US is decimating Iran, they have no navy left, Trump says

Iran fired over 2,200 missiles and drones at the United Arab Emirates, more than at Israel and other Persian Gulf states combined, because it sees the country’s openness and prosperity as a threat, Lana Nusseibeh said on Wednesday.

“Over 60% of the attacks have been directed at the UAE. And that’s a fundamental question: why?” Nusseibeh told Fox News.

“We did not ask for a war in our region. We did not start a war,” she said, adding that Iran chose to fire missiles instead of negotiating with Washington over its nuclear and missile programs.

“They have resources across three continents, but for their own people, there is inflation, their currency is in free fall, and they have spates of killing protesters. This is a ruthless regime, and it is right to hold it to account," Nusseibeh added.

Russia is close to completing phased shipments of drones, medicine and food to Iran, according to Western intelligence reports, in what could mark Moscow’s first provision of lethal support to Tehran since the start of the war, the Financial Times reported on Wednesday.

Senior Russian and Iranian officials began secretly discussing the delivery of drones days after Israel and the United States launched attacks on Iran, two officials briefed on the intelligence told the FT.

The shipments began in early March and are expected to be completed by the end of the month, the report said.

Russia, a close ally of Iran, has already provided support including satellite imagery, targeting data and intelligence assistance, according to people familiar with the matter.

The United States struck more than 10,000 military targets in Iran since launching its campaign last month, CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper said in a video post on X on Wednesday.

Providing an update on Operation Epic Fury, Admiral Cooper said the campaign has entered its fourth week with US forces maintaining air superiority and intensifying strikes across the country.

According to Cooper, 92% of Iran’s largest naval vessels have been destroyed, leaving the country unable to meaningfully challenge maritime security in the region.

He added that Iran’s missile and drone launch rates have fallen by more than 90%, significantly limiting its ability to target US forces and regional allies.

More than two-thirds of Iran’s missile, drone and naval production facilities and shipyards have also been damaged or destroyed, he said, curbing Tehran’s capacity to rebuild its military capabilities.

US forces have carried out over 10,000 combat flights during the campaign, including strikes by B-52 bombers deploying up to 70,000 pounds of munitions per mission.

Cooper said Iran’s combat capability continues to decline as US military strength increases, adding that operations are aimed at eliminating the country’s broader military manufacturing infrastructure.

The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, said the appointment was imposed on Pezeshkian and other members of the council amid intensifying internal struggles within the Islamic Republic’s new leadership and as part of the IRGC’s effort to consolidate full control over power.

According to the sources, following the killing of Ali Larijani—and with no visible sign of Mojtaba Khamenei participating in decision-making—the IRGC selected Zolghadr as the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Despite opposition from some remaining senior officials and Pezeshkian’s own dissatisfaction, the Guards compelled the president to issue the appointment decree.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, deputy for communications and information at Pezeshkian’s office, confirmed the appointment on Tuesday in a post on X, writing: “With the opinion and approval of the esteemed leader of the Islamic Revolution, and by decree of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr has been appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.”

Sources told Iran International that the move reflects the diminishing role of Pezeshkian’s government and other power centers within the Islamic Republic’s highest security decision-making body.

It also highlights the IRGC’s expanding dominance over the country’s power structure, particularly over the Supreme National Security Council.

Mohammad Bagher Ghaziani, better known as Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, currently also serves as secretary of the Expediency Council. In 2021 he replaced Mohsen Rezaei in that position by decree of Sadegh Amoli Larijani.

Following the killing of Mohammad Pakpour, Ahmad Vahidi was introduced as commander-in-chief of the IRGC, although no formal appointment decree signed by Mojtaba Khamenei—the Islamic Republic’s new leader and commander-in-chief—has been made public.

Vahidi Shahcheraghi, known as Ahmad Vahidi, had previously been appointed deputy commander of the IRGC by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on December 27, 2025, replacing Ali Fadavi. After Hossein Salami was killed during the 12-day war, Ali Khamenei had named Mohammad Pakpour as IRGC commander-in-chief.

Despite the absence of any publicly released decree signed by Mojtaba Khamenei, Vahidi has now been introduced as commander-in-chief of the IRGC.

At the same time, Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander, has reportedly been appointed as Mojtaba Khamenei’s military adviser under a decree attributed to the new leader.

Since Mojtaba Khamenei was introduced as the Islamic Republic’s third supreme leader, he has not appeared in public, and only a few written messages attributed to him have been released.

