Editor, Afghanistan International – Pashto
Despite deep political turmoil, economic distress, militant violence, and a fraying security landscape at home, Pakistan has unexpectedly emerged as the publicly acknowledged central mediator between Washington and Tehran.
Since late February 2026, the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has widened, with traffic through the Strait of Hormuz becoming a major pressure point for the global economy.
Under that pressure, a temporary ceasefire was first announced with Pakistani mediation. That was followed by rare direct talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad.
Pakistan’s role was publicly acknowledged by both Washington and Tehran, each of which described it as the “central mediator.”
The talks held in Islamabad on April 11-12 lasted more than 20 hours and ended without an immediate agreement. Even so, the channel remained open, and efforts to prepare a second round have continued.
That process has raised a central question: was Pakistan merely passing messages, or was it managing a broader peace process?
Although the direct US-Iran talks took place in Islamabad, Pakistan’s role can be seen across several parallel tracks.
Hidden channels of communication
From the beginning of the war, Pakistan helped facilitate the exchange of messages between Washington and Tehran.
A number of Pakistani politicians have openly acknowledged that US proposals – at times in the form of specific points or clauses – were conveyed to Iran through Pakistan, and that Iran’s responses were then relayed back to Washington.
That role became particularly important at a moment when some of the Persian Gulf’s traditional mediators, including Qatar, were themselves under severe security pressure and were being targeted daily by Iran.
Structuring the agenda of the talks
By hosting the talks, Islamabad took three practical steps.
First, it provided a secure environment and the necessary logistics for both sides, which trusted Pakistan’s capacity in that area.
Second, it separated the negotiations into distinct tracks: the nuclear program, sanctions, frozen assets, the Strait of Hormuz, and regional security.
Third, it pressed for a timetable and a mechanism for a “second phase” of talks and for dialogue to continue.
Although the talks ended without an immediate outcome, Pakistan succeeded on the first two fronts. That is why it did not remain passive afterward and continued its mediation efforts in preparation for a second round.
Coordination with regional partners
Pakistan has also sought to widen support for a ceasefire and renewed talks by securing broader backing – especially from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt.
That coordination matters because it allows each side to use its influence and reduces the likelihood of disruptive action by spoilers.
Why trusting Pakistan?
Although there are countries in the region more powerful than Pakistan – India being the clearest example – trust in Pakistan has not stemmed from moral authority. It has come from necessity, leverage, and calculation.
Pakistan has long-standing security ties with the United States, as well as neighborly and working relations with Iran. Together, those ties provide a minimum level of mutual trust for both sides.
For Washington, the need was for a country able to transmit messages within a framework aligned with US interests and to provide a negotiating venue acceptable to Donald Trump’s administration.
In that context, India was not a suitable choice for the United States, because the degree of influence and leverage the Trump administration has over Pakistan does not exist in the same way over India.
At the same time, America’s Arab allies are not only under intense pressure, but are also seen by Iran as direct partners of Washington and therefore lack the credibility needed for mediation. The United States also needed an Islamic country with nuclear capability to play that role. From that perspective, Pakistan was the best available option.
Pakistan also has workable relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and its trust-building efforts during the talks could prove useful.
Pakistan depends on the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East for energy, labor remittances, and regional stability. A prolonged war would therefore carry domestic economic and security costs. Those costs, in turn, increase Islamabad’s incentive to preserve the ceasefire and keep negotiations alive.
There is also a domestic political calculation. Pakistan’s government is trying to ease both internal and external pressure, particularly amid the country’s political crisis and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan. By taking part in a process in which the United States is one of the parties, Islamabad may hope to reduce pressure on Shehbaz Sharif’s government.
Economic distress is another dimension. Pakistan hopes that these talks may help it secure US economic support as well as financial aid and loans from Arab states – a need Islamabad understands well.
At the same time, Pakistan has security and defense agreements with Saudi Arabia and could, if the war dragged on, come under pressure to support Riyadh. That concern appears to have pushed Pakistan to avoid direct entry into the conflict: first by opening confrontations in Afghanistan to signal to its allies that internal instability left it unable to cooperate militarily against Iran, and then by presenting itself as a mediator for peace.
For Iran, too, Pakistan may not be the ideal mediator, but in practice there are few alternatives. Tehran has targeted many Arab countries, while Qatar – which had previously played a mediating role – has itself become a casualty of the war. That leaves Pakistan, as an Islamic country, as the remaining option. For that reason, Tehran has also welcomed Pakistani mediation.
