Iranian lawmaker demands action on impeachment of two ministers
Lawmaker Hosseinali Haji Deligani called on the Iranian parliament Sunday to advance stalled impeachment motions against the foreign and agriculture ministers.
Haji Deligani, deputy chairman of parliament's Article 90 Commission, said the agriculture minister's impeachment motion was submitted two months ago but had yet to reach the relevant committee. The commission investigates complaints about the conduct of government institutions.
He cited rising food prices and poor management of poultry prices as reasons for seeking the agriculture minister's removal. Hardline lawmakers have sought Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's impeachment over what they see as his conciliatory approach toward the West.
Iran's judiciary has indicted comedian Saeed Shakiba on charges including supporting Israel and the Pahlavi dynasty, state media reported on Sunday, days after authorities opened a case against him over a video impersonating former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The judiciary-affiliated Mizan news agency said Tehran prosecutors had issued the indictment following an investigation into what authorities described as insulting and offensive content published by the comedian on Instagram.
According to Mizan, the charges include knowingly expressing support for Israel on social media, insult and engaging in propaganda against the Islamic Republic through negative portrayals of the country and support for the Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled Iran until the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Mizan said the case had been referred to court for further proceedings.
Shakiba came under scrutiny after publishing a satirical video on October 13 in which he imitated Khamenei's voice, parodying his meetings with poets.
On October 14, Mizan announced that Tehran prosecutors had opened a case against a social media personality identified only by the initials S.Sh., accusing him of publishing insulting and offensive content.
The agency said action had been taken against the individual but provided no details about the measures, the specific charges or his whereabouts.
US-based rights group Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRANA) reported on October 14 that authorities had opened a case against Shakiba following the satirical video, saying the judiciary had not disclosed details about the proceedings or his situation.
Shakiba is known for posting comedy videos and voice impressions of prominent figures on Instagram, where he had around one million followers.
Following the announcement of legal proceedings, posts on his Instagram account were removed. A notice bearing the emblem of Iran's police said the account had been restricted by judicial order over what authorities called criminal content.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Fars news agency also criticized the video, accusing Shakiba of insulting Khamenei and his family.
Shakiba had previously published satirical impressions of other Islamic Republic officials and expressed support for protestors killed during the January uprising.
Previous arrests and prosecutions of Iranian comedians
Iranian authorities have previously arrested and sentenced comedians and satirists over their work, drawing criticism from human rights groups.
Shaker Bori
Last month, Shaker Bori, a comedian and social media personality from the southwestern city of Abadan, was sentenced to 13 months and 20 days in prison for disseminating false information with the intent to harm others, according to the rights group HRANA.
Bori was also fined 45 million rials (approximately $17) for insulting a member of parliament. The case followed a complaint by lawmaker Mousa Ghazanfarabadi over a video Bori had published.
Bori had previously been arrested on July 31, 2023, after reporting to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence office in Abadan to seek the return of his confiscated mobile phone, according to the Norway-based rights group Hengaw.
He was released on bail on August 10, 2023, after spending 10 days in detention.
Zeinab Mousavi, known for her online character Empress Kuzco
Another comedian, Zeinab Mousavi, known for her online character Empress Kuzco, was sentenced to six months in prison in November 2025 over a satirical video about Ferdowsi, the celebrated Persian poet.
In February 2026, a Tehran appeals court upheld the sentence, which also included a fine of 160 million rials (approximately $59) and an order to write a research paper about Ferdowsi, according to HRANA.
Mousavi had previously been arrested in October 2022 in the central city of Qom during nationwide protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody. She was released on bail in November that year and subsequently sentenced to two years in prison.
Mousavi said she had spent 25 days in solitary confinement during her detention.
She was arrested again in 2023 and released several days later, according to HRANA.
Kioomars Marzban
In another case, satirical writer Kioomars Marzban was arrested at his home on August 26, 2018, by Revolutionary Guard intelligence agents.
Marzban was sentenced in August 2019 to 23 years and nine months in prison on charges including insulting the supreme leader, propaganda against the Islamic Republic and cooperating with a hostile state, according to HRANA.
The sentence, of which 11 years were enforceable under Iranian law, was upheld on appeal in October 2019.
Marzban was released from Tehran's Evin prison in February 2021 after serving approximately two and a half years. His lawyer, Mohammad Hossein Aghasi, said six years of his sentence had been pardoned and the remainder suspended, according to freedom of expression organization ARTICLE 19.
