Iranians borrow for medicine while state shields Arbaeen healthcare

The controversy has exposed the unofficial network of so-called trusties: companies and intermediaries entrusted with receiving and transferring oil revenues outside the international banking system.

Speaking on state television on Sunday, the head of Iran's State Inspection Organization, Zabihollah Khodaeian, said one intermediary alone had failed to return $200 million in state funds before leaving the country.

Khodaeian added that judicial authorities had opened 59 criminal cases against managers of trustee companies. Some suspects have been arrested, while others have fled abroad.

Iranian media also reported that prosecutors had sought Interpol Red Notices for 15 fugitives linked to the network.

The disclosures prompted unusually blunt criticism from Majid Reza Hariri, head of the Iran-China Chamber of Commerce.

In a public message addressed to Tehran's prosecutor, Hariri said the Interpol requests meant at least 15 trusted intermediaries had escaped with "billions of dollars" in national wealth.

"Who introduced these trusties? Who guaranteed them? And why is no action being taken against those who backed them?" he asked.

Although Hariri's estimate has not been independently verified, his comments echoed questions increasingly being raised in Iranian media over how individuals entrusted with handling billions of dollars in oil revenues could allegedly abscond without serious failures in oversight.

A product of sanctions

The trustee system emerged as international sanctions largely cut Iranian banks off from the global financial system.

Unable to receive oil payments through conventional banking channels, Tehran increasingly relied on trusted intermediaries with access to foreign companies and bank accounts to collect, hold and transfer export revenues.

Many of these intermediaries operate through countries including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Oman.

The arrangement became indispensable to sustaining Iranian oil exports under sanctions. But it also created a largely opaque financial architecture operating outside many of the transparency, auditing and compliance mechanisms that govern formal banking systems.

Trusties have never been clearly defined under Iranian law. Little is publicly known about how they are selected, what commissions they receive, what guarantees they provide or how their activities are supervised.

Critics say the structure also creates an inherent conflict of interest. Oil revenues can remain in intermediary accounts for days or even weeks before reaching Iran, allowing trusties to profit from holding large balances while the state bears the financial risk.

Questions over oversight

The growing scandal has also drawn attention to who ultimately oversees the network.

Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad has previously said the Oil Ministry's responsibility ends with marketing and selling crude, while the Central Bank determines where export revenues are deposited and supervises their transfer.

The issue is especially sensitive because trusties are not ordinary commercial intermediaries. They are selected precisely because they are considered sufficiently reliable to handle some of the state's most strategically important financial transactions.

Officials maintain that such intermediaries remain indispensable as long as sanctions keep Iran largely excluded from the international banking system.

The expanding investigation, however, has transformed what was once a largely hidden mechanism of sanctions evasion into yet another damaging scandal for the Islamic Republic, raising difficult questions about both the alleged abuse and the system that allowed it to occur.

Analysts increasingly see a broader effort to erode Tehran's military, economic and political capacity until negotiations become the less costly option.

President Donald Trump has oscillated between threatening "massive attacks" and calling for renewed negotiations with Tehran. According to Axios, he decided against another round of strikes on Friday despite military plans being ready to execute.

Whether the lull marks the beginning of diplomacy or merely an operational pause remains unclear. What appears more significant is how the campaign itself has evolved.

Military analyst and retired US Army officer John Spencer believes Washington's objectives now extend well beyond degrading Iran's immediate military capabilities.

Rather than seeking immediate regime change, he argues, the campaign is designed to convince Tehran's leadership that continuing the conflict will steadily erode its ability to govern, project military power and preserve the strategic leverage it has spent decades building, ultimately forcing Iran to negotiate from a position of growing weakness.

"The United States could do a lot more," Spencer told Eye for Iran. "This is about changing the regime's behavior."

The evolution is visible in the targets themselves. Early strikes focused overwhelmingly on Iran's ability to threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, hitting coastal radar installations, anti-ship missile batteries, drone facilities and command-and-control centres.

More recently, however, the campaign has shifted inland toward bridges, railways, communications infrastructure and military logistics networks, particularly around Bandar Abbas.

Iran's largest commercial port and a key naval hub overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, Bandar Abbas has become increasingly isolated as transportation links and logistics infrastructure come under repeated attack.

For Spencer, that shift reflects an effort not simply to destroy weapons but to restrict Iran's ability to move forces, sustain military operations and eventually rebuild damaged capabilities.

