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Expectations for a significant breakthrough in the indirect nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States are low, according to Alex Greenberg, an Iran expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
Speaking to Iran International, Greenberg said that "there isn't much hope for reaching a serious agreement between the Islamic Republic and the United States, not just for me, but for many other observers. Because no one really knows what is happening in the negotiation process."
Greenberg expressed skepticism about a fundamental shift in Iran's core policies. "In general, it is difficult to imagine the Iranian government abandoning its identity, which is supporting terrorist groups and developing its ballistic missile program. It is not believable that the Islamic Republic would easily abandon these fundamental components of its being," he said.
Greenberg also talked about the irreconcilable positions of Iran and Israel on the nuclear program. "Netanyahu wants the complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear program, but it is unlikely that the Islamic Republic will accept such a thing. Even if there is an agreement, Iran will probably retain some of its nuclear capabilities."
He concluded by raising doubts about Israel's acceptance of any deal that allows Iran to maintain a nuclear program, even in a limited capacity, citing concerns about verification measures.
The Iranian president’s visit to Azerbaijan, soon to be followed by the Israeli prime minister's trip, highlights Baku’s sophisticated geopolitical maneuvering as Tehran and Tel Aviv vie for influence in the strategically vital South Caucasus.
It is a region where energy corridors, security alignments, and infrastructure ambitions increasingly converge.
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s trip—the first by an Iranian president since 2022—marks a cautious effort to mend a strained relationship.
Restoring Iran-Azerbaijan ties
Central to the distrust is Tehran’s long-standing fear that Azerbaijan could serve as a launchpad for Israeli operations against Iran, given Baku’s deepening military cooperation with Tel Aviv.
Relations further deteriorated after the 2023 attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran, prompting a mutual expulsion of diplomats.
Equally important is Baku's accusation that Iran's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) seeks to destabilize Azerbaijan through groups like the Huseyniyyun. Azerbaijani authorities assert that these groups have been involved in plotting attacks, fomenting unrest, and targeting foreign officials.
Another flashpoint is the Turkish-backed Zangezur Corridor, a proposed route connecting mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan via Armenia.
Iran opposes the project, viewing it as a threat to its regional influence and access to Armenia. However, signs of de-escalation include joint Iranian-Azerbaijani naval drills in the Caspian Sea in late 2024 and progress on the North-South Transport Corridor with Russia.
While the Zangezur dispute remains unresolved, Pezeshkian’s visit focuses on practical cooperation, particularly in energy, rather than contentious territorial issues.
Israel's strategic countermove
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s upcoming visit reflects Israel’s intention to bolster Azerbaijan’s role as a regional partner amid escalating tensions with Iran. The timing of this trip appears as a direct counter to Tehran's outreach.
Israel seeks to deepen its footprint near Iran’s borders, using Azerbaijan’s strategic geography as both a listening post and an energy partner.
Key goals of Netanyahu's visit include strengthening intelligence-sharing on Iran’s nuclear program, encouraging Baku to formalize its long-covert security ties with Israel, and leveraging Azerbaijani diplomacy to ease Turkish-Israeli frictions.
Expanding the Abraham Accords network to include Azerbaijan remains an aspirational longer-term objective.
Competing regional visions
These high-profile visits reflect a broader contest for influence across the South Caucasus.
Turkey and Israel favor the Zangezur Corridor as a means to enhance connectivity and weaken Iranian leverage, while Iran views the project as a direct challenge to its regional role.
Israel has consistently backed Azerbaijan’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while Iran—historically closer to Armenia—has taken a more pragmatic approach toward Baku.
In Syria, Israel and Turkey seek to curb Iranian entrenchment. Armenia’s gradual alignment with the West further deepens Tehran’s strategic anxiety.
For Israel, Azerbaijan offers a critical hub for intelligence gathering and diversification of energy supplies, anchoring its evolving South Caucasus strategy.
Enduring tensions, strategic risks
Despite gestures toward normalization, structural tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan remain deep.
The $9.3 billion in arms deals signed by Baku and Tel Aviv between 2020 and 2024 remains a major obstacle to trust. Iran has repeatedly threatened military action if the Zangezur Corridor advances without its involvement, underscoring how infrastructure projects have become proxies for larger geopolitical rivalries.
Meanwhile, regional flashpoints—such as Israel’s military operations in Gaza and Iran’s nuclear escalation—could further complicate Azerbaijan’s delicate balancing act.
As external pressures mount, Baku’s strategy of engaging both Tehran and Tel Aviv becomes increasingly fraught with risk.
Pezeshkian’s visit signals Iran’s pragmatic attempt to recalibrate its relationship with Azerbaijan after years of estrangement. It is less a breakthrough than a tactical reassessment in response to shifting regional dynamics.
