Yemen says decision made to retake Sanaa from Iran-aligned Houthis - Al Jazeera

Aida Heydari, whose fiancé Abolfazl Soleimani Alamouti was killed on January 9, died on September 3, about eight months after his death. The couple had planned to marry this month, according to the family.

Abolfazl was killed by gunfire during demonstrations in Zibashahr, Qazvin province.

Danial Karimi, the father of 19-year-old Amir-Mohammad Karimi, also died by suicide on September 6. His son, a former member of Iran’s national junior taekwondo team, was shot dead during protests in Marvdasht on January 9.

The 19-year-old was later buried in the nearby village of Joonjan.

Karimi’s death prompted reactions from opposition figures and Iranians on social media. The office of Reza Pahlavi said seeking justice for Amir-Mohammad, his father and others killed in the protests was a “national and collective duty.”

“Let us stand by the families seeking justice and, with care and empathy, be a refuge and support for one another,” his office said.

In an earlier case, Farahnaz “Atefeh” Roozfarah, the mother of slain protester Saman Ebrahimpour, died by suicide on July 16 after months of mourning. The 38-year-old was buried in Shaft, Gilan province.

The suicides come amid mounting reports of severe psychological distress among relatives of protesters killed during the January uprising.

Maryam Shokrani, a journalist based in Iran, recently reported that Tahereh Jangjoo, the mother of slain protester Raha Bohloulipour, had developed severe depression and had survived at least one suicide attempt following her daughter’s death.

Documents reviewed by Iran International show more than 36,500 people were killed in a systematic crackdown on the January protests.

If you or someone you know is struggling with suicidal thoughts, seek help from a trusted medical professional or crisis service. In Iran, the Social Emergency hotline can be reached at 123. In the United States, the Suicide and Crisis Lifeline can be reached at 988.

Iraq’s Foreign Ministry said Monday it was following the attack by “a group of Iranian citizens” with “utmost concern” and was coordinating with Iranian authorities to investigate the incident. Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein ordered the Iraqi embassy in Tehran to examine the circumstances surrounding the violence.

Iranian judicial authorities said two people involved in the confrontation had been identified, while investigations were continuing to identify others.

Baghdad Today, citing its correspondent in Semnan, reported that more than 150 people attacked accommodation used by Iraqi students at Semnan University, entered the compound and beat students, leaving several seriously injured.

The outlet said some Iraqi students remained inside the building as the crowd prevented them from leaving. Police arrived and sought to stop the violence but made no arrests, according to the report.

Videos circulating on social media showed disturbances inside the residence and a crowd gathered outside.

Conflicting accounts of what triggered violence

Iranian news website Rouydad24 said some local reports claimed the confrontation began after Iranian students alleged that several Iraqi students, described in those accounts as affiliated with Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, or Hashd al-Shaabi, had forcibly taken an Iranian woman into the residence.

Social media users also alleged that several Iraqi students had sexually assaulted an Iranian female student, triggering the attack on their accommodation.

No official source has confirmed the allegation, and neither Iranian nor Iraqi authorities have said that sexual assault caused the confrontation.

Semnan University said the incident occurred outside a privately operated residence housing international students and that authorities were investigating its origin.

“There was no confrontation or clash between Iranian students and international students in this incident,” the university said.

Iraq’s ambassador to Tehran, Yasser Abdulzahra, described the episode as a “misunderstanding and verbal altercation” involving Iraqi students that escalated into an assault, according to Iraq’s state news agency.

He said an embassy delegation was sent to the university and stressed that Baghdad would not tolerate attacks on Iraqi students. He also urged Iraqi students to respect Iranian social norms and demonstrate “discipline, academic awareness and mutual respect.”

The Iraqi Foreign Ministry welcomed measures taken by Iranian authorities to protect the students and transport them safely to their university for examinations, but called for legal action against the attackers and safeguards to prevent similar incidents.

Iranian judiciary identifies two people

Mohammad Sadegh Akbari, chief justice of Semnan province, said two people involved in the confrontation had been identified and summoned by police.

He described the incident as a clash between “a number of citizens and some Iraqi students” and said judicial and law enforcement authorities were continuing their investigation.

Akbari also accused what he called “hostile media” of publishing accounts inconsistent with preliminary findings but did not say which claims he was disputing.

The incident comes amid broader debate over the growing number of foreign students in Iran. Science Minister Hossein Simayi Sarraf said in August that more than 50,000 Iraqis were studying at Iranian institutions, more than 95% of them at postgraduate level.

