Iran International
Iran faces a stark choice to address a cost of living crisis: preserve subsidized exchange rates that have failed to protect purchasing power and fueled corruption or remove it and risk triggering another wave of uncontrolled inflation.
Former Central Bank of Iran governor Mohammad-Hossein Adeli summed up the core dilemma in an editorial for Donya-ye-Eghtesad last week.
“The gap between subsidized and free-market exchange rates produces severe distortions, instability, and unjust rents—while simultaneously serving certain political and distributive goals,” he wrote.
Iran’s “preferential” currency system began in April 2018 under President Hassan Rouhani, when the exchange rate was fixed at 42,000 rials per dollar.
The rial plumbed new record lows of over 1.31 million to the dollar on Monday.
Designed to curb price shocks, protect low-income households, and guarantee access to essential goods and medicine, the subsidy was funded through oil and petroleum revenues.
But as the gap between the official and free-market rates continued to widen—and maintaining the system strained the budget—the administration of Ebrahim Raisi scrapped it as part of its so-called “economic surgery.”
Officials defended the move by pointing to massive arbitrage opportunities, rent-seeking among importers of essential goods, waste of foreign-exchange reserves, and the failure of subsidies to reach consumers.
The system, they argued, had become a costly burden on the state.
The “economic surgery” triggered Iran’s highest annual inflation since World War II and sparked widespread protests.
After several months, the government reintroduced subsidized foreign exchange at 285,000 rials—about half the free-market rate at the time.
The subsidized currency initially covered 25 categories of goods, though several items were later removed from the list.
In recent months, the government has also eliminated preferential currency from the import chain for several key commodities such as rice, vegetable oil, red meat, animal feed and medicine.
The state provided importers with roughly $18 billion at the 285,000-rial rate in 2023 and about $15 billion in 2024, and allocations are expected to fall to around $12 billion this year.
An economy distorted
Supporters of the multi-rate structure contend that it keeps essential goods and industrial inputs affordable, curbs inflation, and preserves some purchasing power.
Critics argue that while cheap currency slowed price increases temporarily at first, the widening gap with the market rate ultimately entrenched systematic corruption and prevented subsidies from reaching consumers.
Adeli, the former Central Bank governor, wrote that keeping prices artificially low through “subsidized, rent-laden exchange rates has only marginally contained prices while generating huge rents for importers who gain access to cheap currency.”
“Allocating subsidized currency in the name of supporting the final consumer ends up serving special-interest groups, diverting resources, and fueling informal markets.” Importers, he warned, often manipulate invoices to amplify profits.
Still too risky to end?
One of the starkest illustrations of the system’s failure was the Debsh Tea corruption scandal. Between 2019 and 2022, the company received an estimated $3.4–$3.7 billion in subsidized foreign currency.
Large portions were never used to import high-quality tea. Instead, part of the allocation was sold on the open market for profit, while some was used to import low-quality tea, later repackaged and marketed as premium.
The scandal became emblematic of how subsidized currency rewarded manipulation over genuine import needs, further eroding public trust.
Despite the failures, Adeli argued that Iran is not prepared for a unified exchange rate. Geopolitical tensions, intensifying sanctions, weak economic growth, the risk of inflation rising above 50%, and the possibility of a budget deficit exceeding 50% together create a fragile environment.
He therefore advises maintaining a cautious two-tier system, with essential goods and medicines supplied at a controlled rate.
Former economy Minister Ehsan Khandoozi has similarly echoed this caution, warning that abrupt unification could ignite fresh inflation and insisting on a gradual approach.
Economist Morteza Afghah told ILNA that some advocates of free-market policies act “as if they do not realize that we are in an extremely critical situation, and we cannot apply formulas designed for advanced economies under normal conditions to Iran’s current crisis.”
Babak Mesbahi, a presidium member of the Iranian Pharmacists Association, said sanctions are indirectly choking payment channels and logistics.
“Based on recent officials’ statements, the country’s medicine reserves on average are less than two months,” he said. “Infant formula faces a similar situation, and about 800 items will face shortages over the next three months.”
Mesbahi told Didban Iran that “Sanctions do not directly target medicine and infant formula, but their side effects are entirely palpable. Currency transfers have become difficult and allocation faces problems, and these issues are directly caused by sanctions.”
Asked whether the government has eased FX transfers, Mesbahi said: “As far as I know, nothing specific has been done. Right now there are pro forma invoices that have remained four to five months in the allocation and transfer queue,” he added.
The end of preferential exchange rates on many imported inputs has accelerated price rises for finished medicines and raw materials, according to pharmacists’ associations.
Hadi Ahmadi, a board member of the Iranian Pharmacists Association, said daily currency volatility and rising input costs are pushing up prices, even for common medicines.
“About 70% of production costs – packaging, auxiliaries and other inputs – follow the free-market exchange rate, and only roughly 30% relates to active ingredients, so price increases are unavoidable,” Ahmadi told ILNA.
“When prices rise and insurance does not keep pace, patients either take incomplete regimens or walk away, and the treatment path is disrupted.”
He added that only two to three million doses of influenza vaccine were imported versus a need of six to seven million for a population near 90 million, and distribution was late, which contributed to wider spread of flu.
Pollack’s assessment comes as Iran faces overlapping crises at home and abroad.
The country is under intense economic strain, social dissent has become more visible and the Islamic Republic is recalibrating after military setbacks suffered by the June war with Israel.
Yet despite the pressure, Pollack said the system remains intact for a simple reason.
“Revolutions only succeed when regimes lose either the capacity or the willingness to use force,” he said. “The Islamic Republic learned from 1979. It is determined not to repeat the Shah’s mistake.”
“There is no question this country is in a pre-revolutionary state,” Pollack added. “They’re trying to have a revolution.”
Pollack pointed to Iran’s long cycle of unrest, tracing repeated efforts to challenge the Islamic Republic back to the 1999 student uprising.
Since then, protest waves have erupted every few years, including nationwide demonstrations and the women-led revolt that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody.
Each time, he said, the population pushed harder, experimented with new tactics and widened the social base of dissent.
What stopped those efforts, Pollack said, was not a lack of public anger but the clerical establishment's consistent readiness to deploy force.
Pollack said episodes of unrest, such as at a public memorial service on Friday for a lawyer who died under mysterious circumstances, highlight the paradox defining Iran today: visible cracks in social control paired with an unflinching security response.
Looking ahead, Pollack identified the eventual death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the most serious potential inflection point.
At 86, the health of the veteran theocrat has become a subject of quiet speculation even inside Iran. Succession, Pollack warned, can destabilize authoritarian systems by exposing elite rivalries or paralyzing decision-making.
“Succession can just as easily lead to chaos, fragmentation or something worse,” he warned. “These systems often survive by becoming more repressive, not less.”
Pollack also criticized US policy for focusing too narrowly on Iran’s nuclear program while sidelining Iran's regional behavior and domestic repression. He warned that treating nuclear negotiations as the central problem risks missing broader forces shaping Iran’s future.
“The nuclear program is an irritant,” he said. “The real issue is the regime’s drive to dominate the region and its willingness to repress its own population to survive.”
For now, Pollack said, Iran remains suspended in a dangerous middle ground: a society actively trying to change its political fate and a state still capable of stopping it.
“These regimes can endure for a long time,” he said. “But when they finally break, it usually happens faster than anyone expects.”
