IRGC says it targeted Israeli military satellite reception stations

The Rebrand Begins

The pattern is familiar. When Ali Larijani was killed in an Israeli strike last week, some Western coverage quickly reached for the usual labels: practical, moderate, easier to work with than the other men around him. Ghalibaf may now be next. He is now the most senior surviving figure in the Islamic Republic with deep IRGC roots. That puts him in a dangerous and important position. He could become the next major assassination target. He could also be sold as a channel to the West in a system that increasingly looks like an IRGC republic.

At the very moment that reports are emerging of further U.S. military steps around Iran, there are also reports that JD Vance may soon meet senior regime figures. Ghalibaf may be one of them. We do not know whether those reports are true, whether any such contact will take place, or who exactly would be involved. No name has been officially confirmed. But if such a meeting does happen, it may prove clarifying. Vance belongs to the isolationist wing of the Trump administration. A meeting with Ghalibaf or another senior regime figure would give Vance a direct look at who actually holds power in Iran and the kind of men the administration would be dealing with. That could matter if the war deepens and the isolationist wing has to judge the regime more directly.

As I argued in an earlier piece, ambiguity about potential contacts is already doing political work, unsettling senior officials in Iran as they wonder who may be talking to Washington. This piece makes a different point. The same ambiguity can also create openings for the wrong kind of figure to be misread as a moderate or a usable channel.

But Ghalibaf is not a moderate. He is not a hidden reformer. He is not a practical man trapped inside an ideological state. He is a hardliner, corrupt to the bone, who has spent years trying to look like something else.

Ghalibaf has always been ambitious. He once cast himself as the Islamic Republic’s version of a modernising strongman, even using the language of an “Islamic Reza Khan.” He wanted the presidency and, for years, carried himself like Iran’s next president. He ran in four presidential elections after 2005. Around him, that ambition produced a political project: to present Ghalibaf not as just another insider, but as the man who could impose order after Khamenei.

That image was built not only for domestic politics. It was built for foreign eyes too.

How the image was built

Inside the system, Ghalibaf is a hardliner and a loyal product of the regime. Outside that circle, especially in private meetings and foreign-facing conversations, he has long tried to present himself as more modern, more practical, more disciplined, and less ideological than the Islamic Republic’s usual faces. He has tried to market himself as the man who could keep the system in place while making it easier for the outside world to deal with.

By mid-2024, that effort was already visible. On June 10, IranWire reported that people presenting themselves as Ghalibaf’s advisers had spent the previous two weeks approaching European and American diplomats with a clear message: Iran would need a strongman after Khamenei, and that strongman should be Ghalibaf. A European diplomat quoted in the report said they were presenting him as the only figure with the authority and connections to contain factional conflict, restore order, improve Iran’s foreign relations, and “cleanse” the regime of radical elements. The diplomat added that academics and think tank figures in Europe and the United States were also involved, suggesting a broader effort to persuade Western officials that Ghalibaf was not merely a candidate, but a future leader they should start accepting now.

My own sources point in the same direction. One source who was in the room told me that, in a meeting with European politicians in a European capital a few years before the IranWire report, Ghalibaf was plainly marketing himself as the kind of Islamic Republic figure the West could do business with after Khamenei. He was not presenting himself as an opponent of the regime. He was presenting himself as a more polished custodian of it: strong enough to control the system at home, but measured enough to speak to foreign capitals abroad.

There was another reason this belief took root. People familiar with the matter say Ghalibaf saw his absence from U.S. sanctions lists as a form of distinction, as if Washington treated him differently from other senior figures in the Islamic Republic. According to those familiar with the issue, the explanation was technical and legal rather than political, particularly because of his role as speaker of parliament. Even so, the coincidence seems to have had a real political effect. It fed his belief that he was seen abroad as a more acceptable and more usable figure than others in the system.