US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration—including Vice President J.D. Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth—have said Mojtaba Khamenei is alive but seriously wounded. They have also emphasized that there is no sign of him actively exercising authority in the Islamic Republic.

Senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have likewise reported that Mojtaba Khamenei was injured and warned that there is no guarantee he will survive.

Over the past year, a pattern has emerged across markets, policy decisions and price behavior pointing to the early stages of de facto dollarization.

In April 2025, when a “five-dollar pizza” shop opened in Tehran’s affluent Niavaran neighborhood, many dismissed the fixed dollar price as a marketing gimmick. At the time, one pizza cost roughly 5 million rials, with inflation reportedly above 40%.

Less than a year later, on the eve of the current war, the same pizza was priced at 8.6 million rials, while officials acknowledged inflation exceeding 70%. What initially appeared symbolic began to look practical.

The shift was not confined to niche businesses and high-end stores. Informal dollar transactions, once largely limited to luxury goods or services aimed at foreign customers, steadily expanded.

In the months leading up to the 12-day war, despite the departure of many foreign nationals, dollar-pegged property sales and rentals increased noticeably. While upscale properties led the trend, mid-range apartments also entered the market with dollar-based pricing.

By the end of 2025, the US dollar had climbed to 1,430,000 rials, up from 800,000 in January of the same year. The volatility hit the automotive market hard. With car production concentrated among three major state-linked manufacturers and supply unable to meet demand, the price of second-hand cars in rial terms outpaced the increase in the dollar exchange rate.

Media headlines read, “The dollar is in the driver’s seat,” and traders increasingly priced vehicles in dollars. In December, automobile market expert Abdollah Babaei warned that if current trends continued, car transactions would effectively become dollarized.

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  Stealth austerity: Tehran seeks fuel price hike without a reckoning

Economists began warning of a structural shift. Former Tehran Stock Exchange chief Hossein Abdeh Tabrizi cautioned that Iran "will enter the stage of dollarization" if 60% inflation and government overspending continued.

he statement went viral, and many echoed the growing concern that “Iran’s economy is on a dangerous path,” with the rial losing its function both as a store of value and as a unit of account.

Government policy after the 12-day war reinforced these anxieties.

The administration’s 2026–2027 budget introduced three pivotal shifts. First, gasoline subsidies moved from a liter-based rationing system to cash transfers. Second, an inflation coefficient was added to the pricing formula of Iran’s key commodity anchor. Third, the preferential exchange rate was abruptly removed in December, converting the government’s largest dollar commitment into rial-based direct subsidies.

Perhaps most striking was the historic decline in oil revenue’s share of the budget—from about 32% in 2025–2026 to just 5% in 2026–2027, the lowest level since the 1960s.

To compensate, taxes were increased by more than 60%. Across these measures, the common denominator was clear: the state systematically reduced its foreign-currency and commodity obligations, converting them into rial-based commitments. The administration that campaigned on taming inflation now appeared increasingly reliant on inflationary financing to navigate wartime pressures.

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  Capital flees Tehran stocks as geopolitical tensions deepen

In February, before the outbreak of the second war, average inflation for basic necessities reached triple digits, estimated between 105% and 115%. Reacting to these concerns, the administration pushed to remove four zeros from the rial, presenting it as a technical reform to simplify calculations.

In reality, redenomination in a high-inflation environment is an expensive cosmetic surgery on a patient on his deathbed—an adjustment that quickly loses meaning as prices continue to rise.

During the second war, market closures, the suspension of price discovery in the exchange market, and reduced demand slowed money circulation and provided short-term inflationary relief. At the same time, large banks halted operations, increasing demand for physical cash.

The Central Bank responded by issuing a 10-million-rial banknote—raising the highest denomination one hundredfold from 100,000 rials—a step it had resisted for years.

But such pauses rarely eliminate underlying pressures. When markets fully reopen and normal trading resumes, deferred demand for foreign currency is likely to return. A similar pattern followed the 12 day war, when pent-up demand translated into a rapid adjustment in prices once restrictions eased.

Even under conservative assumptions, inflation could move decisively into triple-digit territory if monetary expansion continues. At that point, the shift toward dollar pricing would no longer be limited to select sectors. It would spread more systematically across contracts, wages and savings behavior.

Dollarization rarely begins with legislation; it begins with economic self-preservation. It starts with a pizza menu, moves to apartment contracts and car listings, and eventually reshapes fiscal expectations.

If post-war reopening triggers another inflationary wave, the timeline may not be measured in years but in quarters. Under such conditions, the transition toward de facto dollarization would become increasingly difficult to reverse.