Proliferation and terrorism financing analyst
A possible resumption of US strikes on Iran would serve an increasingly economic war, weakening Tehran’s ability to challenge a blockade that Washington appears prepared to maintain for the foreseeable future.
A strike on Iran could "absolutely" come this weekend, the US ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, said Friday, and the administration hasn’t said what it would be for.
The New York Times reports that US and Israeli planners have drawn up a short, intensive campaign for after the November 3 midterms, aimed at Iran’s missile and drone arsenal, nuclear sites and energy infrastructure.
Critics read the reports as proof that there is no strategy anymore. That reads the war through the lens of February, when the economic campaign existed to support the war. Whether the administration designed it this way or simply ended up here, the strikes now serve the economic campaign, which is proving more harmful to the regime than the strikes ever were.
Washington has committed to the blockade and treats the strikes as optional. Speaking to reporters Friday, President Trump said the choice was whether to finish it off or let it wither, and that with oil moving through Hormuz the US was getting everything it wanted. Mike Waltz, the US ambassador to the United Nations, told the Financial Times the same day that the president and the Navy can maintain the blockade for the foreseeable future while the administration keeps tightening economic pressure.
The US is now running a siege. It has sharply restricted Iran’s access to oil buyers, international finance and regional trade. The job of the military is to keep the cordon from being broken. The shift in strategy came in July, when the US restored the blockade after the June memorandum collapsed and the strikes that followed were about the strait.
Central Command said its July strikes were meant to degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping. The next round of strikes would be the first planned campaign since the blockade and the sanctions began doing real damage to the regime.
Iran’s imports since the war began show its priority — bringing in the supplies it needs to be able to fight its way out of the blockade. It is bringing in truck parts, missile fuel ingredients and missile and drone components to rebuild the launchers and stockpiles. The Wall Street Journal counted about 1,300 shipments of dual-use components from Chinese suppliers to Iran’s defense ministry in the first half of the year.
On October 1 the Treasury sanctioned Iran’s truck and auto makers, which it called an essential part of Iran’s defense industrial base, and the suppliers in Turkey, the Emirates and East Asia feeding them parts. Iran is assembling missiles from stockpiled components in small numbers, the Journal reported in September, and the blockade has made the solid-fuel components it can’t make harder to import.
Iran loaded no crude oil onto tankers in September, according to Bloomberg. CENTCOM says the blockade has stopped $25 billion in oil exports. The United Arab Emirates halted all trade and financial dealings with Iran in August. The regime has no way to persuade its own base or the Persian Gulf states that it has an answer.
That leaves Tehran a short list of cards to play against the blockade and the sanctions.
The first is attacking commercial shipping in the strait. Maritime security sources recorded at least 12 attacks on tankers around the Strait of Hormuz in the week to October 5, the highest weekly total of the war.
The second is pressuring its neighbors. Iran threatens Persian Gulf energy infrastructure, US bases and undersea cables, and it has the Houthis at Bab el-Mandeb, all meant to push the Persian Gulf states to lobby Washington to end the blockade.
The third is to strain US munition supplies. Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s security chief, said this week that a long war favors Iran because the test is which side can sustain a cycle of production, deployment and response.
The fourth is to keep offering a deal that it likely won’t make. Tehran’s standing offer is to reopen the strait in seven days in exchange for ending the blockade, easing oil sanctions and releasing frozen assets.
The fifth is the nuclear program, which the regime can negotiate to death over enrichment and dangle in front of Washington for the same price.
A strike goes down that list. The missile and drone arsenal the Times describes, and the launchers, mine-layers, naval sites, radars and air defenses CENTCOM has hit since July, are the hardware behind the regime’s threat to the strait and its neighbors.
Fewer launchers means fewer ships hit and a weaker threat to the Persian Gulf. Hitting stockpiles and production sites limits its ability to strain and outlast US munition supplies, and a strike tests Rezaei’s claim directly. Destroying enough of those capabilities would weaken Iran’s offer to stop attacking shipping in exchange for lifting the blockade.
