Iran International
Tehran may have assumed that a US–Israeli attack would activate the loose alignment it has cultivated with Moscow, Beijing and other non-Western powers. So far, it has instead exposed its limits.
What Iranian officials often presented as an emerging geopolitical counterweight to Western power appears, for now, far from a wartime coalition.
Russia and China have condemned the attacks and called for restraint, but neither has shown willingness to intervene militarily on Iran’s behalf.
Reports suggest Moscow may have shared limited intelligence that could assist Iranian targeting of US assets in the region. Even if so, such cooperation remains indirect and far short of what a wartime alliance would entail.
For Moscow, deeper involvement carries obvious risks. Russia remains heavily engaged in Ukraine and under sustained military and economic pressure from the West. Opening another confrontation with the United States in the Middle East would pose significant strategic dangers.
Yet instability in the region could still bring Moscow indirect gains. As a major oil exporter, Russia benefits from higher global energy prices, which help cushion the impact of Western sanctions.
A wider conflict could also divert Western political attention from Ukraine, easing pressure on its primary theater.
China’s calculus points in the same direction: distance. Beijing’s interests in the Middle East are largely economic—stable energy supplies, secure shipping routes and predictable markets. A major regional war threatens all three.
At the same time, a prolonged conflict that absorbs American attention and resources could indirectly ease pressure on China in its broader rivalry with Washington.
North Korea, often cited as part of an emerging anti-Western axis, has remained largely silent. Pyongyang lacks the logistical capacity to project meaningful military power into the Middle East and has little incentive to risk confrontation with the United States in a distant conflict.
For decades, Tehran invested heavily in expanding its regional influence through a network of non-state actors stretching from Lebanon to Yemen. Groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis were meant to provide strategic depth, allowing Iran to pressure adversaries indirectly while avoiding direct confrontation.
That network now faces growing strain.
Hamas has been significantly weakened by prolonged conflict with Israel. Hezbollah remains Iran’s most capable partner, but its structure also reveals a deeper limitation in Tehran’s approach: the system often depends on personal relationships between commanders rather than durable institutional frameworks, making coordination more fragile when individuals are removed.
The Houthis retain the capacity to disrupt shipping routes and launch missile or drone attacks across the region. But their strength lies primarily in asymmetric disruption; in a high-intensity campaign driven by air power and long-range strikes, such actions cannot quickly alter the strategic balance inside Iran itself.
Elsewhere, several militia groups cultivated by Tehran in Iraq appear reluctant to escalate dramatically, underscoring the limits of Iran’s ability to mobilize partners during a major confrontation.
In recent years, Iran has sought to present itself as part of a broader alignment against Israel while simultaneously pursuing pragmatic openings with Arab states. The China-brokered rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2023 suggested the possibility of a more stable Gulf balance.
But that détente depends heavily on regional stability. If Iranian actions—or those of allied militias—threaten shipping lanes or energy infrastructure, Arab governments may prove far less inclined to view Tehran as a reliable long-term partner.
If the conflict continues while its partners remain cautious, Iran risks growing isolation. Its ties with Russia and China are shaped primarily by overlapping interests rather than formal alliance commitments.
Strategic priorities diverge, and even governments opposed to Western dominance remain wary of dependence or rivalry.
A deeper alignment might have emerged under different geopolitical conditions, much as sustained confrontation during the Cold War pushed Western states toward institutional alliances such as NATO.
But that moment has not arrived. The war suggests it may not—at least not on terms Iran had imagined.
On March 5, shortly after heavy strikes targeted areas near the Pasteur government complex in central Tehran – a district that houses the Iranian presidency and several key government offices – the Israeli military published a video depicting what it described as Khamenei’s underground bunker system.
The complex resembles a subterranean city. According to the video and accompanying imagery, the facility appears to have been used as a secure shelter for Iran’s leadership and may still be used by remaining officials following Khamenei’s death.
A tunnel network stretching nearly five kilometers
Analysis of the imagery released by the Israeli military, using publicly available online mapping tools, suggests the tunnel network extends close to five kilometers in length.
To understand the scale of the project, it helps to compare it with ordinary infrastructure construction in Tehran.
According to statements by Tehran mayor Alireza Zakani and members of the Tehran City Council, building one kilometer of metro tunnel in Tehran currently costs between 5,000 and 6,000 billion tomans – roughly $30-36 million at an exchange rate of about 166,000 tomans per dollar.
This estimate covers only the excavation and structural work. It does not include interior finishing, equipment, ventilation systems, or other underground facilities.
Based on those figures, building five kilometers of underground tunnel would cost about 25,000 to 30,000 billion tomans, or roughly $150-180 million.
Given the secrecy and security requirements surrounding such a project, the actual cost was likely significantly higher than that of a standard transportation tunnel.
Under normal conditions, tunneling contractors in Tehran can excavate around 10 meters per day. At that pace, building a five-kilometer tunnel system would take at least 500 days – roughly 17 months.
Considering the classified nature of the project and the additional infrastructure involved, the construction timeline may have been considerably longer.
The core of the complex: beneath a medical facility
The video appears to place the central section of the bunker complex southwest of the presidential compound in the Pasteur district.
The site sits directly beneath the Shahid Shourideh Medical Center, a clinic affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Agriculture. The facility has operated since 1985 and effectively functions as part of the broader Pasteur government complex.
Based on the height of vehicle ramps and the dimensions of vehicles visible in the imagery, the central installation appears to be located 40 to 50 meters underground.
From there, the tunnel system extends northwest toward another entrance near the end of Rajabi Street, roughly 200 meters from the Shourideh hospital complex.
Easternmost entrance: next to an elementary school
The easternmost known entrance to the tunnel network appears to be located in the Sheikh Hadi neighborhood, along Valiasr Street, beneath the Jami multi-story parking garage.
This parking structure stands directly beside Hejrat Girls’ Elementary School, while Saheb a-Zaman Boys’ Elementary School lies about 100 meters away.
At the northern edge of the network sits another multi-story garage known as the 12 Farvardin Parking Complex, located near the intersection of Jomhouri Eslami Street and Danesh Street.
Both parking structures were inaugurated on December 4, 2017, as part of a paired urban development project attended by Tehran’s then-mayor Mohammad Najafi.
An entrance beneath a mosque, beside a school
Another entrance appears west of Pasteur Square, between Hor Metro Station and the square itself.
This access point lies beneath Tohid Mosque. Adjacent to the mosque is a building, and behind it stands Shahid Kadkhodaei Boys’ Elementary School.
Roughly 200 meters away, another possible entrance is located on the southwestern side of Pasteur Square, along a street that houses the AJA University of Command and Staff – the staff college of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army.
Nearby are the Karimeh Ahl-e Beit dental clinic and medical clinic, as well as the 29 Farvardin Pharmacy, which is affiliated with Iran’s army.
Western entrance beside a football school
The westernmost identified entrance to the tunnel network appears to lie beneath a small building near an office responsible for issuing hunting weapon permits.
Immediately next to the building, sharing a wall, is a football training school, while dense residential complexes surround the area.
This location sits near the intersection of Sepah and Kamali streets, along Kashan Street, at the end of Fourth Street.
The tunnels also lie close to the Yas and Namjou residential complexes, which are affiliated with the Iranian army.