According to sources inside Iran, this also made parts of the regime suspicious of him. Some in the intelligence apparatus viewed his unsanctioned status with distrust and asked why a man of his seniority had escaped measures imposed on others. His ability to travel to the West only added to that unease. Ghalibaf is a pilot and, according to these sources, has at times flown aircraft himself, including on trips to London to keep his pilot credentials current. That too strengthened the sense among some insiders that he occupied an unusual place in the regime’s external profile.

The Record Behind the Image

But the image collapses the moment one looks at the record.

Ghalibaf is not a reformer held back by the system. He is one of its purest products. He rose through the Revolutionary Guards, the police, the municipality, and the institutions that sustain power in the Islamic Republic. His name is tied not only to hardline politics but also to repression, corruption, and elite hypocrisy.

For many Iranians, his role in repression has made him one of the most hated faces of the Islamic Republic. He is linked not only to the student crackdowns but also to the coercive institutions that kept the system alive through fear and force.

His corruption record is just as important. His years as mayor of Tehran are tied to some of the best-known scandals of that period, including the “astronomical properties” affair and the wider Yas Holding and Isa Sharifi case. These were not minor accusations at the edge of his career. They became part of the political meaning of his name.

The family scandals tell the same story. “Sismoni-gate” was politically damaging not because it was the gravest case against him, but because it exposed the hypocrisy of the ruling class. While the regime preached sacrifice and resistance, members of Ghalibaf’s family were seen shopping in Turkey for baby goods. Later came the embarrassment over his son’s attempt to secure permanent residence in Canada. These episodes confirmed a familiar pattern: the men who speak in the language of endurance often arrange private exits for their own families.

Why the West Should Resist the Script

That is why the current moment matters.

As war and decapitation strikes have thinned the Islamic Republic’s upper ranks, Ghalibaf has moved closer to the centre of power. Reports have suggested that he may have been involved in contacts with Washington. He has publicly denied that. He called the reports fake news and rejected any suggestion that negotiations had taken place.

But the deeper point is not whether he is lying or whether the reports are true in full. The deeper point is that his name surfaced so quickly at all. Whether Ghalibaf is really involved is almost secondary. He is exactly the kind of figure around whom such speculation gathers: a hardliner who has spent years trying to present himself as more practical, more modern, and more internationally legible than the rest of the ruling class. That makes him a natural target for rumour, whether or not he is the actual channel.

And that is the danger.

In moments of crisis, some in the West begin looking again for a hard man they can call practical. Faced with chaos in Tehran, they search for someone tough enough to control the machine but polished enough to sound like a statesman. Ghalibaf has spent years preparing for that role. He has tried to look like the man who could preserve the system while making it more manageable for outsiders.

But he is not a post-Khamenei solution. He is a distilled product of the Khamenei system.

Before anyone in the West starts calling him a pragmatist, it is worth remembering what he really is.

He is one of the clearest expressions of the Islamic Republic, and one of its most hated figures in the eyes of the Iranian public. That public is not a bystander here. Less than three months ago, Iranians gave more than 30,000 lives in resistance to the same oppressive system that Ghalibaf stands at the heart of. Anyone thinking of dealing with him should remember that.

And that is the point to make now, before the rebranding begins.

Trump did not provide details about the offer he said Iran had made but described it as related to oil, gas and the Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking to reporters in the Oval Office, Trump said Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio were among the officials leading the talks and were "dealing with the right people" in Iran.

Tehran has not publicly acknowledged any such proposal. Iranian officials, however, have been quoted by various outlets as saying that they have received proposals conveyed through intermediaries and are reviewing them.

Trump suggested that Tehran was eager to reach an agreement after weeks of fighting with the United States and Israel.

“And the other side, I can tell you they’d like to make a deal, and who wouldn’t?” Trump said. “If you were there, look, their navy’s gone, their air force is gone, their communications are done — that’s the biggest problem.”

The president’s remarks marked a shift in tone from comments he made at the White House last week, when he said he did not want a cease-fire.

Pressed on the apparent reversal, Trump said the change reflected the progress of talks.