Washington would have less reason to pay for a threat Iran could no longer credibly sustain. Hitting Pickaxe Mountain doesn’t end the nuclear program, but it leaves Tehran less to bargain with when it asks for sanctions relief.
Holding a blockade is expensive. Destroyers are doing work that cheap systems should do, and the Navy is stretched thin. Fewer Iranian launchers firing at the escort mission means the Navy can hold the line longer without forcing a decision in Washington.
The regime has shown it will take the strikes. Ali Khamenei and Ali Larijani are dead, Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded his father, and Tehran still won’t concede on any deal the US could accept. What it can’t take is the economic war.
The blockade turned the clock against Tehran. The regime’s strategy since February has been to wait — for the administration to lose patience, for the midterms, for the next policy swing.
The US can hold a blockade for the foreseeable future at a cost it can carry. A prolonged loss of oil revenue will make Tehran’s strategy of waiting out Washington increasingly difficult to sustain. The strikes exist to keep that clock running.
Washington and Tehran traded increasingly hostile threats on Friday, with President Donald Trump raising the possibility of further military action and Iranian officials warning of attacks on regional infrastructure, while diplomatic efforts in Istanbul produced no breakthrough.
Trump said the United States “may do another little Epic Fury,” referring to the US military operation against Iran, but gave no details on the timing or scope of any renewed action.
His remarks came after US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack said an American strike could come as early as this weekend, while stressing that Trump remained open to a deal. Trump later distanced himself from Barrack’s suggestion, saying he knew nothing about plans for a weekend strike.
The possibility of renewed strikes has also been under discussion in Washington and Israel. The Atlantic reported that Trump was considering several days of strikes after the November 3 midterm elections, potentially targeting Iranian missile and drone capabilities, energy infrastructure and nuclear facilities. ABC News separately reported on Thursday that US and Israeli military planners had drawn up plans for renewed attacks.
Tehran threatens wider response
Tehran, meanwhile, has been preparing its response to another potential round of attacks, with its threats increasingly directed at infrastructure beyond Iran’s borders.
Two senior Iranian security officials told Reuters that Tehran had developed plans to strike undersea communications cables in the Persian Gulf if the United States and Israel resumed military operations. One official said Iran could also seek to prevent repairs to prolong the disruption.
The Wall Street Journal separately reported that Iran had threatened to attack airports, pipelines and other civilian and economic infrastructure in neighboring Persian Gulf countries if US-Israeli strikes resumed.
The Revolutionary Guards added to the warnings. Senior commander Yadollah Javani said Iran would become a killing field for American troops attempting a ground invasion, while Guards spokesman Hossein Mohebbi circulated a graphic showing a burning oil tanker and oil prices climbing to $117 a barrel.
The Guards’ navy also said two supertankers had struck mines in the Strait of Hormuz, where disruption to shipping has become a central part of the confrontation.
Istanbul talks yield no breakthrough
Against this backdrop, Turkey hosted foreign ministers from Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France and Germany in Istanbul on Friday for talks focused on regional conflicts, including the Iran war, shipping security and the fighting in Yemen.
The four regional countries, known collectively as the R4, also met separately and issued a declaration supporting the Islamabad memorandum, calling for a negotiated settlement and opposing attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including commercial vessels.
They called for the swift restoration of safe and unrestricted passage through the Strait of Hormuz, warning that disruptions threaten global supplies of energy, fertilizer and food. The ministers also agreed to maintain close consultations on regional security.
The Istanbul meetings brought regional and European governments together in support of diplomacy but produced no announced progress toward a US-Iran agreement.
With Washington considering further military action and Tehran threatening to widen its response to renewed strikes, the gap between the two sides remained considerable despite continuing mediation efforts.
Escalating war rhetoric from Iran, the United States and Israel, coupled with military movements across the region, has heightened fears of another conflict, as Iranians debate online whether war could bring political change or deepen the country's crises.
