Tehran has intensified efforts to target Iranian government opponents and journalists abroad, as well as Israelis overseas, an official at Israel’s National Security Council told Iran International.
The remarks expand on a public warning issued separately by the National Security Council on Sunday, which described Iran and Iran-backed groups as the principal threat to Israelis abroad.
The official said Iranian operational units had become highly active in planning attacks outside the country.
According to the official, Tehran believes Iranian dissidents and journalists living abroad do not receive comprehensive protection from security agencies in their countries of residence and seeks to exploit those vulnerabilities.
The same Iranian units involved in planning operations against Israelis also work on plans targeting Iranian government opponents and journalists, the official said.
The official identified Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates as high-risk destinations. Several European countries were also assessed as carrying heightened risks.
The official said Tehran was seeking revenge against Israel following the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials in US-Israeli strikes.
Israeli strikes during the war severely damaged Iran’s overseas operational networks, according to the official, who said Tehran began rebuilding them immediately.
Jewish holidays and the anniversary of the October 7 attack were described as particularly sensitive periods during which Iran could seek to carry out operations.
The official said Israel was sharing intelligence and cooperating with security agencies in several countries to identify and disrupt suspected Iranian plans.
Israel has thwarted several operations attributed to Iran, the official added, but many have not been made public for security reasons.
“There’s probably only about 30 million barrels of Iranian crude oil left that China hasn’t bought,” Bessent said. “So that will run out soon, and there will be no problem with China buying because they have no product.”
Bessent described the pressure campaign, dubbed “Operation Economic Outcast,” as the largest effort to isolate a country economically and said Washington intended to “asphyxiate” Iran’s ruling establishment.
“The blockade is working like nothing we’ve ever seen, and the combination - everyone says sanctions don’t work - but I can tell you, blockade and sanctions are one of the most powerful one-two punches in the history of economic isolation,” he said.
Asked about his prediction that the Strait of Hormuz would become irrelevant to the oil industry within two years, Bessent said oil-producing countries around the Persian Gulf were developing “alternative pipeline routes that will no longer entail oil going through the Strait of Hormuz.”
Bessent also rejected the suggestion that Iran controlled the waterway.
“The Iranian chokehold, to the extent they have one - and I can tell you, they do not have one - we are in control of the strait,” he said. “To the extent that they can threaten their neighbors, once we leave, that will not exist anymore.”
Iran’s Economy Ministry has established an “economic war” command center to coordinate and accelerate responses to economic problems caused by the conflict, deputy economy Minister Morteza Zamanian said on Sunday.
He acknowledged that higher energy prices caused by the conflict were affecting Americans but predicted that the shock would end and wage growth would continue.
“This war will end, and those will turn into real wage gains,” Bessent said.
He added that the administration expected the conflict to leave Iran unable to develop a nuclear weapon.
“I think we are going to get to the other side of this Iran conflict with a safer world, with an Iran that cannot have a nuclear weapon,” he said.
The United States imposed a naval blockade in July alongside expanded sanctions aimed at restricting Iran’s oil exports and cutting a key source of government revenue.
Iran’s Economy Ministry has, meanwhile, established an “economic war” command center to coordinate and accelerate responses to economic problems caused by the conflict, Deputy Economy Minister Morteza Zamanian said on Sunday.
The center will initially focus on problems affecting businesses, trade and financing within the ministry’s authority, while using government economic bodies to coordinate responses across agencies, he added.
The apartments are at 3a Palace Green, an exclusive development overlooking Kensington Palace and close to the official London residence of the Prince and Princess of Wales. Both properties include staff accommodation and private roof terraces, according to the report.
One is a five-bedroom duplex covering 3,944 square feet across the sixth and seventh floors. It was purchased for £19 million in 2016 but is now being offered for just under £12 million.
Knight Frank and Sotheby’s International Realty are jointly marketing the apartment. The listing describes it as “an exceptional duplex penthouse with staff accommodation and commanding unrivalled views across Kensington Gardens from one of London’s most prestigious addresses.”
The brochure does not identify its politically sensitive connections but notes: “Due to the property being in receivership, we do not have all of the material information for the property; therefore you should ensure you make all relevant inquiries,” the report said.
The second penthouse occupies the seventh and eighth floors of the same building. It was bought for £16.75 million in 2014 and has also entered receivership.
Land Registry documents show that financial advisory firm Teneo was appointed as its receiver, the report said, adding that the apartment does not appear to have been publicly listed, leaving its asking price unknown.
Several prospective buyers are believed to have viewed the properties amid significant interest, according to The Sunday Times.
The registered owner of both apartments is Iranian banker Ali Ansari, whom the US Treasury sanctioned in July as a “key financier” for Khamenei. Washington said Ansari “oversees a sprawling global network of assets benefiting Iran’s leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and other regime elites.”
Ansari was previously sanctioned by Britain over allegations that he financed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. His British assets were frozen, and he was barred from entering the country. He is understood to deny wrongdoing.
