A mocking segment aired on Iran’s state television about the bodies of protesters killed in January has sparked public outrage and renewed calls, including from Islamic Republic loyalists, for the removal of the head of the national broadcaster.
The public anger erupted after a host on Ofogh TV, a channel operated by Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB and affiliated to the Revolutionary Guards, referred to reports that thousands killed during the January 8–9 crackdown were transported in refrigerated trailers.
Addressing viewers, he asked sarcastically: “What type of refrigerator do you think the Islamic Republic keeps the bodies in?”
He then offered mock multiple-choice answers, including a “side-by-side fridge,” an “ice cream machine,” and a “supermarket freezer,” before adding a fourth option in a joking tone: “I’m an ice seller—don’t ruin my business.”
For many Iranians, the episode has become a stark illustration of a state media apparatus increasingly detached from the pain, grief, and anger of the society it claims to represent.
The remarks were widely shared on social media and immediately drew condemnation from across Iran’s political and social spectrum. Many users accused the program of dehumanizing the dead and humiliating grieving families.
Removal of network director
Following the backlash, Iran’s state broadcaster announced that Sadegh Yazdani, the director of Ofogh TV, had been removed for what it described as “disrespect toward those killed in the January protests.” The program was pulled from the air.
Mohammad Reza Javadi-Yeganeh, a sociology professor at the University of Tehran, wrote that dissatisfaction with IRIB was one of the rare issues uniting an otherwise deeply polarized society. “In this organization,” he wrote, “neither human life nor blood has sanctity.”
Journalist Sina Jahani went further, writing: “For even one frame of this broadcast, not only the director of Ofogh TV but the head of IRIB himself must be immediately dismissed.”
IRIB, headed by Peyman Jebelli, is widely viewed as dominated by hardliners linked to the ultra-conservative Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and figures close to Saeed Jalili, the supreme leader’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council.
Calls for the removal of IRIB chief
While the Ofogh TV director was removed, the fate of IRIB’s leadership remains entirely in the hands of Iran’s supreme leader, who appoints and oversees the broadcaster’s chief. Many users expressed skepticism that deeper accountability would follow.
Journalist Seyed Ali Pourtabatabaei argued that even Jebelli’s removal would be insufficient. “If any other media outlet had done this, it would have been immediately shut down and prosecuted,” he wrote, adding that he held little hope such action would actually occur in this case.
Another user wrote on X: ‘The person who must order change—the leader—apparently believes any change demanded by people or elites is weakness.’”
Conservative alarm over public anger
The mocking tone of the Ofogh TV host also angered conservative figures who warned that such rhetoric risks inflaming public rage and prolonging unrest.
Conservative journalist Ali Gholhaki wrote: “By mocking the martyrs and those killed on January 8 and 9, state TV is setting fire to the hearts of their parents. What exactly must happen in Iran for officials to decide to change course? Do we want to see people back on the streets again?”
Strategic analyst Hossein Ghatib stressed that such broadcasts are never accidental. “An item like this passes through multiple editorial and supervisory filters,” he wrote. “When you knowingly air it, the aim is not a mistake or bad taste—it is a direct assault on the dignity of thousands of grieving families. This is not stupidity or moral collapse; it is betrayal.”
Ghatib compared the outrage to a pivotal media miscalculation before Iran’s 1979 revolution, when an article attacking Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was published in the newspaper Ettela’at. Historians widely regard that piece as a strategic error that ignited mass protests and helped accelerate the fall of the monarchy.
“This program follows the same dangerous logic: provoking public sentiment,” Ghatib wrote. “Why deliberately mess with collective memory and pain?”
A crisis of trust
The incident has reignited long-standing criticism of IRIB, whose head is appointed and overseen directly by the supreme leader and which receives substantial public funding. Despite this, official surveys show that large segments of the population distrust its news coverage, relying instead on foreign-based Persian-language media.
Critics say IRIB routinely insults and discredits opponents, airs coerced confessions, and broadcasts allegations of foreign ties against dissenters. Recent attempts by the broadcaster to discredit a widely shared video showing a father searching for his son’s body among hundreds of victims instead backfired, further eroding its credibility.
When Iran cuts off internet access, millions are plunged into more than digital silence. Mental health experts say the blackouts intensify anxiety, isolation, and trauma in a society already under extreme strain.
