Turkey to host regional and European ministers for talks on Iran, Yemen and Ukraine

Iran has shipped only 4.1 million barrels of LPG, equivalent to around 350,000 tons, since the blockade began, Reuters reported, citing informed sources and shipping data.

Data from Kpler and Vortexa obtained by Iran International show the figure was around 30 million barrels, or 2.6 million tons, over the same period last year.

Vortexa and Kpler estimate Iran's LPG exports in 2025 at between 10.5 million and 11 million tons, worth more than $5 billion.

Iranian Chamber of Commerce data show exports of 9 million tons of propane and butane worth $4.35 billion during the Iranian financial year that ended on March 20, 2026.

The figures cover different periods and may also reflect differences in methodology, but both point to the scale of Iran's LPG exports before the war.

War impact

A document from Iran's National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company obtained by Iran International last year shows that the country's oil refineries produced around 2.4 million tons of LPG, half of which was consumed domestically and the remainder exported.

The South Pars gas processing facilities, serving Iran's largest gas field, produced around 7 million tons, with the rest coming from other gas facilities and petrochemical plants, mainly in Assaluyeh and Mahshahr.

In total, Iran produced around 13 million tons of LPG last year, about 80% of which was exported. Under normal conditions, domestic demand is below 2 million tons annually.

Iran has cut crude oil production since the halt in oil exports. According to OPEC estimates, daily output fell from around 3.26 million barrels in 2025 to 1.96 million barrels in September, a decline of about 40%.

The war has also affected Iran's other major sources of LPG. Israel targeted gas processing units at South Pars as well as petrochemical plants in Assaluyeh and Mahshahr.

Iranian officials say the initial loss of 230 million cubic meters of South Pars gas production has since narrowed to around 100–130 million cubic meters as damaged units returned to operation.

The head of Iran's National Petrochemical Company says around 60% of damaged petrochemical units have also been rebuilt and returned to operation.

Based on these figures, Iran's LPG production may have fallen by around 20–25% since the war, bringing annual output to roughly 10 million tons, comparable to 2020 levels.

But production has fallen far less sharply than exports, potentially leaving Iran with millions of tons of surplus LPG.

Lessons from 2020

Iran faced a similar, though less severe, problem at the height of US sanctions in 2020.

Kpler and Vortexa data show LPG exports that year were less than half last year's level, while Iranian official statistics indicate domestic consumption rose about 2.5-fold to around 5 million tons, roughly half of production.

Even then, Iran continued exporting LPG, shipping 4.4 million tons in 2020 and 5.8 million tons in 2021.

With seaborne exports now sharply curtailed, Tehran could again divert more propane and butane to domestic use, including limited injection into the national gas network or use as fuel by industries and power plants equipped to burn LPG.

That could help ease Iran's recurring winter gas shortages and reduce the need to burn fuel oil, or mazut, at power plants and industrial facilities, a major source of air pollution.

There are limits to how much LPG Iran can absorb at home. Substitution depends on technical constraints, available infrastructure and domestic demand.

Even if some of the surplus can be redirected domestically, a prolonged blockade could deprive Iran of an LPG export trade worth around $5 billion annually before the war, compounding the much larger loss of oil export revenue.

BaFin revoked the license on November 5, 2025, citing persistent legal violations that the bank had failed to remedy. A 2023 special audit found serious shortcomings in its business organization, and the bank had been inactive for more than six months.

BaFin also cited sanctions against the institution, saying German banking law therefore presumes its managers to be unreliable, regardless of whether they personally engaged in misconduct.

BaFin orders branch wound up

BaFin ordered the wind-down on June 11, 2026. The liquidation order became final on July 15, according to the regulator. The bank later withdrew legal action against the measure on September 23, and a Hamburg court appointed Berlin-based FUW Treuhand Project Management GmbH as liquidator on September 30.

The withdrawal of the banking license had already become final on December 8, 2025.

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The bank mainly handled and financed Iran-related exports, including payment services, letters of credit, lending, guarantees and investments. It had 13 employees and assets of €62.4 million at the end of 2025. Customer deposits total about €200,000.

Deposits remain subject to sanctions restrictions

BaFin said there is currently no deposit compensation event, meaning Germany’s deposit guarantee system has not been triggered. Access to funds is restricted under EU sanctions, however, and the liquidator can make payments only with authorization from the Bundesbank’s Financial Sanctions Service Center.

