Reports of power shifts in Tehran put spotlight on Larijani

In a commentary published Friday, IRNA said the two sides’ clashing positions were jeopardizing the talks, laying the blame for such an outcome at Washington’s door.

It also made clear that Tehran is placing considerable hopes in Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, whose quiet mediation has been central to the negotiations.

Albusaidi now carries a “grave responsibility,” the piece argued, with his role beginning in Muscat, continuing through two rounds of talks in Geneva and now entering “another important step” when he meets US Vice President JD Vance in Washington.

Tehran’s official outlet even hinted at the mediator’s message to the American side: a warning that a war with Iran would not remain limited, that regime change is unattainable and that even heavy damage to Iranian targets would not achieve the goals emphasized by President Donald Trump, “just as they did not in the June attacks.”

Iranian media outlets have also begun outlining the main sticking points in the negotiations.

The news website Fararu reported Friday that the talks remain deadlocked over fundamental issues including enrichment levels, sanctions relief and the dismantling of parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Another major obstacle, it said, is Iran’s refusal to export enriched nuclear material, with Tehran insisting on maintaining domestic fuel production.

Axios reported that some of Trump’s advisers, including Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, were disappointed with Araghchi’s proposals, arguing that they fell short of US expectations.

Trump himself signaled frustration with Tehran on Friday, telling reporters he was “not happy” with Iran but expected further talks to take place.

Asked about the possibility of using military force, the president said he hoped it would not be necessary but did not rule it out.

Speaking before leaving the White House for a trip to Texas, Trump said he still wants to reach an agreement with Iran but reiterated that Tehran “cannot have a nuclear weapon.”

Fararu suggested Washington may be pursuing a dual-track strategy, combining diplomacy with the threat of limited military strikes to maintain pressure.

The negotiations, it concluded, have entered a “complex and decisive” phase: a potential framework is beginning to take shape, but deep structural disagreements and continued US military signaling are sustaining a high level of uncertainty.

In a separate interview with the website, foreign policy analyst and former Iranian diplomat Jalal Sadatian said President Trump’s tone toward Iran had recently become noticeably “sharper, more decisive and more alarming.”

Sadatian also warned that Iran’s “asymmetric capabilities” mean that even limited military action could quickly escalate in unpredictable ways.

With officials apparently convinced that the Geneva talks would not satisfy Washington’s demands over Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs, the government rallied more than 500 Iranians—described as celebrities, academics and public figures—to sign a letter headlined “No to War.”

Many signatories were reformist figures of varying prominence, along with individuals whom Iranian lawyer Hassan Assadi Zeidabadi described in a post on X as “employees of the President’s Office, advisers to cabinet ministers, and staff of state-owned companies and government funds presented as political activists.” He called the initiative deceptive.

Published by the government-owned Iran newspaper and echoed by other outlets, the letter urged the public to press foreign powers to halt any planned attack before it materializes.

The appeal for restraint did not stem the flow of bravado from Iranian politicians and military commanders.

Former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki addressed the United States using slang associated with Tehran’s street toughs (jahel)—a coded signal that “this time, we mean it.” His remarks were widely mocked online.

Hardline MP, Abolfazl Zohrehvand, warned Washington against targeting Khamenei or his son in coarse language. Only days earlier, he had declared: “Trump is not brave enough to attack Iran.”

As the Geneva talks began, several outlets openly acknowledged the risk of conflict.

The official IRNA news agency wrote that “if the negotiations fail, the situation will move toward dangerous ambiguity and a possible military conflict,” adding that “successful negotiation in Geneva is the only way to prevent a new war.”

Headlines in IRNA and Fararu were blunt: “If we do not reach an agreement today, we will be moving toward war.”

Later on Thursday, Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, announced that the third round of talks had concluded and would resume next week in Vienna.

Axios reported, citing a source familiar with the discussions, that chief US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were “disappointed” by what they heard from Iran’s foreign minister during the morning session.

'At any price'

Meanwhile, economic outlets in Tehran spoke of “early alarms of high war risk.” Eghtesad News reported that traders were rushing to convert assets into foreign currency or gold “at any price” to hedge against a potential collapse in talks.