The role of the security institutions and the army
In a crisis of this kind, guaranteeing a ceasefire and ensuring the safe passage of messages is difficult without the involvement of security institutions.
According to reports, Pakistan’s army chief is seen in Washington as a reliable channel for direct contact, and that has accelerated decision-making.
Pakistan has also previously hosted and facilitated confidential contacts between major powers, including during the period of rapprochement between China and the United States. That history suggests Islamabad has experience in closed-door diplomacy.
Reports further indicate that direct contact between the Trump administration and General Asim Munir helped smooth the decision-making process, and that Washington believes Pakistan has practical influence over security commitments, can preserve its relationship with Iran, maintain its ties to the Arab world, and is itself affected by instability in the Middle East.
Why is the army chief at the center of this diplomacy?
In this mediation effort, it has been not the prime minister or foreign minister, but Pakistan’s military chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, who has emerged as the main figure in the negotiations.
Pakistan’s military has more than 51 years of experience dealing with US and Iranian security and military circles. Pakistani officials say responsibility for maintaining confidential channels with the political and military leadership in Tehran and Washington has been placed in Munir’s hands. In a crisis like this, security guarantees carry greater weight than purely political commitments.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said in a speech that Munir had played an especially prominent role in the talks. He added that Munir received the Iranian delegation in full field marshal dress and welcomed the American delegation in formal Western attire – a symbolic message suggesting that Pakistan was guaranteeing the process not only at the level of the civilian government, but at the level of the state and security establishment.
After the imprisonment of Imran Khan, public discontent with the army in Pakistan had risen sharply, and many came to see the military as the root of the country’s crises. Munir appears to have understood that mood clearly, and by accepting a mediating role at such a sensitive moment, he has, to a considerable extent, managed to rebuild some of the public trust that had been lost.
According to a source in the Pakistani prime minister’s office, Trump’s office contacted Munir directly 12 times after the first round of talks.
That suggests Pakistan’s army chief is effectively acting as an indirect representative of the United States while also handling the transmission of messages.
Political parties and civilian institutions in Pakistan, however, are unhappy with that role and worry that, if the talks succeed, the army’s power will grow further and the already weakened political sphere will fall more deeply under military influence.
After the first round ended, Munir traveled to Tehran to prepare the ground for a second round of talks and to convey Washington’s messages and proposals to the Iranian side. The trip was directly linked to efforts to shape the next phase and extend the ceasefire.
The prospects for success in talks
Although the first round ended without a final result, the repeated trips by Pakistan’s army chief and the pressure created by the situation in the Strait of Hormuz – on both the United States and global markets – have increased the chances of at least a partial agreement.
The path ahead, however, is far from straightforward, because the disagreements are more structural than merely technical.
Several difficult but essential steps could improve the prospects for success.
Statements by Pakistani officials suggest they are trying to lay the groundwork for those two stages and hope that Islamabad will reap what they describe as “the sweetest fruit” from both Washington and Tehran.
That expectation rests on a broader calculation. Tehran no longer has the capacity for a long war and wants relief for its weak economy from sanctions pressure, while the United States has shown signs of willingness to ease some of those sanctions.
On the other side, the Trump administration is facing rising domestic political and economic pressure, while Iran has sent positive – though conditional – signals on the nuclear file.
For those reasons, hopes for the success of the talks have increased.
At least 36,500 Iranians were killed by the Islamic Republic during the January uprising, mostly on January 8 and 9, according to classified documents, field reports and witness accounts reviewed by Iran International, with the true toll believed by many to be far higher.
The dead included children, students and the elderly. Among the youngest victims frequently cited was three-year-old Melina Asadi.
One image from the unrest remains etched in public memory: a bloodied older woman standing in the street, fist raised, saying, “I’m not afraid. I’ve been dead for 47 years.”
Another was the sight of body bags. Videos that emerged despite the blackout showed rows of black bags lining courtyards, makeshift morgues overflowing and desperate families searching among the dead for loved ones.
Some bodies appeared with catheters and breathing tubes still in place, reinforcing witness claims that wounded protesters were killed after reaching hospitals.
One eyewitness, Kiarash — whose surname is being withheld for security reasons — described Tehran’s main cemetery as a “warehouse of bodies,” saying trucks continued arriving to unload more corpses as families waited outside.
The protests, which erupted in early January, were met with overwhelming force. Demonstrators demanding freedom were confronted with live fire, blades and military-grade repression.