BaFin said the existing deposits would instead be dealt with as part of the liquidation of the branch.

Iranian banks remain under scrutiny in Germany

The decision comes as Iranian banks operating in Germany face heightened scrutiny under renewed EU sanctions and increased US pressure on Tehran’s overseas financial network.

Bank Melli Iran’s Hamburg branch remains open despite being covered by EU sanctions, Germany’s Foreign Ministry told Iran International in August.

The ministry said at the time that the sanctions applied to Bank Melli and its German branch, but did not say whether Berlin was considering closing the operation.

The issue gained attention after US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched “Operation Economic Outcast” and called for every Bank Melli branch abroad to be shut. Germany said it remained in contact with Washington and other partners over further measures against Iran but gave no indication that a decision had been made on Bank Melli’s Hamburg branch.

Bank Melli and Bank Saderat are separate institutions, and BaFin’s action against Bank Saderat was based on German banking-law requirements as well as the sanctions applying to the bank.

Mostafa Sepahvand told Woolwich Crown Court that he visited the embassy on February 15, 2025, where he met a man he identified as Navid Emami.

Sepahvand said he told Emami that addresses provided for the journalists were incorrect but that he was still pursuing the matter. According to Sepahvand, Emami asked whether his co-defendant Farhad Javadi Manesh was working with him.

Later in his testimony, Sepahvand said Emami had supplied addresses to people he described as connected to the Revolutionary Guards. He also alleged that Emami had threatened him.

Sepahvand, 41, is on trial alongside Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57. All three deny charges under Britain's National Security Act.

Prosecutors say the men gathered information for Iranian intelligence in preparation for serious violence against Iran International journalists Mojtaba Pourmohsen and Kambiz Hosseini.

Sepahvand accepts that he conducted surveillance but says he acted under duress and deliberately tried to undermine the operation.

The court was shown phone and vehicle location data placing Sepahvand near addresses linked to the alleged targets, as well as messages in which he passed Manesh information about Hosseini, including references to his dog and a blue Volkswagen Golf.

Sepahvand said he asked Manesh to make a video of the car. On one occasion, he said, he travelled to an address specifically so his phone's GPS would show his Iranian contacts that he had been there.

He said he was trying to convince the Revolutionary Guards that he was cooperating while actually frustrating the alleged operation.

“I played them,” Sepahvand told the court.

Sepahvand also testified that £30,000 had been sent to a money exchange in Finchley after an address linked to Pourmohsen was raised, but said he did not collect it because he did not want to carry out the task.

Asked who had sent the money and what it was for, Sepahvand named a man called Ruhollah and said it was to “go after the journalists.” Asked which journalists, he said that had not been specified.

Sepahvand said he had initially asked for £150,000. When he denied telling his Iranian contacts that he would attack a journalist if they paid him, his barrister, Tyrone Smith, pointed him to an earlier message in which he appeared to say he would carry out the attack if paid.

Sepahvand said he had no choice but to make such claims because he believed the Revolutionary Guards were monitoring his communications and waiting for him to say he would not carry out the attack.

He said he had been under duress from the beginning, citing the arrest of an associate and his younger brother, a raid on his mother's home and pressure over a criminal case against him in Iran.

“I didn't want anyone to be hurt,” Sepahvand said toward the end of his testimony. “I wanted to protect everyone.”

The trial continues.

President Masoud Pezeshkian said threats and sanctions must be lifted in practice before conditions for negotiations could be established, while Revolutionary Guards spokesman Hossein Mohebbi said Iran would launch offensive operations against any country that attacked it as part of a shift toward asymmetric warfare.

An unnamed senior security official also told state-run Press TV that Iran was prepared for an all-out war and would respond “without restraint” to renewed attacks or assassinations.

The rhetoric coincided with high-level discussions in Tehran. Iranian media reported Wednesday that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had met Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to discuss the latest military and economic developments in the confrontation with the United States and Israel.

The meeting also addressed strengthening Iran's national capabilities, maintaining social cohesion, tackling economic difficulties and “advancing relations with strategic partners,” according to the reports.

