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Hakami said Starlink had fundamentally changed that equation. “Our control over cyberspace is no longer based on our domestic network. It is based on Starlink,” Hakami said.

He said officials had warned for more than two years that wider use of the satellite internet service could eventually render existing methods of controlling communications ineffective, but had failed to produce an adequate policy response.

“I sometimes joke that we might as well turn the Ministry of Communications and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace into amusement parks, because they will no longer serve any purpose,” Hakami said.

Iran has repeatedly restricted internet access during periods of unrest. Hakami said the government’s response has grown progressively more restrictive, from blocking a single platform in 2017 to shutting down internet access during the 2019 protests, blocking two major platforms after the 2022 protests and ultimately disconnecting the entire network during the bloody crackdown on nationwide protests in January 2026.

Starlink poses a challenge to that approach because its terminals connect to satellites rather than relying on Iran’s domestic telecommunications network.

Hakami said even measures such as mandatory mobile phone registration could become ineffective with Direct-to-Cell technology, which allows ordinary mobile phones to connect directly to satellites.

“I don’t want to create ‘Starlink-phobia,’ but nothing will remain of our ability to control cyberspace,” he said.

Arrests and seizures
Iranian authorities have intensified their crackdown on Starlink as its use has expanded. Iran’s Economic Security Police said in August that authorities had seized 997 Starlink devices and related equipment and arrested 163 people during the four months through July. Police also impounded 15 vehicles carrying the equipment.

The crackdown has extended to individual users and sellers. Two men from Bukan were sentenced to two years in prison each for buying and selling Starlink equipment.

Iran also criminalized unlicensed satellite internet equipment under legislation adopted in 2025. The law prohibits the use, possession, purchase, sale and import of devices such as Starlink and provides for prison terms and confiscation. It permits the death penalty for specified activities involving the equipment when carried out for espionage or to confront the state and the perpetrator is deemed an enemy force.

Amnesty International said Iran’s Intelligence Ministry announced in March that “hundreds” of Starlink devices had been seized. The rights group said authorities had portrayed the use of alternative satellite connections as potential espionage or collaboration with hostile states and threatened users with prosecution.

Death after Starlink-related arrest
The crackdown has also been linked to a reported death in custody.

Hesam Alaeddin, a 40-year-old man detained in Tehran over his alleged use of Starlink equipment to bypass an internet blackout, died after he was severely beaten by government agents, a source familiar with the case told Iran International in May.

Alaeddin had gone to a hospital to check on his brother, Hamid, who had been shot during protests, when some of his electronic devices were seized, according to the source.

A week later, he went to retrieve the devices and was arrested. Agents took him to his home for questioning and a search, where they severely beat him with various objects and he died, the source said. Authorities concealed his death and continued to treat him as a living detainee before eventually telling his family to collect his body.

Amnesty International later documented Alaeddin’s death but said the precise timing and circumstances remained unclear. The rights group said his arrest was connected to an investigation involving his brother and alleged possession of a Starlink device.

Despite the enforcement campaign, Hakami said Starlink had already reached a significant level of use in Iran and questioned whether existing policies could keep pace with the technology.

“Tell me: What policy have we adopted to protect the country against Starlink?” he said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, speaking before leaving New York on Tuesday, rejected suggestions that Tehran had agreed to nuclear concessions, saying Iran’s immediate focus was the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite Trump’s rejection of the Iranian proposal, Araghchi said he had told Qatari mediators that Tehran would wait for an official US response through them.

The reformist newspaper Shargh said Araghchi’s remarks carried an important message: Tehran did not want its return to diplomacy to be interpreted in Washington as a retreat from its nuclear positions.

The dispute is increasingly about whether that diplomatic opening can produce an agreement before pressure gives way to another round of escalation.

An opening, but on whose terms?

President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated on Wednesday that his government was seeking to bring the Islamabad understanding to fruition. He did not comment directly on Trump’s rejection of Iran’s proposal.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, meanwhile, responded sharply to Trump’s recent statements, warning that Iran would retaliate against further military action.

“In a region where we do not sell oil, no one will sell oil, and if our security is not ensured, no infrastructure will be safe,” he said.

“The main issue in the coming days will not be whether Iran and the United States are talking to each other, but whether they can move from exchanging messages to an implementable formula,” Shargh wrote.

It said a US response meeting at least some of Tehran’s conditions could lead to more serious negotiations, while failure to find such a formula would return the dispute to “a logic of pressure and confrontation.”

