The wave of protests arrived at a sensitive moment for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: as he was pressing US President Donald Trump to nod ahead another round of Israeli strikes against Iran, especially its missile program.
For years, Netanyahu has argued in Washington that Tehran’s challenge cannot be resolved through containment or diplomacy alone, but only through the collapse of the Islamic Republic.
Against that backdrop, one might have expected Israel to seize on Iran’s internal instability and move decisively against its strategic assets. Instead, restraint has become policy.
Netanyahu is aware that any visible Israeli role could serve the interests of Iran’s rulers—by discrediting protesters as foreign-backed agents or by giving Tehran justification to escalate militarily against Israel.
Cautious calculation
Several considerations reinforce Netanyahu’s caution.
Israel is still emerging from a recent military campaign and has little appetite for being drawn into another direct confrontation with Iran. At the same time, Netanyahu continues to prefer US leadership on the Iran file, a long-standing strategic priority.
From his perspective, the most effective—and legitimate—pressure on Iran, including any potential military action, must come from the United States rather than Israel.
There is also a deeper calculation at play. Netanyahu may believe the Islamic Republic is closer than at any point in decades to a breaking point, and that overt Israeli involvement could delay or derail that process.
From this view, Israel’s most effective contribution to regime destabilization is to avoid becoming the focal point of Iranian nationalism or regime propaganda.
Restraint: pros and cons
Yet restraint carries risks of its own.
Iran’s theocratic rule may survive the current unrest and seek to exploit its vulnerability by pursuing a renewed nuclear agreement with the West. For Israel, this is a deeply troubling scenario as it could ease economic pressure on Tehran and extend the life of the Islamic Republic without addressing Israel’s core security concerns.
Nor would every political transformation in Iran necessarily serve Israeli or American interests.
A pro-Western restoration, such as the return of the Shah’s son, is far from certain. Other outcomes could include further radicalization of the regime or a decision to accelerate its nuclear program, moving more decisively toward a nuclear weapon.
In short, Israel is not rushing to exploit Iran’s internal crisis. Despite longstanding fears over Iran’s military buildup and a fundamental desire for regime change, Netanyahu is pursuing a policy of restraint shaped by caution, timing, and deference to US leadership.
Even so, restraint does not guarantee insulation. Israel could still be drawn into a broader conflict—particularly if the United States launches a military strike and Iran chooses to retaliate against Israeli targets.
For now, Israel’s posture reflects a familiar strategic logic: hoping for the best, while preparing for the worst.
