Rubio condemns Houthi attack on Riyadh airport, confirms American among dead

Western policy has long treated Iran’s nuclear program as the crisis and the government in Tehran as the address for a deal. Katz, a professor at George Mason University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, said Moscow has not shared that order of priorities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed Moscow’s support for Tehran during talks with President Masoud Pezeshkian in Turkmenistan on Thursday, offering to help end the war.

But during last year’s 12-day war, which focused mainly on Iranian nuclear facilities, “the Russians weren’t very helpful,” Katz said.

They would prefer that Iran not acquire a bomb, but they are “not hysterical about it” in the way Israel and some other states in the region are.

An Iran with nuclear weapons is the outcome US policy has spent years trying to block. Katz said Moscow does not put it in the same category.

“For them, the worst case is a pro-Western Iran.” Even an anti-Western Iran has pursued interests that clash with Russia’s. A government in Tehran aligned with the West, he said, “would have complete contempt for Russia.”

“But they want the regime to survive, that’s for sure.”

A nuclear partnership with limits

Moscow has nevertheless provided Tehran with diplomatic protection over its nuclear program.

On September 17, Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution extending independent monitoring of sanctions on Iran. The veto blocked the monitoring mechanism, not the sanctions themselves.

Russia also took part in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, and some diplomats credited it with being useful in the 2000s and 2010s, when Moscow and Tehran still differed on the issue.

Katz said that gap has since closed. Russian pressure on the nuclear issue continued through the end of 2021. Once the war in Ukraine began, “the Russians are simply not focusing on the Iranian nuclear issue.”

“I don’t think that they would be that sad if Iran acquired nuclear weapons,” he added, because those weapons would be aimed at others, not at Russia.

Cooperation stops short of defense

The military relationship between Russia and Iran has deepened considerably since Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022.

Iran supplied Russia with Shahed drone technology. Western governments have also accused Tehran of supplying short-range ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine.

The two countries formalized their growing cooperation in a strategic partnership treaty signed in January 2025. But the agreement, despite provisions for closer military cooperation, contains no mutual defense obligation.

“Russia’s assistance is to help Iran target US facilities and, of course, the facilities in other Middle Eastern states,” Katz said. “They’re helping Iran make attacks. They’re not defending Iran from attack.”

With Russian forces tied down in Ukraine, a US and Israeli campaign serious enough to threaten the Iranian government would leave Moscow unsure it could help.

Katz said Russia appears to be betting that no such attack will come, drawing confidence from the lesson of earlier this year: strikes on military and nuclear sites do not, by themselves, change who rules in Tehran.

Why Putin will not trade Tehran away

Katz rejected the idea that Iran is expendable, or a gun for hire. Moscow does not control Tehran, and Iran has done things Russia has disliked. For the most part, though, Iran does what Russia wants because of its hostility to the West.

The outcomes Moscow does not want are the fall of the regime or a Trump visit to Tehran “like Nixon in China.” Iranian fears of being traded away, Katz said, misread Putin.

Saudi Arabia tried that bargain in 2015 and 2016, offering more business in the hope Russia would cut back on Iran. Moscow took the business and kept the Iranian relationship.

“I don’t think there’s anything that we could give him that he would be willing to give up relations with Iran for.”

The US-Iran conflict pulls Washington’s attention away from Ukraine and, if Persian Gulf oil shipments are interrupted, lifts the price at which Russia sells its own crude.

Katz said Putin believes he will prevail in Ukraine and feels no need, for now, to give the West anything.

But if Russia prevailed in Ukraine and the United States pulled back from Europe and the Middle East, a more ambitious Iran could clash with Russian interests in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

“The weaker America’s position in the Middle East, the more likely we’re going to see clashes of interests between Russia and Iran,” Katz argued.

Nezamoddin Mousavi, a former conservative lawmaker with longstanding ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), gave unusually explicit expression to that argument this week, declaring that “nuclear ambiguity did not prevent war” and raising the prospect of revisiting Iran’s nuclear doctrine and even its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Mousavi, who helped found IRGC-linked media outlets, made the remarks in an interview with Ensaf News, a website close to President Massoud Pezeshkian.

Senior Iranian officials have previously hinted that Tehran could change its nuclear doctrine if sufficiently threatened. But such warnings have generally been directed outward, rather than framed as criticism of an established policy favored by slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Mousavi, however, is effectively arguing that a policy intended to preserve strategic uncertainty while stopping short of weaponization failed to provide the deterrence its architects expected.

That diagnosis feeds into a wider debate over what lesson Iran should draw from the war: whether the failure was one of deterrence, requiring greater military leverage, or of escalation management, requiring a different approach to diplomacy.

Iran has long cited Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons when confronted with accusations that it might seek a bomb.

Critics, however, have questioned how absolute that prohibition would prove in an existential crisis, especially since Khamenei’s predecessor and founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, held that preserving the state was paramount, taking precedence even over religious obligations.