Etemad, another reformist daily, raised a different concern: that the Strait of Hormuz could lose value as an Iranian bargaining tool the longer the confrontation continues.

It argued that if the blockade, restrictions on Iranian oil exports and pressure on Iran’s commercial networks become entrenched, Washington could increasingly rely on economic pressure rather than further large-scale military action.

Former Iranian diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi made a similar argument in Shargh, saying Iranian officials should recognize that “diplomacy is an arena of give-and-take” rather than expect progress while offering almost no concessions.

Trump’s rejection of Tehran’s proposal, he argued, showed that the dispute was increasingly about “who sets the negotiating ground and who will be forced to put more concessions on the table to get out of pressure.”

If diplomacy fails

Hardline voices have pushed in the opposite direction, warning officials against interpreting continued diplomacy as evidence that Iran should compromise.

Political analyst Mehdi Kharatian rejected arguments that the Strait of Hormuz was losing its effectiveness as leverage.

“Do not be deceived by those who these days are flooding you with false and biased reports about the ineffectiveness of oil and the Strait,” he wrote, accusing such voices of implicitly advocating surrender to the United States.

He also warned officials against sending what he described as excessive signals of willingness to negotiate, arguing that doing so could encourage Trump to resume military action.

The possibility of another confrontation was also raised by IRGC spokesman Hossein Mahdavi, who told state television that Iran was already at war. He said the United States was unlikely to launch attacks on the same scale or with the same capabilities as before.

But he added: “In the world of war, everything is possible.”

Mahdavi also claimed Iranian forces continued to target vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz and that the United States had recently refrained from responding.

The conservative Khorasan newspaper raised the possibility of Iran launching pre-emptive attacks if negotiations over the nuclear issue fail.

It argued that Iran could resort to a “Plan B” aimed at seizing the initiative before its adversaries complete their intelligence and logistical preparations, potentially triggering a period of intensified warfare before the US midterm elections.

The competing prescriptions emerging in Tehran reflect a debate that has moved beyond whether communication with Washington should continue. What the opposing camps increasingly share is a sense that the current diplomatic opening may not remain open indefinitely.

“But of course, it remains an ongoing, complex and serious police investigation,” he told BBC. “We are working closely with our colleagues in the United States of America.”

Five British men in their 20s were arrested on suspicion of terrorism and explosives offenses after three white vans were found near the base.

Police recovered petrol but found no viable explosives, and all five suspects were later released on bail as the investigation continued.

The base is home to the US Air Force’s 501st Combat Support Wing and also serves as a forward operating site for Air Force Global Strike Command.

Fairford has supported major US military operations, including the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and this year’s US-Israeli strikes on Iran.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently said a foreign state was involved, without naming it, while President Donald Trump said the men had planned "big damage."

Iran has denied involvement. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) said in July that bases used for attacks on Iranian territory could be considered legitimate targets.

Before Burnham’s remarks, British authorities had not publicly linked the incident to Iran, though counter-terrorism police said they were investigating possible foreign state involvement, including whether proxies may have been “knowingly or unknowingly working on behalf of a foreign state.”

Police said Tuesday that petrol, but no improvised explosive device, was found in the vans used by the men. They also defended releasing the suspects on bail after criticism, including from Trump.

The Times reported that one suspect called emergency services shortly before his arrest, with investigators considering whether the incident was surveillance, a “dry run” or an attempt to send a message to the British government.

Britain said in January that its services had tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots over the previous year targeting dissidents, journalists and members of the Jewish community.

In June, 24 Western governments accused Iran’s IRGC intelligence apparatus, the Quds Force and Iran’s intelligence ministry of plotting attacks in Europe, North America and Australia, including against Iranian dissidents and Jewish and Israeli interests.

Informed sources described the section known as “Alef-Ta” as a place used for interrogations, holding prisoners before execution and, in some cases, applying additional pressure.

“Some prisoners put their faces close to the gap beneath the cell door so they can breathe,” one informed source said.

The ward holds some political prisoners alongside people accused of violent crimes and a number of clerics. Alireza Sepahi, a January protest detainee sentenced to death in the case known as the Alikhani case, has also been transferred there.

The Alikhani Square case stems from anti-government protests in Isfahan on January 8, during which authorities said four members of the security forces were killed.

