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INSIGHT

War or economic collapse: can Iran withstand the pressure?

Apr 22, 2026, 01:05 GMT+1Updated: 02:09 GMT+1
The Iran International Insight townhall, held on April 21, 2026, in Washington, DC, featured panelists (from left to right): Mohammad Machine-Chian, Miad Maleki, Jason Brodsky and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin.
The Iran International Insight townhall, held on April 21, 2026, in Washington, DC, featured panelists (from left to right): Mohammad Machine-Chian, Miad Maleki, Jason Brodsky and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin.

Iran’s economy is likely to buckle faster than the United States or the global economy under the combined pressure of war, sanctions, a US blockade and Tehran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, experts said at Iran International’s townhall in Washington DC.

The war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran began on February 28 and continued until April 7, when a two-week ceasefire was announced. The ceasefire was extended on April 21, but a US blockade of Iranian ports remained in place.

Miad Maleki, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former senior sanctions strategist at the US Treasury, said Iran had spent decades threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz but had never prepared its own economy for the consequences including the naval blockade.

“If we’re at the point that we have to close the Strait of Hormuz, can our own economy handle $455 million a day in trade that we have to rely on going through the Strait of Hormuz?” Maleki said, referring to his earlier estimate of Iran's daily loss during the US blockade which has been in place since April 13.

Miad Maleki
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Miad Maleki

He said the answer was becoming clearer as the war, blockade, currency crisis and damage to key export sectors placed Iran under pressure faster than its adversaries.

While Hormuz disruption has created serious risks for global energy markets, Maleki argued that Iran’s own economic exposure to the waterway made Tehran more vulnerable than the countries it was trying to pressure.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, said Trump appeared willing to test that weakness through a strategy of coercive diplomacy backed by military force.

“He lays out the military option, prepares the theatre for US Central Command,” Brodsky said. “He then offers a diplomatic off-ramp for the Iranian regime. He lays out US terms and gives a deadline. And if the Iranian regime doesn’t play ball, he strikes.”

Who blinks first?

The discussion repeatedly returned to the question of who would break first: Iran, the United States, or the global economy. The blockade, imposed on April 13, has added to the pressure on Iranian trade, while Tehran’s disruption of Hormuz has turned the confrontation into a test of economic endurance for Iran, Washington and major Asian energy consumers.

Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, head of digital at Iran International and moderator of the townhall, said Iran’s disruption of Hormuz amounted to Tehran “putting sanctions on the world,” while the US blockade showed Washington using military power to enforce sanctions.

Bozorgmehr Sharafedin
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Bozorgmehr Sharafedin

Maleki said Asian economies would be the first major external victims of a prolonged Hormuz crisis because of their heavy dependence on energy flows through the strait. But he said the global impact did not change the basic balance of vulnerability.

“Asia is the first,” Maleki said, referring to economies dependent on energy flows through Hormuz. “North Korea, Japan, China and India, 89, 90 percent of their petroleum, 75 percent of their natural gas comes through the Strait of Hormuz. We’re not here in the US the main target of the economic ramifications of the Strait of Hormuz, but what’s happening in those countries will affect our economy.”

Still, he said, Iran had far less time to absorb the shock.

“The clock is much faster on Iran’s economy side than it is on our own side,” Maleki said. “But we know historically that the Iranian regime doesn’t really care to the extent that Iranians are starved or dealing with major economic issues.”

Brodsky said Trump was also likely willing to sustain pressure longer than many expected because he was in his second term and focused on legacy.

He argued that Washington had achieved through force what diplomacy alone had failed to achieve, including pushing Tehran to reportedly consider a one-year suspension of uranium enrichment.

Jason Brodsky
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Jason Brodsky

“President Trump is willing to go at this for longer than most people expect,” Brodsky said. “He is willing to take that risk because he is in legacy-building mode at the moment.”

Iran’s postwar economy

Mohammad Machine-Chian, a senior journalist covering economic affairs at Iran International and former head of market research at EcoIran, said Iran’s stock market had been closed for eight weeks, an unprecedented development in the history of the Tehran Stock Exchange.

He said the closure allowed policymakers to pretend prices had remained normal, while in reality the war had changed the value of companies, assets and investor expectations. The market, he said, was already in crisis before the war, even though nominal gains had masked the impact of inflation above 70 percent.

Mohammad Machine-Chian
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Mohammad Machine-Chian

Machine-Chian said banking was “in shambles,” the auto industry was deep in trouble, and the market had been relying heavily on export-oriented sectors such as petrochemicals, steel, oil and gas-related companies. Many of those sectors, he said, had been damaged or disrupted by the war.

“Even if they reopen the market, there’s no petrochemical, there’s no steel,” Machine-Chian said. “They have to rely on the banks, car manufacturers and other industries that rely on basically petrochemicals to begin with in the supply chain.”

