For years, Mojtaba has operated largely behind the scenes within Iran’s political and security elite. The only public recording of his voice is a one-minute video in which he tells seminary students that his classes have been cancelled.
He appears to lack any significant public profile or popular following among the wider population—an element the Islamic Republic now seems increasingly unconcerned about.
Mojtaba played a significant role in the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and has long been seen as influential in the expansion of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence and economic reach, as well as in policies used to suppress dissent.
His rise reflects the priorities of a system that now appears to value internal cohesion and security ties more than public stature.
The issue of choosing the supreme leader has always posed both a philosophical and practical challenge in the Islamic Republic. If the leader is the representative of God on earth and a successor to the Prophet Mohammad, the question is how that authority is conferred: through popular recognition or divine designation.
These two impulses have shaped debates over the nature of the Islamic Republic for decades. One emphasizes the system’s republican and electoral elements; the other gives primacy to its theocratic foundations.
Popularity factor
The question barely arose when Ruhollah Khomeini came to power. He embodied both elements: he enjoyed broad popular support and was among the most prominent religious figures of his time.
Khomeini’s ascendancy preceded the formal codification of the office of supreme leader. The robe, as a Persian expression would have it, was cut to his measure
This was reflected in the first constitution adopted after the 1979 revolution, which described the leader as one “recognized and accepted by the overwhelming majority of the people,” as was the case with Khomeini.
That provision was revised in 1989, when Ali Khamenei was selected as the second supreme leader. The reference to popular acceptance was removed, assigning the decision solely to the Assembly of Experts.
Yet popularity still mattered. Ali Khamenei did not hold a high religious rank at the time and was not yet an ayatollah. But after eight years as president he was a familiar national figure, and public recognition and political experience were judged more important than clerical standing.
Staying the course
The selection of Mojtaba suggests those considerations now carry far less weight. He has been elevated not because of religious stature, executive experience or public standing, but largely because of his ties to the security establishment.
If the Islamic Republic had followed its previous trajectory, it might have been expected to choose one of the former cleric presidents—most plausibly Hassan Rouhani, who in recent months appeared to be positioning himself for such a role.
By choosing Mojtaba, the Islamic Republic has effectively crossed a threshold. The system that once defined itself in opposition to hereditary rule now appears willing to tolerate it, prioritizing continuity and control over ideological consistency.
While officials have presented Mojtaba’s appointment as an emergency wartime decision, his decades of behind-the-scenes activity suggest a far longer process of consolidation.
His succession also narrows the already limited space for fundamental change.
As Iran confronts war with the United States and Israel abroad while continuing to face deep mistrust at home, the balance of power now points firmly toward continuity—and toward a system with little interest in resolving tensions either with its own society or with its adversaries.
