Explosion heard near Iran’s Qeshm Island - state media

Flight-monitoring data from Flightradar24 indicate that US aviation sanctions have reduced Iran’s international flights by about half in one week. Almost all of Iran’s international flights over the past month have been operated by Iranian airlines, as foreign carriers have largely stopped flying to the country.

The latest restrictions reach beyond Iranian airlines themselves. Airports, fuel suppliers, ground handlers, ticket sellers and other companies providing services to sanctioned carriers can risk US penalties, giving businesses in third countries an incentive to stop handling Iranian flights.

Iranian-operated flights to the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Georgia and Azerbaijan have been suspended or sharply restricted, while Iranian carriers remain barred from Iraqi airports despite a limited resumption of services by Iraq’s national airline. Flights to China and Russia continue, while services to several other destinations, including Turkey and Afghanistan, have remained available.

For passengers trying to reach countries no longer served directly, that increasingly means flying through cities such as Istanbul, Islamabad, Kabul, Beijing, Dushanbe, Yerevan or Moscow before continuing to their destinations.

The detours can add hours or even days to journeys and substantially increase costs.

Turkey has become one of the most important remaining gateways. Iran Air flights between Tehran and Istanbul were still operating Monday, according to flight-tracking data, although Mahan Air has already suspended its Turkey services and Turkish Airlines has no Iran flights scheduled before March 2027.

Turkey Today reported Monday, citing two sources, that the remaining Iranian flights to Turkey were expected to be suspended in early October. No formal announcement of a complete suspension has yet been made.

Longer routes, higher costs

Mahan, a 42-year-old Iranian who has lived and worked in the United Arab Emirates for years and regularly travels to Tehran to visit her elderly mother, said her latest return journey to Dubai showed how quickly the restrictions were changing ordinary travel.

With direct options unavailable, she flew from Iran to Armenia on Sunday, spent the night at a hotel in Yerevan and continued to Dubai the following day.

Including the hotel and transportation in Armenia, she said the journey cost almost three times what she previously paid to travel between Iran and the UAE.

The trip was also more stressful, she said, because the hotel arranged for her was a considerable distance from the airport.

Other passengers she encountered had taken an even more difficult route. They told her they had traveled overland from Iran to the Armenian border and then continued roughly 400 kilometers by bus to Yerevan.

They described carrying luggage through crowded border areas and struggling to find transportation for the long journey from the crossing to the Armenian capital.

Najaf becomes test case

Iraq has emerged as one of the clearest examples of the complications created by Washington’s aviation pressure because of the volume of religious and family travel between the two countries.

Baghdad airport stopped accepting flights operated by Iranian airlines on September 22. Iranian aviation authorities initially sought to redirect some Baghdad-bound services to Najaf, one of Shiite Islam’s most important pilgrimage centers.

Najaf airport then suspended all flights to and from Iran on September 25, cutting off the alternative route and affecting large numbers of Iranian pilgrims traveling to Najaf and nearby Karbala.

The Iraqi government subsequently opened direct talks with Washington for exemptions from US Treasury measures. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s office said it was seeking exemptions allowing travel for medical treatment, education, religious visits and other civilian purposes.

Reuters reported Monday that the Trump administration was preparing a one-month waiver allowing Iraqi Airways to carry Shia pilgrims between Najaf and Iran, with a more permanent exemption potentially following. The proposed waiver applies specifically to the Iraqi national carrier.

Iraq’s state news agency later reported that Iraqi Airways had resumed flights between Najaf and Iranian airports.

Iran, however, disputed reports that Iran-Najaf flights had broadly resumed. Civil Aviation Organization spokesman Majid Akhavan said Tehran had received no official communication authorizing a resumption and said Iranian airlines remained unable to restart the route.

The two accounts refer to different operators: the Iraqi announcement concerned Iraqi Airways, while the Iranian statement addressed the ability of Iranian carriers to return to Najaf. Iraqi media also reported Monday that the ban on Iranian airlines remained in force even as Iraqi Airways resumed flights to Iranian airports.

The distinction gives Baghdad a way to restore at least some pilgrimage traffic without immediately reopening its airports to sanctioned Iranian carriers.