The British government is believed to have authorized the sale of the two apartments after Ansari defaulted on their mortgages, according to The Sunday Times. The private lenders that financed the purchases appointed receivers to recover their money, although the amount originally borrowed is not known.
Any proceeds remaining after the lenders are repaid are expected to be frozen while Ansari remains under sanctions.
Neither Khamenei nor Ansari has been seen by employees at the Palace Green development since the apartments were purchased, the newspaper reported.
Since his father was killed in US-Israeli airstrikes in February, Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen or heard publicly, leaving his condition and circumstances unclear.
Sequences of Copernicus satellite images comparing the months before the war with the period under the blockade show a striking change at both ports.
At Shahid Rajaee near Bandar Abbas, pre-war images show vessels occupying multiple berths and denser use of the container terminal, while later images show far fewer ships and large sections of the port appearing largely inactive.
Copernicus satellite images from January 2, 2026 and September 4, 2026 show Shahid Rajaee Port near Bandar Abbas before the war and during the US blockade, with far fewer vessels visible at its berths in the later image.
Shahid Rajaee is Iran’s most important export port and, after Imam Khomeini Port, its second-largest gateway for imports. It is also the country’s largest container port, handling nearly 80% of Iran’s container loading and unloading, according to official figures.
A similar pattern is visible at Imam Khomeini Port in southwestern Iran, the country’s largest import gateway, where satellite imagery shows markedly reduced vessel presence and terminal activity compared with the period before the conflict.
Copernicus satellite images from February 25, 2026 and September 5, 2026 show Imam Khomeini Port in southwestern Iran before the war and during the US blockade, with a marked decline in visible vessel and terminal activity.
The images provide a visual measure of the disruption at ports that are critical to Iran’s economy. Shahid Rajaee handles more than 55% of Iran’s imports and exports and an estimated 85% to 90% of its container trade, according to Iranian port data.
Imam Khomeini Port plays a particularly important role in imports of food and other basic commodities. Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization said the port handled more than 48 million tons of cargo in the year ending March 2025, including 19.2 million tons of imported goods.
The satellite evidence reinforces other indications that the blockade is increasingly biting. Video published from Shahid Rajaee in late August showed no ships docked and little apparent loading or unloading activity.
Iran International reported in July that activity at the port had been reduced to a minimum, with thousands of containers stranded and about half of its workforce laid off.
Iranian officials have also increasingly acknowledged the economic impact. President Masoud Pezeshkian said in late August that blocked routes were preventing goods, including gasoline, from entering the country.
Reuters reported this week that Iranian trade had fallen by as much as 35% amid the blockade and intensified sanctions, while gasoline supplies had tightened sharply.
The effect has been even more pronounced on Iran’s oil trade. Iranian crude loadings fell from around 2 million barrels per day before the war to roughly 220,000–255,000 bpd in August, according to shipping data cited by Reuters.
Washington says the blockade can be sustained indefinitely. As of Aug. 23, US Central Command said its forces had redirected 70 commercial vessels attempting to breach it, while three had been disabled and two boarded.
Iran’s foreign trade has contracted sharply since the conflict with the United States began, with non-oil exports and imports falling by around a quarter or more, according to customs data released after months of delay.
Iran exported about $15 billion worth of non-oil goods, including natural gas and LPG, through August 16, nearly five months into the Iranian calendar year that began on March 21. That was nearly 30% below the figure reported for the first five months of the previous year.
Imports fell to about $17 billion over the same near-five-month period, about a quarter below the full five-month figure reported a year earlier.
The figures show a sharp deterioration in Iran’s trade during a conflict that has disrupted key industries and shipping routes, adding to an economy already struggling under years of sanctions, declining oil revenues and chronic shortages of foreign currency.
A mountain in the Zagros range in Isfahan province, about 1.5 kilometers south of the Natanz enrichment complex, with a large facility dug into it.
The name is a small accident of translation. The mountain is called Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La, and kolang means pickaxe, so foreign analysts began calling the site Pickaxe Mountain. It is not what Iranians call the facility, and Iran has never given it a public name at all.
Because of the rock. Most of the surrounding range is sedimentary, but this mountain is hard, dense granite, which gives anything tunneled beneath it substantial natural protection.
Construction began in the autumn of 2020, months after an explosion destroyed an above-ground advanced centrifuge assembly plant at Natanz in an attack widely attributed to Israel. Iran said at the time that the underground halls would replace it.
The destroyed plant had been built to assemble roughly 6,000 advanced centrifuges a year, a capacity sized for the tens of thousands Iran expected to need as restrictions under the 2015 nuclear deal expired between 2025 and 2030.
Nobody outside Iran knows, which is the heart of the problem.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has never been given access. A double security perimeter, a fence and a wall with a patrol route, rings the entire mountain and joins Natanz's own perimeter. There are two pairs of tunnel entrances, one on the east side and one on the west. Analysts assume they lead to a single facility, but even that is not certain.