Iranian social media users are closely following statements by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as diplomatic and military movements across the region.
Many view the developments as possible signs of an impending US-Israeli attack.
A central debate is whether another war could bring down the Islamic Republic or simply inflict further damage on Iran.
Those supporting military action describe war as a necessary evil to end the political system, arguing that previous attempts to bring about change have failed.
Opponents warn that another conflict could destroy energy infrastructure and refineries, deepen economic hardship and leave Iranian society in an even worse position.
“We are inside Iran and face all kinds of financial, security and social problems, but we are willing to pay the price to end this nightmare,” one user wrote.
Another user wrote: “This uncertainty is really a thousand times worse than war. We cannot even plan a trip, let alone make decisions about work, education or running a business.”
Others strongly rejected that view.
“War brings destruction, chaos, disease and so many other problems,” one user wrote. “The outcome will not necessarily be what you imagine. It could be much worse than things are now.”
Another highlighted the vulnerability of people without secure salaries, who could lose their livelihoods if fighting disrupted economic activity.
One user summed up the conflicting attitudes they had encountered.
“I have seen many people in Iran waiting for an attack so that things can finally be settled… and others who wanted an agreement to be reached,” the user wrote. “Feelings differ, but everyone is tired of this situation.”
Some are urging others to stock up on water, food and medicine and keep cash on hand. Others warn people living near military or government facilities to consider leaving.
Users have also expressed concern for elderly people, those with illnesses and people living alone.
Hardliners push for confrontation
Ultra-hardline voices have also expressed enthusiasm for military confrontation, but for very different reasons.
They argue that negotiations with Washington have merely given Iran's adversaries time to regroup and prepare for a stronger attack.
Some have sharply criticized officials who pursued diplomacy and called for Iran to launch a pre-emptive strike if war appears imminent.
“Why shouldn't Iran start the war this time instead of always waiting to be caught off guard?” one user wrote.
Another argued that Iran did not need nuclear weapons to inflict serious damage on its adversaries.
“We don't even need an atomic bomb to retaliate,” the user wrote, arguing instead for strikes on nuclear power plants in Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
The calls for confrontation reflect a very different political outlook from anti-government users hoping outside military action could bring down the Islamic Republic.
But both illustrate how repeated rounds of fighting and failed diplomacy have led some on opposing sides of Iran's political divide to see another war as preferable to the current uncertainty.
Parents prepare for the worst
Parents' concerns about children's safety have intensified following the deaths of more than 100 schoolchildren in a US attack on Minab at the beginning of the recent war.
Some are urging families to keep children home from school if the likelihood of an attack increases. Others are discussing plans to collect children from schools and move them to safer locations as quickly as possible if fighting resumes.
An Instagram post featuring a firefighter has attracted particular attention. The firefighter said that while inspecting safety arrangements at a girls' high school, a school official told them instructions had been issued to prepare identification tags for students.
On Friday, an Education Ministry spokesperson denied that such measures were being implemented and accused “enemies or ignorant individuals” of spreading fear.
One user said they had checked with relatives in Tehran and concluded that the reports were accurate, claiming families they contacted had requested identification tags and were awaiting their delivery.
Fear of another internet blackout
The prospect of another shutdown of international internet access is adding to the anxiety.
Users fear authorities could cut international connectivity immediately if hostilities resume. The prospect is particularly troubling after previous shutdowns made it difficult to contact relatives and access reliable information.
One user recalled that during the war in June last year, the internet was cut several days after fighting began. When war broke out again at the end of February, the shutdown came within hours.
“Now, instead of checking the news in the morning, I open Google's domain to see whether it loads,” the user wrote, “so I can find out whether the war has started.”
The United States is tightening economic pressure on Iran to bolster efforts to reach a diplomatic solution and can sustain its naval blockade for the foreseeable future, the US Ambassador to the UN said, as President Donald Trump weighs renewed strikes after midterm elections.