Against that backdrop, Mousavi said Tehran should reassess its international commitments, the value of NPT membership and its broader deterrence strategy following attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

He stopped short of explicitly advocating the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

His reasoning amounts to three premises and a conclusion: Iran refrained from building a nuclear weapon; ambiguity was supposed to contribute to deterrence; yet Iran was attacked and senior leaders and military commanders were killed. The assumptions underlying Iran’s deterrence strategy, he argues, must therefore be reconsidered.

Beyond Khamenei

Mousavi also ventured into another sensitive subject: whether Khamenei’s death would fundamentally alter Iran’s strategic direction.

He argued that he would not expect dramatic change. Foreign and security policy, he said, is not simply the product of one individual but of institutional thinking and long-term calculations developed over decades.

It reflects a distinctly conservative view of regime continuity: leaders matter, but institutions matter more. Major strategic directions, in this reading, are unlikely to change abruptly regardless of who occupies the highest office.

That also gives the nuclear debate greater significance. If Iran’s strategic direction is fundamentally institutional rather than dependent on one leader, the lessons the establishment draws from the war could outlast the present leadership.

Deterrence or de-escalation?

Not everyone in Tehran is drawing the same lesson.

An article published Wednesday in Etemad newspaper highlighted a competing strand of Iranian political thinking. Where Mousavi sees a failure of deterrence, more moderate voices see a failure to manage escalation.

The hardline argument holds that the United States and Israel seek to weaken Iran regardless of its diplomatic behavior and that negotiations cannot guarantee security while military pressure continues.

The more moderate argument sees the conflict as the product of a broader strategic environment shaped by political, regional, military and economic pressures. For this camp, the lesson is not necessarily that Iran needs greater deterrence, but that it needs more effective crisis management.

The emerging argument in Tehran, then, appears to be shifting from how this war ends to what lesson should be drawn from it: whether greater military and potentially nuclear deterrence offers the best protection against another conflict, or whether security ultimately depends on preventing the next escalation before it begins.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said Saturday that satellite imagery showed repairs to what appeared to be a water tank and the addition of a small building nearby at the Minzadayi compound, northeast of Tehran.

The findings add to an assessment published Tuesday in which the institute identified unusually heavy vehicle traffic and earth-moving activity at the heavily secured site, which Israeli aircraft struck on March 3.

The latest observations suggest Iran is seeking “not just to clean up the site” but to resume regular activities there, the institute said in a post on X.

Iran has consistently denied seeking nuclear weapons, maintaining that its nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has said it has no credible indication of a coordinated Iranian nuclear weapons program, although it has repeatedly raised concerns about Tehran's uranium enrichment and unresolved questions over past nuclear activities.

The original ISIS report, based on high-resolution satellite images taken in September and October, documented passenger vehicles and trucks returning to the compound following extensive work to remove rubble and repair damage from the Israeli attack.

Researchers also identified continued excavation at a section of the compound where the March strikes had left several craters, apparently above underground structures.

The institute said the activity could indicate an attempt to restore capabilities associated with nuclear weapons development. But the images do not establish what work, if any, has resumed inside the compound.

Israel identified Minzadayi as a covert nuclear weapons development facility during the war, saying scientists there had been working on a component of a nuclear weapons system. The institute's assessment of the site's earlier purpose relies partly on those Israeli military claims, which have not been independently verified.

The US and Israel launched their military campaign against Iran on February 28, two days after indirect nuclear negotiations in Geneva that Omani mediators said had made progress. Further technical talks had been planned before the attacks began.

Washington and Tehran remain divided over the future of Iran's nuclear program. The Trump administration is demanding substantial reductions in Iran's enrichment capacity, while Tehran insists it will not surrender its right to enrich uranium.

On Saturday, the Kremlin said Russian President Vladimir Putin had conveyed Tehran's position on a possible settlement of the war to President Donald Trump during a phone call Friday, following consultations with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Moscow disclosed neither the details of Iran's position nor Trump's response.

The institute's findings raise the possibility that Iran is rebuilding infrastructure damaged in the war, but leave unanswered the more consequential question of whether any nuclear weapons-related research has resumed.

“Revenues from crude and condensate will drop to zero for the first time ever,” Homayoun Falakshahi told Iran International's Eye for Iran, warning that Tehran could lose between $3 billion and $6 billion in monthly oil income.

That makes December the critical month as the last Iranian oil shipments already outside the blockade zone make their way to Chinese buyers.

According to Kpler, just eight million barrels of Iranian crude remain on the water outside the blockade, down from nearly 90 million barrels in mid-July. Falakshahi expects those remaining shipments to be discharged by around October 18.

With Chinese refiners typically taking another one to two months to settle payments, Tehran could receive its final proceeds from those shipments by mid-December.

The looming revenue shortfall follows a halt in Iranian oil shipments. Kpler data shows that Iran loaded no crude oil or condensate onto tankers throughout September, the first full month without loadings since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

The last recorded loading took place around August 26 or 27.

Even during the 1979 revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and successive rounds of Western sanctions, Iranian crude continued reaching international buyers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, shipments fell as low as 300,000 barrels per day in some months, compared with typical volumes of around 1.7 million to 1.8 million, but never stopped entirely.