Netanyahu’s impending trip adds another layer to the strategic competition, reinforcing Azerbaijan’s emergence as a pivotal mediator between rival powers.
Ultimately, the interaction between these two visits will shape not only the future of Iran-Azerbaijan ties but also the broader geopolitical realignment underway in the South Caucasus.
Negotiations between Iran and the United States are making cautious progress, but the outcome remains highly uncertain as fundamental divisions persist and any overlap between the two sides’ red lines remains elusive.
The third round of talks took place in Muscat on Saturday, marking the first time that technical experts engaged directly.
Although the initiation of technical discussions is a positive development, addressing detailed issues exposed deep divisions, slowing the momentum. Statements by Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi were notably cautious, signaling limited optimism.
Araghchi emphasized the substantial gap between the two sides' demands, noting that goodwill alone will not bridge it. Talks are scheduled to continue next week at both expert and chief negotiator levels.
Potential breakthrough?
Despite the uncertainties, a deal could be easier to forge compared to the one in 2015, for several reasons:
- Regional dynamics have shifted, with Arab states now largely supporting an agreement.
- Iran’s frozen assets are significantly lower—$10–20 billion today, compared to $80–150 billion in 2015.
- Iran’s regional influence through proxy groups has weakened.
- Domestic unrest has eroded the IRI’s internal position, increasing its incentive to negotiate.
- The reduced intensity of US-Russia rivalry removes a complicating factor.
- The US-China trade war may hamper Washington’s ability to apply maximum pressure.
Both Washington and Tehran prefer a diplomatic outcome over military confrontation. However, historical, political, and ideological differences complicate the path forward.
Core obstacles
First, the legacy of mistrust remains deep. Decades of conflict, sanctions, and failed diplomacy have hardened suspicions on both sides.
President Trump's withdrawal from the 2015 deal heightened Iranian concerns about American reliability. Meanwhile, US officials remain wary of Iran’s actions. Any agreement would require both sides to genuinely believe that commitments will be honored—an especially tall order given the political volatility in both countries.
Second, Tehran is unwilling to fully dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, resisting a repeat of Libya’s disarmament model. It may agree to reduce uranium enrichment and degrade highly enriched stockpiles but will preserve advanced centrifuge capabilities.
Iran’s regional influence, although waned, still concerns Washington, particularly with regard to Israel. Many in Benjamin Netanyahu's cabinet believe the current window offers a rare chance to cripple Iran’s nuclear capabilities and may push for covert or limited military operations to derail negotiations.
European powers are another factor. Britain, Germany, and France, alarmed by Iran’s growing military cooperation with Russia, are considering reimposing UN sanctions if no progress is made. Though not directly involved in current talks, their support will be critical to any final agreement.
Sanctions are another obstacle. While economic pressure has hurt Iran deeply, many sanctions, particularly those linked to terrorism, were codified by Congress and cannot be lifted by the administration alone. A complex framework for phased sanctions relief will be necessary.
Interim agreement?
In sum, while opportunities for a breakthrough exist, formidable challenges remain. Mistrust, nuclear safeguards, regional tensions, domestic politics, and sanctions enforcement all complicate diplomacy.
An interim agreement—laying the groundwork for a broader, binding deal—appears the most realistic short-term path.
Revived US-Iran nuclear negotiations risk empowering Iran and accelerating a strategic shift away from Washington’s traditional influence in the Middle East, according to an analysis by Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.
Arab states, particularly in the Persian Gulf, have adopted a cautious stance toward the talks, not out of trust in Tehran but out of skepticism toward US reliability, political analyst Dalia Ziada wrote. "The muted Arab response is a hedging strategy."
Meanwhile, regional powers are advancing their own nuclear programs. Egypt is building a Russian-backed civilian nuclear plant at El Alamein and has recently conducted its first-ever joint military exercise with China, the article pointed out.
Saudi Arabia’s atomic energy project is progressing, with Riyadh exploring cooperation with China and Russia if the US does not allow domestic enrichment.
"Arab states are learning to live with ambiguity," Ziada wrote, adding that many are leveraging new relationships with Beijing and Moscow to balance Washington’s influence.
US President Donald Trump's optimistic pronouncements regarding negotiations with Iran are primarily an effort to maintain Tehran's engagement in the talks, according to Shahram Kholdi, a professor of international relations.
Speaking to Iran International, Kholdi characterized Trump's optimism as a strategy to prevent any disruption to the process.
"Trump is trying to paint a silver lining around this very gray and ambiguous cloud of negotiations, in the hope that there might be a light at the end of the tunnel and the Islamic Republic agrees to stop enrichment," he said.
Kholdi said that Trump's expressions of confidence are largely intended to keep the Iranian delegation at the negotiating table. "Trump's optimism is mostly to keep the other side at the negotiating table."
