Direct-to-cell satellite technology could one day help Iranians bypass part of the Islamic Republic’s digital blockade, but it is not yet a practical solution to the country’s internet shutdown despite widespread hopes.
Internet access in Iran was cut off for months, first amid the January protests and then during the March war, before being partially restored after an 88-day nationwide blackout.
International connectivity has returned for many fixed-line and home broadband users, but the network remains degraded, unstable and heavily censored.
More than 100 days after the broader shutdown began, the pattern of restoration has been limited, selective and tightly controlled.
From conditional access tied to identity verification and the migration of businesses to domestic platforms to the creation of internet-access whitelists, the Islamic Republic appears intent on preserving its multi-layered system of censorship, surveillance and communications control.
The National Information Network, centralized gateways to the global internet, controlled mobile-network settings, identity-verification systems and device-registration mechanisms are all tools that allow the state to restrict or cut off public access to the global internet while keeping stable communication channels open for selected groups.
That is why direct-to-cell, or D2C, has attracted growing attention among Iranians. Many see the promise of direct phone-to-satellite connectivity — without a dish, terminal, domestic operator or government gateway — as a possible way out of the Islamic Republic’s digital prison.
The idea has gained enough attention that the Pentagon held talks with SpaceX about activating direct-to-cell service for Iranian citizens. According to Reuters, SpaceX requested up to $500 million to launch the service and $100 million per month to operate it.
The central question, however, is whether current versions of direct-to-cell technology can meet such expectations on the scale of Iran. For now, the answer is no: today’s systems remain limited in capacity, vulnerable to radio interference and risky for users who could be identified through Iran’s device-registration and mobile-network systems.
The central questions, however, remain: Can current versions of Direct-to-Cell technology truly meet such expectations on the scale of Iran? Is the technology still only an emergency and limited communication channel, or can it become a scalable escape route for millions of Iranian users? And if future generations of the technology operate without relying on domestic towers and operators, will Iran’s digital wall be broken?
Dependency on mobile operators and the foreign eSIM scenario
In ordinary Starlink service, the satellite connects to a dedicated ground terminal — the same dish that users must obtain, install, maintain and hide from the Islamic Republic. The phone connects to the Starlink modem through Wi-Fi.
But Direct-to-Cell is based on a different idea: an ordinary phone itself becomes the receiver and transmitter for satellite communication.
Current versions of Direct-to-Cell are mostly not independent satellite internet systems. Rather, they complement the existing coverage of mobile operators in each area, effectively turning the satellite into a space-based cell tower whose real function is to cover mobile-network dead zones.
The use of independent S-Band frequencies and the deployment of satellites in very low Earth orbit, or VLEO, closer to the Earth’s surface, are among the paths that could make D2C more relevant to Iran’s problem.
Under this scenario, foreign Starlink partner operators such as T-Mobile, Kyivstar or One NZ in New Zealand would declare Iranian territory a zone without terrestrial coverage and include it under their own service.
Politically and technically, this model comes closer to what Iranian citizens expect from the technology. In that case, a phone using a SIM card or eSIM from one of these operators could establish a D2C connection from inside Iran to SpaceX’s new-generation satellites. Reports say about 700 satellites of this type are already in orbit.
But making this scenario a reality is not limited to SpaceX’s will or decision. It requires an entire chain: frequency spectrum, regulatory licenses, compatible phones, modems, antennas, transmission power and chipsets that support new satellite bands.
Companies such as Qualcomm, MediaTek, Apple, Samsung and Google play a decisive role in this process. If phone hardware is not ready, even an advanced satellite constellation will not become a practical connection for users inside Iran.
Even under this optimistic scenario for Iran, three major obstacles remain: limited capacity, the possibility of radio interference, and the risk of users being identified through device registration and the Hamta system.
1. Capacity limits in densely populated areas
The first serious obstacle to widespread D2C deployment in Iran is capacity. This connection is not designed to replace urban internet. It is designed to deliver minimal connectivity to areas with no terrestrial coverage or weak coverage. But in Iran, the issue is not simply connecting a few users on a road or in a mountain area.
The issue is a communications blackout in cities where hundreds of thousands of people may simultaneously need messaging apps, voice and video calls, news, maps, email, financial services, and the ability to send photos and videos.
In some early tests, recorded bandwidth for a single connection reached about 14 Mbps. But this number should not be confused with the experience of urban internet speeds. In the real world, that limited bandwidth must be shared among all users across the wide area covered by each satellite.