The unease spilled into consumer behavior. Iranians bought gas canisters, candles and emergency supplies amid fears of fuel shortages, power cuts or casualties. Fararu described the rush as a reflection of growing public anxiety.

Universities shifted classes online—officially to contain ongoing student protests, but also as a precaution against possible conflict. According to Nour News, even calm and remote provinces such as Yazd were affected.

Even Kayhan, closely aligned with Khamenei and typically focused on projecting stability, acknowledged that reports of US aircraft carrier deployments had unsettled public sentiment.

Still, it insisted that “although some 40,000 US troops have been deployed to the region, Iran is capable of inflicting serious harm on Israel and the United States, even at high cost.”

​​The oscillation between alarm and defiance points to a system projecting strength while betraying unease—an establishment at once threatening war and visibly anxious about it.

Negotiators are set to meet in Geneva on Thursday in discussions that could prove decisive, particularly if reports are accurate that Washington has set informal deadlines for progress.

Public messaging inside Iran reflects both anticipation and unease as officials brace for what could be a pivotal round.

Late Tuesday, just before departing for Geneva, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi struck an optimistic tone.

“We have a historic opportunity to strike an unprecedented agreement that addresses mutual concerns and achieves mutual interests,” he wrote on X. “A deal is within reach, but only if diplomacy is given priority.”

Government-aligned newspapers such as Iran and Etemad described the talks as “an exit route for both sides” and “the last resort to prevent military confrontation.” The phrasing carried urgency — and an implicit acknowledgment of rising stakes.

At the same time, outlets close to security circles worked to downplay the prospect of imminent war.

Tabnak, run by a former IRGC commander, and Nour News, affiliated with senior adviser Ali Shamkhani, dismissed Western reporting on possible US military action as “media terrorism inspired by Trump’s manifesto in The Art of the Deal.” The suggestion was clear: Washington’s threats are part of a pressure campaign, not a prelude to attack.

The heightened tone followed President Donald Trump’s State of the Union address, in which he referenced Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — remarks that reverberated quickly across Iranian media and political circles.

Other commentary reflected a careful hedge. Fararu and Iranian Diplomacy, which is close to the Foreign Ministry, outlined potential military scenarios—from limited symbolic strikes to targeted attacks on infrastructure or senior officials—but argued that the cost of escalation makes a prolonged conflict unlikely.

Official rhetoric has remained firm. ISNA reported that Iran warned the United Nations it would “respond swiftly to any aggression,” including attacks on “all assets and military bases of belligerent parties in the region,” which Tehran would treat as legitimate targets.

Yet markets betrayed public sensitivity to the tension. The dollar climbed to 1,660,000 rials amid the renewed uncertainty.

Among the more measured assessments was an article in Fararu by Mohsen Jalilvand, who argued that “there will be no war,” and that the likelihood of regional countries joining a confrontation is “near zero.”

Still, he acknowledged the impasse. “There is a wide gap between the demands of the two sides,” he wrote, warning that even if sanctions were lifted immediately, “it would take at least 15 years for the country to return to normal conditions.”

His closing note captured the broader sentiment: “We cannot afford excessive optimism.”

Across Iran and the diaspora, many stayed up through the night to follow the speech via satellite television and livestreams, many hoping to detect signals about the likelihood of a US military strike in the coming days.

By morning, Persian-language social media reflected a swirl of alarm, anticipation and skepticism.

In his address, Trump accused Tehran and its proxy forces of spreading “terrorism and hatred” and said Iran continues to pursue missile and nuclear capabilities despite years of US pressure.

“As president, I will make peace wherever I can, but I will never hesitate to confront threats to America wherever we must,” he added.

For some Iranians, the balance of menace and ambiguity less than two days before the third round of talks between Tehran and Washington suggested escalation was near.

“President Trump issued the order for a military strike and put the final nail in the coffin of the Islamic Republic,” one user wrote on X. “In the coming hours, we will certainly witness very important events.”

Another focused on Trump’s reference to ballistic missiles—an issue Tehran insists should not be part of current negotiations—arguing it signaled the likelihood of military action may be greater than that of a deal.

