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Iran’s legal drug market is being hollowed out as shortages feed illicit channels

Jun 20, 2026, 12:43 GMT+1

Iran’s official medicine market is being hollowed out as policy instability, currency disruptions and shortages push more patients toward illegal sellers, counterfeit drugs and informal supply networks, industry figures and officials have warned.

The warnings point to a new phase in Iran’s long-running drug crisis. The problem is no longer only that medicines are expensive or hard to find. The formal supply chain itself is weakening, while the black market grows around patients who cannot obtain medicine through pharmacies.

Haleh Hamedifar, head of the Association of Medical Biotechnology Product Manufacturers, told the semi-official ISNA news agency that the main challenge facing Iran’s pharmaceutical industry is not simply a shortage of foreign currency, but “instability in decision-making and lack of coordination in implementation.”

“The pharmaceutical industry cannot be managed with daily decisions, changing circulars and unpredictable processes,” she said.

Hamedifar warned that sudden policy changes disrupt the supply of raw materials, production and distribution, with effects that appear months later “in pharmacies, hospitals and ultimately at the patient’s bedside.”

Iran says it produces most of the medicines consumed in the country, but domestic production still depends on imported raw materials, equipment, packaging, machinery and spare parts. That leaves even locally made drugs exposed to banking restrictions, currency decisions and import delays.

Hamedifar said recent shifts in currency rules have forced some raw materials out of preferential currency categories and into exchange-rate systems that are not reliably funded. Alternative routes, including the use of export proceeds or privately held foreign currency, were introduced before the administrative infrastructure was ready, she said.

Companies have been forced to amend files, repeat import registrations and restart procedures they had already completed, she said.

“The problem in many cases is not the decision itself, but how it is implemented,” Hamedifar said.

She said outages and errors in government platforms, including disconnects between trade, drug-regulation and banking systems, should not be treated as technical glitches because each delay can postpone the arrival of raw materials and later disrupt drug supply.

Interior Ministry spokesman Ali Zeynivand separately acknowledged that high medicine prices are real and said the government does not deny that internal failures may be part of the problem.

“Part of the problems are caused by the imposed war, another part by the sanctions that already existed, and part may be due to our shortcomings or lack of precision,” he told the Dideban Iran news website. “We do not reject any of these.”

Zeynivand said President Masoud Pezeshkian, himself a physician, is personally sensitive to the issue and that the Health Ministry, Plan and Budget Organization and Central Bank are working on measures to contain the situation. But he cautioned that Iran’s economic problems would not be solved simply by signing a memorandum.

For patients, the consequences are already visible in higher out-of-pocket costs, incomplete prescriptions, empty pharmacy shelves and growing reliance on unofficial sellers.

Mehdi Sanei, an investigator at Iran’s medical crimes prosecutor’s office, told the Iranian daily Shargh that Iran has only one legal medicine market: the official network supervised by the Health Ministry and Food and Drug Administration. Any medicine sold outside that chain is illegal, he said.

“In the field of medicine, there is no such thing as a legal free market,” Sanei said.

He said shortages are the starting point for much of the illegal trade. When patients cannot find medicine in pharmacies, they turn to dealers, Telegram channels, middlemen and informal networks.

“As long as medicine shortages exist, the smuggling market will exist,” he said.

Sanei warned that the illegal drug market is unusually profitable because patients cannot postpone treatment. Families dealing with cancer or chronic illness may sell savings, jewelry, cars or even homes to obtain scarce medicine.

“I do not know of a commodity whose profit is as guaranteed as smuggled medicine,” he said.

He said some black-market medicines are official Iranian-made drugs diverted from the legal system through fake prescriptions, distribution violations or other routes. But he described an even more dangerous trend: the growing presence of counterfeit or unauthorized medicines made inside Iran.

Sanei estimated that more than 80 percent of medicines in the illegal market are now unauthorized domestic products rather than genuine imported drugs.

Those products may be made in illegal workshops with unknown or ineffective materials and fake packaging, he said. Some may contain no active ingredient, contamination or harmful substances.

“People pay heavy costs, and there is no guarantee that what they receive is really medicine,” he said.

The result is a self-reinforcing cycle: shortages weaken the legal market, patients move toward illegal sellers, the black market becomes more profitable, and the official system loses more ground.