To better understand the scale, in a city such as Tehran, if only 1% of residents simultaneously wanted a very basic 1 Mbps connection, the network would need capacity equivalent to 99 Gbps. Compared with the current capacity of each active D2C beam, which ranges from 4 to 17 Mbps, and even compared with an optimistic 150 Mbps outlook for future generations, this reveals a gap hundreds of times larger than current capabilities.
2. Radio interference from ground signals
Even if D2C can reduce the problems of capacity and dependence on domestic operators, it still faces an obstacle rooted in the physics of radio waves. To connect, a phone must receive a very weak signal from a satellite moving hundreds of kilometers above the Earth, while operating in an environment filled with nearby mobile towers, ground transmitters and local signals that are far stronger.
In this context, the ratio between the desired signal and surrounding interference determines whether the receiver can detect the satellite signal at all amid noise and terrestrial interference.
A nearby ground tower operated by MCI or Irancell could emit a signal so much stronger than the satellite signal that the phone’s receiver effectively fails to see the weaker signal or cannot build a stable connection on it.
In such a situation, the government does not need to target the satellite. It only needs to use towers, transmitters and control over mobile-network power levels to make the radio environment around the user unfavorable for satellite connectivity.
For the Islamic Republic, this type of interference could be fast, local and low-cost. So even if the satellite is beyond the government’s reach, the user’s phone remains on the ground, inside a radio environment that can be manipulated. Future versions with dedicated spectrum, better modems and more resilient protocols may reduce part of this vulnerability, but they will not eliminate it entirely.
3. Device registration and user identification
The more serious security question is how identifiable a user inside Iran would be when using D2C. In Iran, a phone is not merely a communication device. The SIM card, subscriber identity, device identity and the user’s real identity are linked together across several layers.
Every phone has a unique hardware identifier, or IMEI, which serves as the device’s identity on mobile networks. The Hamta system can link this identifier to the SIM card, activation history, ownership and, in many cases, the user’s real identity.
In such an environment, using a foreign SIM card or eSIM for satellite connectivity does not necessarily make the user anonymous. If a phone with a known IMEI suddenly tries to connect through an unauthorized satellite route using a foreign operator identifier, that behavior could become an unusual and flaggable pattern.
The combination of device registration, operator data, SIM-card databases and local monitoring tools could turn such a connection into a security risk. The key question, therefore, is how this can be done without exposing the user’s identity, location and behavioral pattern.
A strategic opportunity, not an immediate solution
Direct-to-Cell should be taken seriously, but it should not be exaggerated. For Iran, the appeal of this technology is clear: if one day an ordinary phone can connect to a satellite without a dish, separate terminal, domestic operator or Islamic Republic gateway, one of the foundations of Iran’s internet-control architecture will be challenged. But that day has not yet arrived. Current versions under development are mainly designed to cover dead zones, not to replace urban internet for tens of millions of users.
Limited capacity, the possibility of interference, and the risk of exposing and identifying users mean this technology is not currently a public and scalable escape route from Iran’s internet shutdown. Its present value is mostly as an emergency tool: sending messages, sharing locations, issuing alerts or maintaining brief communication during a crisis.
The future could be different if the next generation of satellites brings together higher capacity, independent spectrum, compatible phones, user security and global protective rules. Until then, Direct-to-Cell remains an important opening for the future — not today’s solution to the digital prison.
Muharram is the holiest month in the Shiite Muslim calendar. Its ninth and tenth days, Tasu'a and Ashura, commemorate the seventh-century killing of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, whose death at the Battle of Karbala symbolizes resistance against oppression and is marked each year with public mourning processions.
Messages received by Iran International suggest this year's ceremonies have drawn smaller crowds than in previous years, with many Iranians saying the nights of January 8 and 9 massacres have become their own Tasu'a and Ashura, when they mourn tens of thousands of those killed.
Social media posts also show many users replacing traditional Muharram images with photographs and names of people killed during recent protest crackdowns.
Many shared similar sentiments, writing: "We have had our own Ashura. We have seen the real oppressed."
Quieter ceremonies, different mourning
Videos sent to Iran International show some mourning processions incorporating tributes to those killed in the protests.
One resident said a banner bearing the names and photographs of protest victims was raised during Ashura ceremonies in Homayounshahr, near Isfahan, on June 25. According to the account, it was displayed openly during the religious gathering.
