CENTCOM highlights Operation Epic Fury

The European Union condemned Iran’s execution of a Swedish citizen, calling it a “brutal act of senseless violence.”

In a statement on Wednesday, the EU’s High Representative said the bloc “strongly condemns” the execution and expressed full solidarity with Sweden, offering condolences to the victim’s family.

The EU said the Swedish national had been held in Iran since June 2025 and renewed its call on Tehran to halt all executions and abolish the death penalty.

It added that Iran’s human rights situation is “appalling,” pointing to what it described as an alarming rise in executions.

Qatar declared the Iranian embassy’s military and security attaché persona non grata hours after Iranian forces struck near the Ras Laffan industrial area, home to the world’s largest liquefied natural gas facility.

Qatari authorities reported a fire at the site, with emergency teams working to contain it.

Doha said the decision was driven by what it described as Iran’s repeated attacks on the country, the latest targeting Ras Laffan industrial city.

The escalation followed Israeli strikes on facilities linked to Iran’s South Pars gas field and the onshore hub at Asaluyeh in Bushehr Province—a critical node in Iran’s energy system.

The strikes marked a departure from previous targeting patterns, hitting the economic core of Iran’s power rather than its military or nuclear assets.

Iranian officials warned that attacks on the country’s fuel and gas infrastructure would be met with retaliation across the region. Tehran said energy facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates could be targeted.

Saudi officials said air defenses intercepted incoming threats aimed at energy infrastructure, according to regional media reports, though details were limited.

Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, said he “strongly condemns” the attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure, warning that such actions would “complicate the situation” and could lead to “uncontrollable consequences that will affect the entire world.”

The widening confrontation has raised concerns that energy infrastructure across the Persian Gulf—and beyond—could become a primary battleground, with risks extending to global oil and gas markets.

Markets have already reacted. Wall Street ended sharply lower on Wednesday after the Federal Reserve held interest rates steady and signaled only a single rate cut this year, as officials assessed economic risks tied to surging oil prices and the expanding conflict.

Israeli officials have not publicly detailed the operation, but multiple reports suggested the strikes were carried out with US awareness, if not direct coordination.

For now, the immediate damage appears contained. But the sequence of events culminating in the diplomatic fallout between Tehran and Doha underscores how quickly the conflict is spilling beyond its original bounds.

Israel has identified US preparations for a possible military operation to take control of the Strait of Hormuz, which could extend the war with Iran, according to a report by Kan News on Wednesday.

The report said American forces are building up in the region, including the deployment of the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, as Washington prepares to counter Iran’s blockade of the strategic waterway.

An Israeli source told Kan the operation could last about two weeks, but fighting may continue for several more weeks if Iran maintains restrictions on shipping through the strait.

Israel is expected to initially support the US-led operation by providing intelligence, likely alongside Persian Gulf states, the report added.

Europe’s aviation safety regulator said on Wednesday it had extended its advisory for airlines to avoid the airspace of Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and several other Middle Eastern countries due to heightened military activity, according to an updated bulletin.

The advisory covers Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The advisory is valid until March 27.

With a career spanning both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the political establishment, including a decade as parliament speaker, Larijani functioned as a bridge between Iran’s military and civilian centers of power.

That position—part coordinator, part mediator—made him one of the system’s most important internal stabilizers. His removal further narrows the circle of actors capable of managing competing interests within the system.

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei praised him in a brief statement Wednesday, vowing to avenge his blood.

Senior officials sought to project continuity. President Masoud Pezeshkian said Larijani’s “path of resistance combined with rationality” would continue, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi insisted that the absence of any individual cannot destabilize the Islamic Republic’s “powerful political structure.”

Even with continuity, however, the system Larijani helped manage now faces a more immediate test: succession.

Formally, the secretary of the SNSC is appointed by the president, but the role only acquires real authority when the Supreme Leader designates the holder as his representative, granting voting power within the council.

Early indications suggest that Mojtaba Khamenei is overseeing key appointments. Whether he does so here will shape both the balance of power and the direction of decision-making.

Two names dominate early speculation.

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the current speaker of parliament, is already a member of the council and holds voting rights, making his elevation procedurally straightforward.

A former IRGC Air Force commander and national police chief, he brings operational experience and political stature. But his appointment carries risks. His high profile and role in recent military operations could place him near the top of potential Israeli target lists, raising questions about durability and continuity.

Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, a senior IRGC naval commander, represents a more technocratic option. He previously served as both secretary of the council and the Supreme Leader’s representative before being reassigned in 2025.

His return would provide institutional familiarity, but he would require reappointment by the new leadership to regain full authority. Compared to Ghalibaf, he offers less political reach but fewer immediate security liabilities.

Other figures—including former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei and former SNSC secretary Saeed Jalili—have been mentioned but appear less likely contenders, either because they would require additional endorsement or because of political frictions within the current leadership.

Larijani’s influence rested less on formal authority than on his ability to navigate between institutions that do not always align: the IRGC, the presidency, parliament, and the clerical establishment. Replacing that function may prove harder than filling the office.

His absence therefore raises a broader question about the system’s internal cohesion. Without a figure capable of managing competing centers of power, the risk of renewed factionalism increases—particularly at a time when external pressure is intensifying.

Iran’s leadership insists the system remains stable. The coming appointment will test that claim.