Iran has said the site is for producing and assembling advanced centrifuges. The Institute for Science and International Security, which has tracked the construction by satellite for years, judges the space beneath the mountain large enough to hold considerably more: not only an assembly plant but a working enrichment plant capable of producing weapons-grade uranium, and probably enough room for weaponization work such as casting uranium metal and shaping it into weapon components.
Two further claims circulate, neither verified. One is that part of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, estimated by the IAEA at around 440 kilograms, has been moved there.
The other, from an Israeli intelligence assessment reported by the Wall Street Journal, is that thousands of centrifuges were moved into the mountain last autumn. Neither Israel nor the United States has published evidence.
The institute's reading of the imagery is that the facility is not yet operational, and that construction continues.
At least 100 meters beneath the mountain, which stands 1,608 meters above sea level.
There is a detail in those measurements worth noticing. The eastern entrances sit about 145 meters below the ridge; the western entrances about 100 meters. That 50-metre difference between the two sets of doors suggests the facility may have more than one level.
Either way it is deeper than Fordow or Natanz, both of which the United States has bombed.
Not the mountain itself. The GBU-57, the largest conventional bunker-buster in the US arsenal, weighs about 13,000 kilograms and is reported to penetrate 18 meters of concrete or 61 meters of earth. Against 100 meters of granite, experts are skeptical.
But a buried facility still has to breathe, and that is where the vulnerability lies. Any working complex needs power, ventilation, heating and cooling, deliveries and people going in and out, and each of those connections surfaces somewhere.
There is a precedent for exactly this. Schematics have been published for two other Iranian tunnel sites built by the Amad nuclear weapons program, Fordow and Shahid Boroujerdi. Both showed ventilation shafts, and in both cases those shafts were directly targeted in air strikes, in June 2025 and March 2026 respectively, because they offered penetrating weapons a way further inside.
No schematics for Pickaxe Mountain have surfaced publicly, but a probable ventilation shaft near the eastern entrances was seen under construction in 2024, fed by a power line that runs above ground before disappearing underground.
The institute's assessment is that an attack would most likely aim at the power supply, the ventilation shafts and the open tunnel mouths, and it notes that as of imagery from July 9 the western pair of entrances remained open.
It also notes that hitting the hardened portals alone would probably deny Iran access only temporarily, adding the mountain to the list of sites that then have to be watched for attempts to dig back in.
Air defenses are not seen as an obstacle. Israel overcame them at Natanz in the opening hours of the June 2025 war.
There is a second possibility, and it has history behind it.
The institute judges that the site, as it now stands, would be more suitable for attack or sabotage by ground forces than from the air. Its model is the 2020 destruction of the Natanz assembly plant, which reportedly involved explosives brought into the building during its construction.
Pickaxe Mountain is still under construction.
That there is nothing there to bomb. Foreign ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said in July that "no nuclear activity is taking place" at the site and called the American threats "a fabricated pretext for aggression, destruction, and sabotage."
Others have been less restrained. Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to the parliament speaker, called Pickaxe Mountain "the most heavily fortified nuclear facility in the world" and said a strike would "turn the region into hell."
Iran's joint military command has warned that any attack on nuclear or sensitive sites would widen the war.
July 13. On the Hugh Hewitt show: "We have eyes on it and Pickaxe mountain is a possible target for a nice big fat shot right in the front door. We're watching Pickaxe Mountain very closely. We don't see any activity there." He ended the interview more bluntly: "We're going to take out Pickaxe Mountain. Tell the Iranians to be ready."
July 21. After the Israeli intelligence assessment surfaced: "The new site that they're talking about, they're trying to possibly reconstitute a site, we'll hit that site. Any site where they're even thinking about nuclear, we'll be hitting it very, very powerfully." He said the US would hit the area "pretty soon, and very heavily."
July 28. "I know exactly what's going on at Pickaxe. It's not a big problem. We took out their nuclear sites, and we'll have to take out Pickaxe if we don't make a deal."
September 4. Trump said the US may hit the site very soon, crediting the Space Force for the intelligence. "We know everybody that's moving at Pickaxe, we know everybody that's moving everywhere, all over Iran, and if anything goes bad, we hit them. We hit them hard." He called the conflict a "military conflict" rather than a war, and added: "It's small potatoes for us."
Across two wars, the only recorded strike at the site destroyed a single vehicle on a spoil pile, thought to have been connected to air defense.
One explanation is simply that it is hard to destroy and may not yet contain anything worth destroying.
Iran has spent the interval hardening it further: concrete poured over a western entrance extension, a reinforced structure added at another portal, rock and soil pushed up over an eastern one, and by late April both eastern entrances partially backfilled to block vehicles.
A separate, smaller tunnel complex inside the same perimeter, built in 2007, was sealed shortly after the June 2025 war. What is inside it is unknown.
The other explanation is that Washington wants the option of getting in rather than burying it. Rebeccah Heinrichs of the Hudson Institute has suggested the United States may be preserving the possibility of entering or securing the complex, which would mean a ground operation rather than an air strike. There is no public evidence that one is being planned.
