Iran says US must release its blocked assets before Islamabad talks
"Two of the measures mutually agreed upon between the parties have yet to be implemented: a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of Iran’s blocked assets prior to the commencement of negotiations," Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Friday on his X account.
"These two matters must be fulfilled before negotiations begin," said Ghalibaf who is expected to lead Iran's negotiating team at Islamabad talks slated for Saturday.
As US and Iranian envoys prepare to meet in Pakistan to explore a path out of the war, China is watching from further east—an influential but cautious actor that helped move diplomacy forward but is unlikely to become the guarantor Tehran would like.
The truce that emerged after six weeks of war remains fragile, even as diplomatic signals from Washington, Tehran and Islamabad suggest the meeting is likely to go ahead.
Amid the uncertainties and the mistrust, it was perhaps unsurprising that Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, publicly expressed hope that Beijing could act as a guarantor of the process. The suggestion followed reports that China maintained contact with both Washington and Tehran during the diplomatic push that helped produce the ceasefire.
Yet when asked directly about such a role, China’s foreign ministry avoided any commitment, saying only that Beijing hopes “all parties can properly resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation” and will maintain communication with those involved.
This episode reflects a broader pattern in China’s response to the war: exerting influence while avoiding commitment.
Beijing is engaged, but only up to a point. It maintains economic ties with Iran, continues to purchase its oil, and provides forms of support that help sustain the Iranian economy under pressure. Yet none of this amounts to the kind of backing Tehran would need in an existential conflict. There are no security guarantees, no military involvement, and no willingness to absorb significant strategic risks.
China’s limited readiness to intervene reflects both its capabilities and its priorities. Its actions are ultimately directed toward ensuring that the conflict does not disrupt its broader strategic agenda at minimal cost. Contributing to de-escalation can serve that objective, but only insofar as it advances clearly defined interests.
When the conflict began on February 28, Beijing was relatively well positioned to absorb the initial shock with the strategic reserves it had built up throughout 2025, the increasing electrification of its economy, and its vast domestic coal resources. It also soon became clear that Tehran could withstand the initial decapitation strikes.
At the same time, China’s regional strategy has increasingly shifted toward the monarchies across the Persian Gulf, reinforcing its preference for a balanced and non-committal posture.
The conflict also presents certain strategic opportunities. As the United States diverts military resources and political attention to the Middle East, pressure on China in the Indo-Pacific decreases. The war also offers insights into US military capabilities and operational patterns.
These advantages, however, depend on the conflict remaining limited. A prolonged war—such as the one that loomed when President Donald Trump warned that a “whole civilization will die”—poses significant risks.
China is poorly positioned to weather a global recession with ease. Exports remain essential for sustaining industrial output, growth and employment. A decline in external demand, combined with disruptions to key industrial and agricultural inputs, would therefore undermine a critical pillar of its economy.
Beijing wants stable relations with Washington, not least to buy time to strengthen its economy against future US pressure. In addition, the question of how to protect or evacuate the hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals in the region would become increasingly urgent if the conflict escalated further.
It was under these conditions that China chose to act. On the one hand, it vetoed a Bahrain-sponsored resolution at the UN Security Council that—even in revised form—could have provided legal cover for further attacks against Iran. On the other, it helped create a diplomatic off-ramp to a US president in clear need of one.
China’s role in the crisis thus highlights both the reach and the limits of its influence. Beijing has demonstrated an ability to shape outcomes at critical junctures, but it remains unwilling to assume the responsibilities of a security provider. Its actions are highly context-dependent: had Washington shown no interest in de-escalation, or had diplomatic openings not emerged, China’s ability to intervene would likely have been far more limited.
The Chinese leadership, in other words, is not seeking to resolve the conflict as much as to manage its consequences. It intervenes not to build a lasting order, but to prevent outcomes that would damage its broader strategic agenda.
As long as that calculation holds, Beijing will remain an influential—but ultimately cautious and constrained—actor in Middle Eastern security.
Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said the country’s armed forces have a "finger on the trigger", signaling heightened military readiness ahead of negotiations with the United States in Pakistan.
The military command warned that any continued attacks on Lebanon's Hezbollah would be met with a “crushing” and “painful” response.
It also said Iran will take its management of the Strait of Hormuz into a “new phase,” vowing to maintain initiative and not back down from what it called its rights.
Senior Iranian officials are locked in a dispute over the composition and authority of the delegation set to negotiate with the United States in Islamabad, sources with knowledge of the matter told Iran International.
IRGC commander-in-chief Ahmad Vahidi is seeking to curb the authority of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in the talks, according to the sources.
Vahidi has also pushed for the inclusion of Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, in the negotiating team — a move opposed by current members, who consider him lacking experience for strategic negotiations, the sources said.
At the same time, Vahidi and the IRGC Aerospace Force commander have stressed that the delegation must avoid any negotiations over Iran’s missile program.
US Vice President JD Vance said on Friday he is looking forward to negotiations with Iran, adding that President Donald Trump has provided clear guidelines for the talks. He said he believes the negotiations will be positive.
"As the president of the United States said, if the Iranians are willing to negotiate in good faith, we're certainly willing to extend the open hand," Vance said. "If they're going to try to play us, then they're going to find the negotiating team is not that receptive."
An Iranian hardline cleric said the country’s leader approved a ceasefire while warning forces it would not be upheld and fighting would continue.
Mashhad Friday prayers imam Ahmad Alamolhoda said on Friday, “the leader [Mojtaba Khamenei] allowed the Supreme National Security Council to accept a ceasefire, but also told fighters it is false and the enemy will not adhere to it.”
“The Supreme National Security Council also announced it would accept a ceasefire to counter the US plot, but it ultimately became clear that the ceasefire itself was false and the enemy does not abide by one.”