Iranian expats say UAE canceled their residency visas, leaving many stranded

In response to Operation Epic Fury, Tehran turned to asymmetric leverage, relying on its capacity to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and drive up global oil prices.

Anticipating market volatility, the US Treasury issued a targeted sanctions waiver designed to stabilize oil markets while preserving financial pressure on Tehran.

Yet as the waiver framework evolved from an India-specific mechanism into a more generalized policy, it continued in practice to serve Indian refiners, redirecting sanctioned crude away from China and toward India.

The Russian test case

On March 5, Treasury issued a waiver allowing Indian refiners — IOC, BPCL, HPCL, and Reliance Industries — to purchase already-produced Russian crude cargoes that were on the water.

When Treasury expanded the waiver on March 12–13, Indian refiners remained the only significant buyers of the authorized Russian barrels. The expansion continued to apply only to cargoes already on the water, did not restore formal banking channels, and did not lift underlying sanctions.

Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official, described General License U as authorizing “the commodity transaction; it says nothing about payment.” The license permits the sale of oil but does not restore banking access or create a formal payment channel. That distinction allowed trade in physical barrels while preserving financial pressure.

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  India tells US it needs Iran, Venezuela crude to offset Russian cuts

The Iranian extension

The March 20 application of the same waiver model to roughly 170 million barrels of Iranian crude floating offshore replicated the policy — and once again, India remained the only swing buyer.

Reliance Industries, the largest Indian public company, purchased 5 million barrels of Iranian crude at a $7 premium to Brent. The same Indian refiners, IOC, BPCL, and HPCL, reportedly plan to resume purchases.

Homayoun Falakshahi, head of crude oil analysis at Kpler, said Iranian crude often remains unsold until reaching Asian discharge zones such as Singapore or Malaysia. Because many cargoes were already produced but waiting for buyers, releasing them under the waiver had immediate supply effects. He added: “Now that India has entered as a competitor, the price in China will most likely increase.”

In effect, India’s participation disrupted China’s near-monopsony over sanctioned Iranian crude — reshaping pricing leverage without formally lifting sanctions.

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  Iran still depends on Hormuz despite years of workarounds

Before 2019, Indian refiners imported roughly 450,000 barrels per day of Iranian crude under contracts with National Iranian Oil Company. They retain the technical configuration and commercial familiarity to scale quickly within short waiver windows. That institutional memory gives Washington a ready-made alternative buyer base whenever it chooses to recalibrate supply pressure.

India’s strategic ascent

India’s admission into the Pax Silica, formalized on February 20, placed it within the US-led supply-chain initiative focused on reducing dependence on China in semiconductor and AI production. As Under Secretary Jacob Helberg said: "Pax Silica is really not about China, it is about America. We want to secure our supply chains. We view India as a partner to help de-risk and diversify those supply chains."

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Israel on February 25–26, where the two countries elevated ties to a “special strategic partnership.” Two days later, Operation Epic Fury began.

The new world order

Early in President Trump’s second term, Washington sought to reshape the global order. India was expected to become a counterweight to China, and Iran was given a chance for realignment. Neither objective materialized at the outset. India’s role remained limited, negotiations with Iran collapsed, and a 12-day war followed. Trade and tariff disputes further complicated the restructuring effort.

Washington’s tactical support of India’s energy role may carry implications beyond temporary oil supply management. Pax Silica realigns industrial supply chains; the waiver framework redirects sanctioned energy flows. Together, they position India within the technological and commodity axes of great-power competition.

This suggests a second, more structured attempt to reshape the global order. With India onboard, the decisive variable becomes whether Operation Epic Fury generates sufficient leverage to push Iran away from its long-standing partnerships with Beijing and Moscow. A realignment toward Washington could be the tipping point in the consolidation of this new order.

On March 20, Iran fired two long-range ballistic missiles at the Diego Garcia base, a target long considered beyond its declared range of around 2,000 kilometers.

Iran’s attempted long-range strike — which US officials say did not hit its target — marks the first time Tehran has demonstrated the ability to reach as far as Diego Garcia.

For years, Iran claimed its missile range was capped at around 2,000 kilometers. That claim now appears increasingly untenable.

The attempted strike exposes a reality that can no longer be ignored, experts told this week's episode of Eye for Iran: Tehran’s missile capabilities extend far beyond the Middle East, its hardened arsenal has withstood sustained US and Israeli strikes, and the conflict is now colliding with critical global pressure points — from the Strait of Hormuz to the growing likelihood of a broader military phase.