He said a crash was likely if trading resumed, even with official limits preventing shares from falling by more than five percent a day.

“It doesn’t make any sense,” Machine-Chian said of those limits. “Nonetheless, that’s the way they’re managing it, but even in that scenario, I don’t think they can afford to open the markets.”

Machine-Chian said the economic crisis had reached a point where inflation should be discussed monthly rather than annually. In a best-case scenario involving a comprehensive agreement, he estimated inflation could still average at least five percent a month for the rest of 2026.

“I’m talking about inflation in months, no longer in years, and that is the reality we’re dealing with,” he said.

He said that in a “no war, no peace” scenario, prices could triple over the year. In the event of another conflict, he warned monthly inflation could exceed 20 percent, pushing annual price increases toward 500 percent.

Sanctions relief would not be quick

Maleki said even a diplomatic agreement would not quickly revive Iran’s economy because the sanctions regime is complex and private banks and companies remain deeply reluctant to handle Iran-related business.

He said the experience of the 2015 nuclear deal showed the limits of formal sanctions relief. Even when the US government tried to facilitate limited access to funds, he said, banks refused to touch Iranian money.

“They couldn’t find one single bank,” Maleki said. “Not just US banks, but little, tiny banks without any corresponding relationship with US banks to actually touch the money. At the end of the day they had to put the funds on a pallet and send them in cash.”

Maleki said Iran’s sanctions architecture was more layered than Syria’s and could take months or years to unwind. He added that even regime change would not automatically solve the immediate fiscal crisis.

“If we have a democratic government today, a transitional government established in Iran today, and the Islamic Republic is gone, that transitional government probably is not going to be able to pay government salaries for more than a week or two,” he said.

The warning underscored one of the main themes of the townhall: Iran’s economy is not merely under wartime pressure, but faces deeper structural damage that may outlast the fighting and any short-term diplomatic arrangement.

No access to cash

In the Q&A section, an audience member asked whether cash or access to frozen funds could allow the Islamic Republic to recover and rebuild its capabilities after the war.

Brodsky said that would be the worst possible move, arguing that Tehran would use any financial relief to rebuild the same military and security structures targeted during the conflict.

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“The worst thing that we could do right now is to flush the regime with cash,” Brodsky said. “It’s going to use that to rebuild its missile program, its nuclear program, its drone program, and all of its repression architecture.”

Maleki said direct cash transfers were unlikely because of legal restrictions, but access to restricted funds or sanctions relief for metals and petrochemicals could still provide Tehran with a lifeline.

He said those details would determine whether Iran’s weakened economy remains under pressure or gains enough room to recover.

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Opposition to US talks grows in Tehran as ceasefire deadline nears

Apr 21, 2026, 19:21 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee

Mounting opposition to negotiations with Washington in Tehran is casting doubt over whether Iran will proceed with a new round of talks with the United States in Islamabad as the ceasefire deadline approaches.

Iranian officials and state media have increasingly emphasized a lack of interest in continuing negotiations. State television has claimed that a majority of Iranians oppose further talks, a narrative reinforced by coverage from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlets including Fars News Agency and Tasnim News Agency.

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, who led Iran’s delegation in the first round of talks, struck a defiant tone earlier this week, saying Tehran would not accept negotiations “under the shadow of threats” and had spent the past two weeks preparing “to reveal new cards on the battlefield.”

Ali Abdollahi, commander of Iran's Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters, warned that Iranian forces are prepared to deliver an “immediate and decisive response” to any violation of agreements or commitments.

Abdollah Haji-Sadeghi, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, said “there are no negotiations for now,” adding: “We will negotiate whenever the enemy accepts our conditions.”

On the US side, rhetoric has also hardened. President Donald Trump told CNBC on Tuesday that he does not intend to extend the ceasefire and that Washington is prepared for a military approach.

According to the Washington Post, Vice President J. D. Vance’s planned trip to Islamabad has been postponed.

Political activist Ali Gholhaki, considered close to Ghalibaf, argued that negotiations in Islamabad should only occur if the United States ends its naval blockade and moderates its nuclear demands.

Hardline commentator Foad Izadi was even more explicit, saying in an interview that entering negotiations now would be a mistake.

“We must raise the cost of this war to a significant level,” he said. “Wars ultimately end with negotiations, but they have not yet paid the expected price.”

Opposition to talks has also surfaced within Iran’s parliament. Vahid Ahmadi reaffirmed Iran’s right to uranium enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating that enriched materials would “under no circumstances” be removed from the country.

State television also aired footage of a pro-government rally where participants chanted “Death to compromisers.” A television host claimed that 87% of Iranians believe the war should continue—an assertion critics say cannot be independently verified.