The disruption had already created political pressure in Iraq. Demonstrations were held in Baghdad and Najaf against the suspension, while Iranian officials warned that restrictions on air links could affect the broader relationship between the two neighbors.

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security Committee, pointed to Iraq’s reliance on Iranian electricity and gas and warned that policies obstructing bilateral ties could have consequences in other areas.

Iranian website Rouydad24 described the flight dispute as a test of relations between Tehran and Baghdad, noting Iran’s role in Iraq’s energy supplies and its past support in the fight against Islamic State.

Tehran warns its neighbors

The aviation restrictions have also produced increasingly sharp warnings from Iranian political figures toward governments cooperating with Washington.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned regional countries last week that if Iranian aircraft were prevented from flying, airports elsewhere in the region could also be unable to operate.

The council’s secretariat later sought to distance itself from interpretations that Iran was threatening military attacks on regional airports, saying military retaliation over the flight restrictions was not on the agenda.

Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, nevertheless issued a separate warning Friday.

“Alignment with America in implementing hostile policies will remain in the memory of the Iranian people,” Mokhber wrote on X.

“Flights in the region are either free for everyone or for no one,” he added. “If Iran cannot fly or receive airport services, no country in the region will have this possibility either.”

The remarks prompted support from some hardline social-media users, including calls for Tehran to impose a no-fly zone over the Persian Gulf or threaten airlines serving neighboring countries.

Others criticized the approach. Amir Abbasi, an X user, compared the aviation warnings with previous Iranian threats to prevent other countries from exporting oil if Tehran was unable to do so.

“Perhaps these threats have a domestic use, but a crisis cannot be solved with slogans,” he wrote.

Mizan, the judiciary’s news agency, said a final ruling by the Special Court of Clergy’s appeals court convicted Rasaei of “publishing falsehoods with intent to harm others.” He was transferred on September 27 to Evin’s ward for clerics to serve the sentence, Mizan said.

The case dates to early 2024, when Rasaei was not an MP but editor-in-chief of the hardline weekly 9 Dey. Parliament’s legal representative referred a complaint to prosecutors on February 3, 2024, over an article alleging “manipulation by Ghalibaf in parliamentary documents.”

The case also involved a video posted on Rasaei’s Telegram channel in which he described Ghalibaf as a “parliamentary dictator.” Rasaei was acquitted over that remark but convicted over the allegation concerning parliamentary documents.

Rasaei said the headline was based on remarks by another lawmaker, but the court rejected that defense, ruling that the alleged manipulation of parliamentary documents had not been established.

The court also ordered Rasaei to publish a correction on the front page of 9 Dey using the same typeface and headline size, although the weekly has not been published for the past two years.

Fars reported that Rasaei was asked during the proceedings to apologize over the article but refused, saying he saw no reason to apologize and stood by his position.

Rasaei called the ruling “non-legal and political” in parliament but said he would comply because it was a legal judgment. He also argued that the 10-month term was excessive, saying a first-time offender convicted of publishing falsehoods should have received the minimum sentence of 91 days.

Because Rasaei is a cleric, the case was handled by the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Clergy and later the Special Court of Clergy.

Rasaei, now a Tehran lawmaker, has long been identified with the Islamic Republic’s ultraconservative wing and was formerly a member of the Paydari Front. He has said he left the party more than a decade ago because of disagreements with members of its central council, while acknowledging continued ideological closeness to it.

His conflict with Ghalibaf reflects a broader struggle within Iran’s conservative establishment. Rasaei and other ultraconservative lawmakers have repeatedly challenged Ghalibaf over his control of parliament and his role in negotiations with Washington, accusing him of crossing leadership red lines and making excessive concessions.

That confrontation intensified after Iran’s agreement with the United States. Rasaei accused Ghalibaf of backing an arrangement that prevented Tehran from retaliating for the killing of Ali Khamenei and said the deal could pave the way for a “bloodless coup.” Other Paydari-aligned and ultraconservative lawmakers have mounted similar attacks on the speaker.

