The divide among Iran's ultraconservatives began at least a month before the latest round of Iran-US talks, but it has since escalated into an open rift, with most hardliners now backing away from their earlier opposition to negotiations.
Even before the talks resumed, Mahmood Nabavian, vice chairman of the Iranian parliament’s National Security Committee, had begun taking positions that diverged from the hardline Paydari Party’s stance on both domestic and foreign policy.
As recently as last week, hardliners in the Iranian parliament (Majles) and Friday Prayer imams continued to insist that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei opposed any negotiations with the United States. They maintained that there was no possibility of Iran engaging in talks with anyone from the Trump administration.
That changed on Saturday, April 12, when Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, in Oman. By Monday, it became clear that the meeting had been more substantial than initially disclosed—despite Araghchi’s earlier statements, the two officials had held a face-to-face meeting lasting about 45 minutes.
Iranian hardliners had expected Khamenei to react—perhaps with public disapproval or at least a symbolic rebuke of his foreign minister. But instead, the Supreme Leader remained silent.
At the Majles, ultraconservative lawmaker Hamid Rasaei declared, in a less than happy tone, that the talks had taken place with Khamenei’s full endorsement. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the hardline daily Kayhan, echoed the sentiment, insisting the meeting would not have occurred without the Supreme Leader’s explicit approval.
This left the ultraconservatives with little ground to stand on regarding the negotiations. Still, pockets of resistance remained in the Majles. Outspoken hardliner Mehdi Kouchakzadeh shouted that the legislature had been kept in the dark about the talks. Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf quickly cut him off, insisting that the Majles was fully informed. Other lawmakers looked on in silence, their expressions unreadable.
Some hardliners such as Nabavian supported the talks as something that was backed by Khamenei but lambasted Araghchi for meeting with Witkoff breaking his promise of not holding direct talks.
On Monday, the moderate conservative website Khabar Online and the reformist, pro-Pezeshkian daily Etemad published detailed reports on the ultraconservatives’ anger over the negotiations, highlighting what they described as a new rift within Iran’s hardline camp.
Khabar Online reported that the ultraconservatives have fractured into several factions. Some figures, it noted, were so enraged that their public remarks included direct insults toward the negotiators. Meanwhile, other conservatives such as Naghavi Hosseini, along with centrists like Mansoor Haghighatpour, criticized the hardliners opposing the talks, branding them "infiltrators who seek to polarize Iranian society."
Abbas Amirifar, a cleric close to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, accused the ultraconservatives of dishonesty, saying they only pretend to be obedient to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Former lawmaker Gholamali Imanabadi went further, calling them "traitors." From the reformist camp, cleric Mohsen Rohami claimed, "If there were a referendum on negotiating with America, 98 percent of Iranians would vote in favor of the talks."
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaking on April 13, 2025, avoided any direct reference to talks with the US.
Khabar Online revealed that many prominent conservatives have repeatedly expressed their support for negotiations with the United States. Even Ali Khezrian, a staunch supporter of Paydari Party at the Majles has defended the negotiations saying that "America has been weakened under Tump and it is now time to negotiate with it."
Others like hardline cleric Mojtaba Zolnouri who had set fire to copies of the 2015 nuclear agreement at the Majles have also supported the talks. Zolnouri said: "We live under the shadow of the Supreme Leader. We will accept whatever he wants."
Curiously, one prominent ultraconservative figure—former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili—has remained conspicuously silent on the ongoing talks. He has not commented on the negotiations themselves, nor on the exchange of letters between Trump and Khamenei that preceded them.
Some Iranian media outlets speculate that Jalili may be mobilizing his "infantry"—a reference to the vigilante groups often active in Tehran and other cities—for a potential street campaign. Another theory circulating among reporters in Tehran is that Jalili is confident the current round of talks will ultimately fail. A third possibility is that he has been instructed by authorities to stay silent for now.
Nonetheless, Jalili still wields influence. His brother Vahid oversees state television, which has maintained its anti-US tone despite the launch of formal negotiations. Media analysts note that state TV continues to give airtime to commentators openly opposed to the talks and to US policy in the region.
A real shift in Khamenei’s stance on negotiations, some observers argue, would only be evident if state television—and Tehran’s hardline newspapers—begin to change their messaging.