The Iranian outlet Khabar Online has argued that the fear of being digitally cut off from unfolding events can resemble a form of mass FOMO, anxiety driven not by social media envy, but by enforced disconnection.
Beyond personal stress
The article says that the consequences extend far beyond individual stress. “Cutting the internet is not just a trauma at the individual level; it severely destroys interpersonal bonds and trust,” it said.
It also warned of what it called “anticipatory anxiety.” Even after access is partially restored, society remains on edge.
“Every slight drop in internet speed triggers waves of stress and panic over another shutdown,” the article added.
US-based psychotherapist Azadeh Afsahi said the effects mirror enforced isolation. “Clinically, shutting down the internet is equivalent to enforced isolation and the sudden loss of multiple coping mechanisms at once,” Afsahi told Iran International.
“Isolation is a well-established driver of anxiety and depression and significantly increases the risk of suicidal ideation and suicide attempts.”
She added that Iran’s psychological baseline is already fragile.
Decades of repression, violence, economic instability, and chronic uncertainty have severely compromised mental health, she said, and internet shutdowns “compound the existing trauma” and can “push already vulnerable individuals closer to psychological collapse.”
From isolation to overload
Afsahi said prolonged digital silence creates a dangerous psychological cycle: after days or weeks of isolation, people are suddenly exposed to graphic images and devastating news once access is partially restored.
The abrupt flood of information, she said, can overwhelm the nervous system, triggering panic attacks, dissociation, intrusive thoughts, trauma-related symptoms resembling PTSD, and an increased risk of suicide.
“This cycle – isolation followed by psychological overload – creates cumulative, long-term harm,” Afsahi said.
The effects are not confined to those inside Iran. Families, journalists, activists, and content creators abroad are also affected, as their mental wellbeing depends on connection and community.
Shutdown as a tool of control
Internet disruptions have become a familiar reality for Iranians in recent years. Sometimes nationwide, sometimes regional or temporary, shutdowns have emerged as a central tool used by authorities to control protests, slow the spread of information, and suppress evidence of repression.
During crises, restricted access heightens public anxiety while crippling digital businesses and essential online services.
The most recent shutdown followed the 12-day war with Israel in June, when internet access was disrupted for roughly six days. This time, however, several days of complete blackout were followed by only limited access to a heavily censored domestic intranet.
Nearly 25 days later, the restrictions persist, with only a trickle of tightly restricted access returning. Many people and businesses still lack access.
Some Iranians have traveled to border regions or neighboring countries to send business files, upload videos documenting the January 8-9 crackdown, or contact family members.
Meanwhile, informal volunteer networks abroad have attempted to provide access through anti-censorship tools such as Psiphon and its Conduit feature, offering slow and unstable connections to the outside world.
The government says the shutdown is necessary to protect national security and citizens’ lives. Concerns over potential cyberattacks may also play a role.
Technology researcher Mohammad Rahbari warned in Khabar Online that prolonged communication blackouts can undermine society’s psychological stability.
“The continuation of communication shutdowns, even if intended to protect citizens’ physical safety, can seriously damage psychological security – which is a core component of overall security,” he said.
Tehran appears to have taken the US military buildup near Iran seriously, but shows no sign of softening its rhetoric or accepting Washington’s terms while it explores limited diplomatic channels.
Speaking in Istanbul on Friday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran would consider US proposals for negotiations only if the military threat was removed first. Araghchi was in the Turkish city to explore a possible mediation initiative, though he made clear that Tehran would not negotiate under pressure.
Hours later, US President Donald Trump said he had directly communicated a deadline to Iran for reaching an agreement with Washington. “Only they know about the deadline for sure,” Trump told reporters, without elaborating on the terms or consequences.
The exchange reflects a familiar standoff: Washington is attempting to force rapid movement at a moment when Iran is politically and economically weakened, while Tehran is signaling defiance even as it quietly probes diplomatic off-ramps.
Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of parliament’s Foreign Policy Committee, said on Thursday that internal debates were under way in Tehran over how far Trump might go.
“Trump’s confrontation with Iran during his first term was a failure,” he told news website Didban Iran, setting out his assessment that the US president’s long-term aim was to end the Islamic Republic.
“He knows there is no third term, and this is his only chance.”
Ardestani also argued that regional powers including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Turkey oppose the collapse of the Islamic Republic, which he said they view as destabilizing and economically disruptive.