Twelve protesters were sentenced to death, drawing concerns from rights groups and UN experts over due process and fair-trial standards. At least five had been executed by August, including Abolfazl Sepahi and Amirhossein Safari, who were publicly hanged in Alikhani Square on July 28.

Windowless cells

The section consists of rooms originally designed for solitary confinement, with each cell measuring about eight square meters.

The cells have no windows or adequate airflow and rely on a single ventilation fan that is sometimes switched off. Despite being designed for one person, several prisoners are sometimes held in the same cell, leaving insufficient room to sleep normally.

Prisoners receive two dirty blankets, while a shower and toilet without a separating door or wall occupy a significant portion of each cell. Using water further increases humidity inside the enclosed space.

Access to fresh air can be limited to about 15 minutes once a week. Prisoners are blindfolded and taken to the roof, where only the sky is visible.

Lights inside the cells remain on continuously. With no windows or clocks, prisoners can struggle to distinguish day from night. The central sewage system, which operates at around 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., can become one of the few indications of time.

Prisoners also have no access to phones, television, a prison shop or facilities for heating food. Sources said poor-quality food and the inability to reheat it have led to repeated cases of food poisoning.

'Cables and metal rods’

Prisoners can be removed from their cells for interrogation several times over a 24-hour period, sources said.

Sources described prisoners being beaten with cables and metal rods during interrogation and returning to their cells with injuries to their legs, mouths and teeth. Iran International also received accounts of interrogators pulling out prisoners’ fingernails.

Iran International reported on September 9, citing a judicial document, that 18 prisoners held at Dastgerd face charges connected to unrest and a fire in April that could carry the death penalty.

The response was reportedly delivered through Qatar and has been described as US “feedback” rather than acceptance or rejection of the Iranian plan.

Hardline voices have portrayed Washington’s position as evidence that further diplomacy is futile, while more pragmatic commentators argue that the fact the US responded at all shows negotiations remain alive.

President Donald Trump had publicly dismissed Iran’s proposal as insufficient. Iranian diplomats said reopening the Strait and lifting the naval blockade were discussed in indirect talks mediated by Qatar.

The dispute in Tehran is increasingly about what it should do next.

Jame Jam, affiliated with state television, published an op-ed Wednesday by hardliner Abbas Salimi-Namin titled “America’s Fear of Admitting Defeat Against Iran.”

Salimi-Namin argued that Washington’s resistance to the seven-point plan, rooted in the earlier Islamabad talks, reflected the White House’s unwillingness to acknowledge that framework as a strategic setback.

US policymakers, he wrote, still cling to the prospect of delivering a “crippling blow” to Iran and fear the domestic political cost of acknowledging failure more than continued escalation.

Kayhan went considerably further.

Editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari portrayed US demands for verifiable nuclear concessions as evidence that Washington never intended to negotiate in good faith.

He argued that linking freer navigation through the Strait to nuclear concessions was an attempt to strip Iran of its principal leverage while maintaining US economic and military pressure.

Kayhan criticized what it described as the Foreign Ministry’s excessive “patience” and called for non-attributable maritime interdictions, deployment of coastal anti-ship batteries and expanded targeting of Western-escorted vessels.

Global energy markets, it argued, must face an “unbearable cost” before Washington lifts its blockade.

The moderate daily Sharq offered an almost opposite prescription.

In a commentary, Ahmad Zeidabadi argued that despite the rigidity of the US response, Washington’s decision to send detailed feedback through Qatar showed that a diplomatic off-ramp remained open.

He urged the government to preserve the Qatari channel and proposed a two-stage approach under which Iran could offer targeted technical assurances, including temporary IAEA monitoring protocols, in return for an immediate, phased easing of restrictions on commercial transit under the Islamabad memorandum.

Zeidabadi rejected calls for military escalation, warning that abandoning shuttle diplomacy as restrictions on Iranian aviation and banking intensify would push the country towards deeper economic and civilian isolation.

The contrasting reactions show how Washington’s response has shifted the argument in Tehran from whether diplomacy should continue to what price Iran should be prepared to pay for it.

Jame Jam occupies a space somewhere between the positions represented by Kayhan and Sharq: deeply skeptical of Washington’s intentions, but portraying the impasse as a product of US reluctance to acknowledge Iran’s leverage rather than as grounds for immediately abandoning negotiations.

With an actual US response now before Tehran, those competing interpretations are no longer arguments about a hypothetical deal. They are becoming arguments over how Iran should answer.