Following his release, ARTICLE 19 condemned his prosecution, saying he should never have been imprisoned for his writing.
"His case is emblematic of the Iranian authorities' zero tolerance for freedom of expression and the Judiciary's lack of independence," said Saloua Ghazouani, then director of ARTICLE 19's Middle East and North Africa program.
PEN America has also criticized Iran's treatment of satirical artists. In June 2023, the organization condemned the arrest of cartoonist Atena Farghadani following the publication of a satirical drawing on Instagram.
"Cartoonists should not be persecuted for their creative expression," said Julie Trébault, then director of PEN America's Artists at Risk Connection.
PEN America said the arrest reflected broader efforts by Iranian authorities to intimidate artists, journalists and activists.
A pedestrian passes as an artist paints a mural on a wall in the Chaharmardan neighborhood of Qom, central Iran.
Iran may be approaching a mental-health emergency as prolonged uncertainty over war, economic pressure and the future takes a growing toll on the public, the head of the country’s Psychology and Counseling Organization said on Sunday.
Asked by ILNA how far Iranian society was from a mental-health emergency, Alireza Agha-Yousefi said: “I don’t think we are very far from it.”
He pointed to marriage, divorce and birth rates as areas of concern and said authorities needed to act before psychological and social problems became more severe.
Uncertainty and prolonged stress
Agha-Yousefi said the prolonged state of neither full-scale war nor peace was itself becoming a major source of pressure.
“The overall condition of society in a situation of neither war nor peace can create significant psychological strain,” he said.
He said people normally try to meet their needs while also responding to threats, but when both are present at the same time, threats tend to dominate.
“Uncertainty about the future is one of the most difficult situations,” he said, adding that it deprives people of the ability to plan their lives.
Agha-Yousefi said prolonged uncertainty could produce severe anxiety and, over time, lead to both physical and psychological exhaustion.
Effects may emerge later
He cautioned that the consequences of intense stress do not always appear immediately.
“The effects may show themselves one or two years later,” he said, citing depression, marital conflict and physical health problems as possible outcomes.
He also pointed to prolonged muscle tension, joint and spinal pain and gastrointestinal problems as conditions that can be associated with chronic stress.
President Masoud Pezeshkian last week also described the current “no war, no peace” situation as the worst position Iran could be in, as tensions with Washington remained unresolved.
Agha-Yousefi said the same economic conditions contributing to psychological strain were also making treatment less accessible.
He said demand for counselling had risen, but inflation and declining purchasing power meant many people could no longer afford psychological services.
“Psychological services are not covered by basic insurance,” he said, adding that official figures on the number of people seeking treatment could therefore give a misleading picture.
He said some people who need help simply do not seek it because of the cost.
A proposal to bring psychological services under insurance coverage had been submitted to the organization’s central council around four months ago but had yet to be approved, he said.
Pressure on families and social stability
Agha-Yousefi also said Iran appeared to be moving toward greater social dislocation.
“It seems our social situation is, to some extent, moving toward anomie or social normlessness,” he said.
He warned that as social stress rises, the effects can spread into family life and wider social behavior, including later marriage, addiction and greater instability within households.
“When problems enter the family, they can be a sign of deeper social damage,” he said.
He added that severe family pressures could, in some cases, contribute to extreme violence, including killings within families.
Agha-Yousefi said delaying preventive measures would make the psychological, physical and social consequences much harder and more expensive to address later.
War fears add to uncertainty
His comments come as speculation grows over possible renewed US and Israeli military action against Iran.
Recent reports have said the US military has prepared options for further strikes after the November 3 midterm elections if President Donald Trump authorizes them.
That uncertainty has added another layer of pressure to an economy already strained by inflation, a weakening currency and declining purchasing power.
Smoke billows following missile attack from Iran on Israel, at Tel Aviv, Israel, June 13, 2025.
The war with Iran raises a familiar question for Israel: Can battlefield gains produce lasting peace? Its military history offers mixed answers, from unresolved victories to withdrawals and ceasefires that left adversaries armed.
Destroying Iran’s military capabilities and preventing their reconstruction are different objectives, requiring different measures of success.
Since 1948, Israel has fought conventional Arab armies and armed organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and has increasingly confronted Iran directly through missile, drone and air attacks far beyond its borders. These forms of warfare have overlapped, posing different challenges for bringing the fighting to an end.