On Saturday evening, Semnan’s Friday prayers leader, Morteza Motiei, said the presence of large numbers of foreign students in the province should not be treated solely as an academic matter and called for a “cultural framework” to accompany it.

He said economic and social issues associated with foreign students had created challenges across Semnan province and required a broader approach.

In 2024, the University of Tehran announced an increase in the admission of members of Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq, without the need for entrance exams.

The influx of the Hashd al-Shaabi members into Iranian universities, particularly the University of Tehran where admission for Iraqis has doubled, is part of a broader plan, the University’s president said at the time.

Tensions over Iraqi students have surfaced before. In October 2025, students and residents in Hamadan protested after an Iraqi student was accused of harassing a female student at Bu-Ali Sina University. Protesters also complained about students they said were affiliated with Hashd al-Shaabi.

Iranian security forces later prevented another planned gathering, while Hamadan prosecutors described the harassment allegation as unproven and warned protesters against unauthorized demonstrations.

Afkar-e Naft, a Telegram channel which reports on issues affecting permanent oil industry employees, said the demonstrations were part of protests held every Monday.

Images published by the channel showed workers at several offshore installations holding placards calling for the removal of salary caps, full payment of wages and benefits, fairer compensation and changes to the tax system for offshore employees.

“Full payment of wages and benefits,” read one placard, while another said, “Fair pay is our right, not an extra privilege.”

Other signs called for an overhaul of the wage system for operational oil workers and the removal of what protesters described as “unfair restrictions” on salary payments.

1 / 5

100%

1 / 5

Several workers also highlighted the conditions under which oil production has continued during the war. One placard read, “Uninterrupted production in a war zone,” while another referred to “uninterrupted production in border areas.”

The protesters are also seeking payment of outstanding compensation under Article 10 of the law governing the duties and powers of Iran’s Oil Ministry.

The so-called Article 10 back pay refers to accumulated payments employees say they are owed following implementation of provisions governing compensation and employment conditions for Oil Ministry personnel.

The protests come as Iran’s economy faces mounting pressure from the regional war and a US maritime blockade that was reimposed in mid-July. Satellite imagery reviewed by Iran International shows a sharp decline in visible vessel activity at Shahid Rajaee and Imam Khomeini, two of the country’s most important commercial ports, since the blockade resumed.

• 

  Satellite images show Iran’s key ports falling quiet under US blockade

The impact has been particularly severe on Iran’s oil trade, a crucial source of government revenue and foreign currency. Kpler tanker-tracking data reviewed by Iran International showed Iranian crude loadings averaging about 287,000 barrels per day in August through Aug. 21, compared with roughly 2 million barrels per day before the war — a fall of about 85%.

Washington has simultaneously intensified its financial campaign against Tehran. On Aug. 24, the US Treasury launched Operation Economic Outcast, dubbed an “Economic D-Day,” saying it aimed to sever Iran’s remaining financial and commercial connections and increase the risks for foreign banks and companies doing business with Tehran. The campaign has since targeted financial channels in countries including the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye.

The pressure has coincided with a steep deterioration in household purchasing power. Iran’s rial has fallen to a record low of about 2.2 million to the US dollar this month, compared with roughly 958,000 a year earlier.

Official figures for July showed average annual inflation at around 62%, year-on-year inflation at 82% and food inflation at 134%, adding to the pressure on wages and living standards.

The European Union has welcomed additional economic pressure on Tehran, including through the US-led Operation Economic Outcast, but has not formally endorsed every element of Washington’s strategy.

Yet the distinction over formal alignment conceals a more consequential reality: since the United States withdrew from the nuclear agreement in 2018, Europe has increasingly behaved as Washington’s junior partner on Iran.

This alignment predates the current war. Since the late 2000s, Europe has increasingly substituted declaratory diplomacy for autonomous action, defending multilateralism and dialogue while adapting in practice to US policy.

This gap became particularly evident after Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of US sanctions on Iran in 2018: despite European opposition, the blocking statute and INSTEX failed to sustain meaningful trade, as almost every major European company abandoned Iran to preserve access to the US market.

This choice was economically rational. The US market and financial system are vastly more important to European companies than Iran. The international dominance of the dollar enables Washington to impose sanctions with effects far beyond US territory.