Former Iranian diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi offered a more cautious assessment.
Speaking to Entekhab on January 29, he said Trump’s deployment of military forces was intended primarily to intensify diplomatic and economic pressure on Tehran rather than signal a settled decision to strike.
“Trump does not want to be remembered as a president who failed to deliver on his promises,” Ahmadi said, adding that the show of force was designed to deepen Iran’s economic crisis and force concessions.
Araghchi has denied that talks are planned with US envoy and Trump aide Steve Witkoff, even as he travels regionally to discuss mediation proposals.
Ahmadi said US military action remained possible but warned that Trump would face difficulties justifying an attack both internationally and to his domestic political base.
He also dismissed speculation that Washington might attempt to block Iran’s oil exports, arguing that such a move would almost certainly trigger military confrontation in the Persian Gulf and affect China and Arab nations in the region.
Ironically, Iran’s hardline daily Kayhan—close to the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—has suggested that Tehran itself should consider closing the strategic waterway.
Rahman Gharemanpour, an international relations expert, told Donya-ye Eghtesad that preparations for a major operation would require significantly more time and should not be read as evidence of an imminent attack.
In the same newspaper, Mashhad University academic Rouhollah Eslami said regional states are increasingly guided by cost-benefit calculations rather than ideological alignment—a shift that helps explain their reluctance to support military action against Iran.
For now, Iran’s position remains deliberately unresolved. Araghchi insists Tehran is prepared both for negotiations and for war—and given the balance of fear and defiance now shaping decision-making in Tehran, he may not be spinning for once.
Tehran’s violent mid-January crackdown was accompanied by a quieter but sweeping campaign to silence the press and control information about the killings.
Following the bloodshed of January 8 and 9, Iranian authorities imposed the harshest media restrictions in decades, shutting down newspapers and severely limiting internet access in an effort to conceal the scale of repression.
After about a week, officials appeared to conclude that a total blackout was counterproductive: the absence of newspapers made it harder to project an image of normal life. Editors were summoned back to newsrooms, even though most journalists still lacked internet access.
With little they could do, many reporters went home, a journalist at the moderate daily Shargh later recalled in an Instagram post. Hours later, they were called back. “You must publish a newspaper tomorrow morning,” authorities told editors, “even if it is only one page.”
The papers that followed were thin and tightly controlled. Many carried only a handful of short items drawn from state-approved agencies, alongside recycled material from months or even years earlier.
At the same time, the government shifted its internet controls from broad blacklisting to a strict whitelisting system, allowing access only to approved users and outlets.
For nearly two weeks, outlets affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards — primarily Tasnim and Fars — dominated the limited online output, carrying statements from commanders and hardline officials and promoting the narrative that the unrest was “foreign-backed terrorism.”
When Fars opened its comment sections earlier this week, readers flooded the site with angry and often derogatory remarks aimed at the government. Moderators removed posts and blocked users, but commenters returned under new identities.
Critical comments often remained visible for minutes before deletion. Within days, Fars shut down comments entirely.
Khabar Online, one of the first websites permitted to resume limited updates as part of efforts to “normalize” the situation, encountered a similar problem. Reader comments quickly overwhelmed official narratives, prompting tighter controls.
By January 27, several newspapers and websites had cautiously resumed publication, avoiding any reference to the true death toll.
One exception was Etemad, whose managing editor, Elias Hazrati—also head of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s advisory public-relations board—published casualty figures approved by authorities, widely seen as a fraction of the real numbers.
Internet access has since been partially restored, but remains unpredictable. Some businesses are granted just 30 minutes of access per day at designated government offices after signing pledges not to cross official “red lines.” Their online activity is monitored.
Messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram function intermittently through VPNs. Even when messages are sent, replies often fail to arrive. Platforms commonly used for political communication, especially X, remain largely inaccessible.
Authorities say YouTube access has been restored at universities, and some pre-protest interviews have reappeared online.
The YouTube-based news program Hasht-e Shab (8 PM) resumed after a three-week suspension. In its first broadcast, it reported that the brother of one staff member had been shot dead during the protests.
With senior officials avoiding public appearances, the program interviewed its own managing editor, Ali Mazinani, who said internet access had become “critical” even for media outlets, particularly as Iran faces heightened external threats.
He said journalists are now barred from government offices they once covered and criticized the lack of transparency surrounding the crackdown and casualty figures.
