Tehran leaders wiring huge sums of money out of Iran, US Treasury says

The wave of protests arrived at a sensitive moment for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: as he was pressing US President Donald Trump to nod ahead another round of Israeli strikes against Iran, especially its missile program.

For years, Netanyahu has argued in Washington that Tehran’s challenge cannot be resolved through containment or diplomacy alone, but only through the collapse of the Islamic Republic.

Against that backdrop, one might have expected Israel to seize on Iran’s internal instability and move decisively against its strategic assets. Instead, restraint has become policy.

Netanyahu is aware that any visible Israeli role could serve the interests of Iran’s rulers—by discrediting protesters as foreign-backed agents or by giving Tehran justification to escalate militarily against Israel.

Cautious calculation

Several considerations reinforce Netanyahu’s caution.

Israel is still emerging from a recent military campaign and has little appetite for being drawn into another direct confrontation with Iran. At the same time, Netanyahu continues to prefer US leadership on the Iran file, a long-standing strategic priority.

From his perspective, the most effective—and legitimate—pressure on Iran, including any potential military action, must come from the United States rather than Israel.

There is also a deeper calculation at play. Netanyahu may believe the Islamic Republic is closer than at any point in decades to a breaking point, and that overt Israeli involvement could delay or derail that process.

From this view, Israel’s most effective contribution to regime destabilization is to avoid becoming the focal point of Iranian nationalism or regime propaganda.

Restraint: pros and cons

Yet restraint carries risks of its own.

Iran’s theocratic rule may survive the current unrest and seek to exploit its vulnerability by pursuing a renewed nuclear agreement with the West. For Israel, this is a deeply troubling scenario as it could ease economic pressure on Tehran and extend the life of the Islamic Republic without addressing Israel’s core security concerns.

Nor would every political transformation in Iran necessarily serve Israeli or American interests.

A pro-Western restoration, such as the return of the Shah’s son, is far from certain. Other outcomes could include further radicalization of the regime or a decision to accelerate its nuclear program, moving more decisively toward a nuclear weapon.

In short, Israel is not rushing to exploit Iran’s internal crisis. Despite longstanding fears over Iran’s military buildup and a fundamental desire for regime change, Netanyahu is pursuing a policy of restraint shaped by caution, timing, and deference to US leadership.

Even so, restraint does not guarantee insulation. Israel could still be drawn into a broader conflict—particularly if the United States launches a military strike and Iran chooses to retaliate against Israeli targets.

For now, Israel’s posture reflects a familiar strategic logic: hoping for the best, while preparing for the worst.

Multiple sources told Iran International that patrols and checkpoints were ubiquitous, with increased police and military deployments across urban centers, particularly in major cities.

In Tehran, daily life has slowed markedly, with many shops closed and streets quieter than usual.

Residents said movement, communications, healthcare activity, and access to educational institutions are under tight government control, describing the capital as subdued and tense, with people avoiding unnecessary travel or gatherings.

"It's like a de facto curfew," one Tehran resident said.

In Karaj, residents said that because of the dense presence of security forces, people cannot even speak comfortably with one another. Similar conditions have been reported in multiple parts of the country.

The expanded security footprint follows what rights groups and media outlets describe as a bloody crackdown on the protests.

Iran International reported on Tuesday that at least 12,000 people have been killed nationwide since the unrest began, while CBS News, citing an Iranian official, said the death toll could be as high as 20,000.

Tehran rejected those figures on Wednesday, dismissing them as claims spread by what it called “Mossad-backed” media.

‘Help on the way’

On Tuesday, US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to remain in the streets and take over state institutions, telling protesters that “help is on the way,” while exiled prince Reza Pahlavi has also called on Iranians to continue demonstrations.

The calls from abroad for sustained protest appear to be colliding with a harsher reality on the ground—at least for now.

In Shiraz, sources said security conditions intensified earlier this week, with additional military units deployed and new restrictions imposed on movement. Local notices outlining the presence of armed forces and limits on traffic circulated in the city, though no nationwide emergency measures have been formally announced.

In Sanandaj, residents reported an expanded security presence beginning earlier this week, including personnel they described as speaking Arabic rather than Persian.

Similar observations have been reported by sources in other western regions, though the identities and affiliations of the forces could not be independently verified.

Some protesters and observers alleged that forces affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including Afghan and Iraqi recruits, have been mobilized and organized at specific locations, including a mosque in Tehran’s Gholhak district.

Iranian authorities have not commented on these claims.

The proposed secondary tariffs were announced by President Donald Trump earlier this week in response to a violent crackdown on protesters in Iran.

Some commentators have questioned whether such measures could be enforced, pointing to Iran’s trade links with more than 140 countries. Others have focused on China’s open opposition, noting that Beijing is Iran’s largest trading partner.

Yet recent experience suggests that secondary tariffs can be far more damaging to the sanctioned country than to those doing business with it.

What past examples say?

A telling precedent is the United States’ action against India over its imports of Russian oil in late August last year. Although the mechanics differed, the effect became clear within months.

By late 2025, Russian crude was selling at discounts of up to $20 to $30 per barrel compared to discounts of around $3 per barrel in summer and $10 in autumn. Even at a discounted price, Russia’s oil exports to India fell by 29 percent in December compared with the previous month.

The pain, in short, was absorbed primarily by Russia, not India.

US Census Bureau data show that despite the imposition of 25 percent tariffs on Indian goods, India’s exports to the United States did not decline significantly. Cheap Russian oil helped Indian refiners remain competitive.

China’s experience tells a similar story. While Chinese exports to the United States fell by about 20 percent in 2025 under US tariffs, China’s total global exports grew by 5.5 percent. Supported by discounted Russian oil and gas, Beijing posted a record $1.2 trillion trade surplus.