Many Iranian officials, political elites, and many public figures appear to be cautiously optimistic as Tehran and Washington prepare for the next round of nuclear talks, set to take place on April 19.
The optimism stems from what appears to be a shift in Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s position—evidenced by his authorization of earlier negotiations in Muscat—and US President Donald Trump’s insistence that Iran must either accept a deal or face serious consequences. Notably, Khamenei made no mention of the talks during his meeting with military commanders following the Oman round, echoing hissilence on other contentious issues such as the mandatory hijab in recent months.
“God willing, the negotiations will move forward in the right direction, public anxiety will ease, and the country can return to a state of calm so businesses can operate with more motivation and confidence,” said Mahmoud Alavi, special aide to President Masoud Pezeshkian and former intelligence minister, on Tuesday. Alavi added that a deal seems plausible because Trump, now positioning himself for the international stage, may prefer being remembered as a “peace hero” rather than a “war hero.”
The former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali-Akbar Salehi, expressed similar optimism. He said both Tehran and Washington appear determined to reach a positive outcome and dismissed the likelihood of military conflict, adding that Trump has no interest in engaging the US in another war.
Azar Mansouri, head of the Reform Front, echoed this hopeful sentiment in a post on X, describing a “general feeling of optimism” within society. She emphasized that the talks were being coordinated by “all pillars of governance”—a veiled reference to Khamenei and his close circle—and described the process as constructive so far.
Abbas Golrou, a member of the parliament’s National Security Committee, also pointed to consensus within the political establishment. “The entire sovereign system has endorsed the talks,” he said, again alluding to Khamenei’s involvement. “This is the right thing to do.”
In interviews with the reformist daily Ham-Mihan, several former diplomats expressed cautious hope. “This may be the first time we can [realistically] hope for all sanctions—not just nuclear-related ones—to be lifted if the negotiations fully succeed,” said Qasem Mohebali, former Director General of the Foreign Ministry’s Middle East and North Africa Division.
Still, concerns remain. Mansouri warned of potential disruption from hardline factions with significant access to state media and public platforms such as Friday prayer pulpits.
The influence of ultra-hardline opponents of US engagement, including former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and the Steadfastness Front (Paydari Party), appears to be waning amid internal divisions. Even among some hardliners, resistance to negotiations has softened, as outright opposition could now be interpreted as defiance of Khamenei’s authority.
Facing a deepening economic crisis, President Pezeshkian has publicly acknowledged that sanctions must be lifted for any meaningful recovery. As a result, many ordinary Iranians are also pinning their hopes on the success of the talks.
“People are hopeful, cautious, angry, and anxious all at once—but I think most of them are taking the possibility of a deal very seriously,” said Amir-Hossein, a Tehran-based businessman, in an interview with Iran International.
“You can see it in the market,” he added. “People are starting to sell the dollars they were holding onto, which shows they believe the rial might strengthen if sanctions are lifted," he said, adding that in his view Khamenei has realized that he has no option other than capitulating to save himself and the Islamic Republic from annihilation.
Indeed, the Iranian rial has appreciated in recent days, and the main index of the Tehran Stock Exchange has rebounded sharply—surpassing its all-time high from January after months of decline.
In a scathing response to an op-ed article by former US Secretary of State John Kerry, Iran's hardline Kayhan daily dismissed his assertion that Tehran is backed into a corner due to recent developments.
Kayhan’s editorial, responding to a Wall Street Journal op-ed by John Kerry and Thomas Kaplan that suggested President Donald Trump now has an opportunity for a broader nuclear deal with Iran due to Tehran’s weakened regional position, dismissed the analysis as based on false premises and a fundamental misunderstanding of Iran’s strengths.
Tehran has seen its regional influence weakened, with Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis under increasing pressure, and Bashar al-Assad no longer in power in Syria.
"Mr. Kerry, although you still seem to dream of leading the world, there is ample and undeniable evidence that today’s America is no longer the powerful nation it once was," Kayhan wrote. "How can a country whose president speaks of hardship, whose senators describe this as the worst period in its history, and whose people stand in line for food and shelter, expect to pressure others?"
In contrast to Kerry's portrayal of Iran's weakened hand, Kayhan argued that the Islamic Republic is in the center of regional and global developments and continues its path with "authority and dignity."