“The smaller the legal market becomes, the larger the illegal market becomes,” Sanei said.

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Illegal adoptions expose Iran’s hidden baby-selling market, child advocate warns

Jun 20, 2026, 11:49 GMT+1
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Nearly one-third of registered adoptions in Iran over the past decade were illegal, according to state welfare data, exposing a hidden child-transfer market that advocates say can leave babies vulnerable to sale, abandonment, domestic servitude and other forms of abuse.

Parisa Valentina Pouyan, director of the Pouya Helpers of Child Workers Institute, told Iran’s labor-focused ILNA news agency that baby-selling is a hidden and complex phenomenon driven not only by poverty but also by addiction, cultural pressures, weak oversight, lack of parenting education and failures in state protection systems.

“Buying and selling children is one of the most horrifying forms of social harm and one of the most damaging acts committed against children,” Pouyan said.

Her remarks followed renewed attention in Iranian media to the case of a mother accused of selling several of her newborns over different years for small sums, reviving concerns about underground markets for infants and the future awaiting children transferred outside legal adoption channels.

A recent analytical report by Iran’s State Welfare Organization, known as Behzisti, found that illegal adoption remains a serious challenge for the country’s child-protection and judicial systems.

According to the report, 18,240 adoption cases were registered from 2013 to 2024, of which 13,020, or 71 percent, were legal, while 5,224, or 29 percent, were recorded as illegal.

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Behzisti is the main state body responsible for welfare and child-protection cases in Iran, including formal adoption procedures. Illegal adoptions take place outside that system, often through private arrangements, brokers or concealed transfers of newborns.

Pouyan said official and precise statistics on baby-selling do not exist because the practice is hidden. But she said poverty creates fertile ground for such cases, especially during wider social and economic crises.

Still, she warned against reducing the issue to poverty alone.

“Would every poor family sell its child?” she said. “If parents have sold a child once and their living conditions improve a little, does that mean they will never do it again?”

Pouyan said global experience shows baby-selling has become a lucrative trade in some places, and that poverty is only one driver. She cited addiction, sex work, cultural pressures and the possibility that a mother herself may have been a victim of child-selling as factors that can feed the trade.

She said the hidden nature of illegal transfers means the child’s future is often irrelevant to the transaction.

“In this kind of trade, parents who sell their baby or child do not care whether the buyers have the conditions and qualifications needed to become parents,” she said, adding that in illegal transfers “money comes first.”

Pouyan said she had personally been approached several years ago by someone seeking a child for a couple living abroad, both doctors, who wanted to adopt by finding a parent willing to sell a child. She said she rejected the request and warned she would report any such case.

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According to Pouyan, the darker danger is that not all buyers are seeking parenthood.

In some cases, she said, children are bought or taken through illegal adoption channels for domestic labor or other forms of exploitation.

“I have seen a case in which a child was illegally adopted and, a few years later, became the family’s servant,” she said.

Pouyan said Iran’s response to baby-selling and illegal adoption is weakened by poor oversight, ineffective intervention by responsible agencies and possible misconduct inside institutions meant to protect children.

Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain

Jun 20, 2026, 09:37 GMT+1
•
Dalga Khatinoglu
Iran may get a lifeline, but major obstacles remain
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کودکان و خانواده‌ها در اصفهان، پس از بازگشت آب به زاینده‌رود، در کنار این رودخانه حضور یافته‌اند

The agreement between Tehran and Washington holds out the prospect of sanctions relief and potentially unprecedented foreign investment, but many of its economic promises remain uncertain and some may prove difficult to deliver even if negotiations succeed.

The relative strengthening of the Iranian rial suggests the agreement has already had a positive psychological impact.

The US dollar, which traded above 1.8 million rials during the recent conflict, has fallen to around 1.57 million. Even so, it remains roughly 18 percent higher than six months ago.

According to estimates by Kpler, Iran was exporting about 1.5 million barrels per day of crude oil and condensates before the recent conflict. Without sanctions, exports could eventually return to around 2.5 million barrels per day.

Iran would also no longer be forced to sell much of its crude to Chinese buyers at steep discounts.

