account identifying itself as “Fans of Saeed Jalili” sharply criticized Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, accusing them of falsely suggesting that their more moderate positions toward Washington had been endorsed by Mojtaba Khamenei.

The account demanded that Mojtaba appear publicly—or at least release an audio or video message—to clarify his political intentions. The post was deleted within an hour, and Jalili later distanced himself from its content, though he did not deny links to the account.

Ghalibaf has also criticized calls to continue the war, referring to the large crowds of mostly young Iranians who have taken to the streets nightly to demand renewed attacks on the United States and Israel.

In an unprecedented televised address on Sunday, he told the nation that Iran “controls the battlefield,” but acknowledged that “the US and Israeli militaries are far stronger and more experienced than Iran’s.”

Meanwhile, several members of parliament—including Ali Khezrian, Hamid Rasai and Morteza Mahmoudi—have been reported to be encouraging efforts to unseat Ghalibaf as speaker and to push for the impeachment of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Whether these pro-war factions are strong enough to derail the Islamabad talks remains uncertain. The deeper issue is that while Ali Khamenei often managed factional rivalries to maintain control, the emerging leadership—what President Trump has referred to as the “new regime in Iran”—has yet to demonstrate the same ability to balance competing forces.

Under Khamenei, domestic politics remained a relatively contained arena in which rival factions competed but ultimately operated within boundaries he enforced.

The new leadership now faces a far more volatile environment: major military powers are directly engaged in the region, and the Middle East remains perched on a geopolitical powder keg.