Despite the hardline chorus, some voices have warned against abandoning diplomacy.

Prominent Sunni cleric Molavi Abdolhamid warned of dire consequences, writing: “The country’s skies are under enemy control, infrastructure is at risk of destruction, and the armed forces lack adequate air defense tools. In this deadlock, the only path to salvation is a ‘fair agreement.’”

He asked what hardliners would say before God and the nation if their actions lead to “the nation’s ruin.”

Prominent journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi also criticized state media claims about public opinion, arguing that they encourage parts of society to oppose negotiations.

“Iranians seek sustainable peace and security and the lifting of sanctions,” he wrote. “Any trade-off that guarantees these is justified for the overwhelming majority.”

Ali-Asghar Shafieian, media adviser to President Masoud Pezeshkian, similarly challenged claims of unanimous anti-negotiation sentiment, noting that participants in public rallies do not represent all citizens.

“Those of us attending nightly gatherings are not the entirety of the people,” he said.

Tehran moderates see ‘no deal–no war’ limbo as worst outcome

Apr 21, 2026, 18:18 GMT+1
•
Behrouz Turani

Tehran’s commentariat is warning that the most troubling outcome of the current negotiations with Washington may be neither war nor peace, but a prolonged “no deal–no war” limbo.

With uncertainty surrounding the talks and the fragile ceasefire nearing its end, several outlets have begun outlining possible trajectories for the negotiations. While some reduce the situation to a simple binary of “deal or no deal,” others argue that the more likely outcome may lie somewhere in between.

Writing in the pro-government Etemad daily, columnist Babak Kazemi described three possible scenarios for the talks: a limited agreement on less contentious issues, a pause in negotiations due to irreconcilable differences, or a collapse of the process if either side insists on maximalist demands.

The dispute appears to center on several core issues, foremost among them Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran insists on its right to enrichment, while President Donald Trump has been pressing for “zero enrichment.”

Iran is also seeking full or at least partial lifting of US sanctions, along with guarantees that any agreement reached with the Trump administration would be honored by future US governments.

Kazemi suggested that the two sides’ experience with the 2015 nuclear agreement could serve as a foundation for progress, arguing that détente and mutual economic benefits could help stabilize the region.

He added that even if a comprehensive agreement proves out of reach, a limited deal could create space for broader negotiations later.

Other commentators are more pessimistic.

The reform-leaning Fararu website described Iran–US tensions as “complicated and multi-layered,” arguing that the two sides are neither heading toward full-scale conflict nor toward a durable agreement.

Instead, it portrayed the situation as a protracted game of attrition in which each side seeks to gain leverage before the crisis eventually reaches some form of resolution.

Former diplomat Jalal Sadatian echoed this view, saying neither Tehran nor Washington appears willing to start a war, yet neither sees a clear path to a sustainable agreement. He added that Israel’s role as a regional actor capable of escalating tensions further complicates the landscape.

Another veteran diplomat, Fereidoun Majlesi, offered an even bleaker assessment, telling Fararu that the United States is unlikely to accept anything short of Iran’s “surrender” and that the chances of reaching an agreement in Islamabad are extremely narrow.

Analysts writing on the Asr Iran website outlined several possible outcomes, arguing that the worst scenario would be the continuation of the current “no deal–no war” status quo.

The editorial warned that prolonged limbo would deepen economic instability and create a precarious security environment in which war could erupt at any moment, potentially giving Israel and the United States time and space to prepare for further attacks.

According to Asr Iran, even if wartime conditions temporarily foster social cohesion, the long-term strain would weaken the country’s internal resilience.

For that reason, the editorial called for a comprehensive and durable agreement that removes the pretext for future economic or military pressure and moves Tehran and Washington toward non-hostility and lasting peace.

Top condom maker plans price hikes of up to 30% amid US-Iran war impact

Apr 21, 2026, 14:19 GMT+1

Malaysia’s Karex Bhd, the world’s largest condom producer, plans to raise prices by 20% to 30% and possibly more if supply chain disruptions linked to the Iran war persist, its chief executive told Reuters.

CEO Goh Miah Kiat said rising costs across petrochemical-based inputs, including synthetic rubber, nitrile and packaging materials, were forcing the company to pass on higher prices to customers. “We have no choice but to transfer the costs right now,” he said.

Karex is also seeing demand rise by about 30% this year as shipping delays and higher freight costs leave customers with lower stockpiles.

Shipments to Europe and the United States are now taking close to two months to arrive, compared with about a month previously, the company said.

The company produces more than 5 billion condoms annually and supplies major brands including Durex and Trojan, as well as public health systems such as Britain’s NHS and UN-backed aid programs.

Karex said it has enough supplies for the coming months and is looking to boost output, but warned that ongoing disruptions to energy and petrochemical flows from the Middle East are tightening global supply chains.