Revenue boost

According to OPEC estimates, Iran earned $46.7 billion from exports of crude oil and petroleum products last year. If sanctions are lifted and oil prices remain relatively elevated, that figure could rise substantially.

A rapid recovery, however, should not be expected.

Iran's petrochemical and steel industries, which together generate roughly $17 billion in annual export revenue, have suffered extensive damage during the conflict.

As a result, Iran could temporarily become a net importer of some products it has traditionally exported.

Persian Gulf Holding, which accounts for 38 percent of Iran's petrochemical production, recently reported that output at six heavily damaged complexes fell to just 13 percent of levels recorded during the same period last year. Overall production across the holding's petrochemical subsidiaries declined by 75 percent.

According to Iran's Central Bank, oil, gas, steel and petrochemicals account for 73 percent of the country's total exports, underscoring the importance of rebuilding damaged industrial capacity.

Release of frozen assets

Iran is estimated to hold approximately $24 billion in frozen assets abroad, about half of which could be released within two months.

The Wall Street Journal reported on June 19 that, contingent upon what it described as appropriate Iranian behavior and the transfer of enriched uranium, Tehran could gain access to $6 billion in frozen funds currently held in Qatari banks for the purchase of humanitarian and agricultural goods from the United States.

The arrangement could benefit both countries. Iran imports approximately $17 billion worth of grain annually, while the United States remains the world's largest grain exporter.

Trade between the two countries has collapsed since the 1979 revolution. According to official US statistics, bilateral trade totaled $6.6 billion in 1978 but amounted to only $60 million last year, almost entirely consisting of US exports to Iran.

The reconstruction fund

One of the most ambitious — and least defined — elements of the agreement is a proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund involving foreign companies, including firms from Arab states, to support Iran's reconstruction.

Unlike historical reconstruction programs financed by governments, the proposed fund is expected to rely largely on private investment. That raises significant questions about how such a large sum could be mobilized and whether foreign companies would be willing to commit substantial capital to Iran after years of sanctions, regional tensions and political uncertainty.

Beyond political considerations, investors would also have to weigh sanctions risks, regulatory uncertainty and the long-term stability of the investment environment before committing significant capital.

Given Tehran's strained relations with many Arab states in recent years, enthusiasm among regional investors may remain limited, although countries such as Qatar and Oman could encourage some level of participation.

For now, the creation of a fund on the scale envisioned by the agreement appears unlikely in the medium term. More modest investment flows may be possible if Tehran complies with future commitments and continues improving ties with its neighbors.

The need for investment is undeniable. Iran's oil and gas sector alone is estimated to require at least $300 billion in capital to modernize infrastructure and expand production after decades of underinvestment.

Ultimately, the economic benefits outlined in the agreement depend not only on sanctions relief but also on Tehran's ability to reassure investors, rebuild damaged industries and maintain stable relations with regional and international partners.

For now, the agreement has boosted expectations. Whether it can deliver a lasting economic recovery remains an open question.

A US-Iran deal alone won't rescue Iran's oil economy

Jun 19, 2026, 20:13 GMT+1
•
Mehdi Moslehi
A US-Iran deal alone won't rescue Iran's oil economy
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A drilling rig operated by Iran’s Exploration Operations Company is seen at an energy site in Iran.

The memorandum of understanding signed on Thursday has prompted fresh hopes of an economic revival in Iran. But even a successful US-Iran agreement may do far less for the country's oil industry than many supporters expect.

Tehran’s challenge is no longer simply one of sanctions. Iran's oil and gas sector faces a combination of structural, technical, financial and geopolitical obstacles that cannot be quickly resolved, even if the agreement ultimately leads to a broader settlement with the United States.

The reality is that Iran's energy sector is no longer constrained primarily by its ability to sell oil. Its greater challenges lie in sustaining production, attracting investment, accessing advanced technology and reconnecting to the global financial system.

Aging infrastructure, declining capacity

Much of Iran's oil and gas infrastructure has reached the latter half of its operational life. Years of underinvestment, limited access to modern technology and the departure of major international energy companies have left many fields grappling with increasingly complex technical problems.

The challenge extends far beyond the natural decline of mature fields. Veteran figures within Iran's energy industry have repeatedly warned about reservoir degradation, declining pressure, scaling, well damage and the growing difficulty of maintaining stable production.

