Iranian parliament deputy speaker Ali Nikzad said on Friday that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's survival during a US attack was "definitely a miracle."
Nikzad also said the United States had failed to achieve its objectives against Iran, saying it had neither destroyed the country's nuclear and missile programs nor brought about political change.
Tehran media see diplomacy with Washington as increasingly precarious but not yet dead, with the two sides far apart over the sequencing of any deal and the window for compromise appearing to narrow.
Iran has disputed US accounts that Secretary of State Marco Rubio ordered Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his delegation to leave the country after indirect negotiations in New York reached a stalemate.
Iran’s UN mission said the delegation left according to a schedule communicated to the State Department on September 17 and dismissed reports of a US-mandated departure as “baseless and worthless.”
Two US officials told the Associated Press that Rubio ordered the delegation to leave after little progress in indirect talks mediated by Qatar.
The dispute follows Washington’s response to Iran’s seven-point proposal for de-escalation and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Araghchi has said Tehran has made no changes to the proposal, which calls for lifting the blockade and unfreezing Iranian assets as steps toward reopening maritime transit and resuming nuclear negotiations.
Iranian media have nevertheless stopped short of declaring the diplomatic process dead.
Across outlets ranging from the government’s Iran Newspaper and state broadcaster-affiliated Jam-e Jam to the moderate business daily Donya-ye Eghtesad, the negotiations are portrayed as a stalled bargaining process rather than a complete collapse.
Washington’s response, delivered through Qatar, is seen as keeping the diplomatic channel open even as the two sides remain far apart.
Across the three outlets, four broad conclusions emerge.
First, no comprehensive settlement appears close. Even the more optimistic assessments envisage, at best, a phased arrangement focused initially on crisis management rather than a broader breakthrough.
Second, trust remains a central constraint. Iran Newspaper and Jam-e Jam cite the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and subsequent American policy, while Donya-ye Eghtesad frames the problem more neutrally as the enduring question of which side should move first.
Third, the central dispute is increasingly about sequencing. Tehran wants an end to hostilities, sanctions and blockade relief before reopening Hormuz within seven days and moving to nuclear talks. Washington wants nuclear concessions and movement on Hormuz before easing pressure.
Fourth, from Tehran’s perspective, the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding remains the principal reference point. The Iranian press portrays the seven-day plan as an accelerated version of the June framework rather than a departure from it.
As the government’s voice, Iran Newspaper presents the seven-point proposal as a reasonable sequence that Washington is obstructing.
It also turns its attention to actors it sees as working against diplomacy, linking Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE and his reported intelligence briefing there to efforts to build regional opposition to Iran.
Jam-e Jam similarly rejects accusations that Tehran is seeking to avoid the nuclear issue, arguing that the proposal would bring forward the start of nuclear negotiations from roughly 60 days to seven.
Donya-ye Eghtesad, however, focuses more heavily on the costs of prolonged deadlock. It treats the US response as a test of Iran’s willingness to show nuclear flexibility and argues that verifiable limits on its program would improve the prospects for an agreement.
Despite their different political orientations, the three outlets broadly treat the seven-point plan as the basis for further negotiations rather than something Tehran should abandon.
The remaining debate is largely about timing.
Iran Newspaper and Jam-e Jam argue that leverage over Hormuz, combined with US pre-election concerns about energy prices, favors Tehran holding firm. Donya-ye Eghtesad warns instead that the diplomatic window could close within weeks and that the risks of waiting until after the election may outweigh the benefits.
Trump’s rejection of key Iranian demands, Israeli intelligence activity and the UAE’s acknowledgement of Netanyahu’s visit also provide ammunition to voices in Tehran arguing against early concessions.
Jam-e Jam compared the diplomatic process to a game of Snakes and Ladders, in which every advance is followed by a setback. For now, it sees the US midterm elections as the next major variable that could alter the calculations of either side.
A leaked Russian government roadmap obtained by Fox News put the share of Russia-Iran trade settled in national currencies at 68%, far below Moscow’s public claims that nearly all bilateral trade had shifted to rubles and rials.