Scam messages seek crypto for ships’ safe passage through Hormuz, firm warns

Apr 21, 2026, 08:52 GMT+1

Fraudulent messages offering ships safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for cryptocurrency have been sent to some shipping companies, Reuters reported on Tuesday, citing a maritime security firm.

Greek risk management firm MARISKS said unknown actors posing as Iranian authorities had contacted companies whose vessels are stuck west of the strategic waterway, asking for transit fees in Bitcoin or Tether in return for “clearance.”

"These specific messages are a scam," the firm said in an alert, adding the communications did not originate from Iranian authorities.

The warning comes as the United States continues a blockade of Iranian ports, while Iran has imposed restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint through which about a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas once passed before conflict disrupted flows.

Amid ceasefire talks, Tehran has suggested collecting tolls from vessels seeking safe transit, contributing to uncertainty among shipowners.

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Hundreds of vessels and roughly 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Persian Gulf due to the disruptions, according to the firm.

On April 18, when Iran briefly allowed limited passage subject to inspections, several ships attempted to transit, but at least two vessels, including a tanker, reported that Iranian boats fired shots, forcing them to turn back.

MARISKS said it believed at least one ship that came under fire while trying to leave the strait on Saturday may have been affected by the fraudulent scheme.

The messages cited by the firm said vessels would need to submit documents for review by Iranian security services, after which a cryptocurrency fee would be set before transit at a pre-arranged time.

Is Iran entering its Gorbachev moment?

Apr 21, 2026, 04:48 GMT+1
•
Ashkan Safaei

The idea of an “Iranian Gorbachev” has surfaced before in the Islamic Republic, but this time the conditions may be different.

At the peak of the Reform Movement in the late 1990s, when Iranian president Mohammad Khatami promoted political openness and civil society, hardliners labeled him Iran’s Gorbachev.

Hardliners like Hossein Shariatmadari and Hassan Abbasi used the title to demonize him, while opposition groups clung to the hope that he might accelerate the regime's collapse—a feat they themselves had been unable to achieve.

In reality, neither Khatami nor his inner circle accepted such a role. They repeatedly stressed that their reforms were intended to strengthen the system, not dismantle it. The structure of power at the time also made a true "Gorbachev moment" nearly impossible.

Now-slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei controlled the pace of reform, restraining both reformists and hardliners and preventing the political system from tipping into crisis.

Iranian society in the late 1990s was also not prepared for a total rupture with the state. A significant portion of the population still believed reform was possible. The generation shaped by the 1979 revolution remained politically active and hopeful.

Three decades later, the situation appears markedly different. A new generation, deeply disillusioned with the system, appears to settle for nothing less than regime change.

Over the past three years the Islamic Republic has endured repeated foreign military strikes. Ali Khamenei, referred to by many officials as the “system,” has been removed from the scene. Mojtaba, his son, lacks the authority that allowed his father to hold competing factions together during moments of crisis.

It is in this environment that an individual—or individuals—may unintentionally become "Iran’s Gorbachev." One possible candidate is Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf.

During the 40-day memorial of Ali Khamenei, Ghalibaf traveled to Islamabad to meet with the Vice President of the country that helped kill the Supreme Leader.

Signs suggest that the remnants of the regime, in a desperate attempt to remain in power, may be prepared to make concessions that strike at the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic.

US President Donald Trump’s demands—surrendering enriched uranium, permanently ending enrichment, and disarming Hezbollah—strike at core elements of the Islamic Republic’s identity. Accepting them could alienate the ideological base that has long defended the system.

Even without an official agreement, hints of retreat have already triggered anger among loyalist forces. Aggressive reactions from accounts linked to ultrahardline figures, accusing officials of "sedition" and a "coup," suggest tremors within the regime’s core supporters.

When a Jalili-aligned account writes, “If these are the Leader's orders, release a video of him saying so,” it signals how deeply trust in the central authority has eroded.

Another example of frustration within the regime’s ideological base appeared in a tweet warning: “Alas for the public’s rage and disillusionment when they learn what has been agreed upon and what is yet to come.”

During the final years of the USSR, the policies of Glasnost (Openness) and Perestroika (Restructuring) distanced the Soviet system from its founding ideals. When transparency exposed the privileges of party elites, the ideological base lost faith. Many refused to defend the system when it needed them most. The "Evil Empire" collapsed with startling speed.

If those in power in Tehran abandon uranium enrichment and withdraw support from Hezbollah, there is no guarantee that their ideological base will mobilize in their defense—or shoot protesters as they did in January.

Without Ali Khamenei to frame such a retreat as "Heroic Flexibility," Ghalibaf and his allies, in their struggle to preserve the system, could inadvertently become the Gorbachevs of Iran.