Rasaei has simultaneously been a persistent opponent of President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s reformist factions. He has attacked Pezeshkian over negotiations with the United States, questioned his political fitness and previously compared him to Abolhassan Banisadr, Iran’s first president, who was removed from office by parliament in 1981.

His politics therefore place him in conflict both with reformists and with more negotiation-minded conservative rivals such as Ghalibaf, highlighting divisions within the establishment over diplomacy with Washington, the use of military leverage and control of parliament.

In a commentary titled Reformists' Game in Trump's Sanctions Pressure Puzzle, Fars said Washington looks for political and social effects inside Iran whenever it applies economic, military or diplomatic pressure, and accused reformists of providing precisely the response US policymakers hope to see.

It argued that calls for negotiations under pressure, suggestions that Iran should suspend nuclear activities, support for what some reformists have termed an “honorable peace,” and doubts about the usefulness of measures such as closing the Strait of Hormuz all send Washington the message that pressure is working.

“When the other side sees that external pressure is also turning into a domestic political demand for retreat and concessions, it naturally has greater motivation to maintain and even intensify that pressure,” the commentary said.

Fars drew a distinction between the military and economic fronts, arguing that direct US military action had encountered Iranian resistance and failed to achieve its objectives, while Washington continued to see sanctions and economic pressure as effective because their impact was quickly reflected in domestic calls for compromise.

The outlet said this created a cycle in which each new US measure was reinforced by political arguments inside Iran that the country had little choice but to negotiate or relinquish some of its leverage. Iranian society and the economy ultimately bear the cost of that cycle, it said.

Fars also accused reformists of constructing a “false dichotomy” between war and peace by presenting themselves as supporters of negotiations while portraying their opponents as advocates of violent confrontation. It argued that negotiations were only one tool of foreign policy and invoked the establishment's longstanding formulation that diplomacy and the “field” — a term commonly used for military and regional power — should complement one another.

The commentary comes amid an increasingly public dispute over the scope of negotiations with Washington.

IRGC-affiliated outlets and hardline lawmakers have criticized Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's contact with US envoy Steve Witkoff in New York, questioning whether he was authorized to hold direct discussions.

At the same time, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a military adviser to Iran's supreme leader, has said the government has been given room to pursue negotiations.

The dispute therefore extends beyond whether Tehran should negotiate at all, focusing increasingly on how talks should be conducted, what concessions Iran can offer and whether military, nuclear and maritime leverage should be maintained alongside diplomacy.

Mediators are expected to hold separate talks with the United States and Iran on Monday or Tuesday over an amended version of a seven-day proposal Tehran presented on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, sources briefed on the negotiations told Reuters.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Qatari mediators remained in the United States for the discussions, an official briefed on the negotiations said.

The diplomatic effort comes with divisions visible inside Iran over negotiations and the country’s nuclear policy, while military officials continue to warn about another confrontation with Washington.

Diplomacy meets resistance at home

A group of serving and former Iranian officials called Monday for an immediate halt to cooperation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and withdrawal from the pact “as soon as possible.”

“Continued membership in this treaty is not in the country’s interest, and we call for withdrawal from it as a strategic necessity,” the signatories said.

Former intelligence minister Heydar Moslehi and other former officials from the administrations of Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad signed the statement alongside serving lawmakers.

Hardline newspaper Kayhan also criticized Iran’s diplomatic approach, saying officials had shown excessive enthusiasm for negotiations during President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to New York and sent Washington “a signal of weakness.”

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, meanwhile, emphasized Iran’s military position, describing the country as the “world’s top power” according to what he called “divine calculations” and saying enemy forces had been pushed back from waters near Iran.

Military pressure centers on Hormuz

Iranian officials continued to point to the Strait of Hormuz in their warnings to Washington.

“We are acting with authority in the northern Arabian Sea and east of the Strait of Hormuz, and we will not let anyone pass. On the other side, our IRGC brothers are also standing firm,” army deputy coordinator Habibollah Sayyari said.

Lawmaker Salar Velayatmadar said Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab if the United States launched another attack.

Rial falls under trade and oil pressure

The economic backdrop to the negotiations has also deteriorated, with the US dollar listed at 2.45 million rials on Iran’s open market Monday.

