A thaw with the US won't fill Iranian tables overnight

Hardline opposition in Iran to the Islamabad MoU increasingly resembles the reaction of ultraconservatives to the 2015 nuclear deal.

The parallels now extend beyond the critics themselves: a message attributed to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on Thursday offered cautious backing for the agreement while signaling reservations about its terms, recalling the balancing act performed by his father during the JCPOA debate.

When then–Foreign Minister Javad Zarif returned to Tehran after the JCPOA was announced in Vienna in July 2015, vigilante groups gathered at the airport, threatening to lynch him on arrival.

Eleven years later, similar militant factions in Tehran and Mashhad have been heard chanting death threats against chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, denouncing them as “traitors” and “mercenaries of the United States.”

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The parallels now extend beyond the critics themselves: a message attributed to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on Thursday offered cautious backing for the agreement while signaling reservations about its terms, recalling the balancing act performed by his father during the JCPOA debate.

When then–Foreign Minister Javad Zarif returned to Tehran after the JCPOA was announced in Vienna in July 2015, vigilante groups gathered at the airport, threatening to lynch him on arrival.

Eleven years later, similar militant factions in Tehran and Mashhad have been heard chanting death threats against chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, denouncing them as “traitors” and “mercenaries of the United States.”

The comparison is striking despite the very different nature of the two agreements.

The JCPOA was a comprehensive, multilateral non-proliferation accord negotiated in peacetime. The June 2026 MoU, by contrast, is a rapid bilateral framework designed to halt a destructive war, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and create a 60-day window for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.

In 2015, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ultimately shielded Zarif and his team, praising their “services to the nation and Islam” despite earlier criticism. A decade later, Mojtaba Khamenei appears to be performing a more cautious version of the same role.

In doing so, he echoed a familiar formula: approving diplomacy while distancing himself from its potential costs. He said he had authorized the agreement despite reservations in principle, after receiving assurances that Iran’s rights and the interests of the “Resistance Front” would be protected.

Hardline outlets and figures have recycled much of the same language deployed against the JCPOA, warning of “capitulation,” “retreat” and repeated “betrayals,” while more pragmatic and reformist-leaning voices defend the MoU as a system-approved effort to secure economic relief and end the war.

Notably, some of the loudest opponents of the Islamabad MoU, including ultraconservative MP Mahmoud Nabavian and Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari, played a similar role in 2015.

Ultraconservative factions continue to accuse negotiators of falling into a Western trap. Elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) view provisions requiring a freeze on enrichment levels and the return of IAEA inspectors to damaged facilities as an unacceptable concession.

The parallels are not exact, but the political script has proved remarkably durable. In both periods, opponents of diplomacy have framed engagement with Washington as a threat to national sovereignty and security.

The JCPOA sought to resolve a long-running nuclear dispute through a detailed and legally complex framework. The Islamabad MoU is a temporary political arrangement intended to stop active hostilities and create space for further negotiations.

Yet some critics on both sides have approached it through the same lens that shaped the debate over the JCPOA.

Similar concerns surfaced at the ongoing G7 summit in France, where several European leaders urged President Trump to adopt a tougher stance toward Tehran and ensure that any future agreement contains sufficient safeguards against the potential weaponization of Iran’s nuclear activities.

Trump may feel free to dismiss such concerns, believing European governments have offered limited support for his campaign against Tehran. Ghalibaf, by contrast, is clearly attempting to persuade domestic hardliners to accept the agreement.

Addressing the Chamber of Commerce on Wednesday, he declared: “All of us must take over the trench that was held by the battlefield warriors, stand firm, lift the people out from under economic pressures, and build the country with power.”

Mojtaba Khamenei’s statement appeared designed to contain opposition from within the conservative camp. While emphasizing that he had approved the agreement only after receiving specific assurances from Iranian officials, he portrayed the decision as a conditional endorsement rather than a strategic shift, signaling to critics that support for the memorandum should not be mistaken for acceptance of broader concessions to Washington.

By invoking the language of wartime sacrifice while defending a diplomatic agreement, Ghalibaf appeared to be making a familiar argument: that negotiation, however unpopular among hardliners, may sometimes be necessary to preserve the very system they seek to defend.

