Iran International
A proposal to return control of Iran’s nuclear negotiations to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has highlighted the growing influence of its new chief, Ali Larijani—and a potential readjustment of Tehran’s negotiation strategy as UN sanctions loom.
Supporters of the move argue that only the SNSC can bring coherence to policymaking, uniting rival political factions in a way the Foreign Ministry cannot.
That case was made most clearly in a rare joint commentary by moderate journalist Mohammad Ghoochani and conservative commentator Mohammad Mohajeri, published September 7 in the centrist daily Ham Mihan.
“(The council) is the only body capable of coordinating between the military, diplomats, revolutionaries, reformist and conservative politicians, the President and the Supreme Leader, or indeed between the government and the people,” they wrote.
Notably, they criticized the continued involvement of former SNSC secretary Ali Shamkhani in the nuclear talks and dismissed the idea of handing the file to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, arguing that Iran could no longer afford the stagnation of recent years.
A day after the joint editorial, Iran’s former ambassador to Germany, Alireza Sheikh Attar, told the conservative daily Farhikhtegan that Larijani had been appointed on September 5 to oversee Iran’s entire nuclear dossier.
If confirmed, Larijani would once more take center stage in tough negotiations in the weeks ahead.
Regroup or rethink?
Although final authority rests with Khamenei, the emphasis on the Council’s coordinating role by Ghoochani and Mohajeri may point to Larijani’s potential to nudge the Leader toward a definitive decision on engagement with Washington.
Khamenei appeared to be abandoning his “neither war nor talks” line in his meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet. The state of “no war, no peace,” he said, was “the enemies’ plan” and harmed the country.
Hints of movement are already emerging.
Conservative diplomat Alireza Sheikh Attar suggested on Monday that decisions have been made about resuming talks with the United States, possibly coupled with a request to delay activation of the snapback mechanism until negotiations yield results.
Whether these shifts mark a genuine rethink or simply a bureaucratic reshuffle remains uncertain.
Council on the rise?
The proposal by the two prominent editors also reflects frustration at the Council’s long decline.
Created in 1990 amid post-war turmoil, the SNSC was designed as a mechanism for cohesion, tasked with protecting national interests and reconciling state institutions with public needs.
Its first secretary, Hassan Rouhani, held the post for 16 years and was credited with pragmatism, particularly in preventing new wars.
The nuclear dossier was assigned to the Council in the early 2000s, but under president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad control shifted to the foreign ministry—and effectively to Ahmadinejad himself, whose chaotic management eventually forced Khamenei to open backchannels of his own.
Larijani’s return has been welcomed by moderates as a potential revival of rational governance, though his occasional firebrand remarks—such as threats against IAEA chief Rafael Grossi—have raised doubts.
Larijani may bring new energy to the Council. The question is whether he can direct diplomacy in ways others could not or his ascent merely repackages decisions that still flow from the top.