Their endings show how battlefield outcomes interact with diplomacy, outside pressure and arrangements for security after the fighting.
1948: Survival without peace
Fighting between Jewish and Arab communities followed the UN’s 1947 partition plan. After Israel declared independence in May 1948, neighboring Arab armies entered the conflict. Israel survived and gained territory beyond the boundaries proposed for the Jewish state.
In 1949, it signed separate armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. These established lines separating the forces, rather than permanent political settlements. The Egyptian agreement explicitly envisaged a subsequent peaceful settlement.
Israel’s survival did not resolve the territorial dispute or the displacement of Palestinians. The fighting ended without peace between Israel and its neighbors.
1956: Military gains, withdrawal under pressure
During the Suez crisis, Israel attacked Egypt in coordination with Britain and France, rapidly advancing across Sinai.
Pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations forced a withdrawal, completed in March 1957. Israel could not retain the territory it had captured, despite its battlefield success.
The outcome nevertheless brought security gains: Israel regained access to the Straits of Tiran, while a UN emergency force deployed in Sinai. The US State Department’s historical account distinguishes those gains from the territorial withdrawal.
The episode illustrates why withdrawal is not automatically evidence of military defeat, and why military superiority alone does not determine a war’s political outcome.
1967: Six days of fighting, decades of consequences
Israel’s opening airstrikes devastated Egypt’s air force. Within six days, Israeli forces had captured Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The war ended through ceasefires, without a formal surrender by the defeated Arab states. Israel’s decisive battlefield victory transformed the territorial balance but did not settle the conflict.
UN Security Council Resolution 242 subsequently established a framework linking Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory with an end to belligerency and recognition of states’ right to live within secure, recognized boundaries.
The military result was immediate. Disputes over occupation, borders and Palestinian rights lasted far beyond the fighting.
Egyptian fighter jets are seen after being destroyed by Israel's Air Force. File photo
1973: From surprise attack to a peace treaty
Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli forces in Sinai and the Golan Heights in October 1973, initially making substantial gains. Israel counterattacked and crossed the Suez Canal before US-Soviet diplomacy and UN ceasefire resolutions helped stop the fighting.
The US State Department’s history describes the war as opening the way for Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and, ultimately, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Egypt did not recover all Sinai through military action, but the war helped break the diplomatic stalemate.
The 1978 Camp David accords provided the framework for the 1979 treaty. Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai in exchange for peace with Egypt. The main withdrawal was completed in 1982; the disputed Taba area was returned in 1989 following arbitration.
Egypt recovered territory through a combination of war and diplomacy. Israel exchanged territorial control for a political agreement with a major adversary.
Israel’s 1982 invasion drove into Beirut, where US-mediated arrangements secured the departure of Palestine Liberation Organization leaders and fighters. This was an evacuation from Beirut, not the elimination of every Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon.
Israel withdrew much of its force in 1985 but retained a southern security zone alongside the allied South Lebanon Army. Its remaining troops left in May 2000, following years of conflict with Hezbollah. UNIFIL’s historical account records both withdrawals.
The withdrawal was unilateral, without a peace treaty or formal Israeli surrender. Hezbollah portrayed it as a victory; Israel ended a prolonged deployment without resolving the underlying confrontation.
The departure of one armed organization’s leadership in 1982 had not produced a lasting end to fighting.
Israeli tanks are positioned near Israel's border with Lebanon, in northern Israel. File Photo
2006: A ceasefire without disarmament
The 2006 war followed Hezbollah’s cross-border attack and capture of two Israeli soldiers. Israel launched extensive air and ground operations, but Hezbollah remained armed and continued firing rockets during the conflict.
Neither side’s survival or military performance alone explains the settlement. The operative mechanism was UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted on August 11, followed by a cessation of hostilities on August 14.
It called for Hezbollah to stop attacks, Israel to stop offensive operations, and Israeli forces to withdraw as Lebanese troops and an expanded UNIFIL deployed. It envisaged an area between the Blue Line and Litani River free of armed personnel and weapons other than those of the Lebanese government and UNIFIL.
Hezbollah was not disarmed. Nevertheless, UNIFIL says the arrangements helped sustain almost 17 years of relative calm before the escalation beginning in 2023. An incomplete settlement still had significant practical effects.