The restrictions appear to have achieved their aim, narrowing what can be reported and publicly discussed about the crackdown—for now.
Iran’s internet, throttled for 20 days amid the mass killing of protesters, began to partially resume on Wednesday, according to monitoring groups and users inside the country, who said access remains heavily restricted and unstable.
Signs of reconnection were also observed on Sunday, they said, but restrictions were reimposed shortly afterward. The latest restoration appears broader but still falls well short of a full return to normal service.
NetBlocks, the internet freedom watchdog, reported that although Iran has restored some international connectivity, most websites remain blocked or unreliable unless users rely on circumvention tools like VPNs.
Most ordinary users still face heavy filtering and intermittent service under a whitelist system despite a significant increase in internationally visible networks and datacenters, NetBlocks said in a statement on X.
Whitelist refers to state-sanctioned access for officials or state bodies like banks. Iran's foreign minister and other senior officials have posted statements on social media throughout the shutdown.
Iranian authorities have said the internet outage which began on January 8 was imposed to control recent unrest, which officials blame on foreign interference and the activities of what they call “terrorists.”
The crackdown killed thousands of people and appears to rank among the deadliest attack on protestors in modern history.
Ali Akbar Pour-Jamshidian, deputy for security affairs at the Interior Ministry, addressed questions about when internet access would fully normalize by saying the Supreme National Security Council and the National Security Council had prioritized “public security” over economic considerations.
An uncertain digital future
Many data centers still lack stable internet access, and officials have yet to outline a clear timetable or framework for restoring full connectivity.
Milad Nouri, a programmer and internet expert, warned in comments to the news site Entekhab that the situation signals a deeper shift in network infrastructure. He said it shows the system has moved toward enabling permanent whitelist policies and “tiered internet” not just as a policy choice, but as a technical reality.
Tiered internet refers to granting access based on assessed “needs,” such as allowing media outlets controlled access to platforms like Telegram, while most other traffic remains blocked by default.
Economic damage mounts
The prolonged internet shutdown has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s economy.
Communications Minister Sattar Hashemi has estimated the economic cost of the shutdown at 50 trillion rials per day (roughly $50 million at open market rates).
Speaking on Tuesday, Hashemi acknowledged that domestic platforms cannot function independently of international connectivity and would face serious challenges over time.
“(Claiming) that there is no need for the global internet is only a bitter joke,” he said.
At the same time, Iran’s broader economic indicators have continued to deteriorate. As fears of a possible US or Israeli attack intensified, the national currency fell further, reaching a record low of 1,600,000 rials to the dollar on Wednesday.
The Statistical Center of Iran has announced that point-to-point inflation in January reached 60 percent, meaning households paid on average 60 percent more than a year earlier for an identical basket of goods and services. The Tehran Stock Exchange has also seen several consecutive days of declining share values.
Businesses under strain
Many companies are reportedly facing bankruptcy, while others have laid off employees or downsized operations.
The daily newspaper Haft-e Sobh has reported that newspapers are now filled with advertisements offering office desks and chairs for sale by recently shuttered companies.
Babak Aghili-Nasab, CEO of Postex, told the Digiato news outlet that his company’s order shipments dropped by 80 percent during the shutdown. He said the first and most immediate impact was forced layoffs, adding that he expects to lay off around 60 percent of his workforce starting this month.
While the government has said it will offer loans to compensate affected businesses, Aghili-Nasab rejected this approach, insisting that compensation should be provided as direct grants rather than debt. He said: “You have plundered our house and want to give us loans (to compensate)?”
International trade has also been disrupted. Companies have lost contact with foreign partners and customers, and some trucks carrying perishable goods into Iran have reportedly been stranded at border crossings.
Authorities recently provided limited international internet access at Iran’s Chamber of Commerce. long queues for supervised 20-minute sessions, after filling out written commitments.
For small and home-based businesses, especially those dependent on social commerce—which accounted for about 40 percent of Iran’s online retail sector last year—the outlook remains bleak.
Many have resumed activity after a month without sales, but say they have little hope of meaningful income under current conditions.
As Iran’s authorities continue sealing off global internet access, thousands of Iranian volunteers abroad are helping users inside the country slip through what few narrow digital cracks remain.
Thousands of diaspora users have downloaded and run an application called Psiphon Conduit that allows them to securely share part of their bandwidth with the widely popular censorship circumvention tool Psiphon, helping users inside Iran maintain access to it.