Mike Waltz told the Financial Times that Washington still wanted Tehran to return to negotiations and reach what he called a “meaningful agreement” on its nuclear program, but acknowledged the standoff could continue without a deal or a return to prewar shipping levels through the Strait of Hormuz.
“The president and the US Navy can maintain this blockade for the foreseeable future,” Waltz said, adding that the administration was continuing to tighten economic pressure.
He said the US would not consider its objectives achieved until Iran’s highly enriched nuclear material had been dealt with and an agreement reached over domestic uranium enrichment.
Trump considers renewed strikes after midterms
The comments come as Trump is considering several days of renewed strikes against Iran after the midterms, The Atlantic reported, citing officials and people familiar with the discussions.
Potential targets include Iran’s missile and drone arsenal, energy infrastructure and nuclear facilities, according to the report. One outside adviser told the magazine that US economic pressure was working and that additional strikes could push Iran closer to collapse.
An official and another person familiar with the talks said Trump had initially hoped Tehran would return to negotiations before the election, but that had not happened.
US officials stressed that no decision had been made on whether to resume strikes after November 3. The Atlantic said some officials also saw uncertainty over Washington’s next move as a way of keeping Tehran under pressure.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had pushed for another round of strikes before Israel’s election, according to the report, but Trump has so far declined to authorize a new attack before the US vote.
Washington and Tehran trade competing Hormuz messages
The military pressure is unfolding alongside sharply different accounts from Washington and Tehran over control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Trump said on Thursday that more oil had moved through the strait over the previous week than at any point before the war, attributing the increase to the US blockade.
“More oil came out of the Hormuz Strait over the last week than at any time previous, including before the war,” Trump told a campaign rally in Iowa. “That’s because of the blockade.”
He said the blockade had stopped Iran from exporting its own oil and again argued that US military action had destroyed Tehran’s nuclear enrichment capacity.
IRGC says US pushed away from the strait
Iran, however, presented a very different picture on Friday.
IRGC Navy commander Ali Ozmaei said US forces had been pushed hundreds of kilometers away from the Strait of Hormuz and no longer had a place there.
“Today, the Americans are not present in the Persian Gulf and have moved 600 to 700 kilometers away from the Strait of Hormuz,” Ozmaei said. “America no longer has a place in the Strait of Hormuz.”
The competing statements underscore how control of shipping and access through Hormuz have become central to both sides’ strategy, as Washington seeks to pressure Tehran economically while keeping open the possibility of renewed military action.
China's imports of oil recorded as Malaysian have plunged alongside the collapse of Iranian exports under the US naval blockade, suggesting how heavily Iran relied on relabeling its crude for its biggest customer.
In September, China imported just 276,000 barrels per day of oil recorded as Malaysian, down from an average of nearly 1.3 million barrels per day in 2025.
In some previous months, the figure had reached 2 million barrels per day. That is roughly four times Malaysia's total oil production.
Much of the discrepancy may reflect oil coming from Iran but recorded by China's customs as originating in Malaysia, alongside sanctioned oil from other producers and genuine Malaysian exports.
Chinese customs authorities have consistently reported zero monthly imports of Iranian oil since 2020. Yet tanker-tracking companies estimate that Iran delivered an average of around 1.5 million barrels per day to China last year.
Sanctions and blockade
Kpler previously told Iran International that most Iranian oil exports to China are recorded as Malaysian, while some cargoes are declared as originating from Iraq, Oman and even the United Arab Emirates. TankerTrackers has also documented the practice.
The decline in China's recorded Malaysian imports has accelerated as US sanctions have tightened and the naval blockade has choked off Iranian exports.
Kpler data obtained by Iran International show that Iran delivered more than 1.55 million barrels per day of oil to China between January and May this year. From June through September, the average fell to less than half that level.
By mid-October, the volume of Iranian oil afloat outside the US blockade line had fallen to zero.
If current trends persist, China's imports of oil recorded as Malaysian could fall to their lowest level in years, potentially approaching the 2017 level of just 130,000 barrels per day as early as this month or next.