A view shows houses and buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes, in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip. File Photo
Gaza: Repeated campaigns and rebuilding
The Gaza wars of 2008–09, 2012, 2014 and 2021 ended without Hamas surrendering or losing all its military capabilities.
Scholars Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir described Israel’s approach as “mowing the grass”: periodically degrading an adversary’s capabilities and restoring deterrence rather than expecting a permanent political resolution through force. Their study appeared online in 2013 and in the Journal of Strategic Studies in 2014.
After Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack, Israel set broader objectives, including dismantling its military and governing capabilities and recovering the hostages. Shamir argued that the attack marked a departure from the previous limited-campaign approach. That was his strategic assessment, rather than proof that eliminating Hamas was achievable.
The ensuing war devastated Gaza. The October 2025 ceasefire did not settle its future: a year later, the UN human rights office was still reporting killings despite the agreement.
Lebanon after 2023: Military damage and state authority
Israel’s 2024 campaign killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior commanders, severely damaging its leadership. The fighting nevertheless moved toward a negotiated cessation of hostilities rather than formal surrender.
The US-French-brokered arrangement took effect on November 27, 2024, and again rested on implementing Resolution 1701, Lebanese state authority and Israeli withdrawal.
Disarmament remained contested. In October 2026, The Wall Street Journal reported that Hezbollah demanded the return of explosives seized by Lebanese authorities, illustrating the continuing struggle over weapons outside state control.
Missiles launched from Iran are intercepted as seen from Tel Aviv, Israel, June 13, 2025.
Iran: Ending operations or preventing reconstruction?
The June 2025 war involved Israeli attacks on Iranian military and nuclear targets and direct US strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. US involvement therefore preceded the broader war of 2026.
Israel’s Foreign Ministry described the nuclear threat as “existential and imminent” in its account of the operation. That characterization was Israel’s stated justification, not an independently established finding that Iran possessed nuclear weapons. The same document records Israel’s acceptance of a US-proposed ceasefire on June 24. The broader confrontation in 2026 extended to shipping and energy supplies. By October, the US naval blockade and the standoff over reopening the Strait of Hormuz remained unresolved.
Netanyahu has explicitly advocated moving beyond containment. Addressing military cadets in February 2026, he declared there would be “no more containment of threats” and emphasized preemptive action. This supports describing a shift in his stated approach, without assuming a uniform doctrine across every Israeli institution.
Destroying launchers or facilities has measurable immediate effects. Preventing their reconstruction depends on industrial capacity, supply networks, political decisions and whatever monitoring or enforcement follows.
Possible scenarios
Within the approach of seeking to prevent Iran from rebuilding its military threat, two scenarios can be considered. Neither is a prediction or an exhaustive account of how the conflict might end.
The first is a military defeat sufficiently extensive to destroy much of Iran’s offensive capability and substantially constrain its reconstruction. Lasting results would depend on measures that prevent replenishment, rather than destruction alone. The second combines military defeat with the end of the Islamic Republic and its replacement by a political system that abandons hostility toward Israel and support for armed proxies.
That scenario depends on more than a change of leadership. It assumes a successor government both chooses and can enforce a different policy, including ending financial, military and operational support for allied armed groups. A government’s collapse would not itself establish those conditions.
The scenarios may overlap, but neither guarantees stability. Their outcomes would depend on political authority, security arrangements and the capacity to enforce commitments after combat ends.
Other possible outcomes include a negotiated agreement that constrains Iran’s capabilities without changing its government, or a prolonged armed standoff sustained by deterrence. Neither would necessarily eliminate the underlying hostility, though either could bring the current fighting to an end.
Israel’s earlier wars provide different benchmarks: territorial withdrawal under international pressure in 1956, land exchanged for peace with Egypt, unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, and ceasefire arrangements that reduced fighting without disarming Hezbollah. Each ended a particular phase of conflict; only some produced a broader political settlement.
Two US Air Force A-10 aircraft patrol over the Middle East in a photo released by US Central Command.
Tehran has offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz if Washington lifted its naval blockade, Iran’s envoy to Pakistan said Saturday, while an IRGC-affiliated outlet rejected such an exchange and President Donald Trump raised the possibility of strikes as soon as “tomorrow.”
Iran’s ambassador to Islamabad, Reza Amiri Moghadam, said Tehran had conveyed through Pakistani mediators that it was prepared to reopen the strait if Washington ended its blockade of Iranian ports, the Associated Press reported.