Former oil executives and industry specialists say a significant share of the sector's efforts is now devoted to managing technical problems that require equipment and expertise not readily available inside the country.

Nowhere is this more evident than in South Pars, the giant gas field that underpins Iran's energy security. Natural pressure decline began years ago, and reversing it will require tens of billions of dollars in investment, advanced offshore infrastructure and the participation of companies that are predominantly based in the West.

Even if political barriers disappeared tomorrow, the planning, engineering and construction required for such projects would take years—time an economy struggling with inflation, budget deficits and capital shortages can ill afford.

World not waiting for Iranian Oil

Many discussions about Iran's future still view today's energy market through the lens of a decade ago.

Before sanctions tightened, a significant portion of the global market relied on Iranian crude. The world of 2026 looks very different.

The United States has become one of the world's largest energy producers and exporters. Canada, Brazil and Guyana have expanded output dramatically.

Qatar and the United States have transformed the global LNG market, while major consumers have spent years diversifying supply chains and reducing dependence on any single producer.

Many customers that found alternative suppliers during years of sanctions are unlikely to return simply because restrictions are eased. Re-entering global markets requires not only competitive pricing but confidence in Iran's long-term reliability as a supplier.

The banking problem

Even if Washington permits the return of major energy companies to Iran, another obstacle remains: the international financial system.

The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated that political agreements do not automatically translate into investment flows. Despite official support from Western governments, many major banks remained unwilling to accept the risks associated with doing business in Iran.

Crucially, the Islamic Republic is currently on the FATF blacklist, and the process of exiting this list entails a time-consuming verification period. Iran's failure to meet FATF standards, concerns over financial transparency, money-laundering risks and the extensive role of military-linked institutions in the economy continue to discourage foreign investors.

For many global financial institutions, both credit risk and reputational risk associated with Iran remain exceptionally high.

Russia is not a substitute

In the absence of Western companies, Tehran has repeatedly looked to Russia as an alternative partner.

Yet the experience of the past two decades suggests Moscow has shown limited interest in helping Iran re-emerge as a major competitor in global energy markets.

Even Russian firms with significant technical capabilities have, at various points, slowed, suspended or withdrawn from Iranian projects.

Russia's interests do not necessarily align with a full-scale revival of Iran's energy sector.

As a major energy exporter itself, Moscow has strong incentives to preserve its own position in global markets rather than facilitate the rise of another competitor.

Regional stability

There is another actor in this equation that often receives less attention than it deserves: the Persian Gulf states.

Iran’s Arab neighbors are undertaking some of the largest investment programs in their history. Infrastructure, artificial intelligence, logistics, technology and tourism have become central pillars of their economic strategies.

From their perspective, the overriding concern is not ideology but stability.

Rising geopolitical tensions have already increased insurance costs, raised financing expenses and complicated long-term investment planning across the region.

As a result, many in the region have concluded that even a successful Tehran-Washington agreement may not, by itself, provide the level of certainty required for the massive investments envisioned under their long-term development plans.

Taken all that together, one can argue that Iran’s oil economy faces far more than a sanctions problem.

Even if the newly signed memorandum evolves into a broader deal, rebuilding Iran's lost energy capacity will require years of work, tens of billions of dollars in investment and the restoration of confidence among international investors and financial institutions.

The agreement signed this week may ease some short-term pressures and improve economic sentiment. But on its own, it is unlikely to reverse the long-term erosion confronting Iran's oil and gas sector.

Iran's Qatar power link exposes a deeper energy dilemma

Jun 19, 2026, 11:46 GMT+1
•
Umud Shokri
Iran's Qatar power link exposes a deeper energy dilemma
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A technician works on high-voltage transmission equipment at an electricity substation in Iran.

Iran's plan to connect its electricity grid to Qatar highlights a growing paradox at the heart of the country's energy strategy: even as Tehran seeks a larger regional role through cross-border energy diplomacy, it faces one of the worst domestic power shortages in decades.

On June 16, Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi announced that studies for a power-grid connection between Iran and Qatar were nearing completion and that implementation was beginning.

The project revives a 2022 memorandum of understanding signed during President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to Doha, which envisaged electricity exchanges of up to 1,000 megawatts through a subsea link.