Iranian businesses are facing higher costs in trade with neighboring Iraq as banks tighten checks and anti-money-laundering requirements, head of the Iran-Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce, said.

The main danger was not a complete halt in trade but a gradual loss of Iran’s share of the Iraqi market, Jahangbakhsh Sanjabi Shirazi, said.

Washington is also seeking to restrict Iran’s oil income more. Iran could have “nothing left to trade for anything” within two weeks after completing its remaining oil deliveries to China, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Sunday.

About 15 million barrels remained out for delivery, Bessent estimated.

Pressure on Iranian financial operations extends into Europe. Italy’s central bank told Iran International on Monday that the Rome branch of Iran’s Bank Sepah has remained under special administration since October 2025 following the European Union’s adoption of restrictive measures against Iran.

The weakening rial and growing obstacles to trade are adding to Iran’s economic pressure, while warnings over Hormuz and recent military exchanges keep the risk of renewed conflict hanging over the country and the region.

Four people appeared on IRIB’s Be Vaght-e-Iran (Iran Time) program, with three speaking during an exchange on how Abu Dhabi has adapted its oil shipments to Iran’s approach to the strategic waterway.

One participant suggested Iran could target the smaller shuttle vessels moving through the strait or strike their point of origin. Another rejected that approach as insufficient.

“It makes no sense to just hit these vessels. That is not an adequate response to this change in logic,” he said.

A third participant laid out the central argument: Abu Dhabi has sought to change the economics behind Iran’s maritime leverage rather than directly challenge its military capabilities.

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“The UAE has attacked the logic of closing the Strait of Hormuz,” he said.

Cheap ships change the calculation

Iran’s strategy, according to the panel, had relied partly on the vulnerability of very large crude carriers, or VLCCs, whose high value meant the prospect of an Iranian strike could make voyages commercially prohibitive as insurers withdrew coverage.

The UAE has sought to remove that pressure by creating a state-backed logistics chain and using smaller, cheaper vessels that can be readily replaced.

“It is defining a battlefield that has been designed to its advantage,” the commentator said. “It says: fight me here. You hit these small ones, and I keep replacing them.”

Abu Dhabi is also using ageing VLCCs that would otherwise be destined for scrapping because they no longer meet environmental or safety standards required at many ports, according to the discussion.

The ships can be worth considerably less than the oil they carry, reducing the economic loss if Iran damages them.

The broadcast also described a pattern in Iranian operations that the UAE could anticipate. Iranian forces radio vessels, fire warning shots if they continue and then target the bridge rather than immediately sinking the ship, giving crews around 30 to 40 minutes to evacuate.

Abu Dhabi has responded by positioning tugboats to recover damaged vessels and tow them to Sohar in Oman, where their cargo can still be unloaded, the main contributor said.

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“The tugboat comes and attaches itself right there to the ship that has been hit,” he said. “They tow it to Sohar and unload it there on the Omani coast.”

The result, he argued, is that Iran can damage a vessel without preventing its oil from reaching port.

Iran’s military logic questioned

Simply striking greater numbers of replaceable vessels would not restore Iran’s leverage, the discussion suggested.

“They have attacked our military logic,” the main contributor said. “You have to hit this logic.”

The participant who opened the exchange said Iran’s problem was not a lack of political will, but its continued reliance on an approach that was no longer producing the intended outcome.

“There really is the political will to confront them. But because we are confronting them within the previous framework, we are not getting the result we want,” he said.

The main contributor described the problem as a “cognitive error.”

Another researcher and Middle East commentator Mustafa Najafi separately accused the UAE on X of spending weeks trying to reduce Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and seeking to move oil belonging to other countries through the waterway.

Najafi also accused Abu Dhabi of obstructing an Iran-Oman agreement on managing the strait and lobbying in the United States and Israel for attacks on Iran.

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“After Israel, no actor dreams of weakening and disintegrating Iran as much as the UAE does,” Najafi wrote, arguing that Tehran should move beyond a solely political and diplomatic response.

The remarks reflect concern among Iranian pro-system experts that the UAE is seeking not to overcome Iran’s military power in the Strait of Hormuz, but to diminish the strategic leverage that power is intended to provide.