Iran demands seven conditions be met before US talks, Basij chief says

Speaking at a Veterans Day ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery, Trump declared that US forces had already defeated Iran militarily and suggested Washington could decide when to end the conflict.

“We won. It’s just a question of when we end it,” Trump said.

“I want to make sure we have a total victory, not a 93 percent victory,” he added, predicting that the conflict would end soon.

Tehran, however, showed little willingness to accept Washington's terms. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Iran was determined to end its prolonged state between war and peace through military deterrence, potentially without negotiations.

In an interview with Al Jazeera, Ghalibaf said Washington had not formally responded to Tehran's seven conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and resuming talks. He insisted that those conditions must be fully implemented before either could proceed.

His remarks followed comments by President Masoud Pezeshkian on Monday that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had ordered an end to the country's “no war, no peace” situation. Pezeshkian said Iran could resolve the dispute through negotiations but would not yield to pressure.

The impasse extends to Iran's nuclear program, one of the central disputes between the two countries.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said Tehran would not transfer any of its enriched nuclear material abroad, rejecting a possible arrangement involving Russia.

“We have informed our Russian friends that the enriched material will remain in Iran, and we will use it ourselves,” Rezaei told Lebanon's pro-Hezbollah Al Mayadeen television.

Russia's Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that its offer to receive the material remained available, while emphasizing that Tehran alone would decide what happened to its stockpile.

The disagreement highlights the obstacles facing any diplomatic settlement, even as Pakistan continues efforts to mediate between Washington and Tehran.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who met Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the COP31 climate summit in Turkey, called for restraint and sustained diplomacy, saying negotiations offered the only path to lasting peace.

The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that US Vice President JD Vance was considering face-to-face talks with Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, citing US and Middle Eastern officials and people familiar with the negotiations.

Trump has authorized Vance to negotiate with Iran, according to the report. Vance sent Rezaei a letter in October requesting a meeting, but no date has been set, with Doha under consideration as a possible venue.

But prospects for direct talks appeared uncertain. Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to Ghalibaf, said Tehran had rejected a request from US Vice President JD Vance for direct negotiations before Washington delivered its final response to Iran's proposal.

The Wall Street Journal, meanwhile, reported that Trump had privately questioned whether a Pakistan-brokered agreement reached in June had allowed Tehran to regroup before the United States imposed its naval blockade.

With negotiations stalled, Washington is seeking to intensify the economic pressure already imposed through maritime restrictions and sanctions.

The New York Times reported Wednesday that US officials had spent weeks unsuccessfully pressing Iran's neighbors, particularly Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan, to restrict trade across their land borders.

The effort gained a new dimension with the establishment of Task Force Iron Gate, a US Central Command initiative aimed at disrupting the movement of weapons, sanctioned goods and illicit revenue across Iran's land borders and the Caspian Sea.

But neighboring governments have resisted measures that could damage their own economies and provoke unrest in communities dependent on cross-border trade.

According to the Times, Iraq rejected a US request to close all but two crossings with Iran, while Turkey has largely declined to change its border policies.

The Group of Seven foreign ministers pledged Wednesday to maintain economic and political pressure if diplomacy failed to address Iran's nuclear program and regional security concerns.

Iran's response has combined diplomatic resistance with increasingly expansive military threats.

Rezaei warned Wednesday that any US military base involved in a renewed war against Iran could be targeted, including facilities in Europe.

“NO SAFE DISTANCE. NO SAFE HAVEN. NO IMMUNITY,” he wrote on X.

Other senior Iranian military figures issued similar warnings. Deputy armed forces chief Keyoumars Heydari said Iran had prepared an expanded list of potential targets beyond the Middle East, while Revolutionary Guards adviser Mohammadreza Naghdi said the armed forces had authorization to retaliate without geographical restrictions.

Mohammadi, the adviser to Ghalibaf, also warned that Iran could consider preemptive military action if Washington continued tightening economic pressure. He claimed the United States was preparing for a limited strike, although there was no independent confirmation of such a plan.

An adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei also warned that countries helping enforce a blockade against Iran could be treated as participants in an act of war.

Those threats came as the Strait of Hormuz remained a flashpoint, complicating efforts to restore commercial shipping and energy exports from the Persian Gulf.

Reuters reported Wednesday, citing three sources familiar with the matter, that Iran had attacked navigation infrastructure on Oman's Didamar island used to support shipping through the waterway. The extent of any damage was unclear.