The announcement comes as Iran grapples with a deepening electricity crisis, sanctions pressure and vulnerabilities exposed by recent conflict involving Iran, Israel and the United States.

Energy diplomacy under pressure

The proposed interconnection is more than a technical project.

If completed, it could allow electricity to flow in either direction during periods of peak demand or disruption. Qatar's gas-fired generation could help support Iran during shortages, while Tehran could seek to export power when domestic demand is lower.

More broadly, the project reflects Iran's effort to deepen economic ties with Gulf neighbours and reduce its regional isolation. Qatar has long maintained relations with Iran, the United States and other Gulf states while playing a recurring mediating role in regional diplomacy.

For Tehran, electricity trade offers revenue, political leverage and a way to project itself as a regional energy actor despite sanctions and mounting domestic constraints.

The project could also serve as a modest step toward wider Gulf electricity integration. Linking Iran to the GCC Interconnection Authority network would remain politically and technically difficult, but the Qatar connection would mark one of the few tangible efforts in recent years to expand energy cooperation across a region long divided by geopolitical rivalries.

Yet Iran's own power shortages raise questions about how realistic those ambitions are.

A worsening power crisis

Iran's electricity system faces mounting strain from years of underinvestment, aging infrastructure, sanctions, inefficient consumption, fuel constraints and drought-related pressure on hydropower generation.

Although installed generation capacity appears substantial on paper, actual available supply is often significantly lower because of plant outages, fuel shortages, declining efficiency and transmission losses.

The situation becomes especially acute during the summer, when air conditioning, industrial demand and urban consumption push the grid beyond available capacity.

Iran's parliamentary research center has warned that the country could face a summer electricity deficit of around 13,640 megawatts, equivalent to roughly 17% of projected peak demand.

Blackouts, industrial shutdowns and disruptions to public services have become increasingly common.

This context helps explain why the Qatar project matters. While Iranian officials often present such initiatives as evidence of the country's emergence as a regional energy hub, the interconnection may be just as important as a potential source of imported electricity during periods of domestic stress.

Without major investment in generation, transmission and fuel supply, the project could ultimately expose Iran's dependence on its neighbours rather than demonstrate export strength.

Iran has relatively few options for addressing the crisis quickly. Sanctions continue to restrict access to modern turbines, grid equipment, financing and foreign expertise, while meaningful electricity-price reforms remain politically sensitive. Expanding renewable energy would help, but doing so requires investment, storage capacity and transmission upgrades that cannot be deployed overnight.

Regional electricity trade is therefore one of the few tools available to Tehran in the short term.

The shadow of war

Recent conflict has further highlighted Iran's energy vulnerabilities.

Strikes on infrastructure linked to South Pars, the giant gas field that underpins much of Iran's electricity generation, underscored how disruptions to gas production can quickly affect power supplies.

The conflict also exposed broader risks facing Gulf energy systems. Iranian attacks on facilities linked to Qatar's energy sector demonstrated how regional infrastructure could become vulnerable during periods of military escalation.

As a result, the proposed interconnection carries both economic and strategic significance. It could strengthen resilience and create incentives for cooperation, but it would also add another piece of critical infrastructure exposed to future crises.

Opportunities and limits

An Iran-Qatar electricity link could provide benefits for both countries.

Cross-border interconnections can improve grid stability, reduce reserve requirements and provide emergency support during disruptions. Over time, they may also help integrate renewable energy by balancing supply across larger networks.

The technical challenges are significant but manageable. A subsea high-voltage connection would require substantial investment, converter stations, cybersecurity protections and close operational coordination.

The larger obstacles may be political and financial.

US sanctions could deter banks, insurers and international engineering firms from participating in Iran-linked infrastructure projects. Broader Gulf integration would face additional political hurdles after years of regional tension.

Outlook

The Qatar interconnection ultimately reveals as much about Iran's domestic weaknesses as its regional ambitions.

Faced with sanctions, underinvestment and a worsening electricity crisis, Tehran has increasingly turned to energy diplomacy, regional trade and cross-border infrastructure as tools for managing pressure at home.

The project could strengthen Iran-Qatar ties, improve energy resilience and create a modest opening toward wider regional cooperation.