In his first message after the signing of the MoU, Mojtaba Khamenei said on Thursday he authorized the agreement only after President Masoud Pezeshkian, as head of the Supreme National Security Council, accepted responsibility for safeguarding Iran’s national rights and the interests of the “Resistance Front.”

He said Pezeshkian had pledged on behalf of himself and other council members to protect Iran’s rights and those of the Resistance Front, and had made clear that excessive US demands would be rejected.

“He also made clear that if the American side seeks excessive demands, they will not accept them,” Khamenei said.

The message reflected a pattern long associated with his father’s leadership: endorsing a major decision while maintaining a degree of political distance from its outcome.

By emphasizing Pezeshkian’s responsibility and the Supreme National Security Council’s assurances, Khamenei appeared to leave himself room to fault the government if the MoU falters, while retaining credit if it holds.

In his message, Khamenei said Iranian officials had made extensive efforts “out of compassion and goodwill” to reach the agreement, while accusing US President Donald Trump of acting “out of desperation” and using “all kinds of leverage” to secure it.

In-person talks with US

Khamenei also appeared to prepare the ground for upcoming in-person meetings between Iranian and American officials, saying, “It is self-evident that the in-person negotiations that will take place in the future will not mean acceptance of the enemy’s position.”

The message appeared aimed at both justifying his approval of the MoU and shifting political responsibility for its outcome to Pezeshkian and the Supreme National Security Council, as hardliners continued to criticize the agreement.

“From this moment, we — you, the proud nation, and this humble servant — will await the realization of the stated conditions,” he said.

US says blockade lifted

US Central Command said on Thursday that American forces had lifted the blockade on all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports and coastal areas in accordance with Trump’s direction.

“American forces are not impeding the transit of vessels to or from Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman,” CENTCOM said in a post on X.

“All US military blockade enforcement efforts have ceased,” it added.

CENTCOM said US naval ships would remain in the area to ensure all aspects of the agreement were “adhered to, obeyed and in full force and effect.”

Iran sets Hormuz procedures

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council in turn said commercial vessels seeking passage through the Strait of Hormuz must submit requests to the Persian Gulf Strait Administration through PGSA.ir, in line with clause 5 of what Tehran calls the Islamabad memorandum of understanding.

The council said no fees would be charged to applicants for 60 days under the terms of the MoU, adding that the costs would be covered by the Iranian government.

It said the Persian Gulf Strait Administration had been instructed to process and respond to requests “with speed and priority” to help implement the objectives of the agreement.

The council added that because of “special conditions” and safety risks along the route, ships must pass through the strait at the assigned time and along the assigned route to ensure safe transit and prevent maritime incidents.

The parallel announcements marked the first visible steps by both sides to implement the maritime provisions of the MoU, after weeks of confrontation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz arrangements are among the first practical tests of the MoU, which began implementation Thursday and opened a 60-day period for negotiations toward a final agreement.

For Iran, the new process allows Tehran to retain a role in managing passage through the strait while waiving fees for 60 days and pledging to facilitate traffic. For Washington, the lifting of the blockade signals a reciprocal step while keeping US naval forces in the area to monitor compliance.

The central question, some observers say, is no longer whether Iran lost the war but whether it survived long enough to turn military setbacks into political gains.

"The Iranian regime is now entering the strategy of what I call surviving, recovering, and rebuilding," former Israeli intelligence official and Middle East analyst Avi Melamed said.

That assessment reflects a broader regional anxiety that after years of pressure on Iran's so-called Axis of Resistance, Tehran may now gain the time and space necessary to reconstruct its influence.

Since the October 7 attacks and the ensuing regional conflict, Iran's proxy network has faced unprecedented pressure. Hezbollah and Hamas have been weakened, while Iranian military infrastructure has come under direct attack.

Yet some in the region fear a return to “square one and even in the worst conditions,” as Melamed put it.

"The Iranian regime marked a triumph," Melamed added. "As far as the Iranian regime is concerned, it views itself as the victorious one."

Whether Tehran can ultimately translate survival into renewed influence will depend in part on whether the emerging understanding with Washington evolves into a durable agreement.

But the prospect alone has already prompted debate across the region about the political consequences of the war.

A changing Middle East

The implications extend beyond Iran.