A threat no longer abstract

Iran’s ballistic missile threat is no longer abstract — it is real and expanding.

Both Janatan Sayeh, an Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and Farzin Nadimi, a defense and military expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, warned on the Eye for Iran podcast that Tehran’s capabilities now extend far beyond previously stated limits — potentially reaching as far as the United Kingdom.

“This should not come as a surprise,” Sayeh said. He noted that Iranian missiles and drones have already been used on European soil through Russia.

“The difference now is that the regime itself can launch them directly from Iranian territory," said Sayeh.

The shift marks a critical evolution — from indirect projection of force to direct long-range capability — underscoring the growing reach of Iran’s arsenal.

Even if unsuccessful, the Diego Garcia strike signals a move from regional containment to global reach — with direct implications for Europe and beyond.

In his State of the Union address last month, President Donald Trump cautioned that Iran’s missile program could soon put the United States within reach — a claim that, in light of recent developments, is no longer theoretical.

Missile cities: A durable arsenal

That expanded reach is underpinned by an infrastructure designed not just to deter — but to endure.

Nadimi said Iran has long possessed the technical ability to extend the range of its missiles, including through payload modification and dual-use space-launch technology.

More significantly, he described a vast network of hardened underground facilities — some “the size of a small city” — buried deep beneath mountainous terrain and reinforced structures, making them extraordinarily difficult to destroy.

These so-called “missile cities” are often positioned near — and in some cases beneath — civilian infrastructure, including residential neighborhoods and public spaces, complicating targeting while increasing their survivability.

“Many of these missile bases are so deep that even the most powerful bunker-buster bombs cannot reach them… some are as deep as 500 meters and the size of a small city," Nadimi told Eye for Iran.

Strait of Hormuz: Global Stakes

The implications extend far beyond military capability.

The Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes — has emerged as a central pressure point in the conflict.

Disruptions tied to the war have already rattled global energy markets, with prices reacting to uncertainty around shipping routes and potential escalation.

Joel Rubin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Obama administration, warned on Eye for Iran that Iran’s actions reflect a broader strategic calculus.

“This is how Iran behaves,” he said. “They are willing to disrupt and destroy the global economy to protect themselves.”

Dr. Walid Phares, foreign policy expert, advisor to past US presidents and author, described the Strait not as a theoretical chokepoint, but as an active military theater — where Iranian missile systems along the coastline could trigger direct US intervention to secure global shipping lanes.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly said the United States would reopen the Strait “with or without” allied support — underscoring the scale of the economic stakes.

“Which tells me that ground forces, limited special forces, Marines, now we understand, may be used," said Phares, author of Iran: An Imperialist Republic and US Policy.

Talks as strategy, not solution

Even as diplomatic efforts continue, both sides appear to be using negotiations as part of a broader strategic game.

Rubin pointed to a narrowing political and economic window in Washington, suggesting the US is unlikely to sustain prolonged negotiations as domestic pressure builds.

Phares also framed talks not as a pathway to de-escalation, but as part of a parallel track where diplomacy unfolds alongside active military preparation.

In this environment, negotiations are not replacing escalation — they are occurring within it.

Toward escalation: troops and targets

On the ground, signs of a deeper military phase are becoming more pronounced.

The Pentagon is weighing sending up to 10,000 additional ground troops to the Middle East, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal and Axios — a move that would significantly expand US combat presence in the region.

The deployment would include infantry and armored units, adding to thousands of Marines and paratroopers already moving into position.

Officials say forces could be staged within striking distance of Iran, including near Kharg Island, a critical oil export hub that handles the vast majority of the country’s crude exports.

Military planners are also reportedly developing options for a “final blow,” including a large-scale bombing campaign and the potential use of ground forces.

No final decision has been made — but the scale and positioning of forces point toward preparation, not restraint.

A region already shifting

At the same time, regional dynamics are beginning to shift.

The United Arab Emirates has publicly warned — in a Wall Street Journal op-ed by its ambassador to Washington — that a simple ceasefire is not enough, signaling growing alignment among US partners around the need for a more decisive outcome.

In Lebanon — long considered firmly within Iran’s sphere of influence — mounting pressure on Hezbollah, moves to marginalize IRGC influence, and the withdrawal of Iran’s ambassador from Beirut point to potential cracks in Tehran’s regional posture.

For many observers, the attempted strike toward Diego Garcia marks a turning point because of what it revealed: the range and the probable intent, all are now visible.

