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"We have not negotiated with the United States on any issue other than the nuclear matter," Iran's top security official Ali Larijani told Oman's state TV on Tuesday.
"The American side has also come to the conclusion that the talks must focus on the nuclear issue," he said.
"In my view, this issue is resolvable. If the Americans’ concern is that Iran should not move toward acquiring a nuclear weapon, that can be addressed. But if issues beyond this are introduced into the negotiations, the process could face difficulties."
"At present, the American side is thinking more realistically. In the past, they linked military and missile issues to the nuclear file, but now they are speaking only about the nuclear issue, which is a rational approach. Military matters are unrelated to the nuclear dossier," Larijani said.
Iran’s January protests were the predictable result of years of ignored economic and social warning signs, according to one of the country’s most prominent economists, who says the state failed to recognize how close society had come to the brink.
In an op-ed published this week in one of Iran’s leading economic newspapers, Donya-ye Eghtesad, the economist Massoud Nili described the country’s current predicament as a failure of governance that left mounting problems and public grievances unaddressed.
“The current situation marks one of the saddest and most critical junctures in Iran’s history,” Nili wrote, “a moment in which thousands of Iranians — mainly young people — lost their lives in less than 48 hours.”
He argued that “a combination of poverty, unemployment, inequality, inflation, psychological insecurity under the looming shadow of war, and cultural conflict placed young Iranians at the center of the crisis.”
The unrest began in Tehran’s historic Grand Bazaar in late 2025, initially driven by slogans reflecting economic hardship. Over the following week, they broadened into nationwide demonstrations calling for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
Protests peaked on January 8 and 9, following a call for coordinated actions by exiled prince Reza Pahlavi.
As many as 36,500 people were killed during the crackdown on those two days, according to an internal assessment leaked to and reviewed by Iran International.
Among the clearest warning signs, Nili noted, was the existence of nearly 12 million young Iranians who are neither employed nor enrolled in education.
Iran’s labor market, he wrote, has been effectively stagnant since 2009. While the working-age population increased by 4.4 million, the economy created only about 200,000 jobs, even as roughly 700,000 people lost employment.
Official figures suggest that net job creation has approached zero in recent years.
Other economists have echoed Nili’s assessment in the weeks since the protests and their violent suppression.
Speaking at Tejarat Farda’s economic forum in late January, Mohammad Mehdi Behkish described the protests as the product of “forty years of flawed governance and policymaking,” arguing that rigid political and economic structures had pushed society toward a breaking point.
Another prominent economist, Mousa Ghaninejad, pointed to the scale of the deterioration. In 2011, he said, fewer than 20 percent of Iranians lived below the poverty line. Today, that figure has risen to roughly 40 percent.
Declining oil revenues have further constrained the state’s ability to provide social support, while access to adequate nutrition and medical care has sharply declined.
Official data show inflation has exceeded 40 percent for at least two years, eroding purchasing power even among government employees and military personnel.
High inflation has enriched groups with preferential access to state-linked resources, widening inequality and deepening social resentment.
Nili concluded that a convergence of poverty, unemployment, inequality, psychological insecurity under the shadow of war, and cultural conflict had placed young Iranians at the center of the crisis.
Writing from inside Iran, Nili confined his analysis to economic and social indicators and avoided the political roots of the crisis—the deepening rupture between the state and a society that has come to resent the worldview and governing vision of its rulers.
He did mention “realities”, however, that if ignored, would steer the country toward “an extremely dangerous future.”
American forces in Qatar's al-Udeid air base, the biggest US base in the region, put Patriot air defense missiles into truck launchers amid heightened tensions with Tehran, Reuters reported on Tuesday citing satellite imagery.
"Patriot missiles were placed in M983 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT) rather than semi-static launcher stations-- which could allow them to be less easily targeted by Iran or deployed more quickly if needed," the report said.
"The decision to do so gives the Patriots much greater mobility, meaning they can be moved to an alternative site or repositioned with greater speed," William Goodhind, a forensic imagery analyst with Contested Ground, told Reuters.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu plans to discuss possible military options against Tehran during his meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington this week, CNN reported citing two Israeli sources.
Netanyahu intends to present Trump with new intelligence on the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities, the report said citing one of the sources.
