Tehran’s drive to turn that control into lasting economic and political leverage—through shipping routes, mine clearance and potentially revenues from passing vessels—is emerging as a major obstacle to extending its fragile memorandum with the United States, which expires Sunday.
Washington, meanwhile, increasingly claims it has broken Iran’s control of Hormuz.
The June 18 memorandum is formally due to expire on August 16. President Donald Trump pronounced it over after Iran attacked three ships in the Strait of Hormuz, ordering more strikes and the resumption of the US maritime blockade.
Neither side, however, has formally abandoned diplomacy. If no extension is announced before Sunday, the current state of neither war nor peace could continue. An explicit declaration that the arrangement has ended could increase the risk of renewed attacks.
‘More valuable than a nuke’
Pressure against concessions over the strait is also growing inside Tehran.
Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission this week unanimously approved the broad outlines of legislation that would tighten Iran’s control over Hormuz.
The bill includes provisions for inspecting vessels in Iranian territorial waters, banning the passage of assets, equipment and vessels belonging to the United States, Israel and other countries Tehran deems hostile, and charging ships for maritime services.
If enacted, the legislation could constrain Tehran’s room for compromise, much as legislation passed during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency required his government to increase uranium enrichment and suspend implementation of the Additional Protocol unless banking and oil sanctions were lifted.
Alireza Salimi, a member of parliament’s presiding board, told the ISNA news agency Thursday that “the Strait of Hormuz is currently more valuable to Iran than an atomic bomb,” describing it as leverage for lifting sanctions and securing compensation for wartime losses.
Demands put talks in doubt
The tougher approach was also reflected in demands laid out shortly before his departure by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
Zolghadr said reopening the strait would require an end to attacks on Iran and its allies, the lifting of the blockade, the withdrawal of US forces from around Iran, sanctions relief, the release of frozen Iranian assets and compensation for damage caused by the wars.
It remains unclear whether those demands represented his personal position or that of the SNSC, and whether his successor, Mohsen Rezaei, will pursue the same approach.
Rezaei’s appointment this week, along with other changes at the top of Iran’s security establishment, has been welcomed by hardline opponents of the government’s approach to negotiations.
Former diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi wrote in the Shargh newspaper that if Tehran insisted on the conditions outlined by Zolghadr, “it is highly unlikely that there will be any serious negotiations between Tehran and Washington at all.”
Both sides claim control
The dispute is unfolding as Tehran and Washington offer directly competing accounts of who actually controls Hormuz.
Trump said Wednesday that the United States had complete control of the waterway and that the maritime blockade had deprived Iran of the ability to act.
The spokesman for Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the country’s wartime command center, rejected that assertion Thursday, saying the strait remained under Iranian control and that no vessel could pass safely without authorization from Iran’s armed forces.
Shipping-monitoring data show traffic remains a fraction of pre-war levels. Around 10 to 12 vessels have been crossing the strait daily in recent days, compared with roughly 130 to 140 before the war, with most currently using a route designated by Iran.
Tehran has also stressed that an agreement with Oman over shipping routes would not by itself be sufficient to reopen the strait.
Ali Gholhaki, a political activist close to parliament speaker and senior Islamabad negotiator Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, said Iranian decision-makers currently had no intention of reopening the waterway and had blocked an agreement with Oman because of what they viewed as Muscat’s alignment with Washington.
Tehran and Muscat at odds
The disagreement with Oman offers perhaps the clearest illustration of what Tehran now wants from its control of Hormuz.
Iran has pushed for control over shipping routes and mine clearance and for mandatory payments from vessels using the waterway. Oman has instead favored a joint fund supported by voluntary contributions from governments and companies benefiting from shipping.
Few in Tehran expect Muscat to accept Iran’s terms. Ahad Azadikhah, a lawmaker aligned with Ghalibaf, recently told Khabar Online that if Oman did so, the Islamic Republic would have achieved “the victory of all victories.”
The dispute means Hormuz is increasingly intertwined with the fate of the wider Tehran-Washington dialogue. As Iran seeks to turn control of the strait into leverage over sanctions, compensation and any broader settlement, Washington may increasingly see that same leverage as something that must be neutralized before a deal can be reached.