Iran International
An Iranian official's assertion that Russia had prior knowledge of Israel’s plans to topple the Islamic Republic has sparked a renewed debate in Iran over the relative silence of Tehran's superpower ally during a punishing war in June.
Mohammad-Hossein Saffar-Harandi, a hardline member of Iran’s Expediency Council, said on state television this week that Israel’s attacks on Iran in a 12-day war in June was part of a deliberate, long-planned “overthrow” operation.
“(Some people) in Israel contacted certain officials within Russia’s Foreign Ministry two to three days before the attack,” he asserted, informing Moscow about the operation and urging them to abandon their cooperation with Tehran.
The Islamic Republic would be toppled in a few days, the Russians were told, according to Saffar-Harandi. He did not say how he obtained the information, nor whether Moscow had informed Tehran or taken any preventive steps.
“If his claim is true, did Russia inform Iran? Or was Russia suffering from a miscalculation (like Israel), believing that Iran was finished?” asked Esfandiar Zolghadr, lawyer and journalist, in a post on X.
Moscow muted
Russia’s response to the war was limited to diplomatic statements, offering no political or military support for Tehran. Iranian analysts see this as a reflection of Moscow’s focus on the Ukraine war and its desire to avoid jeopardizing ties with Israel and the West.
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told reporters last week that Moscow was “seriously concerned” about Israeli and American attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities—but stopped short of backing Iran, instead urging negotiations with the UN nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.
Critics in Iran argue this cautious stance fits a broader pattern.
“From Russia’s unfulfilled promises to deliver defense systems like the S-400 and Su-35 fighter jets, to repeated delays in military cooperation, all suggest that this partnership is not based on mutual trust, but rather on opportunistic, short-term interests,” the reformist Shargh daily said in an August 5 commentary.
Israel first?
Russia’s response has not gone unnoticed in Iran’s military and political circles.
Brigadier-General Yadollah Javani, political deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, acknowledged public confusion over the silence of both Russia and China, pointing to the limits of military pacts that don’t entail mutual defense.
Nematollah Izadi, Iran’s former ambassador to Russia, told the Jamaran news website in late July that if Russia had to choose between Iran and Israel, “it would definitely choose Israel.”
He also pointed to Moscow’s strategic logic: continued Iran-West tensions help Russia maintain regional leverage. A thaw with the West, he warned, could shift Tehran’s alignment.
During the war, President Vladimir Putin said Israel has two million Russian speakers and is “practically a Russian-speaking country.”
The comment was seen as a signal of priorities in Tehran.
“Putin’s statements indicated that ethnic and demographic ties with Israel take precedence for him over regional commitments with Iran,” the commentary in Shargh read.
“This behavior cannot be explained merely within the framework of diplomatic caution; rather, it should be seen as the logical extension of a policy rooted in transactionalism.”
Behind the tailored suits and diplomatic polish lies the same system preparing for confrontation, not compromise.
The SNSC, one of the Islamic Republic’s most powerful institutions, is ultimately controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. All senior appointments fall under his direct authority.
Larijani, who previously served as SNSC secretary from 2005 to 2007 and was parliament speaker for over a decade, is one of the regime’s most enduring insiders. A longtime adviser to Khamenei, he has often served as a bridge between rival factions.
With his neatly trimmed beard, sharp gaze, and preference for suits over uniforms, Larijani offers a stark contrast to his predecessor, Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian of the IRGC Navy, who often appeared in fatigues and had a distinctly harder edge.
But the change is stylistic, not strategic. Tehran’s broader posture remains intact.
Image over substance
The reshuffle comes as Iran faces mounting pressure over its nuclear program and prepares for the possibility of renewed military conflict with Israel or the United States.
Even journalists aligned with the reformist camp have voiced skepticism over Larijani’s return, calling it “too little, too late.” That skepticism is echoed by Nour News, affiliated with former SNSC chief Ali Shamkhani, who issued a thinly veiled warning on Wednesday:
“National security bodies complement the decision-making process, not replace it. If management and structural changes at a national security body are paired with unrealistic expectations, it will lead to the institution losing its operational credibility.”
Contained rivalries
Larijani and Shamkhani represent rival power centers within the Islamic Republic, each vying for influence over national security and foreign policy.
They may trade blows in public—or, in Iranian political parlance, compete for a bigger “share of the revolution’s spoils.” But when faced with internal unrest or foreign threats, such rivalries are quickly subordinated to regime survival.
Their behavior is captured by a Persian proverb: “We might tear each other limb from limb, but we are brothers. Therefore, we will always bury the bones.”
The Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader Ruhollah Khomeini put it more bluntly: “Preserving the regime is everyone’s highest religious duty—even more important than the life of the (Promised Savior).”
A new war council
Two days before Larijani’s appointment, the SNSC invoked Article 176 of Iran’s constitution to establish a National Defense Council.
Echoing the Supreme Defense Council of the 1980s, the new body is tasked with streamlining security decision-making in wartime.
It will be chaired by the president—or an SNSC member appointed by him—and will include the heads of Iran’s three branches of power, the intelligence minister, the chief of the General Staff, commanders of the IRGC and Artesh, two Supreme Leader representatives, and the head of the Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters.
The formation of the new body is a sign that Tehran sees confrontation as imminent.
Larijani’s return should be viewed in that context: not the return of a moderate to power, but the placement of a loyal, presentable veteran into a structure recalibrating for crisis.
As another Persian proverb puts it: “When the adversary rains arrows down on you, take shelter. Rush from one column to another, and buy yourself time—until chance provides you with an opening to fight or flee.”