"It could be beyond the battle of Hormuz," Spencer said. "It could be setting the conditions for future operations."

He argues the United States still retains considerable military, economic and cyber capabilities that have yet to be fully employed should Washington decide to intensify pressure further.

Regional balance shifts

Former Kuwaiti Information Minister Saad bin Tefla Al Ajmi believes the campaign has also altered Iran's wider strategic position.

He argues Tehran's regional network has suffered setbacks on multiple fronts. Hezbollah has been severely weakened, Syria no longer provides the strategic corridor it once did following Bashar al-Assad's fall, and repeated attacks have degraded Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

"Iran is now between two choices," Al Ajmi said. "The chalice of poison or suicide."

He also questioned whether Iran's increasingly fragmented decision-making structure could complicate any future negotiations.

"There is a fragmentation in the leadership in Iran now," he said. "Sometimes we have a problem of who to communicate with."

Military pressure has also coincided with a tightening domestic crackdown, with human rights groups reporting an increase in executions of protesters and political prisoners during the conflict.

Whether the two-night pause marks the beginning of diplomacy or simply the interval before another wave of strikes remains uncertain.

What the past fortnight has already revealed, however, is that Washington's objectives now appear to extend far beyond the Strait of Hormuz, towards reshaping the military and political calculations of Iran's leadership itself.

The report said Iran's nuclear infrastructure had already been heavily damaged by Israeli strikes and the US "Midnight Hammer" operation against its main enrichment sites, but that several facilities could still be considered targets.

"It appears that the bulk of the sites that were needed to make nuclear weapons have been hit," David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security and a former UN weapons inspector, told the newspaper.

"But Israel may know of new sites through intelligence, and there may be reason to strike old sites that are being rebuilt," he said.

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  Why Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain has become Trump’s next target

Pickaxe Mountain seen as top target

The Journal said Pickaxe Mountain, known in Iran as Mount Kolang, remains the most likely target because Israeli intelligence believes Iran moved thousands of uranium-enrichment centrifuges into tunnels there after last year's 12-day war.

According to the report, the underground complex lies hundreds of feet beneath granite, making it difficult to destroy even with US bunker-busting bombs. Experts cited by the newspaper said Washington could instead strike tunnel entrances or other access points.

"Washington's clearest nonproliferation wins against Iran in the war were stopping all uranium enrichment at declared facilities and entombing enriched uranium stockpiles," Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told the Journal.

"The more time elapses, however, the more crucial Pickaxe mountain appears to Iran's reconstitution effort," he said.

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  Trump threat to hit Pickaxe renews calls in Iran for nuclear bomb, NPT exit

Other facilities could also be struck

The Journal said other potential targets include the Taleghan 2 facility at the Parchin military complex, which satellite imagery suggests Iran has been rebuilding, although experts differ over how much of the site survived previous Israeli strikes.

It also identified support facilities at Fordow, where above-ground buildings housing centrifuges and isotope-production equipment remain, as well as parts of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, where satellite imagery has shown continued vehicle activity despite previous US missile strikes.

The report added that remaining buildings at Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant could also be targeted if Washington expands its air campaign.

Nima Rezaei, known online as Nima Takido, has more than 935,000 YouTube subscribers and 1.5 million Instagram followers.

Iranian media reported that 5,000 free tickets had been issued for scheduled sessions at Iran Mall. Organizers were reportedly caught off guard when tens of thousands more arrived without reservations.

Teenagers traveled from several provinces and waited for hours for a chance to see him. Videos showed crowds filling the venue, turning what was intended to be a controlled fan event into a mass gathering.

The event was eventually cut short after the crowd overwhelmed the venue. Takido injured his leg in the crush and was taken for treatment.

Some Iranian reports also said his phone and wallet went missing and that security forces were called to help control the gathering.

The scenes highlighted the emergence of a parallel celebrity culture among Iran’s younger generation—one with its own stars, humor, language and communities, largely separate from television, cinema and other traditional routes to fame.

Many older Iranians had never heard Takido’s name. Yet to his young followers, he is a familiar figure whose videos and online presence have created a sense of connection built over years.

That divide is not unique to Iran. Online creators have become major cultural figures for teenagers around the world, often attracting crowds once associated mainly with film stars, musicians or athletes.