Middle East analyst and ISGAP research fellow Dalia Ziada argues that one consequence of the war may be a more fragmented regional order. The familiar framework of an Iran-led axis facing Israel and moderate Arab states may no longer adequately describe the region's evolving dynamics.

"What we thought is a Gulf Cooperation Council or a unified Gulf opposition is now being dismantled, dismantled severely," Ziada said, adding that Iran's Arab neighbours will increasingly “act individually and they will not be shy about it.”

According to Ziada, the post-war Middle East may increasingly be shaped by competition between regional powers, mainly “between Turkey and the axis it represents and Israel and the axes it represents.”

This fragmentation comes at a moment of growing uncertainty over America's role in the region.

The reliability question

One theme surfaced repeatedly across interviews: concerns over US credibility.

"There is a narrative that has been already circling around for many years," Melamed said. "That narrative basically says that the United States is not a reliable ally."

Many Persian Gulf states had hoped the war would significantly reduce Iran's regional influence. Instead, the prospect of a US-Iran understanding has generated unease among some regional actors who fear Tehran could once again rebuild its capabilities.

Ziada argued that many regional actors feel abandoned.

"The US probably is not the same ally we expected it would be," she said.

For Arab monarchies, geography remains inescapable. Iran is not a distant adversary but a permanent neighbor with missile capabilities and extensive regional networks.

If the regime emerges emboldened, Persian Gulf states may increasingly feel compelled to accommodate Tehran even as they continue to view it as a threat.

Victory or strategic pause?

Not all analysts agree that Iran has emerged stronger.

Iran scholar Maj. (res.) Alex Grinberg argues that military realities still matter. In his view, Iran's ability to project power has been significantly degraded.

"Iran is now fighting for its survival and it fails to project power," said Grinberg of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and the Turan Research Center.

He cautions against viewing the conflict through a zero-sum lens in which anything short of regime collapse constitutes failure.

"The balance of power shifted in favor of the US and Israel," he said. But, he added, "it doesn't mean that Israel and America control the Middle East."

Grinberg also argued that Tehran may be exploiting Washington's priorities.

"Iran is, of course, exploiting the weakness of the US, which resides in the mere desire to reach a deal," he said.

Whether Tehran ultimately gains influence, he argues, depends less on Iran itself than on the choices made in Washington.

A people forgotten

Lost amid discussions of geopolitics and regional balances of power are the people of Iran themselves.

Many Iranians had hoped that increased pressure on the Islamic Republic would lead to meaningful political change after years of repression and deadly crackdowns. Instead, some now express feelings of abandonment.

Melamed acknowledged those expectations.

"There has been a lot of expectations and hope," he said. "Well, it doesn't seem to be like the case at least at this point."

For many inside Iran, the post-war settlement is viewed not as a breakthrough but as a return to a status quo that has repeatedly failed to address their aspirations.

Their frustration underscores a deeper question: if military pressure, mass protests and international isolation do not alter the regime's behavior, what comes next?

The answer may determine not only Iran's future but also the future balance of power in the Middle East.

Wars do not always end with winners and losers. Sometimes they end with paradoxes.

The greatest paradox of all may be that a weakened Iran could still emerge with greater influence.

Its implementation began Thursday, Vance told reporters at the White House, opening a 60-day negotiation period in which the two sides are expected to work out the terms of a final agreement. Talks are set to start Friday, with the US vice-president expected to join the negotiations Sunday.

Vance said the final deal, unlike the interim MoU, would have to settle the core US demands on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs: no uranium enrichment, the destruction of enriched uranium stocks and limits on the range of Iranian missiles.

“This is not the Obama deal,” Vance said, contrasting Trump’s approach with the 2015 nuclear agreement. “The Obama deal allowed the Iranians to enrich uranium. This deal will not allow the Iranians to enrich uranium.”

He said Tehran would also have to give up its existing enriched material under any final agreement.

“The enriched uranium stockpile has to be destroyed,” Vance said.

Vance added that the final deal would also restrict Iran’s missile program, saying, "We do expect that as part of the final deal they are not going to be able to build the kind of missiles that can broadly threaten the entire world."

No money without compliance

Vance rejected suggestions that Iran would automatically receive major financial benefits under the MoU, saying Tehran would get no US money and would only gain access to sanctions relief or outside investment if it fully complied and changed its behavior.

