Iran has warned it will take retaliatory steps if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proceeds with a resolution censuring its nuclear activities, following the publication of a detailed report alleging undeclared nuclear work across multiple covert sites.
Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said the agency had “lost its credibility” by acting under “unilateral American influence.”
“We have no hidden program and no deviation from our obligations,” Eslami said in an interview with Al-Arabi TV of Qatar ahead of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting this week. “We will not endanger the health of our people by surrendering to political pressure.”
Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesperson for the agency, also said in a separate broadcast that Iran had already conveyed a list of possible countermeasures if censured.
“Last time we warned them and they didn’t listen, so we increased 60 percent enrichment sevenfold. Now again, we’ve told them what actions we may take. The agency shouldn’t expect continued constructive cooperation.”
ISIS analysis: IAEA findings show coordinated nuclear program
In an analysis of the IAEA’s May 31 report, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the agency had presented “new details from its assessments about Iran’s activities involving undeclared nuclear materials, related equipment, as well as their nuclear weapons relevance, at four sites in Iran.”
The analysis said the IAEA now concludes that Lavizan-Shian, Marivan, Varamin, and Turquz-Abad were “part of an undeclared structured nuclear program.”
The ISIS report highlights Iran’s production of uranium deuteride (UD3) neutron initiators at Lavizan-Shian during 2003, saying these were “integrated into scaled implosion systems and explosively tested.” These initiators play a central role in triggering the chain reaction in a nuclear weapon.
At Marivan, the IAEA assessed that Iran conducted four explosive tests involving “full-scale hemispherical implosion systems,” consistent with preparation for a cold test of a nuclear weapon device.
The analysis said the IAEA found indications that “equipment was developed and tested at Lavizan-Shian that included neutron detectors and housings,” and that “identical housing for neutron detectors was deployed in an explosive test at Marivan.”
The Varamin site, also referred to as the Tehran Plant in Iran’s nuclear archive, was identified as a pilot-scale uranium conversion facility. According to the analysis, the IAEA reported that the site housed “small but heavily contaminated (and possibly full) UF6 cylinders,” along with fluorine-based chemicals and radiation monitoring equipment.
Five containers of equipment were deemed essential by Iranian operators and were later moved to Turquz-Abad.
The ISIS review emphasized the connection between these sites and Turquz-Abad, which the IAEA concluded served as a storage site for nuclear materials and contaminated equipment from Lavizan-Shian, Varamin, and the Jaber Ibn Hayan Laboratory.
The agency detected “processed natural uranium particles” and isotopically altered uranium, including material enriched up to 19 percent, though it noted it has “no assessment regarding the source” of these particles.
ISIS noted that the findings warrant an IAEA Board of Governors censure resolution and referral of Iran’s case to the UN Security Council. It also urged the E3 to trigger a snapback of UN sanctions through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action mechanism.
Iran points to ‘sabotage,’ questions IAEA process
Iran’s semi-official news agency ISNA reported Monday that officials had presented what they described as evidence of sabotage at Varamin and Turquz-Abad during the recent visit by IAEA Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo. According to ISNA, Iran shared physical traces of tampering and indicated it would provide further documentation when appropriate.
Iran said it had not been previously informed of key allegations contained in the IAEA’s report and rejected the agency’s linkage between uranium particles found at Turquz-Abad and activities at JHL. Officials insisted no intact containers were removed from Turquz-Abad in the period referenced by the agency and characterized the site as an industrial waste depot.
On Varamin, Tehran denied the existence of a pilot-scale conversion plant and accused the IAEA of basing its assessment on “fabricated documents” submitted by adversarial actors. Officials also dismissed satellite imagery cited by the agency as insufficient evidence of material transfer to Turquz-Abad.
While Iranian authorities expressed their willingness to cooperate within the safeguards framework, they questioned the IAEA’s transparency and impartiality. They also expressed concern that the agency’s recent conduct indicates “no intention to resolve these matters through technical channels.”
Their accounts document a sprawling overseas network operating under direct orders from the Supreme Leader’s office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence arm well out of step with common diplomatic practice.
“Every embassy has a list. People to watch. People to engage. People to silence,” an Iranian former diplomatic employee told Iran International.
“It’s not foreign policy—it’s field execution,” another told Iran International. “The people sent abroad are on assignment, not appointment.”
Their account outlines a foreign service shaped not by diplomacy but by ideology, surveillance and illicit finance.
According to these individuals—whose names are withheld for their safety—Iran’s diplomatic missions double as intelligence gathering hubs tasked with tracking dissidents, surveilling student communities and delivering cash and equipment under the protection of diplomatic immunity.
UK authorities detained eight men in May, including three charged under the National Security Act for surveilling Iran International journalists on behalf of Tehran between August 2024 and February 2025.
It was not clear whether the charges related in any way to the Iranian embassy in London.
Iran’s foreign ministry denounced the charges as politically motivated, but former officials say such actions are core to the Islamic Republic’s overseas agenda.
Iran’s embassies maintain the outward structure of any diplomatic mission—ambassadors, attachés and advisers—but according to the sources, the roles often serve as cover.
“A person listed as a translator might actually coordinate funds for proxy groups,” said one of the former diplomats. “Titles are just for appearances.”
In one high-profile case, Iranian diplomat Asadollah Asadi used his status to transport explosives intended for an opposition rally in Paris. His 2021 conviction in Belgium exposed how far such dual roles can go.
Another ex-staffer recalled colleagues arriving in Istanbul and Baku with briefcases of undeclared dollars. “They know no one will search their bags,” he said.
Cultural attachés, especially those linked to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization, are said to organize religious events abroad that double as screening grounds for potential recruits.
Germany shuttered the Islamic Center of Hamburg in July over its ties to Tehran and what the Interior Ministry called promotion of extremism and antisemitism.
The diplomatic corps itself, sources say, is dominated by the sons of clerics and system insiders.
“Your father is a Friday prayer leader? Your uncle is close to the Supreme Leader? You’re in,” said one.
Posts rarely align with professional background; language skills and experience are often secondary to loyalty.
Though often expelled or exposed, the structure endures. Loyal staff are rotated across continents with little interruption.
“Each post is a mission. If you complete it to the system’s satisfaction, you’re held in reserve for the next,” one former diplomat said.
The network’s reach is enhanced by front organizations. The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation has been linked to Hezbollah financing. The Iranian Red Crescent has faced accusations of being used by Quds Force operatives for weapons transport. IRGC members have admitted posing as aid workers during the Bosnian war.
IRIB outlets—Press TV, Al-Alam, Hispan TV—have functioned as propaganda arms and intelligence fronts. France expelled one of their journalists in 2011 for spreading state messaging.
The Iranian Red Crescent and the IRGC officially denied these remarks, saying that any such actions were unauthorized and not representative of their organizations.
Despite the rhetoric of resistance, many live in luxury. One former ambassador’s Paris residence cost over €40,000 per month.
“They send their kids to secular schools while preaching Islamic values,” said another. Leaked records show senior envoys receiving up to $12,000 monthly, with generous stipends and ceremonial budgets.
“It’s both reward and insulation,” an ex-diplomatic employee said. “The system buys loyalty with luxury—and distances them from the reality of ordinary Iranians.”
What emerges is not a diplomatic corps, but a global extension of Iran’s security state—trained, titled, and deployed to safeguard the Islamic Republic, not represent it.