The mother of 25-year-old Mohammad Jafarpour, who was killed by security forces in Khomeinishahr, Isfahan province, on January 9, posted a video from his graveside on Wednesday.
"My mourning procession this year, my Ashura and Tasu'a, is your grave, my son," she wrote.
Several residents described this year's Muharram ceremonies as noticeably subdued.
A Tehran resident said that while passing Enghelab Square in central Tehran on June 24, coinciding with Tasu'a, they saw only a single woman waving the Islamic Republic's flag.
Another said chest-beating processions in their town, once dominated by young people, were this year attended mainly by older participants.
"The young people of our city were buried in January with all their dreams," the resident said.
For decades, Muharram rituals have been strongly promoted by the Islamic Republic and, in many state-supported ceremonies, religious observances have also served as platforms for political messaging and expressions of support for the government's ideological positions.
Karbala remembered through recent protests
Many said they now wear black during Muharram to mourn those killed in the January protests.
Some residents also said that mourning ceremonies in places including Kangavar in Kermanshah province included elegies for those killed during the protests.
Video received by Iran International showed the mother of a victim called Mohammad Radmannia addressing mourners during a Tasu'a ceremony in Tehran, urging them: "Do not let my son's path be extinguished."
Radmannia, 29, was killed by security forces during protests in Tehran's Nezamabad neighborhood on January 9.
Another video shared by the sister of 25-year-old Amirhossein Javadzadeh showed their mother searching through Muharram mourners while calling her son's name aloud.
Elsewhere, mourners in Lafmejan village in Gilan province gathered at the grave of 18-year-old Mani Safarpour during a Muharram procession. His photograph was mounted on ceremonial drums used in the procession. Safarpour was killed during protests in Tehran on January 8.
The use of Muharram commemorations to remember those killed in anti-government protests has continued since the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.
During Muharram in 2023, mourners in several cities sang protest songs, held symbolic performances honoring those killed, distributed memorial food offerings in their names and gathered at gravesides.
The investigation draws in part on a list of people recorded at Gharazi Hospital during the crackdown. Documents reviewed by Iran International have so far confirmed the identities of 24 people who died after being taken there.
Iran International has previously reported on several deaths connected to the hospital, including those of Iraj Kiani, Mohammadreza Saberi, Ahmadreza Mehrab Beik, Mehdi Masoumi and Mona Hosseini.
Those reports described a pattern of direct gunfire at protesters, denial of medical treatment, bodies removed without family consent, delayed release of remains, pressure on relatives and demands for large payments before bodies were handed over.
Hospital under security control
Witnesses, relatives and medical sources described the hospital as operating under tight security control during the three-day period.
They said security personnel controlled the hospital, many bodies were removed without informing families and records relating to some of the dead and wounded disappeared from the hospital's admission system.
More than 100 injured people were brought to the hospital on the evening of January 9, according to information received by Iran International. A hospital source said the names of a number of injured and killed were removed from the electronic registration system shortly after being entered.
One medical staff member estimated that 140 bodies linked to the hospital were identified or seen during the unrest, though other sources suggested the real figure may have been considerably higher.
Morgue accounts
Medical sources and eyewitnesses said the hospital morgue reached capacity on the nights of January 8 and 9, with bodies stacked on top of one another. Several sources also said that some wounded people were transferred there alongside those already dead.
One member of the medical staff told Iran International that groaning could be heard from inside one of the body bags after it reached the morgue, suggesting that at least one person was still alive. Security personnel, the source said, prevented staff from approaching the individual.
Witnesses also described bodies being moved to external storage facilities after the morgue became full.
Families told Iran International that some bodies were withheld for several days before being released under heavy security restrictions, with payments of between five billion and 10 billion rials, roughly $3,500 to $7,000 at the time, reportedly demanded before remains were returned.
The reports contrast with an announcement by Iran's Legal Medicine Organization on January 12 that examinations of those injured during the protests and the release of victims' bodies would be free of charge.
Protester's final hours
Among the cases documented is that of Farid Seifi, who was shot during the protests on January 8.
Witnesses said a security officer fired from a rooftop, striking him in the heart. His family took him to Gharazi Hospital while he was still breathing, but he later died there.
People close to the family said security personnel subsequently removed his body. After several days and the payment of a substantial sum, his body were returned and buried under heavy security on January 15.