By leaving unused phones or computers connected to home Wi-Fi networks and power, they have created small, fragile bridges that help keep Psiphon reachable from inside Iran.
In recent days, many Iranians who had been offline since the shutdown began January 8 have managed to contact relatives and friends via WhatsApp and Telegram or publish posts on social media after nearly two weeks of silence.
The closure coincided with two days of mass killings of protestors by security forces.
Psiphon
Much of the recent connectivity has been enabled by Psiphon Conduit, an application designed to function during severe censorship and shutdowns.
In recent days, many diaspora users with unlimited internet access have installed Psiphon Conduit and kept spare devices continuously connected. Inside Iran, users searching for a connection are automatically matched with these external helpers, allowing limited access to the global internet.
Each external user can enable access for roughly 25 people, albeit at low speeds.
The connection is considered relatively secure because traffic ultimately exits through Psiphon servers, meaning neither the Iranian user’s IP address nor the intermediary’s IP address is directly exposed.
According to Psiphon’s official website, Iran currently has more Psiphon users than any other country.
On January 22, more than half of the 2.8 million recorded Psiphon Conduit connection attempts originated from Iran. At the time of writing, more than 40,000 Iranian users were connected simultaneously, according to the site’s live data.
Other means, brief openings
Some users inside Iran report occasional success using the Tor Project’s Snowflake feature, Lantern’s unbounded mode, or WireGuard-based tools, though speeds are often extremely slow and unreliable.
Others say that, at times, unfiltered international internet access briefly becomes available on certain mobile operators in specific provinces. These short windows may be the result of technical glitches or testing of filtering methods, allowing users momentary passage through the state-imposed digital barrier.
The government has effectively sealed Iran’s internet by blocking international gateways and many VPN protocols. Under these conditions, traffic cannot normally leave the country, while limited domestic connectivity—such as banks, government services, and some content delivery networks—remains active.
Tools like Psiphon Conduit exploit narrow pathways that cannot be fully closed without disrupting the state’s own systems. They disguise encrypted traffic as ordinary web activity and route it through these small openings.
When shutdowns occur, users who already have the application installed do not need to download anything new; traffic begins flowing through whatever cracks remain.
This access, however, is far from comprehensive. Telegram or X may load sporadically, images and videos upload slowly, and connections frequently drop and reconnect.
Life online remains unstable
On Friday, Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said global internet access would be restored within 24 hours. Still, the closure continues.
Currently, the only access provided to users inside the country is to a highly unstable, filtered intranet, largely cut off from the global network.
Users say even domestic websites and government-linked platforms frequently disconnect, making basic tasks such as banking or administrative work difficult and at times impossible.
One user wrote on X: “Living without internet access, confined to a handful of domestic media outlets and news agencies and a few foreign satellite channels, is one of the darkest human experiences."
Others say that while they are relieved to have escaped two weeks of digital darkness, gaining access to information and videos withheld during that period has also caused profound distress.
Dark days, costly workarounds
Following the internet and phone shutdowns on January 8—and the violence of that day and the next—some Iranians traveled to border regions, used SIM cards from neighboring countries or left Iran entirely to regain connectivity and share footage with the outside world.
The first video showing large numbers of bodies at the Kahrizak forensic medicine center reportedly reached media outlets days later, filmed by someone who said they had traveled more than 1,000 kilometers to access the internet. Others shared limited information using Starlink, despite significant personal risks.
According to the monitoring site Filterban (Filter Watch), more than 300 hours of internet disruption pushed international connectivity into a black market. Proxies and configurations were reportedly sold at inflated prices—up to $15 for 10 GB of access which is a huge sum in Iran—amid widespread fraud.
Economic damage
For many, internet access is not optional. Hundreds of thousands of small and home-based businesses—from handicrafts and agricultural products to online language and music lessons —have been severely disrupted or effectively shut down.
Officials have yet to present a clear plan for restoring connectivity.
Mohammad-Jafar Ghaempanah, the president’s executive deputy, has said the government itself suffers losses from internet shutdowns, acknowledged that filtering fuels public dissatisfaction, and apologized for the disruption.
At the same time, hardline figures such as Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the Kayhan newspaper, continue to advocate for permanent use of the National Information Network— an intranet system designed to sever direct, universal access to the global internet.