“Israel is worried about Iran’s progress in restoring its ballistic missile stockpiles and capabilities to its status before the 12-day war,” the source was quoted as saying.
The Israeli assessment is that without action, Iran could possess 1,800-2,000 ballistic missiles within weeks or months, the report said.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hastily advanced trip to Washington this week underscores the rising stakes surrounding renewed diplomacy between Iran and the United States.
Originally scheduled for February 18, the visit was brought forward by a week following fresh indirect talks in Oman that both sides have indicated could resume in the coming days.
Netanyahu is expected to press President Donald Trump to impose firm constraints on Iran’s ballistic-missile program and its support for armed groups in the region. But the urgency of the meeting appears to reflect more than immediate tactical concerns, pointing to a blunter effort by Israel to shape US policy rather than simply align with it.
Trump has repeatedly signaled his preference for a "deal with Iran." But Netanyahu remains wary that negotiations might focus narrowly on the nuclear file and leave unaddressed what he sees as Tehran broader threat ecosystem.
That gap was evident during the previous round of US–Iran talks in the spring of 2025.
While Trump conveyed optimism about diplomatic openings and outlined prospective nuclear proposals, reporting suggested Netanyahu remained unconvinced, ultimately awaiting the expiration of Washington’s 60-day deadline before launching strikes that became the 12-Day War.
Even after US bombers joined strikes on Iran’s Natanz and Fordow nuclear sites, Washington reportedly urged Israel to scale back operations as Israeli forces moved closer to senior figures following the killing of top Revolutionary Guards commanders.
Israeli and Western officials say Iran has since moved to restore damaged ballistic-missile infrastructure, in some cases prioritising missile sites over nuclear facilities. Iranian officials have also publicly pointed to renewed—even enhanced—missile capabilities, reinforcing Israeli concerns about Tehran’s readiness to deploy them in a future confrontation.
It is against that backdrop that Israel has watched recent diplomatic signals from Tehran and Washington with growing unease.
Iran has reintroduced senior figures into the diplomatic arena, including Ali Larijani, a longtime adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has held consultations alongside the Muscat talks. His reappearance has been read in Israel as a sign that Tehran is seeking to project flexibility while resisting constraints on missiles and regional networks.
Those moves have coincided with messaging from within Trump’s political orbit emphasizing diplomatic opportunity.
Remarks by J.D. Vance, cautioning against escalation and underscoring the potential for a negotiated outcome, have been noted closely in Jerusalem, where officials have long worried that talks could narrow toward the nuclear file alone.
Taken together, these developments appear to have heightened Israeli concern that its core security priorities could be sidelined as diplomatic momentum builds—helping explain Netanyahu’s decision to advance his Washington visit rather than wait.
Netanyahu’s publicly stated red lines, particularly Iran’s arsenal of more than 1,800 ballistic missiles, align not only with Israeli threat assessments but with those of key Arab states.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have borne the costs of Iran’s regional tactics firsthand. Iran-supplied Houthi drones and missiles struck Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq processing facility in 2019 and later targeted infrastructure near Jeddah in 2022.
Israel’s September 2025 strike on Hamas leaders in Doha strained but did not sever quiet channels with Qatar.
Despite public friction, Persian Gulf states involved in the Abraham Accords and Qatar continued to participate in US-led security discussions in which Israeli intelligence on Iran was reportedly shared, underscoring the resilience of regional threat coordination.
At the same time, Iran’s Arab neighbors have actively sought to contain escalation and, in some cases, helped create the conditions for diplomacy.
While they share Israel’s assessment of the missile and proxy threat, they have often favored de-escalation and engagement as a means of managing it—highlighting a divergence not over the nature of the threat, but over how best to reduce it.
Netanyahu’s visit to Washington reflects an effort to push back against that regional pull toward accommodation, pressing for a harder line on Tehran that addresses Israel’s security concerns. He appears to view Iran’s nuclear latency, missile expansion and regional outreach as a single, interlocking challenge.
Israel’s objective, therefore, is not episodic deterrence but the steady erosion of the capabilities that allow Tehran to sustain an existential threat posture—a logic shaping Netanyahu’s diplomacy in Washington as much as Israel’s readiness to act alone.
