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In the second round, Pezeshkian’s campaign depicted his hardline rival as an existential threat to the livelihood of the nation. More people turned out for the run-off and Pezeshkian defeated the ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili. But he lost to those who boycotted the election. In the end, many more stayed at home than voted for the ‘reformist’ candidate.
So, the question is: how did Pezeshkian win despite failing to persuade the majority that he could deliver the reforms he promised? The answer, I argue in this piece, is the ethnic vote. (All data featured in this piece comes from official sources, and there are reasons to doubt their veracity. But that would be the subject for another article).
Ethnically, Iran is a highly diverse society. While the official language is Persian, millions of people have different mother tongues, such as Azari, Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arabic. These minorities often lack representation, particularly many Kurds and almost all Baluchis who are Sunnis, whereas most other groups, including the Arabic and Azeri speakers, are Shia.
Pezeshkian seems to come from a Azeri-speaking family, but he was born and raised among Kurds. Most minorities, ethnic and religious, picked him over Jalili, especially the Baluchis and the Kurds. But the focus here is on the Azari-speaking voters. (Note that most Turkish-speaking Iranians are Shia, which helps us single out the ethnic element.)
The figure below illustrates the role of the Azari speakers in Pezeshkian's victory. The horizontal axis represents the ratio of Azari speakers in each province. Azari belongs to the family of Turkic languages, which is also heavily influenced by Persian. Within Iran, people usually call it “Torki”, which means Turkish. The vertical axis represents the vote shares in the run-off, as a percentage of eligible voters in each province.
To better understand what seems to be a strong ethnic factor, we can consult the chart below, which shows the Azari or Turkish speaking population in each province.
Pezeshkian secured the highest share of vote in such provinces as East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zanjan and Ardabil, where the majority are Azari (Turkish) speakers. In contrast, Jalili had an overall advantage in provinces with the lowest Azari-speaking populations. This does not mean that Jalili is popular among Persian-speaking Iranians. It seems to suggest that he did better than Pezeshkian in provinces with minimal ethnic minority presence.
The quantitative index of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) is illuminating in this regard. The PCC index indicates the strength of the linear relationship and dependency between two variables. In the following diagram, each candidate’s vote share (in each province) is the dependent variable, and the relative size of the Turkish-speaking population (in that province) is the independent variable.
The correlation coefficient for Pezeshkian is 0.7 (70%), while for Jalili it is -0.47 ( -47). A positive value indicates that an increase in the independent variable leads to an increase in the dependent variable, whereas a negative value suggests that an increase in one variable results in a decrease in the other. The linear relationship for Pezeshkian's votes is strong and positive, suggesting that his share of vote (in most cases) rises as the Azari speaking population in a province increases. In contrast, the relationship for Jalili is weak and negative. (Same for Kurdish, Baloch, and Turkmen speakers).
One counterargument could be that the data should be interpreted differently: that the Persian-speaking population didn’t like Pezeshkian and voted for Jalili. But the low turnout in such provinces seem to refute this hypothesis. Moreover, in most of these provinces, Pezeshkian gained more in vote share as the turnout rose in the run-off.
To underline the crucial role of the Azari (Turkish) speaking Iranians in the second round of the election, we can compare the results with that of the 2017 presidential election –where Hassan Rouhani tried to attract the ethnic vote.
As seen above, Rouhani’s vote is more homogeneous across provinces, and the ‘Azari variable’ is less pronounced. Rouhani did receive more votes in provinces with majority Azari-speaking populations. But he also did so in the non-ethnic regions (except for Zanjan, where Raisi had more votes.)
The Pearson correlation coefficient for Rouhani is 5%, while for Raisi it is -10%. This indicates that the strength of the linear relationship between the two variables is much weaker. Azari speaking Iranians didn’t like Raisi, but their preference had much less impact on the final result that it did in 2024. It was insignificant statistically.
In the 2024 run-off, if we look at the Azari speaking provinces only, Pezeshkian got 2.8 million more votes than Jalili. That’s almost a million more than their vote difference in the first round. However, if we look at the six provinces where Persian is predominant, Jalili got about 830,000 more votes than Pezeshkian. In the first round, that number was about 275,000. In other words, the increase in the vote margin between Pezeshkian and Jalili in the second round is 3.7 times greater than the change observed in the six other provinces. Jalili’s advantage in Isfahan can be attributed to the low turnout (less than 50%). In Yazd, and Kerman, where official turnout in the run-off was above 50%, the changes may suggest a dramatic decline in the social standing of the reformists. In Khorasan Razavi, Jalili’s success may be due to local connections (he was born there). His lead (551,000 votes) is notably large and unexpected. In 2017, the picture was markedly different. Rouhani's advantage over Raisi in the six provinces mentioned above was 2.2 times greater than that of the four provinces with Azari speaking majorities.