He had been married for only one year and eight months, and his wife was pregnant with triplets when he was killed.
Information from the streets of Isfahan also indicates that Gharazi Hospital became the destination for many people wounded by direct fire from security forces during the protests.
A witness said thousands of people had gathered when security forces advanced from the nearby streets on January 9. Officers first used tear gas and long-range fire before moving closer and opening direct fire on the crowd, according to the witness.
Several people fell after a burst of gunfire, forcing protesters to flee through side streets, the witness said.
One protester was struck by three bullets. "People tried to call emergency services, but the lines were busy," the witness said. "Eventually, several people stopped a car and asked the driver to take the protester's body to the hospital."
Wounded teenager says hospital opened judicial case
In a separate account, an 18-year-old identified as Mehdi said he was shot with live ammunition from about 10 meters away during protests in Isfahan on January 8, with the bullet striking above his knee.
He said protesters first took him to a nearby house, where they stemmed the bleeding. "As the number of wounded increased and space ran out, some protesters were treated in residential parking garages," he said.
Because of heavy blood loss, Mehdi later sought treatment at Gharazi Hospital, where he said staff opened a judicial case for him. Security agents visited his home several times after his hospital visit, he added.
Accounts received by Iran International show that fear of arrest, torture or being killed at hospitals led many wounded protesters to avoid medical centers altogether or leave shortly after arriving. Some instead received treatment in homes and parking garages with the help of local residents and medical staff.
The pattern has also meant that the true number of people wounded and killed was never fully recorded in official systems or, in some cases, disappeared after initial registration.
Iran International's campaign into the small town of Mamasani killings in Fars province has previously documented similar accounts of wounded protesters receiving treatment at home because they feared arrest at hospitals.
The campaign to establish the facts surrounding the January protest crackdown continues by collecting, examining and verifying accounts from witnesses, victims' families, medical staff and local sources.
Testimony reviewed by Iran International has made Gharazi Hospital one of the central locations in the investigation. Multiple sources described it not only as a hospital where wounded protesters were denied treatment, but also as a site where bodies were used to intimidate families, extract payments, conceal evidence and erase traces of the killings.
The index, produced for Iran in collaboration with Impact Iran, said torture remained deeply embedded in the country’s law, policy and practice, and warned that US and Israeli strikes on Iran during the June 2025 military escalation had further increased the risk of torture, ill-treatment and arbitrary detention.
The report said Iran scored at the most severe level on six of the index’s seven pillars: political commitment, police and institutional violence, impunity, victims’ rights, the right to defend human rights, and protection for all. It rated Iran as high-risk on conditions in detention.
It said Iran had not ratified the UN Convention against Torture, did not criminalize torture as a distinct offense, and continued to allow punishments such as flogging and amputation.
The report also cited the use of confessions in convictions, saying this created incentives for torture and ill-treatment to extract statements, including confessions later broadcast by state media.
It said at least 1,639 executions were recorded in Iran in 2025, including executions of people who were under 18 at the time of their alleged offenses.
The index also pointed to what it called near-total impunity, saying no independent body investigates torture allegations or deaths in custody, while overcrowded detention facilities operate with little or no outside oversight.
Women and girls, ethnic minorities, LGBTQIA+ people, human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers face heightened risks of torture, arbitrary detention and other abuse, the report said.
“In Iran, torture is not a failure of the system – it is the system: written into law, rewarded by the courts, and concealed behind prison walls,” said Rose Richter, Impact Iran’s executive director.
Richter said security forces fired on civilians even inside hospitals during the crackdown of December 2025 and January 2026, when more than 50,000 people were arrested and more than 7,000 killed.
Other rights groups and monitoring organizations have previously reported higher figures for the crackdown, pointing out the difficulty of verifying casualties and arrests amid restrictions on access, intimidation of families and limited independent reporting inside Iran.
“Behind each of those numbers is a person whose suffering was deliberate, and a family still waiting for the truth,” Richter said.
Gerald Staberock, secretary general of OMCT, said the index was intended to turn “scattered warnings into evidence that cannot be ignored.”
“The Global Torture Index should be read by development agencies, but also by security actors and businesses seeking to engage or invest in the countries covered,” Staberock said.
OMCT urged Iran to halt executions and judicial corporal punishment, ratify the UN Convention against Torture, criminalize torture, end the use of coerced confessions and give the UN Fact-Finding Mission unhindered access.