European banks, insurers, shipping companies and industrial groups remain highly exposed to US regulators and financial markets. Whatever the official position of their governments, companies have overwhelmingly prioritized continued access to the United States over commercial opportunities in Iran.

The weakness of direct EU-Iran trade should not obscure Europe’s remaining economic significance. According to the European Commission, trade in goods between the EU and Iran amounted to €3.7 billion in 2025, comprising €2.97 billion in EU exports to Iran and €760 million in imports from Iran.

This left the EU a significant trading partner for Iran, even though Iran accounted for only around 0.1 percent of EU exports.

These figures also underestimate indirect commercial links. European products reach Iran through Türkiye and, above all, the United Arab Emirates, which serves as a crucial platform for re-exports.

Stronger US pressure on Ankara, Dubai-based traders, logistics companies and regional banks would therefore affect European-origin goods even when European firms have no direct contractual relationship with an Iranian buyer.

“Economic D-Day” is not directed solely against Iran: it is designed to force Iran’s remaining commercial intermediaries to choose between Tehran and access to the US financial system.

Europe’s gradual alignment also has a political and diplomatic dimension. In August 2025, following unsuccessful talks with Tehran, France, Germany and the United Kingdom triggered the UN “snapback” mechanism with US support.

UN sanctions were restored on September 28, prompting the EU to reimpose its own nuclear-related economic and financial restrictions the following day.
The EU formally reimposed those measures on September 29.

After the deadly repression of the January 2026 protests, the EU went further, formally designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization in February and imposing additional sanctions targeting human rights violations, Iran’s missile and drone programs, and Iranian operations on European soil.

This convergence has since extended to the multilateral arena. In September 2026, the United States and the E3 began pressing for an International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors resolution reporting Iran to the UN Security Council for the first time in 20 years.

The push has further deepened the confrontation over inspections: IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said on September 7 that Tehran had told the agency it would not cooperate until there was progress in broader political negotiations, while Iran warned it would take reciprocal action if the resolution was adopted.

Grossi said the agency was receiving no information and had been told Iran would not cooperate without progress in broader political negotiations.

The proposed referral would mark a significant escalation in the nuclear standoff and further narrow the space for Europe’s long-standing ambition to pursue a third way between Washington and Tehran.

The war launched by the United States and Israel on February 28, 2026 initially generated considerable European frustration. European leaders had not been consulted or even properly warned by their principal ally, despite their earlier coordination with Washington over the snapback process.

They called for restraint and respect for international law while expressing concern about the regional and economic consequences of the offensive.

But this dissatisfaction did not produce an autonomous European strategy. Europe lacked the military capabilities, economic leverage and political unity needed to shape the conflict.

The decisive talks involved Washington, Tehran and regional intermediaries such as Pakistan, Oman and Qatar. European governments remained largely peripheral, even as they condemned Iranian attacks against neighboring countries and commercial vessels.

The current hardening of the European position should therefore also be understood in the context of transatlantic relations and the war in Ukraine. For European leaders, preserving US support for Ukraine and preventing a strategic rapprochement between Washington and Moscow remain overriding priorities.

Iran offers them a potential means of demonstrating their usefulness to the Trump administration. By cooperating with Washington on sanctions, nuclear restrictions and regional security, Europeans hope to facilitate dialogue with an administration whose disengagement from Ukraine is their greatest strategic fear.

This calculation resembles the strategy adopted by several European governments at the beginning of Trump’s second presidency: concede or cooperate on secondary issues to preserve US engagement on the issue considered existential for European security. Iran is thus treated partly as a bargaining instrument within the transatlantic relationship.

This does not mean that European and US objectives are identical. Most European governments remain wary of regime-change strategies, uncontrolled military escalation and the humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions.

They continue to emphasize diplomacy and international law and have not formally subscribed to Washington’s campaign of total isolation. The Trump administration is consequently overstating Europe’s political endorsement.

Yet the practical difference is narrower than European rhetoric suggests. Europe’s declaratory autonomy cannot compensate for its financial dependence, limited military capabilities and reliance on the United States for its own security.

Nor can European governments fully control the commercial decisions of private companies, which overwhelmingly prioritize access to the US market and the dollar-based financial system over limited opportunities in Iran.

Washington may therefore be exaggerating when it says that Europe has joined “Economic D-Day.” But since 2018, the structural alignment it describes has become increasingly difficult to deny.