But its significance lies less in the electricity it may eventually carry than in what it reveals about Iran's broader predicament: a country seeking regional influence through energy diplomacy while increasingly dependent on external partnerships to manage mounting pressures at home.

A thaw with the US won't fill Iranian tables overnight

Jun 19, 2026, 03:15 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
A thaw with the US won't fill Iranian tables overnight
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Bakers prepare traditional flatbread at a neighborhood bakery in Tehran, where rising food prices have become a growing concern for many households, June 15, 2026

The easing of tensions between Iran and the United States has raised hopes for economic relief, but after years of declining living standards, many Iranians say any breakthrough will be judged by whether it improves their daily lives.

Iranian authorities now face growing public expectations that any diplomatic opening will translate into tangible economic gains. Many hope that sanctions relief or the release of frozen assets will ease financial pressures and improve living standards.

Economists, however, warn that even if restrictions are lifted, the benefits are unlikely to be felt immediately.

The uncertainty has been compounded by the fact that many of the memorandum's economic provisions remain unclear, including the timing and scope of any sanctions relief or asset releases.

According to a recent survey cited by Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Bathaei during a press conference this week, 60% of respondents said they could no longer tolerate additional economic pressure.

Economist Khalil Janami wrote in Khabar Online that “the real achievement of diplomacy only becomes meaningful when people feel its results in their livelihoods, employment opportunities, and quality of life.”

Economy Minister Ali Madanizadeh also cautioned Thursday that an agreement with Washington would not return Iran's economy to normal conditions overnight.

Discussing government finances, he said Iran had already faced a budget deficit of several hundred trillion tomans before the war and that conditions have since worsened. He said the government also borrowed 100 trillion tomans from the Central Bank after the conflict, with the inflationary consequences likely to become visible in the coming months.

Analysts say Iran's economic challenges—including high inflation, unemployment and years of stagnation—are structural problems that cannot be resolved quickly through a political agreement.

Working people under pressure

Workers have been among the hardest hit by Iran's prolonged economic crisis. In recent years, wage increases have consistently failed to keep pace with inflation, steadily eroding purchasing power.

The Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) recently reported that a worker's daily wage after eight hours of work is not enough to buy even 250 grams of red meat. The agency said many workers struggle to cover basic living expenses even when taking on overtime shifts.

Citizen reports received by Iran International indicate that layoffs and delays in wage payments continue in some sectors. Some people approved for unemployment benefits earlier this year say they have yet to receive any payments.

The middle class has also seen its financial position deteriorate. Families that once had the ability to save, buy homes and plan for the future have increasingly been forced to cut both essential and discretionary spending.

Some economists describe the trend as the gradual erosion of the middle class.

Eroding living standards

In May, Iranian families paid nearly 84% more than a year earlier for the same basket of goods and services.

For many households, food prices remain the most immediate concern.

Official figures from the Statistical Center of Iran show that year-on-year inflation for food and beverages reached 130% in the month ending in May. Annual food inflation also climbed to around 83%, up from roughly 75% in April.

Economist Morteza Afghah told Fararu that families are increasingly under pressure as inflation outpaces wage growth.

“Food has not been completely removed from household shopping baskets,” he said, “but nutritious and valuable items are being replaced with low-quality foods that simply fill the stomach.”

He added that lower-income groups, already spending nearly all of their income on essential goods, would face even greater hardship as inflation intensified.

Skepticism and hope online

The prospect of improved relations with Washington has prompted a wave of reactions on social media, where users expressed a mix of optimism and doubt.

Iranian journalist Azadeh Mokhtari wrote on X: “The military war between Iran and the United States has, at least for now, come to an end. But real victory will be felt when the war against inflation begins and ends with its defeat.”

She added: “People feel relieved when the sound of explosions stops, but they become happy when rising prices end. Today is the time to defeat inflation and control prices.”

Another user, Amir, welcomed the memorandum and expressed hope it would lead to a formal agreement, while lamenting the economic damage, job losses and destruction caused by the conflict.

Others remained unconvinced.

One user wrote: “Based on my limited experience, I highly doubt that signing an agreement will have even a small effect on people's lives. Rest assured, this agreement will not fill people's tables either.”