The push to settle bilateral trade outside the dollar has drawn renewed US scrutiny. Last month, the US Treasury imposed new sanctions on Russia’s VTB Bank, in part for its role in creating a ruble-rial settlement system.
On Thursday, Treasury also targeted the Russia-linked A7 Network, describing it as a “shadow banking network” used by Iran to evade sanctions. It said A7’s sub-agents formed a money-laundering and sanctions-evasion mechanism connected to Russian illicit finance that Iran used to move funds, including for oil sales and weapons procurement.
Both governments have spent years insisting they don’t need the dollar, but the amount of trade settled in each other’s currencies isn’t a number you need to announce unless you’re trying to convince people that sanctions aren’t working.
Sanctions leverage only works if people believe it is there. To convince people otherwise, Russia has since 2019 announced a rising share of its Iran trade settled in rubles and rials: from 40 percent to 50, 60, 80, until Putin himself claimed 95 percent in January 2025.
The Islamic Republic communicates in broad proclamations rather than Soviet-style quarterly statistical reports: its central bank governor said in November 2024 that Iran had “completely excluded the dollar” and traded only in rubles and rials.
But the internal plan, approved in September 2024, put it at 68 percent, with a goal of 71 by 2026.
The reality doesn’t fit the claim
The Kremlin’s claim of a working ruble-rial payment system is harder to sustain when the two sides have an imbalance in trade, because that can leave one side without enough of the other’s currency to meet demand. Russian figures put 2023 bilateral trade at about $4 billion, comprising $2.7 billion in Russian exports and $1.3 billion in Iranian exports.
The two countries also simply do not like holding each other’s currencies. Russia’s central bank described its problem with currencies like the rial in 2023: they are “often non-convertible or only partially convertible,” carry “higher volatility,” and trade in markets too thin to hedge.
Iranian exporters, according to Iran’s Resistance Economy Think Tank, refuse rubles when they can, and if they accept them sell them for dirhams as quickly as possible.
The usual fix for a shortage like this is a central bank swap line, which Iran and Russia signed in July 2024. Two years on, however, the only money either side has publicly put behind it was a 1 billion-ruble deposit, worth about $10 million at the time, at VTB to cover “possible ruble shortages,” and any further draw would leave Russia holding rials as collateral — a currency it cannot sell at home and that has lost 29 percent against the ruble since January.
An Iranian MP says Russia has offered a $20 billion ruble loan that Iran has not taken.
The trade goes around it
If the ruble-rial system worked as advertised, Iranian merchants wouldn’t be paying exchange houses in Dubai and Turkey to reach Russian suppliers.
Iranian MP Meysam Zohourian told Fars News in June that before the war even essential goods bought from Russia were routed through the UAE and settled in dirhams.
Fars asked in August why merchants still settle Russia trade through exchange houses and trustees in Turkey.
Iran’s central bank governor, Abdolnaser Hemmati, called his June trip to Moscow “an operational mission to untie the knots” in foreign trade, starting with letters of credit for Iranian merchants.
What the number counts
Whatever number is claimed, it doesn’t measure money moving between Russia and Iran — it’s a bookkeeping instrument, recording which currency left a Russian company’s account, not what currency reached the other side.
If a Russian importer’s bank takes rubles out of its account, converts them to dollars, and pays the seller in dollars, Russia’s Central Bank counts that as a ruble settlement, despite a contract priced in dollars and a seller that receives dollars.
The number also leaves out trade arranged without conventional cross-border payments. When countries are cut off from the international financial system, it’s easier to move goods than money, and Russia and Iran have increasingly turned to barter and swap arrangements.
Moscow has made barter official policy. The economy ministry issued a government manual for barter contracts in 2023, and a Russian economist says Iran is the one trading partner where barter accounts for a real share of the trade.
Russia and Iran have also pursued energy swaps. Swap deliveries of petroleum products had begun by late 2022, while the two sides were discussing a broader arrangement covering up to 5 million tons of oil and 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Trade conducted through such arrangements would not necessarily appear in the national-currency settlement percentage.
What the mismatch tells you
Russia and Iran’s coordination is real, but both countries overstate the impact. The public number, announced for propaganda value, doesn’t even match the government’s internal goal.
