Water tariffs fill budget gaps, not depleted wells, Iranian lawmaker says

“If I were a decision maker, I would have joined the plan endorsed by Saudi Arabia, which conditions recognition of Israel on its acceptance of a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders,” he said.

Safavi, 44, the son of former Revolutionary Guards commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, added: “Israel will never accept the two-state solution, but Iran would demonstrate it has no intention of undermining the internationally recognized order.”

He stressed he spoke personally and not for the state.

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Safavi also said recognition of Israel is “impossible under Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership,” while allowing that “in the long term, no one knows.”

The article said debate over Iran’s direction has widened among well-connected figures after a brief war with Israel in June.

Other prominent voices cited by the outlet include Faezeh Hashemi – a former lawmaker and daughter of ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani – who said Iran should re-establish diplomatic ties with Washington and take “meaningful steps towards substantial change.”

The article also referenced figures from influential families who have at times diverged publicly from hardline positions, including cleric the grandchild of the Islamic Republic’s founder Hassan Khomeini, his brother Ali, and lawyer Hassan Younesi, the son of a former intelligence minister.

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The article emphasized that their comments reflect a broader discussion inside elite circles rather than an official policy shift.

There is no indication Iran’s leadership plans to adopt the proposals described, the Financial Times said, adding that the debate may gain importance as the country looks ahead to eventual succession for the 86-year-old Supreme Leader.

The commander of Iran’s Forest Protection Unit, Colonel Majid Zakariaei, said fires this year have scorched about 46,000 hectares of national land, forest and rangeland.

He told state media that from March to November more than 2,300 fires were recorded nationwide – a 12-percent rise in the number of incidents compared with the same period last year, though the total burned area was about two percent smaller.

Zakariaei said around 95 percent of fires were linked to human activity, including careless visitors and campers, compounded by drought and rising temperatures.

“Climate change, reduced rainfall, and dryness have turned natural areas into tinder,” he said, calling for better public awareness and faster local response systems.

While the largest recent fires in the Hyrcanian Forests – the ancient, UNESCO-listed woodlands along the Caspian Sea – have been extinguished, authorities warned that dry conditions persist and that access will remain restricted until effective autumn rains arrive.

“The situation is still fragile. Until we have sufficient rainfall, unnecessary entry to the forests is prohibited,” Zakariaei said, announcing that bans now cover the Hyrcanian, Zagros and Arasbaran forest zones.

The measure, which includes parts of Mazandaran, Golestan, Ardabil and North Khorasan provinces, is aimed at preventing new flare-ups.

Firefighting teams remain on full alert and village councils near the forests have been told to prepare local emergency stations.

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  Mismanagement, not drought, pushes Iran toward water bankruptcy

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  Public criticism mounts over Iran government’s forest fire response

Political and media reactions

The government’s handling of the fires has triggered debate in Iranian media and on social networks.

The newspaper Farhikhtegan said in an article on Wednesday that several of the northern fires may have been intentionally set, describing them as “organized acts” rather than the result of drought or accident.

The paper cited unnamed officials who said about 20 suspects had been detained.

The article suggested that such incidents were meant to “undermine confidence in the state’s crisis management,” framing the destruction as part of broader attempts to disrupt the country.

Environmental officials have not endorsed those claims and maintain that negligence remains the dominant cause. They say most of the recent fires began near roads, farms or picnic areas rather than in inaccessible terrain.

Iran’s environmental community has urged a focus on prevention with experts saying that weak firefighting infrastructure, limited aerial equipment and late detection continue to leave forests vulnerable.

The Hyrcanian Forests, believed to be among the world’s oldest surviving temperate forests, are home to hundreds of endemic plant and animal species. Prolonged drought and land encroachment have already reduced much of their natural resilience.

Zakariaei said Iran plans to expand its firefighting bases and training programs, with 21 stations now designated nationwide and more in development. “With better readiness and local participation, we hope to reduce next year’s figures,” he said.

The newly formed Energy Optimization and Strategic Management Organization (EOMSO) was hailed as a technocratic command center for a sector in crisis.