Witnesses also described hospitals turned into extensions of the crackdown. Doctors and healthcare workers were allegedly threatened, detained or attacked for treating the injured. Some families say loved ones who survived initial gunfire were later killed inside hospital wards.
One such case was 17-year-old Sam Afshari, whose father told Iran International that after being wounded during protests in Karaj, his son was taken to hospital alive, placed on a breathing tube and then fatally shot.
“They finished him off,” his father said.
Authorities and some outside observers initially portrayed the unrest as primarily economic. But many Iranians rejected that narrative.
While anger first surfaced in the bazaars — historically seen as a pillar of the Islamic Republic’s support base — in late December, demonstrations quickly spread to universities, provincial towns and religious communities.
Unrest reached hundreds of cities and towns nationwide, according to reports reviewed by Iran International.
For many participants, this was not just another protest wave. It was the release of 47 years of accumulated pressure over repression, corruption, economic decline and personal freedoms.
Iranians were demanding a future not defined by compulsory social controls, state violence or a nuclear confrontation that repeatedly drags the country into crisis.
On January 8, authorities cut public access to the internet, triggering a 20-day digital blackout that rights groups say helped conceal the scale of the killings.
The blackout severely restricted access to independent information, communication with family abroad and documentation of abuses.
Iranian officials also acknowledged economic damage, with estimates placing losses in the tens of millions of dollars per day.
Trump support resonated with some protesters
During the uprising, support from US President Donald Trump drew significant attention.
For some Iranians, it mattered because memories of the 2009 Green Movement — the mass protest movement that erupted after disputed elections under President Barack Obama — still run deep. Many from that era felt the world did not do enough.
A few days after the January 8–9 massacre of protesters, Trump publicly backed demonstrators, writing: “Iranian patriots… KEEP PROTESTING… HELP IS ON ITS WAY.” He urged them to “take over your institutions” and warned the US was “locked and loaded.”
Despite mixed views on the effectiveness of a military campaign to topple the Islamic Republic, many Iranians felt so desperate that they wanted Trump to begin strikes as soon as possible.
He did so nearly 50 days after the massacre.
40-day war hits regime hard
On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated military campaign targeting the Islamic Republic’s leadership, nuclear infrastructure, missile systems, air defenses and internal security apparatus.
The operation included tens of thousands of strikes on military and strategic sites across Iran. Senior regime figures were killed, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in the most dramatic leadership blow since the 1979 revolution.
Other targets included IRGC commanders, Basij infrastructure, military production centers and strategic compounds tied to regime control. Iranian missile launchers and parts of the country’s strike capability were also heavily degraded.
For many Iranians who blamed these institutions for repression, torture and killings, the campaign was seen not simply as war, but as the first time the machinery used against them had itself come under sustained attack.
Videos reviewed by Iran International showed some Iranians thanking US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the strikes. Others celebrated in homes and streets, with some dancing to YMCA — the song closely associated with Trump rallies — seeing the moment as symbolic justice after years of suffering.
Others hoped the weakening of the regime’s coercive apparatus could create space for future protest and political change, as promised by both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Yet even as parts of the repressive apparatus were hit, executions of prisoners and dissidents continued. Human rights groups say Iran carried out a record number of executions last year and warn the death penalty may be used even more aggressively after the war.
Diplomacy returns, questions remain?
The military campaign paused with the announcement of a two-week ceasefire on April 8, and the rhetoric has since shifted toward diplomacy: talk of deals, sanctions relief, frozen assets, and uranium transfers.
Iranian civil society groups have urged negotiators to include the release of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in any agreement, arguing peace without human rights would leave thousands behind.
For many Iranians, the central question remains unchanged: where are the Iranian people in these negotiations?
Those killed in the streets, in detention and in hospitals did not die for another nuclear arrangement, many argue, nor to see one insider replaced by another such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
One hundred days later, Iran remains suspended between grief and uncertainty.
Some feel partially avenged by the killing of Khamenei and his commanders, and by the weakening of the regime. Others still hold out hope that change may come. But many say they fear the world has moved on without them.
US President Donald Trump said on Friday he expects an agreement with Iran “in the next day or two,” even claiming Iran has “agreed to everything,” including halting uranium enrichment and transferring its highly-enriched uranium stockpiles to the US.
The remarks came hours after Iran announced the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz following weeks of disruption, an announcement that sparked rare public criticism from within the Islamic Republic targeting the negotiating team.
Despite Tehran's declared reopening of the strait, Trump said the US will continue blockading Iranian ports until a final deal is achieved.