Each time tensions escalate between the United States, Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, however, a familiar pattern emerges in Western commentary. Before events have meaningfully unfolded, a chorus of analysts moves quickly to declare failure. T

he comparisons are predictable: Iraq, Afghanistan, quagmires. The conclusion is often presented as inevitable.

This reflex deserves scrutiny. Skepticism is necessary in matters of war. But when skepticism hardens into certainty, it ceases to be analysis. To assert at the outset that success is impossible is not caution; it is intellectual closure. Every conflict contains a range of possible outcomes, and serious analysis requires acknowledging that reality.

Part of the current pessimism is political. Assessments of strategy are often filtered through attitudes toward leadership, particularly in the case of President Donald Trump.

For many critics, this leads to the presumption that any policy associated with him must fail. But political actors are rarely defined by a single dimension. The same American founders who articulated the principle that “all men are created equal” also upheld slavery.

Whatever one’s broader evaluation of Trump, the objective of preventing the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear power addresses a widely recognized security concern. Judging that objective should not depend on personal or partisan preferences, but on its strategic implications.

Many Middle Eastern states are concerned about Tehran’s regional power projection. Cross-border attacks, missile strikes and the use of proxy forces such as Hezbollah reinforce fears that Iran’s leaders are willing to escalate conflict to preserve their position.

Yet the most common analytical error may lie elsewhere: in assumptions about Iranian society. Political theorists from Antonio Gramsci onward have emphasized that durable power requires more than coercion. It requires a governing narrative, a form of “common sense” that people internalize and that gives legitimacy to rule.

The Islamic Republic once possessed such a narrative, rooted in revolutionary ideology and religious authority. But that narrative has eroded; large segments of Iranian society no longer identify with the ideological foundations of the state.

This matters because regimes that lose narrative cohesion often become increasingly dependent on force. They can persist for long periods, but in a more brittle and reactive form.

During the 12-day conflict in June, reactions inside Iran appeared complex rather than uniformly relieved. While many welcomed the ceasefire, reporting from within the country pointed to a mix of fear, uncertainty and guarded expectation. As Israel’s battlefield advantage became apparent, some Iranians expressed concern that the regime might turn inward to reassert control.

The deadly crackdown that followed in January 2026 underscored the argument that the state’s first instinct when challenged is repression.

A different concern has also surfaced in some discussions among Iranians: that conflict might end prematurely, leaving the regime intact and emboldened. For a population that has repeatedly risked its life in protest, partial measures carry their own consequences.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, external intervention collided with deeply fragmented societies marked by sectarian divisions, tribal rivalries and competing power centers. Iran has its own social and political cleavages, but not necessarily the same degree of entrenched sectarian fragmentation.

Opposition to the Islamic Republic frequently cuts across class, gender and regional lines, creating a form of shared political discontent that differs from those earlier conflicts.

Those ruling Iran appear aware of this vulnerability. Several senior officials have used state media in recent weeks to warn citizens against protest. A government at war focusing on controlling its own population may reveal a measure of insecurity rather than strength.

A similar pattern is visible in its information strategy. Governments confident in their position rarely need to shut down internet access for tens of millions of people. Nor do they typically rely on implausible claims of battlefield success, including reports circulated on state media suggesting the downing of advanced fighter jets, the destruction of major Israeli cities or even the death of senior Israeli leaders such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Meanwhile, the external balance has also shifted in ways that are often underappreciated. Israel and the United States have killed several key figures since they began their attacks on Feb. 28. Tehran’s reaction—striking many neighboring states have—has expanded concern beyond its traditional adversaries.

Governments that previously sought to manage relations with Iran now face a more direct security calculus, some even reportedly pondering a more direct involvement in the war.

None of this guarantees a particular outcome. The Islamic Republic retains significant resources, including coercive capacity, financial networks and ideological constituencies. It also benefits from the willingness of committed supporters to endure high costs, reinforced by narratives that valorize sacrifice and martyrdom.

But acknowledging these realities does not require ignoring countervailing pressures. A regime that faces internal discontent, increasing reliance on repression and expanding external pressure may prove less stable than it appears.

To interpret its most extreme actions solely as signs of strength risks misunderstanding the nature of power. Erratic behavior can reflect desperation as much as confidence.

A more balanced assessment would therefore consider not only the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the conditions that distinguish Iran: the erosion of ideological legitimacy, the agency of its society and a shifting regional environment.