Alternative suppliers
While Iranian oil exports have collapsed, tanker-tracking data show that overall oil exports from the Middle East have recovered to prewar levels and even surpassed them.
The Wall Street Journal, citing Kpler data, reported that the region's exports of oil and petroleum products have reached 24 million barrels per day, above the level recorded before the war.
Before the war, more than 80% of the oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz was destined for Asian markets, with China the largest buyer.
Chinese customs data show that in September, China imported an average of 2.9 million barrels per day from Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, up from less than 2 million barrels per day in May.
The figure nevertheless remained below February's prewar level, when China's combined imports from those five countries exceeded 3.8 million barrels per day.
The numbers also reflect a broader shift in Chinese oil buying after the outbreak of war. As global prices surged, China at one point cut overall crude imports by around 30% and drew instead on its strategic petroleum reserves.
In that sense, China acted as a significant shock absorber, helping limit an even sharper increase in global oil prices.
Before the war, China imported around 11.5 million barrels per day of crude. Following the US-Israeli war on Iran and disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, imports fell to around 8 million barrels per day before recovering more recently to above 9 million.
The shift suggests that China is increasingly replacing lost Iranian barrels with oil from other Middle Eastern producers. The disappearance of China's “Malaysian” imports is yet another measure of how sharply the blockade has curtailed Iran's access to its most important oil market.
Turkey will host the foreign ministers of seven countries on Friday for talks on the Iran-US war, security in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, developments in Yemen and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
For the first time, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan will meet Britain, France and Germany for security-focused talks. The meeting comes as attacks on ships and regional energy infrastructure continue and oil prices have reached their highest level in five months.
The Istanbul meeting could mark a shift from regional consultations toward broader security coordination. It follows months of efforts by regional states to build cooperation against threats from the Islamic Republic, particularly attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — the three members of the Mecca defense pact — will all attend and have committed to using their military capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia. Egypt is also considering military support for Riyadh.
The three European powers are now joining the talks with concerns of their own, particularly over energy.
The platform could lead to a form of division of labor in the Iran war, operating in parallel with US and Israeli military pressure on the Islamic Republic and focused primarily on containing the Iran-backed Houthis.
From regional consultations to defense cooperation
Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have held regular consultations since March following Houthi threats in Bab al-Mandab. The grouping has become known as the R4.
The four countries have emphasized direct regional involvement in resolving crises and in recent months have adopted common positions on the Iran war, Palestine and Saudi security.
Alongside these diplomatic efforts, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded defense cooperation through the Mecca pact. Under the agreement, an external armed attack on one member is considered an attack on all three.
Officials from the three countries agreed on August 31 to establish a joint secretariat and expand defense cooperation. Their defense committee decided on October 5 to make agreed forces and military capabilities available for rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia.
The four R4 countries also condemned Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in an October 11 statement and backed Riyadh’s measures to counter the threats.
Turkey is meanwhile pursuing parliamentary approval of the Mecca pact, while Egypt’s parliament is due to decide on Monday, October 26, whether to deploy forces in military support of Saudi Arabia. Egypt is not a member of the pact, but the prospect of it joining is being seriously considered.
Despite these developments, the countries continue to emphasize a diplomatic solution to the Iran-US war, and some remain in contact with Tehran.
While seeking to prevent the war from spreading, they are also moving closer to joint defensive action against Iran-backed Houthi attacks. These parallel efforts could help contain the crisis and pave the way for a new regional security arrangement, but could also draw the countries deeper into the war and create domestic political tensions.
Containing the Iran-backed Houthis on a parallel track
Protecting critical infrastructure is a central priority for Saudi Arabia in its cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan.
Iran-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi economic and military facilities and insecurity in Bab al-Mandab have caused direct damage while putting pressure on the kingdom’s energy exports and investment plans.
Strengthening Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities could reduce some of that vulnerability. But the impact of the new cooperation may extend beyond protecting Saudi facilities.