“This is a first in history,” Falakshahi said.

A financial lifeline under threat

Oil exports remain Iran’s largest source of foreign currency despite years of efforts to reduce the government’s dependence on petroleum income.

Falakshahi said much of Iran’s oil trade with China continues to be settled in dollars despite US sanctions, making the disappearance of those payments particularly consequential for an economy already struggling with currency depreciation.

He said expectations of dwindling oil income may have contributed to the rial’s recent decline. A prolonged loss of foreign exchange could put further pressure on the currency and government finances.

The squeeze could also affect Tehran’s ability to finance regional allies, although Falakshahi said the extent would depend on government priorities. Tehran could choose to preserve such support while cutting spending at home.

Sustained economic pressure could also affect Tehran’s negotiating calculus with Washington, he said, though he doubted the leadership was ready to make significant compromises over its nuclear program.

Why sanctions-evasion methods may not work

Iran has spent decades developing networks to circumvent Western sanctions and maintain oil exports, but Falakshahi said a physical blockade makes those methods far more difficult to replicate.

Unlike financial restrictions, which Tehran has historically navigated through intermediaries, disguised shipments and alternative trading arrangements, the current blockade prevents tankers from physically leaving Iranian waters.

One potential workaround has attracted attention as independent Chinese refiners increasingly turn to Iraqi crude to replace Iranian supplies: transporting Iranian oil through Iraq and disguising its origin before exporting it to China.

But moving even 50,000 to 70,000 barrels per day across the Iraqi border would require thousands of truck movements, Falakshahi said.

“You’d probably see videos of it on the internet,” he said.

He estimated that moving enough crude by truck to fill a single large tanker could take around 20 days, compared with roughly one large tanker Iran previously loaded each day.

Iraq continues to import Iranian natural gas, but payments owed to Tehran are held in a restricted account at Iraq’s central bank because of US sanctions. Falakshahi said Baghdad would be unlikely to facilitate large-scale Iranian oil shipments at the risk of further US sanctions.

Overland routes offer little relief

Rail offers limited alternatives. Falakshahi said the connection to China reaches Tehran, far from Iran’s main oil-producing regions, while the pipeline supplying the capital has capacity of only around 200,000 barrels per day.

Turkmenistan is also reportedly restricting rail transit through its territory over concerns about US sanctions.

Even if Tehran managed to move small quantities through neighboring countries, road and rail would be unlikely to replace the volumes previously exported by sea.

“Iran has a history of evading sanctions successfully to an extent,” Falakshahi said. “But this seems a lot more challenging.”

Pressure extends beyond oil

The blockade is also restricting Iran’s ability to import commodities as oil revenue approaches a potential halt.

Falakshahi said shipments of agricultural products, including corn and wheat, have declined sharply, while alternative supply routes through the Caspian Sea offer only a fraction of the capacity available through Persian Gulf ports.

For Tehran, the immediate question is whether the blockade will remain in place long enough to exhaust the final payments from oil already sold.

If it does, December could mark the first time in Iran’s modern oil-producing history that crude and condensate export revenue falls to zero, cutting off the Islamic Republic’s principal source of foreign exchange with no clear route to restoring exports while the blockade remains in place.

Mohammad Jabbari, chief justice of Kordestan province, said the suspect was summoned to the judiciary in Divandarreh and remanded in custody after being formally accused of sexual abuse and producing obscene footage and other material, according to the judiciary-affiliated Mizan news agency.

Jabbari said the case had been referred to Kordestan province’s Criminal Court One and that further investigations were underway. Authorities have not publicly identified the suspect.

Divandarreh prosecutor Afshar Amir-Ahmadi said the judiciary ordered the arrest after reports emerged that a local teacher and football coach had sexually abused children. He said reports circulating on social media and concerns raised by families prompted authorities to investigate.

The local football association confirmed that the detained man was a football coach in Divandarreh. Police chief Hossein Montazeri said authorities had been aware of the allegations for several weeks and that the coach had been suspended from sporting activities.

Reports point to possible wider case

Earlier reporting by local news outlets in western Iran said around 50 children and teenagers at the Setaregan Divandarreh football club may have been sexually abused, although judicial authorities have so far confirmed only five complaints.

The outlets reported that one student initially filed a complaint with Iran’s cyber police, after which other students also came forward. It also said some students reported being sexually exploited after being promised opportunities to advance in football or join better teams.

Previous cases involving young athletes

The case follows other reports of sexual abuse allegations involving minors in Iranian sports.

In Tehran, a football coach accused by the families of eight teenage boys was initially sentenced to death, but the Supreme Court overturned the sentence. After a retrial, he was sentenced to 99 lashes, two years in internal exile and a two-year ban from coaching and other sporting activities. Forensic authorities had not established rape under the legal definition used in the case.

In Mashhad, parents of 15 young footballers raised sexual abuse allegations against a coach in 2023. Other cases involving coaches and minors have also been reported in Isfahan, Shiraz and Tehran, though the final judicial outcome of some cases has not been made public.