Iran is not Iraq. It is not Afghanistan. Its trajectory is not predetermined.

The more relevant question is not whether failure is inevitable, but whether current analysis adequately captures the possibility that this moment—shaped by internal and external pressures alike—may unfold differently.

For more than a decade, Tehran has invested heavily in the Jask oil terminal, a project designed to shift part of its crude exports to the Gulf of Oman and create an alternative export route outside the Persian Gulf in times of crisis. Yet the data suggests the terminal has so far played only a marginal role in Iran’s export system.

According to Kpler data, Iran loaded an average of about 1.84 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude during the first 25 days of March. The contribution of the Jask terminal remained minimal.

Average loadings from Jask stood at roughly 81,000 bpd during this period—less than 5% of Iran’s total crude exports.

Historical patterns suggest this limitation may be structural. Iran first initiated exports from Jask in October 2024 amid heightened military tensions with Israel. Even then, volumes remained modest at around 77,000 bpd. In March 2025, exports from the terminal averaged roughly 54,000 bpd.

This is despite the fact that Jask is connected to Iran’s main oil-producing regions through a pipeline stretching nearly 1,000 kilometers, an infrastructure investment intended to enable significant export capacity outside the Persian Gulf.

In practice, Iran’s dependence on Kharg Island remains overwhelming.

Kpler data indicates that more than 84% of Iran’s oil exports in March were loaded from Kharg, while Jask accounted for just 4.4%. Another roughly 10% originated from the Soroush and South Pars terminals in the Persian Gulf.

Such concentration creates a clear strategic vulnerability: any disruption at Kharg could severely cripple Iran’s oil exports.

The question has gained renewed relevance as the war between Iran and the United States and Israel has intensified. The Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly a fifth of global oil trade passes—has become a central point of tension, with Tehran periodically restricting maritime traffic.

At the same time, reports have emerged of expanding US military operations in the region, including contingency planning involving strategic islands near the Strait of Hormuz that could be used to control access to the waterway.

In such a scenario, Iran’s continued reliance on export infrastructure concentrated around Kharg would leave its oil trade exposed to disruption.

Overall, the export data underscores a fundamental reality: despite years of investment, Iran has not succeeded in meaningfully reducing its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz—or, more critically, on the Kharg export hub.

In a volatile regional environment, that dependence represents a significant structural weakness.

The comments come as U.S. President Donald Trump said Thursday he would pause planned strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure for 10 days until April 6, saying the move followed a request from Tehran and that negotiations were continuing.

Iranian officials have confirmed receiving proposals for talks but say they are reviewing them while insisting Iran will not accept ultimatums.

The war, now entering its fourth week, has already drawn in multiple regional actors and heightened tensions around strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, raising concerns that a wider confrontation could disrupt global energy flows and destabilize the region further.

Saba Zanganeh, a former diplomat close to the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader, told the moderate outlet Fararu on March 25 that the conflict should prompt regional governments to reconsider their security policies and alliances.

He said regional governments have often acted as secondary players under foreign influence, worsening conflicts rather than resolving them. The current war, he added, offers a stark lesson that continuing the existing model will deepen regional crises.

He argued that decades of instability stem from what he described as “a flawed strategic paradigm shared by regional states and external powers,” which he said has repeatedly produced destruction and fragmentation in countries including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen.

Hossein Mousavian, Iran’s former ambassador to Germany, offered a more confrontational assessment.

Speaking to Etemad Online, he said Iranian officials increasingly view Persian Gulf Arab states as partners in the conflict, sharing what he described as a common objective of the “complete destruction of Iran.”

Mousavian said Tehran is preparing for the possibility of a broader confrontation involving the United States and its regional allies.

Another former diplomat, Kourosh Ahmadi, suggested the conflict may last far longer than initially expected.

Speaking to Fararu, he noted that both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu first suggested the war might last only four to seven days before revising their estimates to several weeks. Even those expectations may prove unrealistic, he said.

Ahmadi pointed to Iran’s ability to restrict or control shipping in the Strait of Hormuz as a decisive factor in prolonging the conflict. As long as Tehran maintains that leverage over one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, he argued, the war is unlikely to end quickly.

“Israel seeks the collapse and incapacitation of Iran, not merely political concessions,” he said, arguing that Washington’s goals were more limited and often diverged from that of Israel.

Despite their different emphases, the three former diplomats share a similar underlying assessment: the current conflict risks evolving into a prolonged regional crisis whose consequences could reshape the Middle East for years.