Kerry's original article had argued that "Ten years after the last nuclear agreement with Iran, the balance of forces has changed dramatically... Iran, often a master of miscalculation and geopolitical malpractice, has backed itself into a corner, and that paradoxically boosts the odds for a peace initiative." He also called on President Trump to seek a deal that "prevents Iran from ever possessing a potentially lethal nuclear program."
"So Mr. Kerry! Accept the reality: It is not Iran that is in the corner of the ring; it is America that is counting down," Kayhan editorial read.
Also on Tuesday, Tasnim News Agency, a media outlet affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, analyzed the reasons behind Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's approval of indirect negotiations with the United States.
The author, Mehdi Khodaei, refuted three common interpretations for this decision: that it was due to Trump's threats, that Iran had no other choice, or that it was imposed upon Khamenei by the government or other high-ranking officials.
It argued that Iran's willingness to engage in indirect talks is not out of fear or frustration, as Iran possesses the capability to respond and doubts the US would initiate a conflict.
US envoy Steve Witkoff, who on Monday appeared to signal that Washington might tolerate limited uranium enrichment by Iran, clarified in a Tuesday tweet that Tehran "must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program."
Witkoff’s remarks on Monday suggested that any new deal could closely resemble the Obama-era JCPOA, which President Donald Trump withdrew from in 2018.
In a tweet on Tuesday Witkoff seemed to have backtracked from his earlier statement.
“A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal," the special envoy said and added, "...meaning that Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program."
On Monday, Witkoff had said in an interview with Fox News’ Hannity that Iran's uranium enrichment would not be eliminated entirely but rather scaled back to the JCPOA’s limit of 3.67 percent. “They do not need to enrich past 3.67 percent,” he said.
Ha also added that “This is going to be much about verification on the enrichment program, and then ultimately verification on weaponization. That includes missiles—the type of missiles that they have stockpiled there—and it includes the trigger for a bomb.”
This particular demand would be within reach, as Tehran has repeatedly has called for a US return to the original terms of the JCPOA.
So what was new in Witkoff’s remarks in his interview with Fox?
First, the Trump administration is seeking a broader inspection regime than the one included in the JCPOA. This could entail access not only to declared enrichment facilities, but also to potential sites involved in warhead development. Iran has consistently resisted such expanded oversight, and this will likely be a point of friction in the talks.
Second, Witkoff explicitly mentioned Iran’s ballistic missile program—a domain left mostly untouched by the original nuclear deal. Including missile oversight would require access to Iran’s extensive military research and development infrastructure, which Tehran has long refused to open to outside inspection.
The logic for including missiles is clear. If Iran were to produce nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles would be its most viable delivery system. Iran has already built thousands of such missiles. While they may not be highly advanced, when armed with nuclear warheads, they could pose a significant threat to the region, including Israel, Greece, and potentially other parts of southern and eastern Europe.
Witkoff had hinted at the administration’s limited goals in an earlier interview with Tucker Carlson in March. However, other senior officials, including the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, have publicly pushed for the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.
One unresolved issue is also the fate of nearly 300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that Iran has stockpiled. According to a report by The Guardian on Tuesday, the United States has proposed transferring the material to a third country, such as Russia—a move Tehran is likely to oppose. The issue was reportedly raised during recent talks in Oman between Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Witkoff, but Iran insisted the stockpile remain under UN supervision inside the country..
Ultimately, the central question is how quickly and how far Tehran is prepared to go in reaching a deal, specially if the US insists on zero enrichment—and whether the Trump administration is willing to compromise on its tougher demands during the bargaining process.
"Iran has to get rid of the concept of a nuclear weapon. They cannot have a nuclear weapon," President Trump said on April 14. "I think they're tapping us along because they were so used to dealing with stupid people in this country."
“They've got to go fast, because they're fairly close to having one, and they're not going to have one,” he added. “If we have to do something very harsh, we'll do it. And I'm not doing it for us, I'm doing it for the world. These are radicalized people, and they cannot have a nuclear weapon.”
Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson said that US-Iran negotiations are indirect because direct talks would not be effective or beneficial for the Islamic Republic.
Esmail Baghaei said that indirect negotiations are not unusual and have occurred before, adding that they are currently taking place in other contexts as well.