Speaking at Iran International's English podcast Eye for Iran, maritime sanctions expert Charlie Brown framed the strategy behind the current US blockade as one that could either be about pressure to deal or pressure to collapse.
“I think it’s clear that the goal would be, you know, the first case is pressure to come to negotiate, but the other case would be pressure to collapse the regime system and make space for a new system,” said Brown, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran who tracks Iran’s shadow fleet and illicit tanker networks.
That dual objective, forcing negotiations while simultaneously weakening the system sits at the heart of the current moment. But whether it is working remains far less clear.
Pressure campaign vs. economic reality
At the center of that uncertainty is the Strait of Hormuz, where a US-led pressure campaign has targeted Iran’s oil exports — the Islamic Republic's economic lifeline.
Both Brown and energy expert Dr. Iman Nasseri, Managing Director for the Middle East at FGE, agreed the impact is real, but warned it is too early to measure its effectiveness.
“The effects of a blockade will definitely take time,” Brown said, cautioning against drawing quick conclusions.
Nasseri, one of the leading experts on Iran’s oil flows and regional energy markets, echoed that view, emphasizing that even under ideal conditions, economic pressure unfolds slowly.
“In normal conditions three to four weeks but in Iranian situation and sanctions evasion it could take up to three months for a cargo to land in the destination market,” he said.
That delay means Iran can continue generating revenue in the short term, even as restrictions tighten.
“Iran is still selling oil which is out there at sea today without loading anything,” Nasseri explained, underscoring how existing cargoes can sustain income flows even as new exports are disrupted.
Shipping data reinforces that point. According to TankerTrackers.com, 633 Iran-linked tankers have been tracked globally, with 397 sanctioned by US authorities. Yet dozens continue operating, including at least 72 vessels currently moving freely in the Middle East.
The system — built on ship-to-ship transfers, AIS spoofing and shadow banking remains active, even under pressure.
That raises a broader question: whether global markets can absorb the disruption long enough for pressure on Iran to fully materialize.
Nuclear stakes and competing narratives
While the economic battle unfolds at sea, the nuclear file remains central to any potential deal and to competing claims of success.
Trump’s assertion that Iran has agreed to halt enrichment would represent a major concession. But nuclear experts caution that the reality is more complex.
“I’d say the probability the regime would want to build the bomb has gone up, but the probability that they can succeed has gone down,” said David Albright, founder of the Institute for Science and International Security.
Albright also warned that focusing only on Iran’s most enriched uranium stockpiles risks missing the bigger picture. Iran possesses thousands of kilograms of lower-enriched uranium that could be further processed if enrichment continues — meaning any deal that does not fully end enrichment could leave a pathway intact.
Taken together, his assessment points to a paradox: Iran may be more motivated than ever to pursue nuclear capability, even as its ability to do so has been degraded by military strikes.
That tension complicates any claim that diplomacy alone has resolved the nuclear threat.
Regional shifts and Iran’s influence
Beyond the nuclear and economic fronts, regional dynamics suggest Iran’s position may be shifting — though not collapsing.
One of the most significant developments has been direct diplomatic engagement between Lebanon and Israel, a move that signals potential decoupling from Tehran’s influence.
“This was the first time that the United States recognizes that the government of Lebanon is sovereign enough and adult enough to sit in face-to-face talks bilaterally without Saudis or Iranians or Syrians or anybody else in the room,” said Hussain Abdul Hussain, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and author of the Arab Case for Israel.
A newly agreed ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is set to last 10 days, with the possibility of being “extended by mutual agreement” if negotiations show progress
That shift challenges one of Iran’s long-standing pillars of regional power: its network of proxy forces.
For years, Lebanon has effectively been treated as an extension of Iran’s regional strategy through Hezbollah. But the current talks — taking place independently of Tehran — suggest a possible shift toward decoupling.
Abdul Hussain underscored that divide more directly, describing how Lebanon’s leadership is increasingly asserting its independence from Iran’s negotiations.
“You do you, we do Lebanon,” he said, characterizing the government’s stance as separate from Tehran’s diplomatic track.
A moment of uncertainty
Taken together, the developments across Hormuz, the nuclear file and the regional landscape point to a single conclusion: it is too early to declare a winner.
The United States has demonstrated its ability to impose pressure — militarily and economically — while Iran has shown it can still adapt, sustain revenue and shape the narrative.
For now, the outcome is not defined by victory, but by how long each side can sustain the pressure before it breaks.
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