Iran's navy also said a tanker had caught fire after striking a mine east of the strait, describing the area as unsafe and restricted and urging shipowners to coordinate passage with Iranian forces.

The increasingly confrontational language comes as Iran faces a continuing US naval blockade and uncertainty over whether the two countries can reach an agreement to end the war.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, warned Wednesday that Tehran could target US military bases in Europe and on distant islands if Washington attacked Iran again.

During a November 10 discussion on the state broadcaster's nightly talk show Be Vaght-e Iran, three analysts argued that Iran should use the Strait of Hormuz to drive up oil prices, deter further US attacks and pressure Washington to accept Tehran's terms for ending the war.

Nima Akbarkhani, a political and military analyst and regular panelist, argued that the United States would launch another war only after bringing oil prices down as far as possible, allowing it to contain the resulting increase once hostilities began.

He rejected the argument that a tighter closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or an Iranian attempt to break the US naval blockade, could prompt President Donald Trump to launch a full-scale war.

“We must definitely go after the blockade militarily. We must recognize that a blockade is a military action and demands a military response,” Akbarkhani said.

“Americans are monitoring the situation, and if it serves their interests, war will happen. We must do something to make it work against their interests.”

He argued that Washington had limited its military response even after US personnel were killed during the earlier war over Hormuz.

Yousef Azizi, an international relations and Middle East analyst, said Iran should keep oil prices high by closing the strait to deter another US attack.

Azizi also urged Iran's diplomatic apparatus to avoid releasing information that could drive oil prices down, including reports of possible meetings with officials from Iraq and Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

His remarks followed a denial by Rezaei of reports about a possible meeting with US Vice President JD Vance in Qatar and claims that negotiations with Washington were continuing.

In an interview with Al Mayadeen on Tuesday, Rezaei called the reports “completely false and a lie,” arguing that American claims about ongoing negotiations were intended to “reduce economic pressure and bring down oil prices.”

Azizi said Washington appeared to have concluded that it could not achieve its objectives through war. He considered a cycle of limited clashes, temporary ceasefires and interim understandings more likely than either side accepting all the other's demands.

Vahid Khazab, another regular analyst on Be Vaght-e Iran, said the costs of war could push the US and global economies into a deep recession and damage Trump's legacy.

An agreement, however, would require Washington to accept Iran's preconditions for ending the war and beginning nuclear negotiations, he said.

“More precisely, there is no unity, consensus or even a majority within the ruling camp in the United States in favor of making such concessions,” Khazab said.

Of three possible scenarios — war, an agreement ending the conflict, or continued economic pressure and a naval blockade — Khazab considered the third the most likely because it was the least costly option for Washington.

He argued that Iran should therefore close the Strait of Hormuz completely, denying Washington the option of maintaining economic pressure while some energy supplies continued to pass through.

Rather than focusing solely on raising oil prices, Khazab said Tehran should seek to influence market expectations about future supplies. A complete closure would prevent Trump from signaling that the strait might soon reopen, encouraging expectations of a return to normal traffic.

“Of course, this will also be reflected in prices, albeit with some delay,” he added.

He also argued that a tighter closure would prompt regional countries to pressure Washington to reach a resolution favorable to Tehran, without Iran having to attack their infrastructure.

Khazab said Tehran should present Washington with a stark choice: “Your only option is to reach an agreement with me and accept my seven conditions. If we want to get to this point, the way to do it is to close the strait.”

The additions to the Iranian year 1406, running from March 2027 to March 2028, were reported Wednesday. Five of the new observances relate to the war and the transfer of power.

The “Day of the Epic Defense of Iran,” designated for February 28, commemorates the killing of Ali Khamenei and senior military commanders during the opening attacks of the war in 2026.

The Day of the Martyrs of the Third Sacred Defense honors those killed in the war, while the Day of the Dena Warship Martyrs commemorates sailors killed when a US submarine sank the Iranian naval vessel off Sri Lanka in March.

The new calendar also includes a day marking Mojtaba Khamenei's selection as supreme leader following his father's death.

Other additions include Iranian Ethnic Clothing Day, a commemoration of the 18th-century Turkmen poet Magtymguly Pyragy, Iranian Naval Power Day, Nomads Day and Polo Day.

Religious and ideological additions include Nahj al-Balagha Day, named after a collection of sermons, letters and sayings attributed to Imam Ali, the first Shiite imam. The calendar will also recognize Quran Day, a day promoting zakat, the Islamic charitable tax, and Interfaith Dialogue Day.

