Leaked documents and media investigations indicate a Berlin businesswoman allegedly ran oil sales for Iran from her apartment, with the proceeds apparently reaching Iran’s Ministry of Defense through a web of front companies operating in Asia.
According to leaked documents published by the exile platform Wiki-Iran and analyzed by German broadcaster ZDF, emails in the dataset of Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ) — an Iranian oil firm tied to the defense ministry — refer to a Berlin-based trading company, suggesting possible links to Iran’s sanctioned oil network.
The documents, which include contracts, customer lists and bank data, show how Iran moves sanctioned crude oil to China using shadow tankers and complex invoicing chains.
On August 28, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom — known as the European Troika — in response to Iran’s violation of its nuclear commitments, initiated the process of activating the snapback mechanism.
Ultimately, all United Nations sanctions against the Islamic Republic, which had been suspended under the framework of the JCPOA, were reimposed on September 28.
The oil trade is essential for Iran’s solvency, so Tehran conceals it at any cost, said Muyu Xu, an economic analyst in Singapore who studies sanctioned oil markets.
Xu told ZDF middlemen typically use false names and altered paperwork so that they themselves would not be involved in the trade.
A Berlin address in the documents
The materials released by Wiki-Iran include email exchanges referencing a Berlin company address and attaching a copy of the businesswoman’s identification card.
From her apartment, investigators believe, she coordinated multimillion-liter oil shipments disguised through renamed firms and falsified invoices.
When confronted by ZDF, the woman admitted knowing Iranian oil traders but denied participating in any commercial transactions.
No official investigation has yet been opened against her, the Berlin prosecutor’s office told ZDF, adding that “no proceedings have been filed regarding the company.”
Customs authorities declined to comment on specific cases.
The broader context
Wiki-Iran, which has previously released credible leaks from within Iran, said it obtained internal SEJ records that trace oil sales through intermediaries in Malaysia and Singapore.
ZDF journalists who followed those leads on the ground found most of the data consistent, strengthening suspicions about the Berlin connection.
Under German law, oil trade with Iran is permitted unless entities tied to the Iranian defense ministry are involved.
“If the Ministry of Defense participates, then they are committing a criminal offense,” said Christian von Soest, head of Peace and Security Studies at the GIGA Institute in Hamburg.
The investigation, led by research firm Kharon and backed by a US civil forfeiture case, reveals how the network used intermediaries across Europe, the Middle East and the Americas to conceal its Iranian military end-users.
“With its use of layered intermediaries, third-country brokers and seemingly legitimate front companies in Western Europe, the helicopter-parts network demonstrates the growing sophistication of the illicit supply chains that support sanctioned military programs,” Kharon said.
The US Treasury’s October 1 sanctions followed the UN’s snapback on Iranian restrictions and targeted the Iran-based Pasargad Parvaz Kish Helicopter Company (PHC) and its Germany-based chief executive, Mehdi Shirazi Shayesteh. Treasury said PHC procured aircraft and spare parts for Iran’s state helicopter maker, PANHA, using a “transnational procurement network.”
Corporate filings show that PHC’s ownership ties extend into the investment arm of the sanctioned Pasargad Bank, embedding it within Iran’s restricted financial system.
According to a civil forfeiture complaint reviewed by Kharon, Shayesteh and his Iran-based partner, Amirhossein Salimi—the head of Uruguay’s Perfect Day SA—set up a joint venture in Portugal in 2021 called Business United Unipessoal LDA. Their first deal was the acquisition of a US-origin helicopter, which was routed through the network and eventually sold to PHC.
A US link in the chain
Among the entities linked to the operation was Cobra International, a Union City, New Jersey–based supplier that advertises itself as serving “civilian and military markets.” Between 2021 and 2023, Business United carried out several transactions with Cobra, including a $209,000 purchase of a used helicopter engine that US authorities later seized.
Kharon’s review found Cobra’s business connections also reached companies tied to Russia’s defense sector.
Court filings identified Dubai-based Indian broker Krishnamurthy Shekar as a key facilitator who sought helicopter engines from Cobra in 2023 on behalf of Business United. He maintains professional links to several aviation suppliers in the UAE and India.
In Europe, Swedish national Ramtin Emami directed two companies—Nordic Air and Heli Invest AB—that received US-origin parts from Cobra and re-exported them to Iran. Business United requested that the shipments be routed through Sweden before their final delivery to PHC, according to Kharon’s findings.
The case underscores the growing complexity of Iran’s defense procurement networks, which rely on Western intermediaries, layered brokers and front companies to mask their military objectives.