“The fact that they are talking to us and they are talking sense,” he said.

Trump reiterated that the central condition of any agreement would be Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.

“And remember, it all starts with they cannot have a nuclear weapon, just as I said yesterday,” he said. “I said, ‘Well, number one, two and three is they can’t have a nuclear weapon,’ and they’re not going to have a nuclear weapon, and we’re talking about that.”

Officials in Washington have indicated that potential talks could involve senior US negotiators and intermediaries in countries such as Pakistan or Turkey, as diplomatic efforts intensify alongside the continuing conflict.

Iranian officials have acknowledged indirect contacts with Washington but have said any agreement would require recognition of Iran’s rights under international law and relief from sanctions.

US President Donald Trump said Iran had given the United States a “significant prize” worth a “tremendous amount of money,” adding that it was related to the Strait of Hormuz.

"They did something yesterday that was amazing. Actually, they gave us a present, and the present arrived today, and it was a very big present, worth a tremendous amount of money," he told reporters in the Oval Office on Tuesday.

"I'm not going to tell you what that present is, but it was a very significant prize, and they gave it to us…So that meant one thing to me, we’re dealing with the right people,” he added.

“It wasn't nuclear related. It was oil and gas related, and it was a very nice thing they did,” Trump said.

President Donald Trump said on Tuesday the United States is talking to “the right people” in Iran to reach an agreement to end hostilities.

“We’re talking to the right people … they want to make a deal,” Trump told reporters.

He added that Iran wants to reach a deal very badly.

According to international media reports, including Bloomberg and Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Iran has begun charging oil tankers for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian outlets such as the state-owned Mehr News Agency and Tabnak—affiliated with Mohsen Rezaei, senior military adviser to Iran’s new leader—had previously reported that Tehran was considering the strait as a potential source of revenue for the Islamic Republic.

News reports say Iran is charging around $2 million per tanker. However, because U.S. sanctions prevent Iran from conducting international banking, it remains unclear what currency is being used and who ultimately receives the payments.

Earlier, Iran’s Foreign Ministry announced that various countries and oil companies should contact Tehran directly to coordinate safe passage.

The idea of monetizing control of the strategic waterway has also been echoed in Iranian political commentary. The IRGC-linked daily Javan wrote that it was Iran’s new leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who first introduced the concept.

“He revived a forgotten historical truth in the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf,” the newspaper wrote on Tuesday, March 24.

In an editorial titled “The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Winning Card in the Post-War Order,” Javan argued that the waterway should become a strategic lever for the Islamic Republic and “the most important fund to compensate Iran’s losses in the war.”

According to the paper, this framework was outlined in Mojtaba Khamenei’s first message to the nation.

Under the heading “A Strategic Package for Compensation of Losses,” the editorial said Iran now needs a comprehensive, multilayered doctrine to prevent circumvention of its new arrangements. Taxes, it said, would be based on “the nature of the cargo” and “the degree of cooperation between the ship’s country of origin and the aggressors.”

Javan estimated that under such a framework regional states would need to pay $50 per barrel to compensate Iran’s losses and contribute to reconstruction efforts.

Ships belonging to Israel and the United States, it added, would be barred from the strait even under a different flag.

Under a section titled “Redefining Negotiations,” the paper said Israeli and U.S. vessels could use the waterway only if one sanction on Iran were lifted for each passage.

The argument rests on the claim—advanced by Iranian commentators—that international law allows states to levy fees to ensure the security of waterways under their control.

With control over several islands and strategic points in the Persian Gulf, and full control of the waterway’s northern shore, Iran holds a uniquely strategic position, the IRGC-linked daily argued.

The paper concluded: “This package sends a clear message to all players inside and outside the region: the era of imposing sanctions on Iran is over, as no country can benefit from Persian Gulf security for free.”

Whether the United States, regional states, or their partners in South Asia would accept Tehran’s unilateral framework and comply with its demands remains uncertain.