Speaking at a seminar in Islamabad, Moghadam said Iranian officials had communicated that position during visits to Tehran by Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir. He accused Trump of rejecting the proposal by insisting the blockade would continue.
Moghadam said Iran remained open to negotiations under a Pakistan-brokered interim agreement reached in June, according to AP’s readout of his remarks.
Pakistan and Qatar helped broker that framework, which envisaged restoring shipping through the strait, lifting the blockade and beginning negotiations on a broader deal covering Iran’s nuclear program.
Al Arabiya separately reported Saturday, citing unnamed sources, that Iran had informed Pakistan it was willing to resume negotiations with Washington and reopen the strait in exchange for the blockade being lifted.
But the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency quoted an informed source rejecting Al Arabiya’s account as “lies and fantasy” and saying Tehran had made no new proposal to Pakistani mediators.
“Iran fundamentally does not accept any equation of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the blockade,” the source said, adding that Iran would find ways around the blockade and ultimately break it.
The source said Tehran stood by seven conditions already formally conveyed through mediators. An earlier “seven-day plan” setting out its demands for reopening the strait had been passed to Washington, the source said, adding that insecurity would persist until all Iranian demands were met, including an end to disruption of its ports and shipping.
Tasnim’s denial explicitly targeted Al Arabiya’s report, rather than the ambassador’s remarks reported by AP.
US may attack Iran tomorrow
Trump, meanwhile, kept open the possibility of both military action and an agreement, saying he wanted a permanent solution to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
“Do you really think I’m going to tell you if I’m going to do it?” Trump told reporters Saturday. “There’s a possibility I will. There’s also a possibility we’ll have a nice big beautiful agreement.”
He said Iranian leaders wanted a deal but questioned whether they would abide by it.
“They want to make a deal. But the problem is, will they hold the deal?”
Trump argued that ending the military campaign after B-2 bomber strikes in 2025 would have allowed Iran to rebuild its nuclear capabilities and eventually develop a bomb.
“I’ve got to make it permanent. That’s the only reason I’m doing it as long as I’m doing,” he said.
The Hill reported Saturday, citing two sources familiar with the planning, that the US military had prepared options for renewed strikes on Iran after November’s midterm elections.
One source said US Central Command had follow-up strike plans ready pending White House authorization. Another said multiple options were being presented to War Secretary Pete Hegseth and that Trump would keep his options open until a final decision was required.
A Pentagon official told The Hill the department’s “job is to develop and present military options to the President.”
The Wall Street Journal reported earlier in the day that US naval forces are preparing for possible renewed strikes against Iran, with sailors loading munitions and readying aircraft aboard American warships.
The preparations include the USS George Washington aircraft carrier strike group, as Washington considers further military action against the Islamic Republic.
Iraqi Shi'ite Muslim men from the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah hold the party's flags as they walk along a street painted in the colours of the Israeli flag during a parade marking the annual Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, on the last Friday of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, in Baghdad.
Baghdad’s pledge to stay out of renewed fighting is being tested by reported Israeli jet flights toward Iran through Iraqi airspace, suspected strikes on militia stores reportedly holding Chinese-made air defenses, and drone attacks on Iranian Kurdish opposition bases.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi says Iraq will not participate in any war, while Iran-backed factions describe supporting Tehran against the United States and Israel as a duty, raising questions over Baghdad’s ability to control how its territory and airspace are used.
“Iraq will not participate in any war,” Zaidi told state-run Al-Iraqiya television on Friday, saying Baghdad wanted to remain a meeting point for regional rivals and was working to ease the confrontation between Iran and the United States.
On Saturday, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella of Iran-aligned armed factions, declared that standing with Tehran was a moral duty and portrayed the conflict as a struggle between righteousness and falsehood, Rudaw reported.
The statement did not announce a resumption of attacks. It underscored the factions’ commitment to Iran at a time when Zaidi is promising to bring weapons and military decisions under state control.
Baghdad also faces economic and diplomatic costs from the conflict. Zaidi said disruption at the Strait of Hormuz had harmed Iraq and that his government had hoped its political, religious and popular ties with Iran would secure an exemption for Iraqi shipping.
He stressed the importance of relations with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, saying some believed attacks against them had originated in Iraq.