“When Trump explicitly declares that the missiles of this criminal cult will soon reach American soil, it means that all paths of diplomacy have reached their final dead end,” a third wrote.

Yet others pushed back against what they saw as over-interpretation.

One user described the speech as “a bucket of cold water poured over warmongers,” arguing that Trump largely repeated familiar themes without announcing new measures.

“This speech, in no way, met the expectations of those who were waiting for a new step,” he wrote.

Another suggested Washington’s military buildup in the region told a different story than the speech itself. “The negotiations are less about reaching an agreement and more a tool for managing public opinion and buying time to prepare militarily,” he argued.

The divergence in reactions underscored the high stakes ahead of Thursday’s talks in Geneva, widely seen as a potentially decisive round amid reports that Washington has set informal timelines for progress.

Iranian officials sought to project steadiness.

President Masoud Pezeshkian said negotiations were proceeding under the guidance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and expressed hope the country could move beyond its current state of “neither war nor peace.”

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi struck a similar dual tone. “

The Islamic Republic is prepared for both war and peace,” he told India Today, warning that any confrontation could quickly escalate into a “devastating” regional conflict while insisting that a “fair, balanced, and just” agreement remains attainable.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, however, warned that Iran would respond forcefully if the United States took military action while talks are underway.

Outside official circles, analysts also offered competing readings. Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, wrote on X that Trump appeared to be laying “public groundwork” for a military strike.

While there was “a brief nod to diplomacy,” he said, most of the speech underscored “the threat and the lethality of the regime,” suggesting limited optimism about negotiations.

As interpretations ricocheted across platforms, one post seemed to capture the broader mood: “These words reeked of war. May God preserve Iran.”

Weeks after the January 2026 protests, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has shown no indication that he intends to open dialogue with a restless public or adjust course in response to mounting domestic criticism.

On Tuesday, February 24, prominent moderate figure Saeed Hajjarian—long regarded as a key strategist of Iran’s reform movement—warned that the political system “has lost the ability to predict and prevent the waves of protest that continue to emerge one after another.”

He added that since 2021, Iranian presidents have effectively functioned as “chief executives for Khamenei.”

Former President Ebrahim Raisi described himself as the Supreme Leader’s “soldier,” while President Massoud Pezeshkian has repeatedly said he is in office to implement Khamenei’s policies.

According to Hajjarian, protest waves will persist “as long as the system remains incapable of tolerating reforms, even those emerging from within.” His remarks pointed to a deeper concern: not simply public anger, but institutional rigidity.

That rigidity, critics argue, extends beyond politics. Khamenei’s resistance to reform has long been evident, but more striking to some observers is the continued dismissal of economic warnings amid a worsening financial crisis.

Earlier in the week, the news website Fararu warned leaders about the growing fragmentation and polarization of Iranian society.

Rather than easing tensions, authorities deployed Basij forces to suppress student protests on university campuses, effectively placing groups of young Iranians in confrontation with one another.

Fararu cautioned that “polarization reduces the chances for dialogue and increases violence in society.” Without meaningful dialogue, it argued, opposing groups increasingly view one another as “enemies,” making disputes far more difficult to resolve.

Economic concerns have followed a similar pattern.

One of the latest warnings came from economist Hossein Raghfar. In an interview with Khabar Online, Raghfar argued that although the January protests had political dimensions, they were primarily driven by deepening economic hardship and government inefficiency.

Without naming Khamenei directly, he said: “The government is certainly responsible, but major decisions are made elsewhere,” referring to the Supreme Leader’s office. While acknowledging the government’s role, he added that “it is obvious that the entire responsibility does not rest with the government.”

Like many Iranian economists, Raghfar warned that removing subsidies on essential goods—and the unrest that followed—has left Iran weakened at a moment of heightened external pressure. Economic mismanagement, he argued, has pushed the country “to the brink of war” while fueling public dissent to unprecedented levels.

Despite earlier warnings going unheeded, Raghfar again urged authorities to avoid inflicting another shock on society by cutting subsidies on staples such as gasoline and bread to offset chronic budget deficits.

Taken together, the cautions from reformists and economists suggest a political system increasingly confronted with recurring unrest yet reluctant to recalibrate—even as social polarization deepens and economic strain intensifies.