Israel says it hit Iranian military command centers in Tehran, Tabriz

The commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard naval forces warned that ships linked to what he called “aggressors” would not be allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and have “no right” to do that.

Alireza Tangsiri wrote on X, “If you have doubts, come closer and test it."

Earlier, the Revolutionary Guards said Arab or European countries that expel Israeli and US ambassadors from their territories would have full freedom to transit the Strait of Hormuz starting Tuesday.

Supporters of the Islamic Republic have gathered in several cities to show loyalty to the new leader. The officialdom has congratulated him in unison. But Khamenei Jr is yet to appear.

There has been no speech, no televised address and very few photos or videos of the new leader. The only recording attributed to him so far is a short old video announcing that his religious classes have been canceled.

The lack of information has been so striking that even state media appears uncertain about how to present him to the public.

Older photographs have been circulated, stylized illustrations or AI-generated renderings have appeared online to fill the visual vacuum. These images are not presented as authentic photos but symbolic representations.

The situation raises a central question: what scenario may explain the unusual debut of Iran’s new Supreme Leader?

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  The ascendency of Khamenei Jr was a long-planned improvisation

Scenario one: delayed unveiling

The simplest explanation is that the Islamic Republic intends to introduce Mojtaba through a carefully managed televised address or recorded message once security conditions allow.

In this scenario, the leadership transition would be framed as orderly and unified, with Mojtaba reiterating familiar themes of resistance, continuity and cohesion under wartime pressure.

Even so, the delay itself invites scrutiny. Authorities could cite security concerns, but the absence of even a brief recorded message—particularly after the steady stream of congratulatory statements from senior officials—has raised questions about the pace and choreography of the transition.

For now, the silence has only heightened curiosity about how and when the new leader will first address the public.

Scenario two: leadership by statement

A second possibility is that Mojtaba may initially govern largely through written statements rather than public appearances. Such an approach would allow the system to project continuity while limiting exposure during a volatile security moment.

Iran’s leadership has long relied on tightly managed messaging, and written statements attributed to Mojtaba could reiterate established positions while reinforcing the central role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which appears to wield growing influence over wartime decision-making.

State television has already described Mojtaba as a veteran of the “Ramadan war,” part of an emerging narrative that presents him as shaped by wartime experience. Under this scenario, his absence would reflect caution rather than weakness.

Scenario three: managed vacuum

A third possibility is that Mojtaba’s continued absence reflects deeper uncertainty within the leadership itself.

The Islamic Republic is operating under sustained Israeli and US strikes, and the rapid announcement of his succession may have served primarily to prevent internal competition at a moment of acute vulnerability.

Another explanation is that Mojtaba may have been injured in the same attacks that killed his father and other senior figures—a scenario that would help explain both the speed of his appointment and his continued absence.

Naming him quickly could have forestalled rivalries among powerful factions while allowing the Revolutionary Guards and other security institutions to consolidate operational control.

In such circumstances, Mojtaba would function largely as a symbolic leader while practical authority remained concentrated within the security establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular.

Presenting an absent or wounded successor could also suppress dissent by discouraging open criticism of someone portrayed as a victim of the same war that killed the previous Supreme Leader.

Continuity and risk

Such a strategy, however, carries risks. If the leader continues to remain unseen for an extended period, public skepticism could deepen further, particularly among a population already wary of official narratives.

The lack of clarity may also reinforce uncertainty within the elite at a time when the system is under exceptional strain.

In the short term, projecting continuity appears to be the system’s priority. By naming a successor quickly, even if still absent, the establishment in Tehran may hope to signal stability to both domestic and international audiences.

Whether that image can be sustained, however, may ultimately depend on one simple question: when and if Iran’s new Supreme Leader finally appears.

The longer he remains unseen, the more his absence risks becoming a political fact in its own right—one that could deepen uncertainty at a moment when Tehran can least afford it.

A China-bound supertanker transporting about two million barrels of Iranian crude passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, according to ship-tracking data released Tuesday.

Tracking services Lloyd’s List Intelligence and Kpler said the vessel, named Cuma and sailing under the flag of Guyana, is listed under US sanctions and is heading toward China.

The shipment is the sixth Iranian oil tanker recorded transiting the strategic waterway since February 28, according to the tracking data.

Israel’s military said on Tuesday it has destroyed most major facilities belonging to Iran’s Internal Security Forces and Basij units in Ilam province in western Iran as part of its ongoing air campaign against the Islamic Republic’s security infrastructure.

The military said in a statement most key assets of the Internal Security Forces and Basij units in Ilam province were destroyed, including the main headquarters of the Internal Security Forces, a command center belonging to the intelligence ministry, a special forces headquarters and several Basij bases.

The IDF also said a command center of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for units involved in suppressing protests was among the facilities struck.

The statement said the attacks over the past week targeted systems and facilities belonging to Iran’s internal security apparatus, which it described as part of the regime’s forces responsible for suppressing domestic protests and conducting security operations.

Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations says the four Iranians killed in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut on Sunday were diplomats, after the Israeli military identified them as senior IRGC Quds Force agents.

The four men were killed in an Israeli attack on the Ramada Hotel in Beirut in the early hours of Sunday.

In a letter addressed to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and the president of the Security Council, Iran’s UN envoy Amir Saeid Iravani said the four men were diplomats, identifying them as Majid Hassani Kondsar, a second secretary; Alireza Bi-Azar, a third secretary; Hossein Ahmadlou, an attaché; and Ahmad Rasouli, assigned to the mission.

Israeli sources, however, had identified the dead as Majid Hosseini, the financial officer of the Lebanon branch of the Quds Force; Ali Biazaar, its intelligence officer; Hossein Ahmadlou, head of what they described as the branch’s “Zionist file”; and Ahmad Rasouli, head of the Intelligence Department in the Palestine Corps.

The Israeli military said the targets were commanders from the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force who it said were operating in Lebanon to plan attacks against Israel while also coordinating with the IRGC in Iran.

“The commanders of the Quds Force's Lebanon Corps operated to advance terror attacks against the state of Israel and its civilians, while operating simultaneously for the IRGC in Iran,” the military said in a statement.