Contested skies
Reports of Israeli fighter jet activity near the Iranian border have put Iraqi airspace at the center of the confrontation even as Baghdad seeks to avoid direct involvement.
Axios reported this week that dozens of Israeli fighter jets flew toward Iran’s border in a demonstration of military capability. The aircraft passed through Syrian and Iraqi airspace before turning back near Iran.
Hardline Iranian lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian demanded that Iraq tale action against the flights, alleging they were preparations for an attack on Iran.
“The Iraqi government must explain why the Zionist regime’s fighter jets are training and preparing to attack Iran in Iraqi airspace,” Nabavian wrote on X.
“If no action is taken, the Iraqi people, Iraq’s resistance groups and the Iranian nation will fulfill their duty,” he added, without specifying what action he meant.
His warning invoked Iraqi armed groups as potential actors alongside Iran if Baghdad failed to respond.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has separately accused US forces of conducting 171 violations of Iraqi airspace between September 30 and October 23.
The umbrella group alleged on Saturday that the United States was using military bases in Jordan and Turkey to conduct flights over Nineveh, Duhok, Erbil, Salahuddin, Anbar and Kirkuk provinces.
It said it had detected 17 aircraft on Friday, including reconnaissance drones and specialized aircraft. The figures and allegations were the factions’ account.
The dispute over foreign military flights also complicates efforts to restrain militia operations. When Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah announced a suspension of military operations on September 30, it excluded responses to what it called hostile aircraft and airspace violations until Iraqi government air defenses were fully established, Asharq Al-Awsat reported.
Suspected strikes on weapons stores
Iraqi officials suspect Israel attacked two sites storing Chinese-made man-portable air defense systems recently transferred from Iran to Iraqi factions, Awsat reported Saturday, citing unnamed sources.
The sources said a large shipment was destroyed shortly after arriving at the facilities.
On October 17, the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces reported an explosion at an ammunition storage facility in eastern Baghdad that injured five people. Its initial account pointed to an internal malfunction.
The newspaper also quoted an Iraqi political adviser as saying intelligence officials were examining whether renewed US-Israeli fighting against Iran had already begun covertly on Iraqi soil, targeting weapons shipments to Tehran-aligned groups.
Israeli responsibility and the reported contents of the warehouses remain unconfirmed. The suspected strikes nevertheless raise the prospect that Iraqi factions could become targets in renewed fighting regardless of Baghdad’s stated position.
A state with factions
Zaidi presented his campaign to bring weapons under government control as a test of whether the Iraqi state could exercise sovereignty.
“Are we a state with factions, or factions with a state?” he said in the television interview.
He said his government had reached understandings with five factions, completing arrangements with three and working to finalize them with two others. Discussions were continuing with another two, he said.
Zaidi pledged that no weapons would remain outside state control by June 30, 2027.
That deadline represents an extension of an earlier September target, and some factions have disputed the government’s account of progress.
Rudaw reported on October 19 that Kataib Hezbollah had described negotiations over its weapons as remaining at “square one,” accusing Zaidi of failing to respond to a proposed agreement.
The group also demanded clarification of Baghdad’s positions on US sanctions against Iran and conflicts elsewhere in the region, tying the weapons dispute to issues beyond Iraq’s borders.
Another attack in Kurdistan
A separate drone attack on Saturday highlighted the exposure of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, where Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have repeatedly come under fire.
An explosive-laden drone struck a camp northeast of Erbil, Reuters reported, citing security sources.
The Kurdistan Komala Party of Iran said one of its bases in the Alana Valley was hit, causing material damage but no casualties. The available account did not establish who launched the drone.
Iran has repeatedly launched missile and drone strikes against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in northern Iraq, accusing them of organizing attacks and fueling unrest inside Iran.
Baghdad agreed in 2023 to disarm the groups and relocate them away from the Iranian border.
The groups also figured in discussions about a possible ground offensive after the US-Israeli war began in February. Reuters reported in March that Iranian Kurdish factions had consulted Washington about attacking Iranian security forces in the country’s west, although it could not establish the extent of CIA involvement or whether US weapons had been supplied.
Trump initially welcomed the prospect of Kurdish fighters crossing into Iran, telling Reuters on March 5 that it would be “wonderful.” Two days later, he said he had told them to stay out.
“They’re willing to go in, but we really—I’ve told them I don’t want them to go in,” Trump told reporters. “The war is complicated enough without having, getting the Kurds involved.”