Pezeshkian’s campaign may depict his presidency as a ‘reformist’ triumph. Previous ‘reform’ moments (1997, 2001, 2013, and 2017) were marked by national fervor and high turnout, neither of which transpired in 2024. Pezeshkian may name a few ‘reformists’ to his cabinet, and some may even call his administration a ‘reform government.’ The president himself acknowledges his indebtedness to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. However, the real story of Iran’s 2024 elections may very well be the ethnic vote.
The declaration comes despite Iran possessing the world's second-largest proven gas reserves, amounting to approximately 29.6 trillion cubic meters, or 16% of the global total. The country’s resources, however, have not shielded it from a dire and ongoing energy crisis.
A nation rich in gas, yet starving for fuel
Owji's announcement on July 17 was made during a cabinet meeting chaired by Acting President Mohammad Mokhber, where he praised the late president Ebrahim Raisi’s efforts in securing the agreement. Raisi died in a helicopter crash on May 19.
The deal stipulates that Iran will receive 300 million cubic meters of Russian gas daily, with Russia also covering the construction costs of the necessary pipeline infrastructure, leveraging their technology for seabed pipelines. This is a gigantic amount of gas, which amounts to more than one-third of Iran's daily production.
Construction of pipelines able to handle such a volume of natural gas from Russian fields thousands of kilometers away would cost tens of billions of dollars, while Iran cannot afford to pay for such a huge amount of gas, with its hard currency revenues slashed by US oil sanctions. Currently there is no pipeline capacity to handle such a large volume of gas.
Despite the fanfare, the reality is stark. Iran's 23 gas refineries produce around 850 million cubic meters of sweet gas daily. However, the country grapples with gas shortages every winter and summer, forcing many industrial units, including gas power plants, to switch to Mazut—a low-quality, heavy oil notorious for its high pollution levels.
Iranian experts have long warned against the environmental and health hazards of using Mazut in place of natural gas to produce electricity. Yet, the severity of gas shortages during colder months has led to a disregard for such concerns, highlighting the government's failure to manage its vast natural resources effectively.
According to the International Energy Agency, gas accounted for about 71% of Iran’s energy supply in 2021, a 295% increase since 2000. Should this trend continue, experts warn that Iran may face chronic shortages in the coming years, further increasing its reliance on imports despite its abundant reserves.
The facade of energy diplomacy
Owji's portrayal of the Russian gas deal as an “economic and industrial revolution” is interpreted by many as misleading. The minister claimed that the agreement would not only stabilize Iran’s internal gas supply but also boost its gas export capacity and stability, involving financial exchanges worth $10 to $12 billion annually. He touted it as an “unprecedented achievement” in Iran's history, dubbing it a "masterpiece of the Raisi government's energy diplomacy."
Behind the facade: Struggles in joint fields and declining investment
In reality, Iran faces significant challenges in its 28 joint oil and gas fields with neighboring countries. It consistently lags behind its neighbors—such as Iraq, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—in production due to a lack of investment. While these countries have ramped up their extraction efforts with the help of international, particularly Western, companies, Iran has seen its investment in upstream projects plummet. The Ministry of Oil relies on a meager 14.5% share of oil revenues for investments, amounting to just over $5 billion last year.
Statistics from the Parliament’s Research Center show a drastic decline in annual investment in Iran’s upstream oil and gas projects, from around $18 billion in the 1990s to about $7 billion in the early 2010s, and further dropping to $3 billion since 2017. International sanctions have crippled Iran’s ability to attract foreign investment or borrow funds, further exacerbating the situation.
A call for policy overhaul
The state of Iran’s energy sector underscores the urgent need for a major shift in the government's foreign policy. Without reaching an agreement with the West over its nuclear program, which is viewed as leading to weapons capability, and changing its hegemonial stance in the region, Iran's energy sector and broader economy will continue to flounder.
Owji’s celebration of the Russian gas deal as a "masterpiece" now is seen by observers as a thin veneer over the reality of Iran’s mismanagement and economic woes.
While the Islamic government promotes participation as voluntary and democratic, a closer examination reveals a system riddled with coercion, manipulation, and inherent inequality.
Iran’s elections are often portrayed as a contest between fundamentalists and reformists, suggesting a choice for the electorate. However, this dichotomy can be considered highly misleading, as it oversimplifies the political landscape and obscures the underlying complexities.
The real power lies not with the elected president but with the Supreme Leader and the unelected bodies that serve him. The Guardian Council, an unelected body, vets all candidates and can disqualify any deemed insufficiently loyal to the regime.
This ensures that only those who align with the Supreme Leader’s vision can run for office, transforming the election into a controlled charade rather than a genuine democratic exercise – as experts have often noted.