With Esmaeil Saghab Esfahani at its helm, tens of millions of Iranians could soon feel through the consequences of having untested hands manage a key aspect of their daily lives.

Iran’s energy system is under historic strain. Chronic blackouts, aging grids, water scarcity and soaring demand have eroded reliability, while subsidies distort consumption and drain national revenue.

Esfahani held a senior position in the administration of Pezeshkian's hardline predecessor Ebrahim Raisi and his appointment has been attributed by some critics as a potential sop to to the government's conservative opponents.

Lacking expertise

The EOMSO was created in early 2025 to confront these pressures by streamlining policy and coordinating investment across electricity, oil, gas and renewables. Its mandate runs from grid modeling and demand-side management to long-term transition planning.

But Esfahani's previous work centered on administrative reform, social equity programs and government transformation initiatives—useful skills, but far removed from the thermodynamics, market design, regulatory engineering and infrastructure planning that define modern energy governance.

There is no record of experience in electricity economics, energy markets, renewable-integration planning or the operational challenges of Iran’s grid and gas systems.

This gap represents more than a resume mismatch. It signals strategic misalignment at a moment when Iran needs precision and domain-specific leadership most.

Task at hand

The stakes are high because EOMSO is tasked to reduce Iran’s estimated $53 billion in annual energy waste, guiding renewable-energy investment with the National Development Fund, supervising subsidy reform and steering the transition toward cleaner and more resilient energy systems.

Integrating the cultures and functions of multiple legacy institutions into a single strategic entity is itself a formidable challenge.

Doing so under intensifying demand pressures, geopolitical volatility, and deteriorating infrastructure requires leadership that understands both the technical architecture and the political economy of Iran’s energy sector.

Without deep technical grounding, the organization risks drifting toward procedural audits rather than reform. Key initiatives could stall. Policies can be misjudged, wasting limited capital and prolonging Iran’s vulnerability to outages.

Administrative instincts alone are no substitute for practical knowledge.

Political cost

Beyond the technical implications, the appointment carries political and institutional consequences that reach into Pezeshkian’s broader reform agenda.

The moderate president campaigned on professionalizing governance and empowering specialists. Choosing Esfahani undercuts that promise and risks reducing EOMSO to another venue where political balancing supersedes competence.

Public trust, already strained by blackouts and stalled projects, is unlikely to withstand another round of unmet expectations. Energy policy touches households and industries daily; missteps are felt immediately.

The danger is not personal failure on the part of Saghab Esfahani. It is the systemic vulnerability created when a critical institution is led without the technical authority needed to manage its portfolio.

Iran’s energy crisis is too severe, and the EOMSO’s mandate too demanding, for improvisation. The body’s creation could be a step toward coherent energy governance if the administration compensates for the expertise gap.

Without corrective measures—and fast—the appointment risks becoming an energy turning point for all the wrong reasons.

But the crisis is rooted less in the sky than in decades of flawed policy: rushed dam-building, inefficient farming and poor governance.

The defining problem is management: lack of coordination among key ministries and short-term crisis fixes that ignore long-term realities.

One striking example came in July 2025, when schools and offices in Tehran and several provinces were temporarily shut down to reduce electricity and water consumption.

The move briefly eased pressure on the grid but underscored the absence of durable policy. No plan yet in sight promises anything near a comprehensive solution.

Daunting figures

A new energy ministry report shows dam inflows this year at just 1.35 billion cubic meters, an extraordinary drop from long-term averages. Total storage in Iran’s 193 major reservoirs has fallen to 34% of capacity, down 25% from last year.

Tehran’s situation is even more alarming.

The capital’s four main dammed reservoirs (Lar, Taleqan, Karaj and Amir Kabir) hold barely 12% of capacity, with Lar at just 2%. Inflow into the capital’s system has plunged 43% year-on-year.

If nothing changes, next summer could bring rationing and widespread drops in water pressure for millions in Tehran and other major cities.

Agriculture: the main drain

The core of Iran’s water crisis lies in agriculture, which consumes over 80% of renewable water resources, often with less than 40% efficiency. Much of the water used in irrigation is simply lost through evaporation, leakage, or outdated techniques.