Saudi defenses against such attacks currently depend on direct US support. A greater role for Turkey and Pakistan, combined with coordination among the four regional countries, could reduce that dependence and allow Washington to devote more resources and attention to the Iran war.
From this perspective, two parallel tracks are taking shape. The United States and Israel are pursuing direct military pressure on Iran, while the countries represented in Istanbul are cooperating to contain the regional consequences of the war.
The two tracks, however, do not constitute a single coalition. Despite their political and security ties with the United States, the regional countries have avoided joint arrangements with Israel, preventing the two approaches from becoming fully integrated.
Cooperation with Washington does not necessarily mean participation in Israel’s strategy. These countries can oppose an expansion of the war against Iran while acting to contain threats arising from it, particularly Houthi attacks.
The practical result could be a form of division of labor even without a formal agreement between the US-Israel camp and the R4.
Iran’s leverage and the risk of diminished influence
The emerging arrangement has particular significance for Iran. If the cooperation succeeds and takes on a military dimension, it would amount to action against an ally of Tehran.
For now, Iran is seeking to raise the cost of continuing the war for the United States and regional countries by leveraging its geographic position in the Strait of Hormuz and its support for the Houthis. Tehran has also promised to respond to actions against its interests.
Alongside maintaining these forms of leverage, Tehran is using diplomacy in an effort to turn them into political gains.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said a seven-day proposal for restoring normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was conveyed through Qatar, with implementation conditional on Tehran’s demands being met.
On Yemen, he has said Iran is prepared to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Ansarullah while rejecting the assertion that the Houthis take direct orders from Tehran.
The two positions indicate that Tehran wants to preserve its ability to turn regional pressure into political leverage. Continued pressure, however, could produce a different outcome.
Governments facing attacks on infrastructure and disruption to maritime routes are moving toward closer defense cooperation to reduce their vulnerability, potentially increasing their capacity to confront Iran.
Crucially, reducing the impact of regional pressure does not necessarily require the military defeat of Iran-aligned forces.
If Saudi Arabia can better protect its infrastructure with help from new partners and the threat to shipping in Bab al-Mandab diminishes, part of Tehran’s bargaining power would be reduced.
Its leverage in the Strait of Hormuz would not be directly affected by these arrangements and would remain in Tehran’s hands, though it could become more fragile than before. Much will depend on Tehran’s response to actions taken by the countries participating in the platform.
Ansarullah, however, is an actor with demands of its own, and ending the Yemen war would require a separate agreement.
Continued contacts between Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt and Tehran also indicate that these governments still see a role for the Islamic Republic in reducing tensions. Anadolu Agency has reported that Pakistan’s army chief asked Tehran to use its influence to halt Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure.
Europe and the future of regional security
The involvement of Britain, France and Germany could broaden the scope of this emerging cooperation.
Their involvement reflects concerns about the wider consequences of the war, disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and, above all, energy supplies.
The European countries are joining the R4 states in an effort to address those concerns, but their involvement would also increase NATO’s presence in the region and could potentially lead to an expanded military role.
For Turkey, hosting the meeting provides an opportunity to strengthen its position in regional diplomacy. Saudi Arabia can combine the defensive support of regional partners with broader European consultations.
The European countries, meanwhile, are engaging governments that cooperate with the United States while maintaining political access to Tehran, allowing them both to maintain channels with Iran and signal their opposition to its actions.
Continued European engagement with the R4 could produce a multilayered structure linking political cooperation among the four regional countries, the defense commitments of three of them and diplomatic coordination with Europe.
Such a structure would not immediately replace the US presence and would not necessarily align with Israel’s strategy, but it could give regional countries a larger role in managing crises — a role Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strongly pursued.
From this perspective, the Istanbul meeting may signal an emerging division of labor between two parallel tracks: US and Israeli military pressure on Iran on one side, and efforts by regional countries, with European participation, to contain Tehran’s regional proxies on the other.
While such cooperation could help reduce tensions, it also carries the risk of widening the war — a shared concern that has made all sides cautious about taking major military action.