Taken together, these cases suggest that secondary tariffs tend to extract concessions from the sanctioned exporter rather than meaningfully penalizing its trading partners.

How secondary tariffs on Iran would work?

Washington has yet to publish detailed guidance on how the proposed 25 percent tariff would be applied. Still, Trump’s public statements indicate that the measure would not be limited to countries purchasing Iranian crude oil.

As with its oil exports to China, Tehran would likely be forced to lower prices across a wide range of goods so that buyers can offset the cost of tariffs imposed on their exports to the United States.

Even if secondary tariffs were applied only to buyers of Iranian energy and petrochemical products, the impact would be severe.

According to data from the commodity intelligence firm Kpler, seen by Iran International, Iran currently exports around 1.3 million barrels per day of crude oil—almost all to China.

It also exports more than half that volume in refined petroleum products, primarily to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iraq, India, and Pakistan.

Annual revenues from liquefied petroleum gas exceed $10 billion, fuel oil generates roughly $7 billion, and gas exports about $5 billion. When petrochemical shipments are included, income from these products roughly matches Iran’s crude oil earnings.

Here, too, vulnerabilities are mounting.

Iran’s 25-year gas supply contract with Turkey is set to expire in five months, with no indication that Ankara intends to renew it. Gas deliveries to Iraq have also been halted because of domestic shortages, prompting Baghdad to seek alternative suppliers.

Tehran shouldering the costs

The United Arab Emirates—the largest buyer of Iranian fuel oil and a major importer of Iranian LPG—maintains extensive economic ties with the United States, making it unlikely to risk exposure to secondary tariffs.

Other Asian buyers, including India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Pakistan, import Iranian products in volumes too small to justify jeopardizing access to the US market.

The most likely outcome is that Iran will once again be pushed to rely overwhelmingly on China, offering steep discounts to preserve market share.

If implemented, secondary tariffs would not isolate Iran’s trading partners so much as narrow Iran’s options, deepen its dependence on a single buyer, and erode its earnings at a moment of acute domestic and fiscal strain.

In that sense, the policy may prove more damaging than conventional sanctions—by forcing Iran itself to absorb the cost of maintaining its already limited presence in the global economy.

Witnesses said security personnel entered medical centers, removed injured protesters for undisclosed locations and fired “finishing shots” at some of those left behind, describing scenes of bodies and wounded being loaded onto trucks without separation. Iran International could not independently verify the accounts.

Residents said the city fell into an uneasy calm on Monday after clashes on Thursday and Friday followed by two days of resistance by protesters over the weekend. Motorbike units and pickup trucks carrying security forces patrolled streets, while access to hospitals was heavily restricted, witnesses said.

A taxi driver who said he witnessed the violence near Gohardasht square on Thursday said security personnel loaded both dead and wounded protesters onto trucks. “The injured were not separated from the dead,” he said, adding that many were young people.

Families gathered outside hospitals including Kasra and Qassem Soleimani, where armed personnel blocked entrances and dispersed crowds, witnesses said.

At Behesht-e Sakineh cemetery, mourners reported restrictions on burials and said authorities halted the release of bodies to prevent public funerals.

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  Security forces blocked blood donations, seized wounded protesters - paper

Similar pressure on medical facilities was reported elsewhere.

In the northeastern city of Bojnourd, a nurse told Iran International that a local hospital had become heavily securitized, with normal shift schedules canceled and staff pressured to prioritize treatment for injured security personnel while protesters were turned away or left untreated.

Rights groups and media have reported security force raids on hospitals in other parts of Iran during the unrest, including incidents in the western city of Ilam.

The project aims to build a national network on a Huawei-based platform, doing work similar to services provided by Iranian cloud firm ArvanCloud (Abr Arvan) but on a far larger scale, the information said.

It is intended to host widely used public services as well as banking and payment platforms and other critical infrastructure.

Huawei did not respond to Iran International’s request for comment.

According to the information, the project is in its final stages and is being brought online under ArvanCloud’s management, through a company called Ayandeh Afzay-e Karaneh.

The project is linked to individuals and companies under US sanctions, including Fanap and its CEO Shahab Javanmardi – sanctioned by the US Treasury in August over alleged ties to Iran’s intelligence ministry and the Revolutionary Guards.

Sources said Huawei supplied the required equipment covertly, and the company’s name does not appear in related documentation.

President Masoud Pezeshkian visited the construction site of the project in March 2025. According to the sources, China’s ambassador also visited the project.

Sources said the project is estimated to cost between $700 million and $1 billion, and that all equipment – supplied by Huawei in China – entered Iran after the 12-day war, shipped in 24 containers.

Sources said the data center would have capacity for about 400 server racks and would incorporate ArvanCloud, with much of the country’s core digital infrastructure eventually moved to the site.

They said the data center is located beneath Fanap’s administrative building in Pardis IT Town, about 20 kilometers northeast of Tehran, in a place designed to be difficult to strike by missile.

Blackout continues

Iran has remained under sweeping internet and phone disruptions as protests continue, limiting reporting on casualties, according to rights groups and internet monitors.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said he was deeply disturbed by reports of violence during nationwide protests and expressed concern about internet and communications shutdowns, calling on authorities to restore access.

NetBlocks said on Wednesday that Iran remained largely offline as the nationwide blackout passed its 132nd hour, adding that limited connectivity was obscuring the scale of casualties.

Fars news agency, which is affiliated with the IRGC, argued that internet restrictions should continue as protests persist, linking the limits to what it described as security concerns.

Iran International has reported that, amid the communications shutdown, particularly on January 7 and 8, at least 12,000 protesters were killed.

Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani said decisions on internet and phone cuts were outside the control of government ministries in a security situation.