In September 2025, thousands crowded into New Jersey’s American Dream mall for an appearance by teenage YouTuber Salish Matter. The turnout overwhelmed organizers and prompted complaints about unsafe conditions and poor planning.

Takido’s event showed that the same global fan culture has taken root among young Iranians, even as they remain relatively isolated from international entertainment markets.

100%

Unlike traditional celebrities, online creators speak directly to their audiences, share parts of their daily lives and build communities through repeated, informal interactions. For young followers, that can make them feel more familiar and accessible than figures promoted through official media.

Takido belongs to a wider Persian-language creator ecosystem that includes Farshad Silent, Aria Rahmati, Pouria Putak, Nivad, KamTalam, Mia Plays and the Kouman team.

Some live outside Iran, while others produce content that rarely appears in state-controlled media. Their influence nevertheless crosses borders and reaches large audiences inside the country.

YouTube remains blocked in Iran, and users commonly rely on circumvention tools to access it. But the restriction was secondary to what the gathering revealed: a generation forming its cultural tastes and identities in spaces largely beyond the reach of traditional institutions.

100%

In Iran, everyone is watching the same number this summer. The US dollar is trading at around 1.9 million rials in Tehran’s open market, and the government has turned stopping it from reaching 2 million into a priority.

The state is spending scarce reserves to defend that line. The market is bracing for it to be crossed.

To understand why one exchange rate commands this much attention, it helps to know what the number means in Iranian life. The rial is a currency people try not to hold.

Salaries are paid in it, but many Iranians with savings convert them into dollars, crypto, gold, property or even food items with a longer shelf life as quickly as they can.

The dollar rate is the thermometer of everything else: rents, medicine, car prices and the cost of a grocery run.

When the rate crosses a round number, shopkeepers reprice, landlords renegotiate and expectations reset a step higher. Round numbers are not milestones on a financial chart; they are political events.

Here is the arc of that thermometer. Fifteen years ago, a dollar cost about 10,000 rials on the open market. In April 2025, it crossed 1 million.

This summer, it stands at the threshold of 2 million.

Spread over the first 15 years, the dollar doubled against the rial roughly once every two and a quarter years. The latest near-doubling took 15 months.

Put another way: it took 15 years to destroy 99 percent of the rial’s value against the dollar, and then 15 months to erase nearly half of what was left.

If inflation and depreciation continue at roughly their recent pace, the 3-million line could be five to eight months away. The latest halving of the currency’s value has arrived far faster than the average over the previous 15 years.

Why the central bank cannot hold the line

The engine behind this is not mysterious. Iran’s official statistics agency reports that consumer prices in June were 88.6 percent higher than a year earlier; the inflation families feel at the grocery store runs higher still.

The dollar has nearly doubled alongside the prices around it.

The inflation itself is rooted in fiscal arithmetic. The war and blockade have severely constrained Iran’s oil exports and maritime trade, while tax revenue is sinking with the economy.

The government is financing a substantial portion of its widening deficit through the banking system and central-bank liquidity creation—effectively expanding the money supply to meet its bills.

Monthly inflation has recently been running as high as 7 to 9 percent. For American readers, one comparison does the work of a statistics table: Iran is now living through something close to its own version of the 2022 US inflation shock almost every month.

The central bank’s playbook for moments like this is familiar to every Iranian. When it cannot stop the dollar’s rise, it tries to postpone losing the round number for as long as possible.

It does so through market interventions and public messaging that intensify in the final stretch.

In the winter of 2024-25, it fought exactly this battle at the 900,000-rial level and managed to push the crossing of 1 million until after the Iranian New Year in March.

But that defense was financed by oil revenue.

This one is being waged mid-war, under blockade and with exports sharply constrained. It is drawing on the remnant of reserves the country will need to import medicine and food.

A central bank without reliable oil income can buy weeks, not a new trend. Every week it buys may increase the pressure behind the next jump.

What happens next depends on the course of the war, the scale of central-bank intervention and whether oil exports resume.

If inflation and depreciation continue at their recent pace, the 2-million line could fall as soon as August.

A wider war would likely freeze the market first and then send it sharply higher when trading resumes. A durable ceasefire could slow or even temporarily reverse the move.

In every version, the greatest burden falls on Iranian families paid in rials and unable to convert their income or savings into anything safer.

They are watching each round number arrive sooner than the one before.