The people's vote becomes meaningless when an unelected individual, the Supreme Leader, holds the power to nullify their decisions.
According to Article 110, Clause 9 of the Iranian Constitution, the Supreme Leader's endorsement is required for the presidential decree to take effect. This endorsement signifies that until the Supreme Leader approves the elected president, the president has no legal authority over the executive branch.
This mechanism underscores that the legitimacy of the people's vote is contingent upon the Supreme Leader's signature, which confers power to the president.
Furthermore, the Supreme Leader's endorsement serves a supervisory role throughout the president's term. If the president deviates from prescribed principles, the Supreme Leader can withdraw his endorsement, voiding the president's authority and legitimacy.
Thus, the system structurally ensures that ultimate power remains with the Supreme Leader, thereby significantly diminishing the impact of the popular vote and perpetuating the state’s autocratic framework.
Even if a candidate emerges victorious from this skewed process, their power remains severely constrained.
The Supreme Leader, who holds ultimate authority, can override presidential decisions, rendering the office of the presidency largely ceremonial.
The parallel institutions created by the Supreme Leader, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and various councils, wield significant power over key aspects of governance and policy, further diluting the president’s influence.
Contrary to the Islamic Republic’s claims, participation in elections is far from voluntary. Voting habits are closely monitored, and individuals who do not participate often face severe repercussions.
Access to higher education, government jobs, and even basic civil rights can be contingent upon one’s voting record. Those who abstain from voting are frequently punished, directly or indirectly, when seeking employment or educational opportunities.
This coercion ensures a high voter turnout, which the regime uses to claim legitimacy while masking the underlying lack of genuine freedom.
Additionally, the high number of void votes indicates that many people go to the voting polls only to receive the associated benefits but refuse to actually vote for any candidate.
This phenomenon further underscores the disillusionment and lack of genuine choice faced by the electorate, many of whom likely participate under duress rather than as an authentic exercise of democratic will.
The system’s deep-seated discrimination
The discriminatory nature of Iran's political system extends beyond the electoral process, influencing all aspects of governance.
The constitution of the IRI primarily categorizes people into seven distinct groups, assigning different rights to each.
This hierarchical structure starts with a gender divide, privileging men over women, and extends to religious discrimination, where Muslims are prioritized over non-Muslims. Among non-Muslims, those whose religions are mentioned in the Quran are given more rights than those that are not, who face even greater discrimination.
Muslims are further divided into Shia and Sunni, with Shia Muslims, particularly those of the Twelve-Imam sect, enjoying the most privileges. Within this sect, there is an additional distinction between ordinary believers and mujtahids (Islamic scholars qualified to interpret religious law), with mujtahids holding significantly more power and rights.
For example, Iran's ten key decision-making institutions, including the Supreme Leader, the Council of Experts, the Guardian Council, the head of the judiciary, the head of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General, are exclusively reserved for mujtahids.
This structure excludes more than 99% of the Iranian population, including all women, non-Muslims, and non-mujtahid Muslims, from participating in these critical roles.
The laws of the IRI are steeped in practices that violate basic human rights. These include stoning, retribution, dowry, polygamy for men, and whipping. Women’s rights are severely curtailed, with their legal status considered half that of men. Women are deprived of rights to divorce and child custody, while Baha'is and Sunnis face severe restrictions on their right to study, work, and travel. During Eid celebrations, Sunnis are prohibited from having mosques or conducting congregational prayers in major cities.
These practices are part of a broader system of discrimination and oppression that has persisted for the past 45 years under the Islamic Republic.
The path to freedom and democracy
The constitution of Iran, the gender-apartheid system of the Islamic Republic, religious governance, and Islamic ideology have all contributed to the human rights abuses perpetrated over the past four decades.
Thus, true freedom and democracy in Iran may only be achievable by transitioning to a secular government based on the principles outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The political system’s portrayal of a choice between fundamentalists and reformists serves as a tactic to force people to choose between bad and worse. Even this false choice was absent in the latest election, as candidates openly pledged loyalty to the Supreme Leader and made no promises of genuine reform. They offered hollow promises of economic improvement, despite a historical pattern of rising inflation, unemployment, and housing prices.
Under the current system, addressing Iran's structural problems is practically impossible, as real power resides with the Supreme Leader and the parallel institutions he controls. The outcomes for past presidents and prime ministers—many of whom have been imprisoned, sidelined, or died under suspicious circumstances—highlight the difficulties of achieving reform within the existing framework. This suggests that significant change is seemingly impossible without altering the concentration of power within these established structures.
Critics and opponents of the Islamic Republic insist that Iran's presidential election last Friday was not an exercise in democracy but a stark reminder of the regime's authoritarian nature. They argue that the only apparent path to genuine freedom and democracy lies in dismantling the current system and establishing a government that respects the rights and dignity of all its citizens.