“Direct negotiations, in a situation where one side insists on a coercive approach, uses threats, and resorts to force, are neither beneficial nor acceptable to a side like the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said speaking to reporters on Monday. “Therefore, we will continue with the form and approach we have chosen.”
Baghaei also said that the next round of talks may take place in a location other than Oman, adding that the location is not as important as ensuring the framework of interaction between Iran and the US remains unchanged.
On Sunday, Axios reported that Rome will host second round of Iran-US negotiations next week.
Baghaei added that the Iran's main demand in the negotiations is the removal of sanctions, which the Islamic Republic is pursuing with determination.
Baghaei also confirmed that the Director General of the UN's nuclear watchdog Rafael Grossi will likely visit Tehran this week. Earlier the Wall Street Journal reported that Grossi will visit Tehran this week ahead of the next round of US-Iran talks on Saturday.
He also addressed Tehran's economic cooperation with Washington, saying: "The Islamic Republic has never placed any obstacles to economic cooperation with other parties, but the real problem lies with the US, which, through complex laws, has deprived its own citizens of any economic dealings with Iran."
Baghaei confirmed that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi will travel to Moscow later this week for a pre-planned visit.
"The trip was planned in advance, but there will be consultations regarding the talks with the US," Baghaei said.
The first thing Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi probably noticed upon returning to Tehran from Oman—where he met with US Special Envoy Steve Wikoff—was the appearance of his own oversized images on billboards across the capital’s expressways.
Hardliners in Tehran have been working to frame the opaque, closed-door meeting—described as positive by both sides—as a political win for the Islamic Republic. Some have even gone so far as to label it a victory.
The following day, Javan, the IRGC-affiliated daily, declared: "Iran is the winner of the negotiations, with or without an agreement." The paper described the meeting as "a show of Iran's power against the United States' helplessness."
Javan highlighted the breaking of the deadlock and the promise of further negotiations as signs the process would ultimately benefit Iran. It claimed Iran had dictated "all of its preconditions, including the venue, timing, and agenda" to the United States.
This triumphant narrative, however, stood in contrast to Araghchi’s own statement that the talks focused solely on nuclear issues. Meanwhile, Reuters reported that the negotiations aimed to "de-escalate regional tensions, facilitate prisoner exchanges, and reach limited agreements to ease sanctions in exchange for controlling Iran's nuclear program."
At the same time, some hardliners sought to emphasize Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s authority by noting that he had personally authorized the meeting.
However some opposition to negotiations was evident among ultra-hardliners. They appeared to highlight Khamenei's role with the possible intent of assigning blame to him should the renewed diplomatic engagement fail.
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the Khamenei-linked Kayhan newspaper, wrote: "The indirect talks with the United States could not have taken place without Khamenei's permission. If he had not approved them, he would certainly have blocked the meeting."
Shariatmadari added: "The horizon is not clear, and Iran must think of a Plan B." He dismissed US threats of military action as "a bluff," and claimed that "the draft Witkoff handed to Araghchi included no such thing as dismantling Iran's nuclear establishments or the possibility of a military attack."
Outspoken ultra-hardliner lawmaker Hamid Rasaei said in parliament on Sunday morning: "We all know that the Supreme Leader believes that the United States is not trustworthy and that negotiations with Washington are useless." He added, however, that "The Leader has authorized the talks to prove to some Iranian officials that the US breaks its promises and will put forward illogical demands."
Meanwhile, another ultraconservative MP, Mahmood Nabavian, vice-chairman of the Iranian parliament's national security committee, claimed that Trump initially wanted US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to participate in the talks with Araghchi. "But we insisted that Witkoff should go to Oman instead," he said, adding: "Trump accepted all of Iran's conditions regarding the format of the talks."
Saeed Haddadian, a political aide to parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, also warned against excessive optimism about the negotiations with Washington. He suggested that Trump might not even support the approach taken by his own special envoy.
"If you show weakness in front of a thug such as Trump," Haddadian said, "you are likely to end up like Ukrainian President Zelensky. You will be humiliated, and you will not get any results."
In a separate development, Mehdi Fazaeli, a member of the Supreme Leader's office staff, denied claims that senior Iranian officials had pressured Khamenei to shift his position in response to Trump’s letter or to adjust his overall approach to the talks.