And the mechanism is in reality a cobbled-together assortment of poorly working, mismatched payment arrangements that don’t serve either side well except in their fight against the international financial system.
Iran on Thursday was linked by US and Israeli officials to the Flydubai incident, the second such case after British police opened a probe into possible Tehran involvement in a suspected RAF Fairford plot and arrested a dual UK-Iranian national.
US President Donald Trump raised the prospect of an Iranian connection, saying investigators were examining whether Tehran had a role in the incident and that, based on what he was hearing, he believed there could be one.
“We're working on it right now,” Trump said. “I would say the answer based on what I'm hearing, is yes. But we're working on it right now.”
Asked whether the co-pilot could have been placed on the flight by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards or radicalized separately, Trump said: “It could have been. Yeah.”
Trump also warned Iran of retaliation if investigators established its involvement.
“Oh they’ll be hit, very hard, don’t worry,” he told reporters Thursday. “You just ask them. They know what happened. They’ll be hit very hard.”
Israeli agencies investigate
Israel’s Mossad and Shin Bet intelligence and security agencies are also investigating the incident and whether the Omani co-pilot acted alone or was directed by others, according to i24News. Israeli officials said no Iranian involvement had been identified so far, and an initial assessment was that the co-pilot likely acted alone.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday that the co-pilot had undergone Islamist radicalization but that it was too early to determine whether he had connections to Iran.
“I think it's too early to say whether he had any connections with Iran or with anyone else,” Netanyahu said, adding that he expected more clarity within days.
The flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv was diverted to Saudi Arabia after the co-pilot allegedly stabbed the captain and tried to bring down the aircraft. Passengers subdued him, and a reserve crew aboard the plane landed it safely in Saudi Arabia.
The United Arab Emirates has launched its own investigation into the circumstances and motives behind the incident, including whether it involved terrorist intent, prior planning or outside direction.
Iran role in UK airbase plot
The Flydubai developments came days after a separate investigation in Britain raised questions about possible Iranian involvement in a suspected plot involving RAF Fairford, an airbase used by US bombers in operations against Iran.
British counter-terrorism police on Thursday arrested a dual UK-Iranian national in London on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts as part of the investigation. Police said they were examining “all possible angles — including possible foreign state involvement.”
The arrest followed the detention Sunday of five British men in their 20s near RAF Fairford. They were arrested on suspicion of terrorism and explosives offenses but were later released on bail.
Police said petrol was found in the vans used by the men but no improvised explosive devices were discovered.
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham said Wednesday there were “strong indications that Iran played a part in what happened over the weekend at RAF Fairford,” while stressing that the case remained an ongoing police investigation.
Iran denies involvement
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi rejected Burnham’s assertion, pointing to the release of the initial five suspects on bail.
“I can confirm Iran's belief that releasing supposed terrorists working for foreign states really says it all,” Araghchi wrote on X. “You're barking up the wrong tree.”
Iran summoned Britain’s ambassador in Tehran on Thursday to protest the accusations, with the Foreign Ministry describing them as baseless.
The Flydubai and RAF Fairford investigations are separate, and authorities have not established Iranian responsibility in either case.
The US Treasury sanctioned Iran’s automotive and rail sectors Thursday, expanding its campaign to some of the country’s largest industrial companies as Washington seeks to choke off Tehran’s sources of revenue with Operation Economic Outcast.
The Treasury said the sectors provide important sources of revenue and logistical capacity and are intertwined with IRGC patronage, trade-based money laundering and sanctions evasion.
“The Iranian regime's ability to fund its war machine and inflict terror on the world has been severely diminished thanks to Operation Economic Outcast,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.
“Today’s action directly targets Iran’s enablers and lays the groundwork for the United States and our partners to drain the regime’s revenue once and for all.”
The automotive designations include Iran Khodro Company, SAIPA, Iran Khodro Diesel, Pars Khodro, Zamyad and Niroo Motor Shiraz.
Iran produced nearly 1.1 million vehicles in 2024, according to the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers. Iran Khodro and SAIPA together account for more than 90% of the country’s domestic auto market.