Households, by contrast, account for just 6-10% of total use, yet are routinely targeted by conservation campaigns. The real problem is structural: water-intensive crops, unrealistic self-sufficiency policies and misallocated resources.

In many plains, groundwater extraction is two to three times higher than natural recharge rates, leading to dried wells, collapsing traditional aqueducts called qanats and land subsidence—up to 30 centimeters a year in some regions.

A test of survival

Climate change has intensified the crisis. Iran’s average temperature has risen 1.8°C over the past decade, triggering the evaporation of billions of cubic meters of water from dams, lakes, and soil.

Evaporation in many regions now exceeds total annual rainfall. Steady rains that once fed aquifers have been replaced by sudden flash downpours that run off quickly instead of replenishing the ground.

Iran can escape its water spiral only through structural reform: overhauling crop patterns and boosting agricultural efficiency, repairing leaky water networks and establishing transparent, data-driven water governance.

But the country's water crisis is ultimately a test of governance and social resilience. Without deep reform, the coming year could turn “thirst” from metaphor into political reality.

Water bankruptcy is not just empty reservoirs. It signals a failing contract between nature, the state and society which badly needs to be renegotiated.

Recent departures and high-profile clashes demonstrate that misgivings within the 18-month-old administration have spilled into public view.

Fayyaz Zahed, a senior adviser, publicly quit last week.

In a sharply worded letter, Zahed denounced several recent appointments as “embarrassing” and reflective of “bad taste,” singling out the choice of Sagheb Esfahani—a hardliner with no experience in the energy sector—to head Iran’s energy optimization body.

Zahed’s colleague Mohammad Mohajeri later quoted him as telling Pezeshkian: “If you want a silent apologist as your adviser, please be advised that genuine opinion cannot be bought with orders and directives.”

Jafar the kingmaker

Much of the internal disarray is now being linked to the expanding influence of Vice President Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah—an old friend, wartime companion and arguably the president’s closest confidant.

Reports from Khabar Online and outlets aligned with Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf accuse Ghaempanah of driving a series of controversial appointments and sidelining more experienced advisers.

Hardline media have seized on the moment, describing the resignations—grudgingly accepted by Pezeshkian—as evidence of a broader administrative failure, one that neither the president nor his deputies can reverse.

These departures land at a time when Iran’s economy is dragging under renewed sanctions, high inflation, frustrated expectations from the post-election period and a sense that Pezeshkian has struggled to articulate a coherent economic direction.

Hardline outlets including Javan, Kayhan and Sobh-e No have amplified that narrative, arguing that the president’s inability to rein in his inner circle has compounded the economic drift.

The line of attack is clear: factional meddling and poor personnel decisions are not just political missteps—they are undermining governance at a moment of national fragility.

VP Aref next?

Against this backdrop, pro-Ghalibaf media such as Sobh-e No and Khorassan now claim that First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref has submitted his resignation.

The government has not confirmed the reports. Some accounts suggest the trigger is Aref’s escalating clashes with Ghaempanah and Chief of Staff Mohen Hajimirzai. Others say Aref grew frustrated with the “limited scope” of his role.

Aref himself has been criticized by both conservatives and moderates for taking on more responsibilities than his capacity allowed.

If Pezeshkian accepts Aref’s resignation, Ghaempanah would become the president’s last remaining senior vice president, consolidating his position as the most influential figure in the administration’s inner ring.

One anecdote from a recent provincial visit has circulated widely: after one too many sycophantic compliments from Ghaempanah, Pezeshkian reportedly snapped, “Come off it!”

Sasan Karimi, an aide to former foreign minister Javad Zarif, later quipped on social media: “The country would have been better off if Jafar (Ghaempanah) really did come off it. Sometimes the biggest obstacles lie within the innermost circles.”

Together, the confirmed exit of Zahed, the deepening feud around Ghaempanah, the economic malaise, and the swirl of unverified but persistent reports surrounding Aref paint a picture of an administration under severe strain and struggling to hold itself up.