Other observances include Crisis and Natural Disasters Management Day, Muhammad Iqbal Lahori Commemoration Day, Sacred Defense Intelligence and Operations Day, Software Movement and Free Thought Day and Boys' Day.

Four further commemorations listed in the calendar's appendix are Kordestan Day, West Azarbaijan Day, Healthy Nutrition Day and Nahavand Day.

Iran's official calendar already contains numerous Shiite religious observances, including Ashura, Arbaeen and anniversaries marking the births and deaths of Shiite imams.

Ideological commemorations include Islamic Revolution Victory Day, Islamic Republic Day, the anniversary of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's death and the Day of Struggle Against Global Arrogance, marking the 1979 seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran.

The calendar also recognizes Nowruz, Persian cultural figures and other national traditions, but its extensive religious and revolutionary commemorations reflect the ideological priorities of the Islamic Republic's leadership.

With supermarkets in several other European countries also affected, this is more than a bilateral dispute between Paris and Tehran.

It raises a question Europe can no longer postpone: how should it respond to attempts to make European societies bear the costs of confrontation in the Middle East?

On November 10, France summoned Iran’s ambassador after publicly assigning responsibility for the attacks to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Tehran denied the allegations.

French prosecutors have requested international arrest warrants against several individuals linked to the Shahid Kaveh cyber unit. France’s decision to name the institution it holds responsible marks a political threshold.

Disrupting refrigeration can destroy stock, interrupt distribution and impose costs on businesses. It can also undermine public confidence in the authorities’ ability to protect ordinary routines.

This does not establish that the attackers could generate nationwide food shortages. But the implications extend beyond the immediate damage: civilian infrastructure can become vulnerable to a conflict that many Europeans consider geographically remote.

One dimension of France’s confrontation with Tehran is the deterioration of bilateral relations. French engagement with Iran has combined diplomatic dialogue and economic interests with disagreements over nuclear proliferation, regional security and human rights.

Iranian security institutions, however, appear to regard France’s diplomatic and cultural presence with suspicion.

The closure of the French Language Centre in Tehran, condemned by Paris in September, and reported attacks against embassy personnel illustrate the deterioration. Cultural institutions that maintain connections between societies have become pressure points in disputes between states.

Information operations exploiting social tensions in France can serve a similar purpose, increasing the domestic costs of confronting Tehran.

Tehran has long been suspicious of foreign engagement with Iranian civil society, often interpreting cultural contact and public criticism as potential subversion. Such an approach further narrows the space for normal diplomacy.

Another dimension concerns France’s military alliance with the United States, which exposes it to Iranian pressure despite its diplomatic opposition to the war.

France also maintains close security relationships with Washington’s partners in the Persian Gulf, including Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, countries that have faced Iranian retaliation in a war they did not seek.

These relationships help explain why Tehran may regard European states as part of the strategic infrastructure sustaining American power in the Middle East. Several European countries host US military bases, making them potential targets in a confrontation that extends beyond the region.

Iran’s top security official, Mohsen Rezaei, reinforced those concerns on Wednesday, warning that Tehran could strike US military bases in Europe and on distant islands if Washington attacked Iran again.

Such threats illustrate the possibility of horizontal escalation: widening a confrontation geographically and expanding the range of potential targets. Pressure on European territory could be intended to influence Washington indirectly while encouraging European governments to constrain American military action.

Cyber operations are particularly suited to this form of pressure because they can disrupt civilian activity while allowing those responsible to conceal or deny their involvement. Responsibility can remain contested even when governments believe their intelligence establishes a convincing chain of attribution.

Beyond cyber operations, Iran’s announcement that it has lifted its self-imposed 2,000-kilometer missile-range limit adds another dimension to this signaling.

The announcement does not, by itself, establish the deployment of reliable longer-range capabilities. It nevertheless suggests that previously asserted geographical restraints should no longer be taken for granted.

Europe should assess these developments together without treating them as identical threats. Cyber sabotage, hostage diplomacy, intimidation of diplomats, information operations and missile signaling involve different methods and require different responses.

Their possible convergence matters because each can contribute to an effort to deter European involvement through the threat of retaliation.

A credible European response must combine collective political action with practical protection. European governments should share evidence, coordinate investigations and strengthen the security of vulnerable commercial systems. Where responsibility is established, sanctions should target the institutions and individuals involved.