The Treasury described the sector as a major remaining source of revenue for Iran and said Niroo Motor Shiraz had supplied more than 6,000 motorcycles for plainclothes intelligence agents working with the IRGC and Basij militia.
Foreign companies were also sanctioned for supporting Iran’s auto industry, including firms based in Indonesia, the UAE, Turkey and Hong Kong.
The Treasury said they supplied components to Iranian automakers or helped move parts into Iran, including shipments linked to Bahman Diesel, which it said produces vehicles for the Iranian armed forces and IRGC missile and drone units.
In the rail sector, the US government sanctioned the Islamic Republic of Iran Railway Company and Raja Passenger Trains Company, saying Tehran has increasingly relied on rail to move oil and sustain trade amid the US maritime blockade.
It also sanctioned Heavy Equipment Production Company (HEPCO) and its China-based subsidiary, saying HEPCO machinery has been used by the IRGC and Quds Force to build underground facilities and military training sites.
The metals sanctions targeted companies in the UAE and Germany over dealings with Iranian steel producers.
The Treasury also designated Ramin Keshvardoust and Mehnoosh Poursaraf Hamedani and companies tied to their steel and financial network in Iran, China and elsewhere.
The US government accused the network of facilitating tens of millions of dollars in Iranian steel and oil shipments and laundering transactions through Iran’s shadow banking system.
In a separate action Thursday, the Treasury targeted the Russia-linked A7 Network, describing it as a “shadow banking network” used by Iran to evade sanctions.
It said A7’s sub-agents formed a money-laundering and sanctions-evasion mechanism linked to Russian illicit finance that Iran used to move funds, including for oil sales and weapons procurement.
Operation Economic Outcast was launched in August to cut off Iran’s remaining sources of revenue and expand sanctions pressure beyond oil into industrial sectors that Tehran still relies on for trade, logistics and foreign currency.
The Treasury says the campaign is designed to isolate companies and financial channels that help Iran move funds, sustain industrial production and circumvent US restrictions.
Four men detained during Iran’s nationwide January protests have been sentenced to death by Tehran Revolutionary Courts, HRANA reported Thursday, as rights groups warn of mounting use of capital punishment against protest detainees.
HRANA identified three of the men as Khosrow Mohammadi-Nia, Masoud Tushmalani and Sirvan Shabani, all from Kermanshah province in western Iran. The fourth, Mehdi Nami, was prosecuted separately.
Citing information received from Iran, HRANA said Branch 23 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court tried Mohammadi-Nia, Tushmalani and Shabani in a joint case and sentenced them to death on charges including “moharebeh” or “waging war against God,” “assembly and collusion with the intent to disrupt national security” and “operational activity in favor of hostile states.”
HRANA said judges Karimi and Taghizadeh issued the ruling.
Security forces arrested the three in Eslamshahr during the January protests, according to HRANA. Tushmalani was initially released on bail but was detained again several days later.
The three are being held at Qezel Hesar prison in Karaj. HRANA said Shabani is around 22 years old, while Mohammadi-Nia and Tushmalani are between 30 and 50.
A woman prosecuted in the same case was sentenced to five years in prison, HRANA said. The group did not identify her and said it was still investigating details of the allegations against her.
Separately, HRANA said Mehdi Nami, who was also detained during the January protests, had been sentenced to death by a Tehran Revolutionary Court on a charge of “operating in favor of hostile governments.”
The verdicts come amid a series of death sentences and executions involving people detained during nationwide protests that began in late December 2025 and intensified in January.
Human Rights Watch and the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center said in September that Iranian authorities had announced the executions of at least 29 protest detainees between March 18 and the end of August. Five were executed publicly.
The groups said 16 of the 29 had not been accused of killing anyone, with some convicted over alleged acts such as damaging public property, throwing stones or entering government buildings. They said such conduct does not meet the threshold for capital punishment under international human rights law.
The organizations also documented allegations of torture, coerced confessions, denial of access to lawyers of the defendants’ choosing and accelerated judicial proceedings. In some protest-related cases, the period between arrest and execution was little more than five weeks.