“The part of this MOU that I think have been most misrepresented by certain parts of the media is the idea that the Iranians get all these benefits,” Vance said. “You will hear things about $300 billion or $24 billion or this or that number of money or amount of money.”

“The simple fact is that the only way the Iranians get any of those resources, not a single penny, by the way, from the United States of America under any circumstances, but the only way that they would ever get any benefit of the bargain is if they comply fully and change their behavior,” he added.

Vance said the arrangement left Washington in a strong position regardless of Tehran’s choice.

“If the Iranians don’t change their behavior, their military and their nuclear program is still destroyed,” he said. “If they do change their behavior, then they are going to have a transformative relationship with the Middle East, and the Middle East will have a transformative relationship with the people of Iran.”

US sign-off for investment

Vance said any future foreign investment in Iran would require US approval because sanctions relief, waivers or exemptions would be needed before governments or companies could proceed.

He gave the United Arab Emirates as an example, saying Abu Dhabi could invest in Iran only if Tehran changed its behavior and Washington signed off on the necessary sanctions relief.

“Let’s say the United Arab Emirates, who have been a great ally over the last, not just a few months, but over the last many years. Let’s say that they would like to invest in building a power plant,” Vance said in earlier remarks. “That actually is impossible right now, because of the way that US sanctions work.”

“What we’re saying is that if you behave, and if the Emiratis themselves want to build a power plant, then we will do the sanctions relief necessary to make that possible,” he added.

Vance said such investment would not simply reward Iran but create regional leverage over Tehran.

“The good thing about that is that it actually creates integration, which is leverage,” he said. “A world where the Gulf Coast Coalition has greater leverage into the Iranian economy is a world where the Iranians are going to be heavily prevented from misbehaving.”

Waivers and transparency

Vance argued that sanctions alone had failed to force Iran to change its behavior, while the new approach would give Washington a clearer view of where money goes once restrictions are lifted.

Under the approach described by Vance, economic openings would depend on specific US approvals, including sanctions waivers, rather than broad or automatic relief. That would allow Washington to track which countries or companies invest in Iran, what projects they fund and whether Tehran is complying with its commitments.

“So, what I’d ask all of you is just to report honestly that the United States isn’t giving up a cent of money to Iran,” Vance said. “And even the economic benefits, the sanctions relief, and so forth, that comes along with this bargain only happens if the Iranians perform.”

Pragmatists gaining ground in Iran

He also said there were “real divisions” inside Iran over how to proceed and argued that “pragmatists” in the Iranian system were gaining ground.

“What we’ve seen over the last couple of months is that the pragmatists within the Iranian system, the people who really do want to transform their relationship with the Middle East and within the world, those people are winning the argument,” Vance said.

“The United States wants those people to win the argument,” he added. “The United States wants to have a better relationship, but in order for that to happen, the Iranians have to perform, and if they don’t perform, as we’ve said before, they don’t get any of the benefits of the bargain.”

Hormuz traffic resumes

Vance said Iran was complying with its early commitments in the Strait of Hormuz, where shipping traffic began to recover after weeks of confrontation.

“Last night, 12.5 million barrels of oil were through the Strait of Hormuz,” Vance said, describing it as the highest level since the beginning of the conflict.

“The Iranians, for the second night in a row, did not shoot at any ships in the Strait of Hormuz,” Vance said. “So far they are honoring their end of the commitment.”

Vance said US Central Command had allowed more than a dozen ships to pass through the naval blockade, saying Washington was also honoring its side of the early military provisions of the agreement.

US Central Command said separately that American forces had lifted the blockade on all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports and coastal areas in accordance with Trump’s direction.

“American forces are not impeding the transit of vessels to or from Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman,” CENTCOM said in a post on X.

“All U.S. military blockade enforcement efforts have ceased,” it added.

CENTCOM said US naval ships would remain in the area to ensure all aspects of the agreement were “adhered to, obeyed and in full force and effect.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in turn, said traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would be increased gradually and that vessels should pass at the time and along the route allocated to them due to security issues.

Technical details about passage through the strait will be announced by the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, the council said.

Measures on mine clearance will be carried out under the Islamabad memorandum of understanding, it added.