Existing measures also need effective enforcement; otherwise, successive announcements risk becoming largely symbolic. Businesses, meanwhile, need clear security guidance. Diplomatic statements alone cannot protect vulnerable equipment.

Maintaining dialogue with Tehran presents a further difficulty. Official denials by Iran’s Foreign Ministry do not necessarily reflect the activities of its security apparatus, often described as the country’s “deep state.”

Iranian intelligence networks have been accused of exploiting diplomatic access and cover for operations abroad. This creates a challenge for European governments seeking to preserve diplomatic engagement while guarding against the misuse of diplomatic privileges.

Diplomatic channels remain necessary to reduce the risk of miscalculation, but they require scrutiny and safeguards. Europe should make clear both the consequences of further attacks and the possibilities for de-escalation.

France’s attribution could become a European wake-up call if it leads to a common policy that protects civilian infrastructure, supports regional partners and preserves diplomatic engagement while guarding against its exploitation by Tehran’s security apparatus.

Some say these costs have multiplied several-fold, though it remains unclear how much of the increase can be attributed to the new operation.

Operation Iron Gate follows two earlier US initiatives, Economic Fury and Economic Outcast, which introduced a naval blockade and expanded secondary sanctions across five sectors: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping.

Iron Gate, by contrast, is a CENTCOM task force rather than a full-scale operation. Established on November 7 and operating with roughly 20 personnel based in Tampa, Florida, its long-term impact remains difficult to assess.

The economic damage

The International Monetary Fund projects a 5.4% economic contraction and 68.9% inflation for 2026.

CENTCOM asserts its blockade has prevented more than $25 billion in crude exports, although the figure has not been independently verified.

While CENTCOM has not specified the total volume of trade Iron Gate aims to block, its stated targets cover weapons, dual-use technology, sanctioned materials and illicit revenue moving through land and Caspian routes.

Ordinary trade is not explicitly targeted, but the scale of Iran's regional commerce illustrates the challenge of enforcing such restrictions.

Regional trade

Iraq has more land crossings with Iran than any other neighbouring country. On November 9, Washington reportedly requested that Baghdad close all but two crossings.

Iraq's Trade Ministry put bilateral trade at $12.5 billion in 2024, while Iranian customs figures showed Iraq purchased $11.9 billion in Iranian exports during the last Iranian calendar year, making it Iran's second-largest export market after China.

Smaller crossings have also expanded rapidly, with Mehran alone handling $453 million in exports over six months.

Reports by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, have highlighted IRGC-supervised smuggling through militia-controlled routes into Iraq, potentially making these networks a particular target for Iron Gate.

Along the Turkish border, six-month bilateral trade reached $7.04 billion, according to Mehr News. Petrochemicals accounted for 48% of Iranian exports and oil products another 33%.

Bazargan remains a major bottleneck, with Iranian officials reporting that Turkey permits only 200 trucks a day, against the 500 requested by Tehran.

To the north, industry estimates published in Iranian economic media project Russia–Iran Caspian cargo volumes of approximately 10 million tonnes in 2026, nearly double the previous year's level.

Iranian exports to Pakistan and Afghanistan amount to roughly $2.4 billion each, alongside extensive informal fuel smuggling on which an estimated 2.4 million people in Pakistan's Baluchistan depend.

Internal strain

Many observers, including some Iranian officials, argue that additional restrictions are unlikely to bring about economic collapse, pointing to Iran's adaptation to nearly five decades of sanctions.

Assessments reported by Reuters have also suggested that renewed military strikes may be unlikely to change Tehran's negotiating position or destabilize its leadership.

Yet the ability of the Iranian state to withstand pressure does not mean its population can absorb the costs. Iranians contacting foreign-based Persian-language outlets, including Iran International, consistently describe the growing hardship facing ordinary households.

Iron Gate may prove more effective at raising trading costs and disrupting specific networks than at restricting Iran's overall commerce.

Oil-product flows through Iraq and Turkey, along with military-related shipments across the Caspian, could face additional scrutiny. But the task force's limited size and the geographical scale of its mission make its eventual impact uncertain.

Caspian maritime traffic, in particular, remains difficult for Washington to reach directly.

Iran may therefore be able to withstand further restrictions, even at the cost of prolonged economic hardship. Tehran could ultimately prefer what amounts to more pressure on ordinary Iranians over geopolitical concessions.