The latest US strikes on three Iranian oil tankers mark a significant escalation in Washington’s economic campaign against Tehran, moving beyond sanctions and blockade to the physical destruction of vessels used to export Iranian oil.

US forces on September 5 disabled two tankers near Kharg Island and Jask and destroyed a third in the Gulf of Oman, according to US Central Command, which described the vessels as part of a “multibillion-dollar shadow network” supporting the IRGC and its regional partners.

The strikes followed Iranian ballistic missile attacks on US naval forces that caused no American casualties. CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper warned Washington was prepared to impose an “even higher economic cost” on Tehran.

The significance of the strikes lies less in the loss of three ships than in the change in tactics. Washington has spent years trying to make Iranian oil harder to sell through sanctions, restrictions on financial transactions and pressure on buyers and shipping networks. Since mid-July, the US naval blockade has added a physical barrier.

Now, the vessels themselves are becoming targets.

From financial to physical risk

The shift comes as Iran’s oil exports are already under severe pressure.

Ship-tracking data indicated Iranian crude loadings fell to roughly 220,000–255,000 barrels per day in August, from about 740,000 bpd in July and peaks close to 2 million bpd before the conflict.

For weeks, no meaningful Iranian crude cargoes were able to reach China through the Strait of Hormuz, leaving more oil in floating storage inside the Persian Gulf.

Iran has spent years building a shadow shipping network capable of operating around Western sanctions, relying on opaque ownership structures, reflagging, manipulation of vessel-tracking systems and ship-to-ship transfers to move crude, particularly to China.

Those methods are useful when the main challenge is avoiding financial sanctions or detection. They offer far less protection if the vessels themselves become military targets.

Sanctions forced Iran to find ships willing to evade Washington. The new strategy may force it to find ships and crews willing to risk being attacked.

That could make the shadow fleet more expensive and difficult to operate. Many of its tankers are aging vessels already working outside conventional Western insurance and maritime-service networks.

If owners, crews and operators come to regard Iranian-linked voyages as carrying a serious risk of attack, some may demand greater compensation or decide the trade is no longer worthwhile.

Washington cannot, however, simply eliminate the shadow fleet overnight. The network is dispersed and adaptable. Ships can change names, flags and ownership structures, while Tehran can alter loading patterns or move ship-to-ship transfers farther from areas dominated by US forces.

But every vessel lost imposes another cost. Iran must replace it, find another operator willing to accept the risk or leave more crude stranded in storage.

Floating storage offers only temporary relief. Oil held offshore does not generate revenue until it reaches a buyer, and prolonged disruption can eventually force producers to cut output as storage fills.

The question is therefore not whether three tanker strikes can dismantle Iran’s export system. They cannot. It is whether repeated physical losses can gradually undermine the commercial network that has allowed Tehran to keep selling oil despite years of sanctions.

A wider energy battlefield

That strategy carries an obvious risk: once Washington treats Iran’s oil-export system as a military target, Tehran has a stronger incentive to widen the energy battlefield.

Iran has already used attacks and threats against maritime traffic as a means of imposing costs on its adversaries. The Strait of Hormuz remains central to that strategy because of the enormous volumes of oil and liquefied natural gas that normally pass through it.

Further reducing Iranian export revenues could weaken Tehran’s ability to finance the IRGC and allied armed groups while increasing the economic cost of continued confrontation.

But direct attacks on tankers could also reinforce the Iranian leadership’s argument that compromise will not end US pressure and that imposing costs on regional energy flows is one of Tehran’s remaining forms of leverage.

That matters well beyond Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have invested heavily in export routes that partially bypass Hormuz, including Saudi pipelines to the Red Sea and the UAE’s link to Fujairah. But those alternatives cannot fully replace normal flows through the Strait, while Kuwait and Iraq remain particularly dependent on the waterway.

Even without major damage to regional infrastructure, greater insecurity can raise war-risk insurance premiums, freight rates and other costs for commercial operators.

The tanker strikes therefore strengthen Washington’s leverage only if they can impose additional costs on Tehran without triggering a broader contest over the region’s energy infrastructure.

Physical attacks may hurt an Iranian oil-export system that has spent years learning to circumvent sanctions. But they also give Tehran stronger incentives to retaliate against the system through which its neighbors export their own energy.

The strategic gamble for Washington is therefore not simply whether tanker strikes can further squeeze Tehran’s oil revenues. It is whether Iran can be made to bear those costs without deciding that its adversaries’ energy exports should bear them too.