Yet diplomatic channels remain active. Russian President Vladimir Putin told US envoy Steve Witkoff on Wednesday that there was still room for diplomacy over Iran and that an agreement with Tehran was needed, according to the Kremlin.

The competing signals leave open whether Tehran is raising the price of a negotiated pause or preparing for another phase of confrontation.

Talk of a negotiated pause

The conservative daily Jomhouri Eslami reported, citing “informed sources,” that discussions mediated by Qatar and Pakistan could take place this week around a framework for halting military clashes and securing reciprocal concessions.

The report followed Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir's visit to Tehran on Tuesday and came amid a flurry of diplomatic activity involving Russia and other regional powers.

According to Jomhouri Eslami, the framework would seek to halt military clashes, address outstanding disputes and sequence concessions in a way that reduced the risk of fighting resuming.

The newspaper said it expected that “the region will not see an escalation of tensions under current conditions.”

The prominence given to the prospect of an agreement by a conservative establishment newspaper is notable at a time when Iranian officials publicly deny that substantive nuclear negotiations with Washington are under way.

Sobh-e No, a newspaper aligned with Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, also linked renewed discussion of talks to diplomatic contacts involving Pakistan and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who visited Tehran on Tuesday.

The newspaper reported on a Russian proposal for a joint Iranian-Russian-Chinese initiative concerning the Strait of Hormuz, although Tehran has continued to insist on maintaining its authority over the waterway.

The Pezeshkian administration's Iran newspaper argued that the country's security depended on exercising sovereignty over the strait rather than sharing responsibility with outside powers.

“To preserve our security, we have no option but to exercise sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz,” it wrote.

That position points to one of the difficulties facing any potential agreement: Tehran wants the Strait of Hormuz and broader maritime security addressed alongside the conflict, while Washington has continued to prioritize Iran's nuclear program.

Pressure in the other direction

Hardline lawmaker Hassan Nataj called for Supreme Leader Khamenei to reconsider the religious prohibition on nuclear weapons in response to the conflict.

“We should ask the Supreme Leader to revise the fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons in light of the current situation,” he told the Didban Iran website.

The comments come amid a wider debate among Iranian politicians and commentators over whether the country's nuclear posture still provides sufficient deterrence against further US or Israeli attacks.

The simultaneous emphasis on diplomacy and escalation does not establish which course Tehran ultimately intends to pursue.

But the pattern has become clearer: diplomatic channels remain open while Iranian officials publicly raise the conditions for negotiations and stress that renewed attacks could bring a broader military response.

Israel's Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism Ministry alerted security and transportation officials on October 19 to allegations circulating on X about the pilot, Sina Amjadian, according to a ministry letter obtained by Ynet.

The letter included two posts from X. One alleged that Amjadian, who was said to have previously worked for flydubai, had shared content supporting Iran's government, including a video in which he purportedly kissed and saluted its emblem.

The other alleged that he had expressed support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah and called on United Airlines to investigate his conduct.

Ynet said it could not independently verify the allegations and that the material submitted to Israeli authorities did not include original statements or social media posts by Amjadian.

The allegations nevertheless prompted a security review and a decision to prohibit Amjadian from serving as a crew member on flights to Israel, senior Transportation Ministry officials told Ynet.

Security review follows flydubai incident

The Diaspora Affairs Ministry said the warning followed an attempted attack aboard a flydubai flight bound for Israel in late September, during which a co-pilot attacked the captain and attempted to seize control of the aircraft.

The incident prompted Israel's National Command and Control Center for Combating Antisemitism to expand its monitoring to people who might pose a threat to aviation security, according to the ministry.

It said the allegations concerning Amjadian warranted security scrutiny because of the responsibilities of an international airline pilot and the potential risks to passengers and crew.

Transportation Ministry officials told Ynet that the ministry did not independently monitor social media or gather intelligence but coordinated with security agencies when information raised aviation safety concerns.

They said preventing a pilot from operating flights to Israel was separate from denying the individual entry to the country, which falls under the authority of border control officials.

Ynet said it remained unclear whether Amjadian had previously flown to Israel, had been scheduled to operate a flight to Ben Gurion Airport or was qualified to fly aircraft used by United Airlines on its Israel routes.

There was no indication that any flight had been canceled or prevented from reaching Israel because of the restriction.