The United Arab Emirates said Friday morning local time that its air defenses were engaging Iranian missile and drone threats, in a fresh sign of strain on the fragile ceasefire between Tehran and Washington.
Few details were immediately available about the reported attack, which came a day after US and Iranian forces exchanged fire around the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian media have welcomed Beijing’s unusually sharp rhetoric in support of Tehran, portraying recent Chinese diplomacy as evidence of a deepening strategic partnership.
Much of the coverage has focused on Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Beijing and his meetings with senior Chinese officials.
During the trip, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered some of Beijing’s strongest language to date on the conflict, condemning what he called “warmongering by the US and Israel” and warning that the region had reached a “decisive turning point.”
Iranian outlets quickly cast the remarks as evidence that China was moving closer to Tehran.
But beneath the celebratory tone lies a more complicated reality: China sees Iran as a useful junior partner, not an ally worth sacrificing its broader economic interests for.
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Oil prices could rise above $167 a barrel if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed through September, the Washington Post reported, citing projections from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Such levels would likely push US gasoline prices above $5 a gallon, up from the current national average of $4.46, according to AAA.
The report said some analysts see an even more severe scenario, with major banks including Macquarie warning crude prices could hit $200 a barrel by early summer.
Based on previous energy shocks, the Post noted, that could send US gasoline prices above $7 a gallon, potentially enough to trigger a global recession.
US President Donald Trump warned Iran to quickly sign an agreement with Washington, saying Tehran would face severe consequences if there is no ceasefire or deal.
“If there’s no ceasefire, you’re just going to have to look at one big glow coming out of Iran,” Trump said at the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool. “They better sign the agreement fast. If they don’t sign, they’re going to have a lot of pain.”
Trump said negotiations with Iran were still underway and referred to the passage of three US destroyers through the Strait of Hormuz amid clashes with Iranian forces.
“We’re negotiating with the Iranians,” Trump said. “You probably heard, we took our three destroyers, and we rammed them through some pretty big stuff today, and we knocked the hell out of them. The destroyers weren’t hurt in any way.”
The surge in diesel prices triggered by the Iran war is expected to accelerate China’s transition toward electric heavy trucks, potentially speeding the decline in fuel demand in the world’s largest oil importer, analysts and automakers say.
Electric heavy trucks, once a niche segment, accounted for nearly a third of new heavy truck sales in China in 2025, driven by government subsidies, lower refuelling costs and expanding charging infrastructure.
According to data provider CVWorld.cn, sales of new-energy heavy trucks rose 45% year-on-year to 44,000 units in early 2026, accounting for more than a quarter of the market, up from less than 20% a year earlier.
Iranian media have welcomed Beijing’s unusually sharp rhetoric in support of Tehran, portraying recent Chinese diplomacy as evidence of a deepening strategic partnership.
Much of the coverage has focused on Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Beijing and his meetings with senior Chinese officials.
During the trip, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered some of Beijing’s strongest language to date on the conflict, condemning what he called “warmongering by the US and Israel” and warning that the region had reached a “decisive turning point.”
Iranian outlets quickly cast the remarks as evidence that China was moving closer to Tehran.
Economic daily Donya-ye-Eqtesad linked Beijing’s rhetoric to Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to China, arguing that the Chinese were trying to secure a de-escalation framework before the summit while resisting US pressure over the Strait of Hormuz.
Other Iranian analyses cited Chinese Communist Party journals describing the conflict as a costly strategic failure for Washington.
The Iranian economic site Tahlil Bazaar highlighted articles in Qiushi arguing that the war had damaged US credibility and increased economic pressure on Western countries through rising energy prices.
These narratives, amplified by Iranian media, emphasized Iran’s asymmetric tactics and their impact on global markets. But beneath the celebratory tone lies a more complicated reality: China sees Iran as a useful junior partner, not an ally worth sacrificing its broader economic interests for.
China’s messaging has not been uniformly supportive. Chinese officials have repeatedly stressed opposition to any action threatening shipping lanes or escalating regional instability.
Iranian media also quoted Beijing calling for a “complete and immediate ceasefire” after Iranian strikes on oil facilities in neighboring states.
That dual messaging—rhetorical support for Tehran combined with warnings against escalation—reflects China’s real priorities.
Beijing’s first concern is the Strait of Hormuz. Although China buys discounted Iranian oil, it depends far more heavily on energy imports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
When Iran effectively closed the strait earlier this year, Chinese officials were reportedly alarmed by the resulting spike in energy prices and its potential impact on economic growth. For Beijing, disruptions in Hormuz are not ideological matters but direct threats to economic stability.
China’s second expectation is restraint. Despite the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” signed in 2021, Beijing has no interest in being dragged into a direct confrontation between Iran and the United States.
Since April, China has worked with Pakistan to facilitate temporary pauses in fighting, but Chinese officials have also made clear that Beijing will not fight on Iran’s behalf. Mediation, not military alignment, remains the limit of China’s commitment.
The third expectation is stability. China wants Iran strong enough to challenge US influence and remain a reliable sanctioned oil supplier, but not unstable enough to damage Beijing’s broader regional interests or require large-scale economic rescue.
Chinese analysts have increasingly warned that prolonged economic deterioration in Iran could complicate Beijing’s ties with Arab states across the Persian Gulf and undermine its long-term regional strategy.
This balancing act explains why China’s rhetoric has sharpened even as its limits have become clearer.
Beijing is willing to criticize the United States and Israel, support ceasefire diplomacy and pressure Washington politically. But it does not seem prepared to jeopardize its relationships in the region or Western markets to shield Iran from the consequences of a wider war.